History lost. How Vladimir Putin’s historical conceptions led to the invasion of Ukraine

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Last year, I wrote an article in New Eastern Europe titled “Vladimir the historian: Putin’s political revision of Ukrainian history” (Issue 6/2021), in which I analysed the Russian president’s inaccurate understandings of history vis-à-vis Ukrainians and their nationhood. Nearly year later and over six months into an all-out war between Russia and Ukraine, it is important to return to Putin’s alternative histories and his application thereof. It is only then that we can truly understand how this conflict came to be and where it is headed.

Putin’s denial

Two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin addressed the Russian nation in a long-winded speech. Similar to his historical articles of the past two years, in which he penned an alternative history of the Second World War and the “Unity of Russia and Ukraine” respectively, he used this speech to propagate another historical narrative. The Russian president sought to deny Ukraine’s existence as a national state, arguing that its creation was a fluke of history and a mistake of the early Bolsheviks after the Russian Revolution. In doing so, he felt justified to take back what he sees to be Russian: Crimea, Donbas and even the whole of Ukraine. At the end of his speech, Putin officially – albeit illegally – recognised the two so-called breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. It was all but a declaration of war.

This time, Putin went further than ever before. In his article from the summer of 2021, Putin argued for the natural “unity” of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. His February 2022 speech, however, simply denied Ukraine’s right to exist. Putin declared that “modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia, or to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia.” For him, the father of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, simply split Ukraine from Russia “by separating, severing what is historically Russian land”. This rhetoric, chosen very carefully by a man who envisions himself to be the primary historian of Russia – from Kyivan Rus’ to today – was not simply a harmless utterance. Rather, these are the true beliefs of a man, a Russian president, who has very specific goals regarding the Ukrainian nation. Putin’s words need to be taken seriously: he does not believe in the existence of a sovereign Ukraine.

Much of Putin’s speech, or rather history lecture, focused on educating Russian society (Putin’s students) on how Ukraine came to be. He employed a number of oftentimes contradictory arguments to achieve this goal. At the beginning, Putin asserted that historical Russian lands were given to appease Ukrainian nationalists and that the Bolsheviks’ policy of creating a Soviet Ukraine can be referred to as “Vladimir Lenin’s Ukraine”. He goes on to mention that Stalin also gave foreign lands to Ukraine, including chunks of Poland, Romania and Hungary. Khrushchev then “took Crimea away from Russia for some reason and also gave it to Ukraine”. For Putin, Ukraine was borne from a series of bad decisions, leading to the creation of a nation that should otherwise not exist.

Yet in Putin’s 2021 article, he devoted significant space to exploring the historical unity of Russia and Ukraine. He explored the interdependence and relations of the Ukrainian and Russian nations from the beginning of Kyivan Rus’, throughout the early modern period, and up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, he effectively and ironically recognised the Ukrainian nation as a state in and of itself. In that article, he argued that the Ukrainian state (and not the Ukrainian nation) was created by nationalists, who defined themselves as anti-Russian and cooperated with the West in order to achieve statehood at the expense of Russia. He proposed the thesis that Europeans, also “anti-Russian”, supported weakening the Russian empire and thus cooperated with these nationalists to construct Ukraine’s statehood. At the time, as I argued, Putin completely ignored Ukraine’s centuries-long relationships with other nation states, such as Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Less than a year later, however, Putin’s understanding of Ukraine and its history has completely changed.

The blame game

Now, for Putin, Ukraine did not exist before the Russian Revolution. At odds with his earlier arguments, he now postulates that it was in fact the Bolsheviks who created the Ukrainian state – a state that should not exist. According to Putin, “after the 1917 October Revolution and the subsequent Civil War, the Bolsheviks set about creating a new statehood … [Lenin] suggested making concessions to the [Ukrainian] nationalists, who he called ‘independents’ at the time. Lenin’s ideas of what amounted in essence to a confederative state arrangement and a slogan about the right of nations to self-determination, up to secession, were laid in the foundation of Soviet statehood.” Here, Putin’s argument brings to light two very important aspects of his understanding of modern Ukraine. First, Ukraine only exists because of Lenin, because the Bolsheviks allowed it to be so. It is no longer the West that is to blame for the creation of Ukraine, but rather Russia. The Kremlin therefore needs to undo that mistake. Second, reading between the lines, Putin very clearly does not recognise Ukraine’s right to self-determination. In blaming Lenin and the Bolsheviks for allowing this mistake to happen on the premise of the right to self-determination, the logical deduction is that Putin denies Ukraine this right. For Putin it is clear: Ukraine is and has always been a part of Russia. For him, history made a mistake.

Furthermore, unlike Putin’s article from 2021, he no longer pays any consideration to Ukraine’s individual culture, language or history. No, for him, these factors no longer have any meaning or relevance vis-à-vis his geopolitical aspirations. Everything Ukraine is and everything it ever was, is because of Russia. Ukraine’s entire existence is an accident; simply the result of a few bad decisions made by powerful men.

Putin’s 2021 article was primarily dedicated to the notion that Ukraine is historically inseparable from Russia, but he at least conceded that a Ukrainian culture and language do exist, albeit very similar to those of Russia. In his February 2022 speech, however, Putin ignores these ideas completely. Russia’s principal historian is using revisionist history to eradicate an entire nation, its language, and culture. The history of Ukraine is now solely the history of Russia.

