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Can Georgia get back on track?

The European Union’s recent decision to award candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine has left Georgia in a difficult position. Whilst eager to integrate with the bloc, the country still suffers from numerous political issues. Tbilisi must now take full advantage of all the tools available to it in order to not fall further behind.

Since the restoration of independence in 1991, Georgia has increasingly identified itself as part of the European family. Despite this, no real reciprocal steps have been taken by Europe to acknowledge these developments. Georgia has most often been perceived by Europe as part of its geographical periphery, somewhat separate from the continent. Since the formal establishment of the European Union in the early 1990s, Tbilisi’s dream of joining the EU has remained a utopian vision. The country has constantly been referred to as simply a “neighbour” of the EU.

October 3, 2022 - Beka Chedia - Hot TopicsIssue 5 2022Magazine

Photo: Nelson Antoine/Shutterstock

Georgia is a part of European civilization and the fact that the EU only perceives it as a neighbour has always been frustrating for Georgians. It was not until the August 2008 war with Russia that the country’s current integration process truly began. The Eastern Partnership programme, which was launched in 2009 on the initiative of Poland and Sweden, was received enthusiastically in Tbilisi and has even turned into an effective mechanism for integration. However, it should be remembered that only half of its members (Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) have managed to take their relations with the EU to a new level. At the early stages of the Eastern Partnership’s development, many doubted its effectiveness, especially in the EU. No one considered it a future tool useful for the next wave of integration. Of course, Russia looked on with disdain at the initiative, hoping for its failure.

More than just a neighbour

The EU’s Eastern Partnership has become especially significant for Georgia. The country has gradually strengthened its image as an Eastern European state, and not just a country of the South Caucasus. This classification is still considered controversial by many in Georgia. In 2011, the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy addressed a rally in the Georgian capital with the following words: “When I am in Tbilisi, I feel like I am in Europe.”

Ten years later, the current president of France, Emmanuel Macron, made a very strange statement about Georgia and hinted at the country’s physical distance from the EU. He made this statement on the eve of the EU’s decision to award candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. Of course, Georgia is indeed geographically far from the EU’s centre. However, this location comes with its own advantages. The EU has no other such foothold in the region. The truth is that both sides currently benefit from today’s relations, as the EU has a vested interest in Georgia as a bridge between Europe and Asia. It is also a beacon of European values in this complex region.

In June, Georgia was denied candidate status. At the same time, the EU officially recognised Tbilisi’s European perspective. In other words, Georgia is no longer considered just a neighbour of Europe, as it has been perceived for many years, but a real part of the continent that aspires to become an official candidate.

Issues surrounding the geographical distance of Georgia from the EU ended with this declaration. Brussels has decided that Georgia does have the right to become a future member of the EU. This recognition of the country’s European perspective would have been unimaginable even last year. Suddenly, Georgia has been declared a potential candidate, and therefore a potential member of the EU – this is a significant achievement. At the same time, it represents a setback as Moldova and Ukraine are now further ahead on the path to integration with the EU. The blame for this appears to lie with the current Georgian government, which has been unable to resolve various serious issues, as outlined by the EU.

No rush to Brussels

The previous government headed by Mikheil Saakashvili put a lot of work into taking the country closer to the EU. Yet this success was not built on by the current administration. On the one hand, the current Georgian Dream government was quite lucky to start with such a position. On the other hand, they have been often criticised for following a pro-Russian political course. Despite this, the current authorities have managed to sign both an association and free trade agreement with the EU. They also achieved a visa-free regime with the bloc. Tbilisi has even made claims that Georgia has already implemented 45 per cent of the regulations and directives stipulated by the association agreement.

Since then, the EU has become Georgia’s main trading partner and exports of Georgian goods to the bloc have risen to a notable degree. After signing the association agreement with the EU, Georgia has received just over one billion euros in financial assistance as of this year. It was on the eighth anniversary of this agreement that Georgia received acknowledgement of its European perspective. However, the current government does not appear to be in any rush to become an EU member. The leaders of the ruling party have stated that accession will take another ten to 15 years, so it makes no sense to hurry. When compared to the steps of the previous authorities, the current government looks more insecure and pessimistic when it comes to integration.

