Russian infrastructure attacks aim to create humanitarian crisis

n Kyiv, the buzzing of power generators is everywhere, and these provide electricity to cafés and shops. Photo: Doroznik/ Shutterstock

A thaw

Nadiya was not the only one. The largest number of Ukrainian refugees arrived at the EU’s borders in the first weeks after the start of the Russian full-scale invasion last February. However, once it became clear that Kyiv had been defended and the situation at the frontline was somewhat stabilised, many Ukrainians started to return home. This could be seen at the Polish-Ukrainian border, where for many months the traffic going into Ukraine was greater than that coming out.

In the energy sector we also noted some moderate optimism in summer 2022 after the worrisome developments in March and April, when discussion about Ukrainian energy was largely focused on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and the risk of a nuclear explosion. On March 4th 2022 the Russians attacked the premises of the plant, in violation of the Geneva Convention, which they later occupied and used as a military base, keeping the workers inside hostage. The greatest risk at that moment was not the destruction of the reactor, which is protected by a thick concrete protection layer, but a possible error made by the terrorised and tired crew members.

Russia’s goal was to disconnect the power station from the network and deprive Ukraine of the electricity it needs to maintain its economy. Before the war the Zaporizhzhia plant was providing over one-fifth of the electricity consumed in Ukraine. The Russian invasion, however, led also to a rapid collapse in electricity demand in Ukraine, which since the start of the invasion has declined by 30 per cent. As a result, even without the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and the other plants which are in the occupied territories, Ukraine still had a large electricity surplus, which could even be exported abroad. And this was a source of optimism.

At the same time, the Russian invasion has accelerated many processes in the energy sector which either were pushed aside or faced procedural obstacles for too long. Already in March – three weeks after the invasion – the Ukrainian electricity system was synchronised with the European synchronous area. This symbolically marked the end of Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. The synchronisation will foster the long-term stability of the Ukrainian energy system, but can also facilitate the export of electricity to the European Union. Already in the summer of 2022 electricity exports reached the levels seen before the start of the war, which allowed Ukraine to make 55 million euros in just two months. Electricity, in fact, has become one of Ukraine’s key export products.

Another project that progressed after March was the rebuilding of the electricity line between Khmelnytskyi and Rzeszów (in Poland), with the aim to double Ukraine’s electricity exports. For years this project faced difficulties in Poland where politicians did not support it. The full-scale invasion along with the energy crisis facing Europe completely reversed the situation. Citizens in the EU need as much cheap electricity as possible; and Ukrainian energy is much cheaper than what is generated in the EU. Thus, modernisation works were started quickly. Their completion was envisioned for December 2022.

Energy terrorism

Russia did not, however, have stabilisation on the military front and in the energy sector in mind following the summer. Starting on October 10th the Russian military command in Ukraine was taken over by General Sergey Surovikin. With this change in leadership Russia altered its military strategy and began to systematically destroy critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, using missiles and Iranian kamikaze drones. Attacks were organised in waves. From October through to the beginning of 2023 there were as many as ten such attacks. On average, the Russians would launch between a dozen to over a hundred missiles and drones that were sent to destroy different targets in Ukraine. They were never fully successful, as Ukrainian air defence forces managed to destroy up to three-quarters of the incoming projectiles. However, those that did hit their targets managed to cause enough damage to massively interrupt Ukrainian infrastructure, in particular electricity.

The Russian tactic is well thought out. The targets of the attacks are electrical substations and then – after that –power plants. “To destroy a power plant, you need several accurately fired missiles to reach the target. Substations are much easier targets,” explains Antonina Antosha from the Ukrainian energy company DTEK. “Russian power engineers used to obtain their knowledge in Ukraine over the Soviet times and are now consulting with the Russian military on how to cause the most damage to Ukraine’s power system,” she adds.

