Sovereignty kills. Lessons learnt from the war

Photo courtesy of Andrey Makarychev

These dimensions of security have been rebalanced by the clear use of military force by Russia. It was something beyond our expectations a few years ago, or even a few months ago, before the invasion began. Not many people took this perspective 100 per cent seriously. What also has changed, and this is a very long-term process, is the decreasing trust in international law, as well as global and regional organisations. Some of them were created after the fall of the Soviet Union, while others have of course much longer legacies like the United Nations and the Red Cross.

Why did such international organisations lose trust?

Just to give you an example, UN representatives were quietly attending various Russian operations – detainments, data collection and forced relocations – taking place on the outskirts of occupied and destroyed Mariupol in Ukraine. Can you imagine that? Was this a tacit and de facto acceptance of the barbarity committed by the Russian army? At the same time, was it a clear sign of the organisation’s inability to change the situation in one way or another? So, UN representatives were just bystanders during a major war crime in Europe. This is something way beyond the world we expected in the 1990s and in the very beginning of the 21st century.

There are also other factors that are conducive to this loss of trust. This includes the originally German idea of Wandel durch Handel, meaning the more you trade with deviant and problematic regimes the more you influence their behaviour. That was wrong. Russia has proven this is not the case. And this is also a security issue. The whole idea of liberal peace was based on the idea of the transformation of regimes like Russia, but also Belarus.

Indeed, Belarus has disappeared a little bit from the radar recently in comparison to the initial phase of the invasion, not to mention during 2020 and the following period…

Belarus became a very important factor regarding insecurity for Central Europe. I do not mean only the de facto deployment of Russian troops and military infrastructure in Belarus but also the artificial refugee crisis created by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in 2021. So, in this sense the modernisation of Russia and Belarus did not bring greater demand for democracy and it did not even bring louder demands for peace. Civil society has also not matured to the point of demanding the implementation of an agenda based on well-being, peace and normalisation.

I would also say that, in a more general sense, rationality is another victim of our security thinking. We thought, in the field of political science and international relations, that we can explain everything in these disciplines. Again, it is not the case. This triggered a big debate in the professional community of security studies and scholars about what we should do when confronted with what we would characterise as explicitly irrational behaviour. And this is first of all related to Russia. The idea that no security can be realised without Russia is past its time. More and more people are thinking the other way, believing that no security with Russia is possible as it exists right now. And this also changes the way we think about security.

Borders are another concept that made us rethink many previous security assumptions. In the 1990s we used to think that borders rather connect people than divide them. This is another example of wishful thinking. Borders do divide and there are even countries located on the borders of different blocs, military powers, and even civilisations in the case of Ukraine. They cannot play multi-vector games anymore as was expected a decade or so ago. Of course, multi-vector policies are not completely impossible but they are becoming more and more complicated in light of Russia’s aggression.

The idea of normative power, which was one of the underpinnings of peace in Europe, is also now facing limitations. Again, it did not disappear but it needs reinvigoration. We must work out how to make normativity a strong instrument for guaranteeing peace and non-intervention in Europe. To some extent, we are returning to the debates surrounding the Helsinki Process back in the 1970s.

Are you expecting more regional militarisation as the outcome of this process? The Polish government has recently announced plans for huge investment in the military domain, including purchases of new types of weaponry from the United States and South Korea. The scale of these investments, if successful, would be unprecedented. Do you see the possibility that other countries will follow Poland’s path and the region will eventually become more militarised, with all the consequences for politics and social life?

I think it might be the case and the Polish example is quite illuminating in this context. Frankly speaking, financial discipline within NATO has not met expectations and the presumptive level of two per cent GDP spending on the military has not always been achieved by all member states. That definitely reflects a kind of inertia from 1991 and this illusion of a new beautiful and peaceful world now or in the future. I certainly observe similar trends in the Baltic states, including Estonia, the country where I live now. The military element of security and defence is definitely on the rise. We can also add to this list Sweden and Finland. These aspiring NATO members are drastically reversing the neutrality paradigm in Nordic Europe. I think this is a game-changer for these two countries. These developments also have implications for military budgets, procurement systems related to technical issues of weapon supplies, and the protection of borders with Russia. So in this sense, the paradox is that Russia to some extent managed to impose its vision of international relations and politics as an area focused on military force. This contrasts with its previous strategy of transforming international relations into a more normative playground in which non-military, institutional factors would largely prevail. In this sense, yes, having faced this aggression, most European countries need to reconsider their military budgets. But it is not only about money.

What else is it about?