During the 2003 Rose Revolution, the revolutionaries used EU flags during demonstrations and rallies. The new authorities led by Saakashvili then “legalised” the EU flag (it is noteworthy that Ukraine did the same after being awarded candidate status) as the country’s second symbol alongside the nation’s flag. EU flags were then installed in all state institutions and raised in front of the Georgian parliament building. This official move was watched with surprise by Brussels, as Georgia did not in principle have the right to use the bloc’s flag as one of its official symbols. Even Georgia’s European perspective was not recognised at this time. Through this widespread use of the EU flag, however, the country’s authorities wished to emphasise their desire for European integration.

Regional context

Looking at previous enlargements, it is clear that the EU prefers a regional approach rather than working with individual countries. This is especially true when it comes to small countries. In order to overcome this preference, Georgia has done a lot politically to move away from the South Caucasus and integrate with the Black Sea region.

It was then believed that any identification with the South Caucasus would damage the country’s chances of getting closer to the EU. After all, the other two countries of the region, Armenia and Azerbaijan, have not clearly expressed any desire for EU integration. This is in spite of the fact that they are also part of the Eastern Partnership. Hence, Georgia gradually began to position itself as a country of the Black Sea basin, associating itself more with Ukraine and Moldova.

When Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, the desire to promote this geographical outlook became even more attractive for Georgia. This new image ultimately played a key role in the gradual formation of a distinct group within the Eastern Partnership. It is noteworthy that from the very beginning this trio of countries (Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova) have faced numerous differences in development. Their paths simply converged around their shared desire to integrate closely and quickly into the EU. Georgia was at one time ahead of both Moldova and Ukraine in terms of the pace and quality of reforms, the effectiveness of anti-corruption campaigns and the modernisation of state institutions. Recent years, however, have seen Georgia lag behind these countries in democratic development.

Nevertheless, these three states strengthened their ties further when they officially formed the “Associated Trio” group after the signing of their association agreements. This is in spite of the fact that political consultations and economic ties between these countries have been insufficient and generally absent in recent years. This is especially true regarding the difficult relationship between the current governments of Georgia and Ukraine.

The Baltic and Central European states have been traditional supporters of this trio within the Eastern Partnership. In contrast, older EU members from Western Europe have remained sceptical. They saw a danger in the potential collapse of the Eastern Partnership programme. Brussels had pinned its hopes on the success of the entire initiative in relation to all six states. The current advantages enjoyed by the three associated countries could eventually push the rest – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus – to cooperate more actively with the EU. Some of these states expressed active dissatisfaction with the trio’s formation, with Azerbaijan perceiving it as an almost unfriendly step.

Looking ahead

The countries of the Associated Trio have not always acted in sync and their success on the path to the EU has not always coincided with one another. Therefore, the fact that Georgia has not yet received candidate status does not mean that Georgia can afford to just fall behind Chisinau and Kyiv. The country’s European future has now acquired real contours in spite of its current status. Fears in Georgia that the EU may once again perceive the country in the context of the South Caucasus are not justified at this stage. Apparently, Brussels will soon reconsider the case of Georgia in the same context as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, which have a similar potential candidate status. It is therefore positive that a political consensus on further enlargement is emerging within the bloc. Even a year ago this would have been unimaginable. Faced with a bloody war in Ukraine, Europe decided to open its doors to its Eastern neighbours. European Council President Charles Michel stated on May 18th that the EU should begin to build “a European geopolitical community” that would cover a wide area. Involvement in such a group would not preclude full EU membership in the future.

In the meantime, Georgia has a chance to fully use the transformative power of both the EU and its status as a potential candidate. Along with candidate states, Tbilisi can also use the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) – a multi-billion-euro fund – to modernise the country. Ultimately, all the reforms that Georgia will implement in anticipation of European integration are needed not just for the EU, but for the development of the country as a whole.

Beka Chedia is a Tbilisi-based researcher and an associate professor of political science.

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