A power plant is also a key element of industrial infrastructure. We can compare it to intersections and junctions in a road network. High-voltage lines can be compared to highways which are used to send electricity to distant locations. Medium-voltage lines, in turn, are like regional roads. For electricity to reach them, they need to have their voltage lowered. And it is these junctions that the Russians have been targeting. As a result, electricity cannot reach recipients, even if the power plants are working and there is a possibility to import energy from abroad.

The scale of destruction is almost unimaginable. And yet already now attempts are made to assess the losses. DTEK, which is the largest energy company in Ukraine, and which even before the invasion had lost two out of its eight energy plants, estimates that its losses are in the hundreds of millions of US dollars. The Kyiv School of Economics has determined that the overall losses of the whole energy sector are around 9.1 billion dollars.

At the moment there is not a single coal or gas (or even hydro) power plant in Ukraine which is not at least partially damaged. The same fate is shared by almost half of the combined heat and power plants. Only the renewable energy power plants did surprisingly well. While 25 per cent of their potential is now lost under occupation, only six per cent of them were destroyed or damaged. It was the dispersed arrangement of the wind energy plants that prevented them from being targets of attacks. However, many of them are located in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine.

In addition, nuclear power plants were rarely targets for the missile attacks. The occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was shelled, but these attacks were aimed at administrative buildings and those that are located outside the plant complex. The Pivdennoukrainska nuclear power plant was attacked once but also here there was no damage done to the reactor. The spectre of nuclear radiation seems to be a deterrent even to Russia.

Systemic attacks

The electrical substations are in the worst situation. Over half that were under Ukrainian control until February 24th are either damaged or destroyed, while 15 per cent are occupied. After each attack, immediate repairs are undertaken by rescue and maintenance teams, which is not an easy task. In fact, one substation can be bombed even a few times. That is why Russia uses its spies to learn about the reconstruction progress. Once a substation is back online and operating again, it is put back on the list for Russian missiles. This race is very costly, not only for Ukraine. The missiles that are used can cost Russia millions of dollars each.

Russia’s goal is to bring about a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine at all costs. Its systemic attacks on infrastructure cause breakages in supply – the so-called blackouts. An attack on a few key substations at the same time forces the system operator to cut large parts of the country – maybe even the majority of it – off from electricity, in order to save sensitive equipment. Until at least parts of the substation have been fixed, the power supply needs to be based on a schedule of temporary blackouts. Each subsequent attack makes it more and more difficult to maintain the schedule and blackouts are increasingly more difficult to plan.

“We are usually without electricity for half a day, or even two days or more,” says Nadiya. “The first weeks were the worst. We had to sit in dark and cold rooms not knowing what was going on and with no contact with the outside world.”

The lack of electricity does not only mean a lack of light. Sometimes it also means no access to cell phone networks or the internet. What is worse, there is no tap water since water infrastructure also needs electricity to run the pumps. There is no heating, because without electricity heating cannot be transmitted to households and institutions.

“There were nights were the temperature in our flat was as low as 12 degrees Celsius,” Nadiya adds. “We then slept in three layers of clothes, all bundled up.”

These experiences show how adaptive the Ukrainians are. In Kyiv, for example, the buzzing of power generators is everywhere, and these provide electricity to cafés and shops. Childcare facilities are also open, even if it means that teachers and kids need to wear headlights. People started to massively purchase mobile batteries. You can use them even to power such appliances as electric kettles. This is what Nadiya was using when she wanted to wash herself during longer blackouts.

Sisyphean labour

Temporary breaks in electricity supply have become an everyday reality in Ukraine. However, a lengthy blackout poses a threat to the lives of millions of people and needs to be counteracted at all costs. That is the responsibility of Ukrenergo, the operator of the transmission system in Ukraine. Ukrenergo is also in charge of the rebuilding of the destroyed electric power stations. Rescue teams enter these premises only after the fire is put out and military forces clear them. Ensuring security for the rescue team is a must. They are some of the silent heroes of this war. In peacetime it would be hard to imagine that somebody would attempt to fix power grids during rain or in icy conditions. Now there is no choice. The only thing that stops them from doing their job is a rocket alarm.