The future is history

Not only is Russian President Vladimir Putin now the principal historian in Russia, but he also sees himself, his person, and his presidency in historical dimensions. Putin seeks to fix what he views as historical wrongs, to remake history in a way that suits his conceptions of how Russia should be and should have been. This is what is most dangerous about Putin now. He is no longer acting rationally but rather acting in a way that permits him to achieve goals that only he can comprehend. In doing so, he has amalgamated revisionist history and a web of lies to justify the illegal invasion of Ukraine.

As spin doctor, Putin has turned questionable rumours into solidified fact for Russian society. In recent years, any historical work that does not tow this line, as I argued in 2021, will be censored or punished by law. On March 4th of this year, for example, police stormed the offices of Memorial, a Russian human rights organisation that was banned at the end of 2021. Memorial has been dealing with the Stalinist repressions in the Soviet Union for more than 30 years and stands for historical clarification, for a sliver of truth under a regime manipulating history. Putin’s system is already taking every possible step to silence any account of history other than its own. Developments in Russia in recent days illustrate the unimaginable consequences the war is having on Russian society. Putin’s hold on the truth has now evolved beyond the realm of history. Russian media is, for example, not allowed to refer to the war in Ukraine as a war, but rather as a “special military operation”. Russian media is now required to propagate Putin’s understanding of the conflict.

Putin used his February 2021 speech to disseminate a number of lies that justified his incursion into Ukraine. The first is that Putin sees Ukraine today as a threat to Russia. Though he will not admit it, Ukraine’s pivot towards the West and its democratic aspirations are what Putin fears most. He views this development as a threat to the sovereignty of Russia. Throughout his speech, Putin referred to Ukraine’s desire to build nuclear weapons, its cooperation with NATO, and the “anti-Russian” nature of modern Ukraine. He devoted nearly half of his speech to discussing Ukraine’s military build-up and NATO’s assistance in the country. The conclusion that Putin has drawn is that both Ukraine and NATO intend to threaten Russia. Therefore, Moscow must act now. Yet he goes further; one justification is not enough.

A war of historical dimensions calls for historical justifications. Putin has no problem drawing these from the memories of Russia’s proudest moment: the Second World War. Putin’s most important argument is that Ukraine is led by neo-Nazis, who have for years been committing genocide in Donbas against ethnic Russians. This is a very convenient narrative, especially as much of modern Russian society has been founded on the notion that the Soviet Union brought an end to Nazi Germany and secured freedom for millions of people. The use of the terms “genocide” and “Nazi” successfully unify Russians, particularly as the vast majority of Russian society views the Second World War as the defining moment of Russian greatness. In claiming that the war (special military operation) seeks to end the genocide against ethnic Russians and “denazify” Ukrainian society, Putin is guaranteed to find support amongst Russians. This is even more so because of the government’s complete control over the media and political and historical narratives.

Within his concept of genocide, Putin advances the claim that Ukraine’s policy is to “root out Russian language and culture”. He asserts that Ukrainian nationalists and neo-Nazis have made Ukraine an anti-Russian state. This argument, however, is littered with inaccuracies. Of course, the Ukrainian language and culture are being fostered in Ukraine, and rightfully so. However, large segments of the population continue to speak Russian on a daily basis and at home. For the most part, this is done peacefully and without notice. A 2014 law that sought to ban the use of the Russian language in governmental offices was never passed, but Russia has never been able to let go of this unfortunate incident. Nevertheless, Ukraine is not systematically attacking the Russian language. Rather, it is defending itself from Russian disinformation, cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare.

The question of actual genocide, which Putin claims to be directed at nearly four million people, is utterly unfounded. There is no evidence that the Ukrainian government or military forces have been persecuting ethnic Russians in Donbas. Rather, ironically, Russian-backed separatists have occupied much of Donbas since 2014. This raises the question of who is committing this supposed genocide in the region. For Putin, the matter of genocide is a much more rhetorical, semantic attempt at justifying Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is by recalling the horrors of the Holocaust – the Shoah of the Jewish people – at the hands of the Nazis in Ukraine, Poland and other countries, that Putin is attempting to rally the Russian people. He has also attempted to gain the support of Russian-leaning Ukrainians as part of his ambitions.

Grim outlook

For Putin, history is the driving factor for his war in Ukraine, and it is exactly these historical misconceptions that are driving both Ukraine – and Russia – towards ruin. Both his article from 2021 and his 2022 speech were designed to discredit Ukraine’s chosen path towards democracy and the West. The result has been the opposite. Putin has consolidated an oftentimes divided country around the Ukrainian flag and president. For Russia, however, the future is looking much grimmer.

Putin has long lamented the break-up of the Soviet Union. A famous quote from the Russian president from his early years as the country’s leader, which is found in nearly every publication ever written on him, asserts that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century. Yet now, 22 years after coming to power, he seems to be acting exactly on those words. For years, politicians, historians, political scientists and Russia experts disregarded Putin’s historical and world views, considering them to be the ravings of a man angry about reality, but too weak to take action.

The war in Ukraine has shown everyone how dangerous Putin and the Kremlin truly are, as well as how there needs to be a greater understanding of both Russia’s history and leading personalities. Most importantly, the conflict has shown how important it is to go back and reread Putin’s writings and speeches about world history and Russia’s place within it. Vladimir Putin and his rhetoric need to be taken literally from now on. Until there exists a better understanding of Russia, its president, and its history, unfortunately for both Russia and Ukraine, the future is history.

Joshua Kroeker is a historian and political scientist, holding degrees from the University of British Columbia in Canada, Heidelberg University in Germany and St Petersburg State University, Russia. He is currently undertaking his doctoral study at Heidelberg University. He specialises in modern Russian and Ukrainian history and politics.

history, imperialism, Russia, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin