The whirlpool of Belgrade’s EuroPride: Russophilia and Russian influence in Serbia

EuroPride took place in Belgrade between September 12th and 18th this year. However, instead of a pride walk acting as a culmination for the whole event, LGBTQ+ participants and supporters were allowed only to have a symbolic walk of just a couple of hundred metres, while constantly being guarded by the police. Photo: Bobica10 / Shutterstock

These views had already brought this country and the whole region to the brink of destruction back in the dark 1990s.

Despite all the indignations, EuroPride took place in Belgrade between September 12th and 18th this year. However, instead of a pride walk acting as a culmination for the whole event, LGBTQ+ participants and supporters were allowed only to have a symbolic walk of just a couple of hundred metres, while constantly being guarded by the police. On the other hand, before, during, and even after EuroPride, various organisations and political parties, with the support of the Serbian Orthodox Church, organised anti-pride marches throughout Belgrade. Some of them brought out tens of thousands of protesters.

Far-right groups, Serbian Orthodox Church bishops, hooligans and “ordinary” citizens believing in a clerical and national Serbia, marched together but not only against EuroPride. They also marched for Russia, and in support of its war in Ukraine, carrying symbols of the infamous letter “Z” and pictures of Vladimir Putin. The culmination of this protest was a six-hundred-metre-long, intertwined Serbian-Russian flag. The Pandora’s box of Russophilia has been opened, again.

Clash between West and East

EuroPride was only one event in a wider culture war that was expanding over the years, but which exploded recently in Serbian society. This single occasion served as an excuse, while being used as a symbol of all the “evil” coming from the West, to present to the religious and right-oriented parts of society an alleged threat to “their” Serbia. Consequently, the anti-pride protests themselves were not only against EuroPride. That was the primary motive, while the real cause for the protests lies deep in the social and identity divisions in Serbian society. The rise of nationalism, and with it the inevitable impulse of Russophilia, are just a logical consequence of the last political and social decade. This did not happen overnight, in fact, EuroPride and all the marches against it were an example of the hidden divisions between the pro-democratic and pro-authoritarian currents, as well as the clash between the European Union and Russia, the archetypal West and East.

Jovan Byford, a social psychologist and senior lecturer at the Open University in the United Kingdom, reminds us that “ever since early 2000, pride has been a totemic issue within the Serbian nationalist discourse,” adding that “the opposition to gay rights was a way of articulating the broader anti-western and anti-liberal sentiment”. As Byford explains, “the recent events surrounding EuroPride were the consequences of the fact that the war in Ukraine and the tensions in Kosovo have propelled identity issues at the fore of political discourse.” They brought into focus “the question of where Serbia belongs politically and culturally”, which is a question that is “routinely exploited by right-wing nationalists and by the Serbian Orthodox Church which sees itself as the main arbiter of identity-related issues”.

Under the decade-long rule of the Serbian Progressive Party and its inviolable political figure, President Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia has become a captured state. His regime is primarily responsible for all the identity divisions. Thus, the pillars of power are built on constant fear and imagined threats to the whole nation. As a result, the ruler, as equal to the nation, is the only one who can be its protector. Yet, despite all the calculations made in the previous years, the current situation exploded well beyond the regime’s control. Even if some of these changes were orchestrated from the top, it seems that the baton slipped out from the hands of the conductor.

Furthermore, Byford thinks that in some sense the “conflict over EuroPride was a staged proxy war waged by those who believe that Serbia should reject progressive European values and align with Russia”. However, there is something even more malignant behind those beliefs. This is their constant hope that major geopolitical changes in the future will allow Serbia to revisit the agenda of the 1990s, in Kosovo, Bosnia and so on.

Even the democratic changes in the 2000s and the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s regime did not destroy the hope for a “great Serbia”. Established in modern form by the Radical Party and its leader, the convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj, back in the 1990s, the hope survived among its supporters. Vučić, once a high-ranking official of the Radical Party and the natural successor to its values, currently disguised in apparent progressiveness, made the survival of this hope possible. He did this by destroying almost everything that was done during the short period of democratic progress and prosperity after 2000. On the other hand, almost full control of the media sector was used for stigmatisation of the EU and the West in favour of Russia’s glorification.

However, Serbia is not a unique case when it comes to the expansion of far-right ideologies, as well as the rise of nationalism. Such a process is taking place across Europe. Professor Marija Djoric from the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade says that the particular problem with Serbia, and the Balkans in general, is the existence of “old generators” of nationalism, which is, in this case, a post-conflict society. On the other hand, “new generators” like the COVID-19 pandemic or the migrant crisis created fear for the survival of “collectivity”, such as the state and nation. Indeed, all those groups or political parties that participated in the anti-pride protests were the same that expressed dissatisfaction with pandemic measures or the acceptance of migrants.