The problem, however, is not the people, but the lack of equipment. All states gather resources for emergency situations. However, there is no state in the world that would have on hand the mass amount of transformers and other equipment needed to constantly repair a whole electricity system. The equipment is also not commonly stored in warehouses but produced on demand. And the time between issuing a demand and receiving a transformer can take a whole year. In Ukraine this equipment is needed now.

In response the free world has come to Ukraine’s aid. Since March the European Energy Community has been running a programme of coordination for Ukraine. A special Ukraine Energy Support Fund matches financial resources obtained from donors with needs on the ground. The supply of equipment and gas is in turn coordinated by the Ukraine Support Task Force. This formalised structure allows for the maximum effectiveness of the help offered.

Antosha from DTEK states that while Poland is without a doubt the most active, assistance comes also from other states – including France, Germany and the UK. The Japanese company Hitachi, for example, declared that the production of transformers for Ukraine is its priority. Its Polish and Ukrainian branches, in cooperation with DTEK, have already provided Ukraine with 52 transformers. However, finding the right equipment remains a huge challenge. According to Yevheniia Nimak from the Ukrainian energy ministry, the greatest problem is that of the compatibility of equipment. There are often situations when the material assistance that is offered cannot be used in Ukraine and what is most needed is unavailable. Ukrainians try to address this challenge as well. “The war has unleashed our creativity. Our engineers are now working on how to make these other transformers work in the Ukrainian system,” Antosha concludes.

Build back better

Without a doubt the destroyed infrastructure is a huge tragedy and millions of Ukrainians live now without electricity. The number of victims remains on the rise. Effective missile defence systems are a top priority and are necessary for Ukraine to protect itself from further attacks and repair the damaged equipment.

At the same time, we can say that now is also the moment to rebuild the Ukrainian energy system. Considering the long-term perspective, it is clear that it cannot be patched and just brought back to the state it was in before the war. In this regard, there is a wide consensus – private and state-owned energy companies, the government and independent think tanks are all of the opinion that the post-war Ukrainian energy system should be green and modern.

The Ukrainian think tank DiXi Group in its report “How to rebuild a ‘green’ country: recommendations for Ukraine’s recovery”, points to two key “wings” of the reconstruction. The objects whose functions are necessary for people’s lives, which include dams, should be rebuilt as quickly as possible but with respect to due diligence and security standards. Meanwhile, objects such as new factories will have to be built in an energy efficient way and in accordance with EU environmental standards. The same can be said about the energy sector. According to the DiXi Group, new investments should be directed, first and foremost, towards renewable and decentralised energy sources.

Antosha of DTEK has the same opinion: “After the 1666 London fire people first started to rebuild the city on their own, just like it had been before, which meant a risk of another large fire. And this is what we want to avoid. We want the new energy sector to be green.” To achieve that Ukraine will need foreign investments. Without them, it is not able to independently start the reconstruction of the sector even now. However, for business to invest in a war-torn country there need to be guarantees for investors. One of the solutions could be to use the confiscated property of Russian firms and individuals who are now under sanctions. However, this is a difficult process and there are no agreements on how to do this, just yet.

In Nadiya’s view Russia has been bombing the Ukrainian energy system to scare and break the population. Even though each series of attacks makes things worse, the Russian plan has not borne much fruit. Ukrainians are still returning home, instead of fleeing. They also try to adjust their lives to the new reality. They buy power generators and batteries. They have created co-working hubs where they can work remotely even when there is no electricity. They buy wood-burning furnaces. They also warm themselves in the so-called “points of invincibility” set up by the authorities. With each attack, however, the Ukrainians get angrier and angrier at Russia and its cruelty. At the same time, they remain full of hope that the war will end and their country will become a better place to live than it was before the war.

Maciej Zaniewicz is an international cooperation programme manager focusing on Ukraine at Forum Energii – an independent Polish think tank focused on energy policy and issues.

energy, infrastructure, Russia, Russia war against Ukraine, Ukraine