It is also about this new factor connected to Central European and Baltic countries and their donations to Ukraine; how much they are helping and assisting the state. This is a new phenomenon because Ukraine is not a member of NATO, but for many countries it does not matter because helping Kyiv is not an act of charity. Helping Ukraine is an investment in the future security of these countries. In some future cases, which are rather easy to imagine, these countries might face pretty much the same challenges as Ukraine. You mentioned that Poland has become a strong military hub, with a greater military budget and power. I think this is good news. I also think that given successful developments on the battlefield, Ukraine may become one of the strongest armies in Europe; one that is fully able to resist unprecedented aggression from its eastern neighbour. How many western armies would be able to resist direct Russian aggression? I am not sure that there are too many. So in this sense, I expect a lot from the reinvigorated Polish-Ukrainian partnership, in which issues of troubled history might be overcome by issues of contemporary importance. This is especially true regarding the need for political coordination.

Continuing the thread of losses due to the war, perhaps a positive one could be a loss of Western Europe’s illusions regarding Russia. Central and Eastern Europe has been advocating this for years. Is this probably a moment in which they can finally say “we were right”?

First of all, I completely agree that the countries in close proximity, which historically had multiple unfriendly encounters with Russia, had been trying to send this message to their western partners for years. Very often the response they received went something like “you might have your post-Soviet traumas, but you exaggerate, you’re just inflating this sense of threat coming from Russia.” The clear position of the Baltic states and Poland and other countries was a very important factor that contributed to this mental transformation among western elites. I think this cognitive dimension is very important but this is a long process. It is very difficult to throw away false assumptions and expectations.

Why is it so difficult?

For thousands of people in western countries this rethinking and reconsideration represents a very strong blow to their careers. Angela Merkel can be an example. She left her position being perceived as the best leader in the post-war history of Germany, and now she faces many, I would say, uneasy questions regarding her policy of energy dependence on Russia. After February 24th, this policy looks very different and much more problematic. Yet it is a very long process. In the meantime, I also think that this change is underway but it is not the whole story.

What would make the story complete?

The whole story includes not only these mental changes that are inevitable in my opinion. But also very practical questions regarding the energy situation in the forthcoming autumn and winter. It also includes a debate on to what extent the sanctions are detrimental to Russia’s economy, whether we are on the right track of sanctioning Russia with six packages of sanctions. Why is it that Russia is still able to economically survive and the rouble is not collapsing? So, apart from these mental changes there are other issues and those were never discussed in public discourse in the western countries. Also, helping Ukraine with efficient weaponry is, as I mentioned, an investment in the security of the European countries themselves. But in the meantime, what I am also observing is a new debate that boils down to the very simple argument that Ukrainians should demonstrate that these weapons do work.

What does it mean exactly?

There is an expectation that Ukrainians need to put something on the table. They need to regain their territories in the short term to make sure that Western weapons are effective and are in the right hands. So, there is an anticipation that Ukrainians will bring one victory after another. And I think it is a completely new debate that has never happened before.

Since you have mentioned a hope for a stronger Polish-Ukrainian partnership, I want to ask a broader question about a possible political reconfiguration in the region. The diminishing credibility of international institutions and multilateralism as such that you mentioned perhaps indicates the reinvigoration of the concept of the nation state. This is because it is mainly individual countries responding to the crisis, on their own or in cooperation with others. Are you expecting the emergence of any reshaped regional order as a result of this?

I agree the regional order in this part of Europe is in flux. I do not think there is one single vector. There are many different factors of transformation. On the one hand, we are clearly witnessing an increased military presence of NATO in the Baltic states and in new NATO members in Scandinavia. It is a relatively new development which is leading to the enlargement of areas of direct contact between Russia and NATO member states. We need to take into account the absorption of Belarus by Russia, at least in a military sense, which also brings Russia and NATO physically closer to each other. Therefore, the buffer zone between two geopolitical and civilisational blocs becomes almost non-existent; especially if we consider the perspective of gradual transformation of Ukraine and Moldova towards the status of fully-fledged members of the European Union in a decade or two. In this sense, the whole idea of Eastern Europe as it was known for a couple of decades is transforming, if not disappearing.

My expectation is that Ukraine and Moldova, on the way to Europeanisation and accepting European norms and standards, would be happier to join the space of Central Europe rather than remain in the area of Eastern Europe that definitely has negative connotations nowadays. But this pathway to institutional acceptance by the European Union is quite bumpy. I see two clusters of issues. The first relates to the question of what would be the policy of the Ukrainian state in the aforementioned post-war arrangement? What would be the policy of the Ukrainian state in the case of the successful de-occupation of Mariupol, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, etc.? What would be the policy towards the people who live there, who might have accepted Russian citizenship? Are they collaborators? Or full-fledged Ukrainians who lived under occupation? I think these issues need to be strategically decided. Another forthcoming Ukrainian debate is what would be the policy of the Ukrainian state toward millions of Ukrainians in Europe who fled the country due to the war. On the one hand, these people could be lost to post-war Ukraine. They have lived there for some time which means that they study the language, some of them get a job, they might have changes in their refugee status, so they might stay where they are. On the other hand, these millions of people represent enormous human capital. They could come back to Ukraine with first-hand understanding of Europe. This is indispensable for rebuilding post-war Ukraine, with people who would have knowledge about the European Union not from Facebook, but from personal experiences. And this is also an issue of governance.