Russophilia and Russian influence

Some of the protest’s organisers have ties to the ruling party, or to be precise are known as groups controlled by the regime. Yet, on the other hand, it is obvious that for all the big demonstrations, or so-called “walks”, the emotional charge among participants is inevitable. Despite messages from the protest’s unofficial spokesmen that they are marching peacefully, accompanied by nationalist songs, protesters look more like the riders of the apocalypse, producing constant fear among those who were passing by. It was a strange fear, not a fear for life, but instead the fear that those who were marching are no longer in the minority. Those on the streets, plus those who support them but for some reason were not visible on the streets, present themselves as the majority of Serbian citizens – the same majority who support Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Research commissioned by the Serbian Science Fund conducted in August this year showed that 80 per cent of citizens are against imposing sanctions on Russia, while only eight per cent of the population are in favour. It would seem that proportionally more citizens in Serbia support the war than even those in Russia. Russian influence on these occasions and Russophilia are two different things. However, the malignancy is almost the same, since pure influence would not be possible without the traditionally widespread love for Russia. To be clear, there is nothing wrong in cultivating a love for culture or history, but supporting madness and the personal aspirations of Putin, who has brought Europe to the brink of destruction, is a completely different thing. Currently Russophilia in Serbian society lies primarily in the worshiping of Vladimir Putin’s cult of personality.

Historically, Russophilia has taken different forms in Serbia, depending on the circumstances. In the 1990s it was abstract, nostalgic and sentimental. Jovan Byford says that today, “the situation is much worse”, because, as he explains, “Serbian nationalists (and indeed nationalists in many other countries) are mesmerised by Putin’s aggression and belligerence and believe that they can prosper with the backing of a resurgent and strong Russia … for them, Putin’s Russia represents a mixture of an authoritarian, socially conservative, Orthodox Christian state, which is what they aspire to.”

Let us come back again to the protests. Beyond the protest organisers linked to the ruling party, there are others who do not hide their links to Russia. One of the protests was led by the infamous Night Wolves biker gang, whose connections reach up to the Kremlin. Their presence in the first row, given their well-known connections in Serbian far-right circles, does not look like a pure coincidence. They were there for a reason.

Dusan Janjić, the founder of the Forum for Ethnic Relations, a think tank in Belgrade, says that without clear Russian influence through intelligence work, it would not have been possible to organise such a massive meeting and bring tens of thousands of people onto the streets of Belgrade. Indeed, it is unusual to gather so many protesters without clear organisation and leadership. It was obvious that someone provided them with logistical support. Janjić believes that these marches are a combination of the dissatisfaction of a part of the population that wants an even closer alliance with Russia, and the excellent monitoring of Serbian society by Russian intelligence services. Bearing that in mind, as he explains, it is not surprising that among the anti-pride protest leaders were some people who are labelled as being very close to Russia and its interests.

On the other hand, Djoric from the Institute for Political Studies thinks that “although Russian influence exists, it should be borne in mind that there are also western influences.” However, she says that considering the geopolitical position of Serbia, being at a crossroads of East and West, it is not illogical to be a subject of interest for different foreign factors.

The main social media platform for mobilising the marches was Telegram. A lot of channels belong to local far-right groups, which are cooperating with other Russian groups, some of them are even involved in the Ukrainian war. The content they are sharing through these groups is very similar to those of pro-war Russian Telegram channels. Although examining Telegram does not prove Russian intelligence work, it at least shows that some of these channels are using the same or similar patterns for propaganda.

However, it is important not to forget the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in all these events. The connections of the Serbian Church with Russia are traditional. Their open Russophilia is no secret either. The previous patriarch said in 2019 that the “Serbian people are lucky enough to tie their small boat to a big Russian ship.” Even though the current Patriarch Porfirije, in the beginning, seemed to be less radical than some stubborn circles inside of the church, he is slowly showing that his beliefs and attitudes are changeable depending in which direction the wind blows. Right now, it looks like the Siberian wind is blowing for them.

When asked about his opinion on Russian influence in the anti-pride protests, Jovan Byford argues that if one scrutinised, for instance, the funding of political parties, certain politicians’ business interests, the media, and so on, one “would uncover the flow of Russian funds”. On the other hand, Russia can also “exploit politicians’ egos and ambitions”, or their “genuine political and ideological affinities”. Furthermore, it can also “intimidate them through a projection of power which may or may not be real”.

Benefits from destabilisation

How does the Kremlin benefit from identity divisions in a small Balkan state like Serbia? Facing an almost cataclysmic scenario in Ukraine, where a “special military operation” has not gone anywhere near as planned, the Putin regime is seeking more areas of destabilisation across Europe. Riding on the wave of Russophilia, the Kremlin benefits from identity divisions in Serbia as it hopes to create an environment that will not so easily allow the Serbian government to impose sanctions.

Yet, imposing sanctions on Russia is probably just a matter of time, even for the current Serbian regime, or at least imposing them partially. The reason is that at some point, there will no longer be any alternative. However, in a social environment such as the current one, that decision probably will not pass without consequences. If EuroPride managed to trigger such a massive protest, what would be the reaction of the aforementioned 80 per cent of the population who are against sanctions if they realise that their small Serbian boat is trying to untie itself from the big, beloved Russian ship?

Byford agrees that Russia’s goal right now is to “generate instability in Europe and undermine the whole European project”. Moscow is trying to “create crises, conflicts and divisions on Europe’s borders”. Sometimes it may not even need a specific goal or endpoint in sight. The point is to create problems that Europe would be obliged, but perhaps unable, to resolve, and consequently drag attention away from its eastern borders. “This would then expose Europe as a failed project,” Byford adds. In the meantime, the Balkans are an ideal setting for this kind of activity, especially since all of the tensions and issues from the 1990s remain largely unresolved.

Filip Mirilović graduated in political sciences and international relations and is currently enrolled in an International Security Master’s programme. He regularly contributes to Vreme – a weekly magazine based in Belgrade, Serbia. He mostly deals with topics such as security and politics.

EuroPride, nationalism, Russophilia, Serbia