Another debate awaits the EU. What would be the main tracks of assistance to Ukraine in the case of the stabilisation of the situation on the ground and probably some kind of a solution to the war, hopefully on Ukrainian conditions. Is it going to be a kind of new Marshall Plan for Ukraine? Is it going to be the responsibility of the EU or individual member states? The Estonian government, for example, is already making commitments to specific Ukrainian cities like Vinnytsia to invest resources and funds to rebuild the urban infrastructure. And this is a very good initiative, but in the meantime, the EU should come up with a policy on this. These are all structural factors which are important to understand regarding the future of regional reconstruction and system of interactions in this part of Europe. Ukraine needs to be accepted not as just a victimised country but as a full-fledged European nation that suffered a lot but still has very strong resource potential.

There were wars in the past that changed not only the physical borders of states but also the sort of mental structures or paradigms that influence the way people perceive politics, relations between states, societies, etc. Do you expect to see those kinds of repercussions after Russia’s war against Ukraine?

It is really interesting that in our conversation you reference these mental structures that define how we perceive politics or humanity. I think there is a very profound controversy in this respect. On the one hand, we need to somehow reconsider or readjust our pre-existing, liberal expectations and anticipations regarding the new reality. This reality was not our choice; it was created by the Russian government. But this process might be quite painful.

What should be readjusted in particular?

Some of the elements of the liberal order have to be reconsidered, including the fascination with globalisation and unwavering trust in global institutions that largely failed, in my opinion, in the case of the war in Ukraine. This includes regional institutions that are an element of the global liberal paradigm of international relations. Their performance was not as strong as I would have expected. This concerns, for example, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and others which are elements of the international liberal order. They were supposed to somehow contribute to making this part of the world more cohesive, coherent and resilient. As you mentioned, most of the efforts came from nation states, not from global organisations, with the exception of NATO. These efforts also did not come from regional organisations which is a very sad part of the story.

In the meantime, we need to somehow reconsider the liberal distinction between the bad Russian government and the “good Russian people and good Russian culture”. It is also a part of this wishful thinking we touched upon. The majority of Russians support the war, that’s a fact. It does not matter if it’s 55 per cent or 75 per cent, it is the majority. This is a very sobering piece of information that might open one’s eyes when it comes to the question of what line we should take on Russian society and culture. Russian culture is very imperial and was always promoted by the state. It did not exist as a form on its own. It was more like an instrument in the invisible hands of the state. That explains why Russian culture did not go through the process of decolonisation, as many other cultures did in Europe. Hopefully this is an issue for the future but I am not sure how distant this future is.

But some of the concepts we know have proven their validity. For example, the very simple Foucauldian idea that sovereignty kills. Just two words: “sovereignty kills”. That is what we have seen, unfortunately, in Ukraine. To some extent, we need to return to what has been written by the French political philosophers half a century ago. They were right, it is not about culture. It is about making the whole society of a country completely depoliticised and unable to formulate its own political agenda, demands or expectations. Basically, it is a transformation of the whole population into a group of mass culture-consumers, without being able to produce political impulses and demands. This happened to Russia. One of the explanations for this is that this constant performativity of political action and over-saturation of the information and culture spaces with different genres of shows and spectacles did have an effect in Russia.

So, in this case the history of political thought offers us some solutions on how to become more resilient?

Take the issue of irrational behaviour as an example. Political scientists were quite comfortable studying mostly those events that correspond to our understanding of normativity and institutionalisation, which are well-established and quite easy subjects of our studies. But what if not all of the events that surround us are institutionalised, rational and explainable? Maybe we need to dig a bit into the political psychology of irrational behaviour, political myth, political mantras or political cults of certain concepts? We just might need to reread Jacques Lacan or Sigmund Freud to understand a little bit more about the irrational terrains of political psychology. Not only as a matter of academic interest, but as a matter of security regarding the reasons that triggered this disaster Russia has carried out in Ukraine.

You can listen to this interview as a podcast along with other exclusive content by becoming a patron of Talk Eastern Europe at www.patreon.com/talkeasterneurope.  

Andrey Makarychev is professor of regional political studies at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies in Tartu, Estonia.

Maciej Makulski is a contributing editor of New Eastern Europe and the co-host of the Talk Eastern Europe podcast.

Baltic states, geopolitics, politics, Russia, War