Georgian Dream faces a critical moment

Thousands of Georgians took to the street to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The lack of a clear position of the Georgian government during the war has been surprising, even disappointing. Photo: Nelson Antoine / Shutterstock

These tensions between the governments of Georgia and Ukraine were visible from the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. However, in April, Georgian Dream temporarily changed its rhetoric and decided to send a parliamentary delegation to Bucha. Amidst diplomatic tension, this move surprised the Georgian public and encouraged even more questions regarding what game the party was really playing.

Do not irritate policy

Opponents of Georgian Dream often mention that the authorities long ago chose a “do not irritate Russia” policy. For some, this is perceived as a pragmatic policy, as it aims to avoid Russian aggression against the country. The ruling party has continued this policy since February 24th by trying to not take any action that could cause Moscow to change its focus to Georgia. Yet, Georgian Dream fails to understand that for society, which is also a victim of Russian aggression and occupation, it is not only a moral duty to stand with Ukraine but also a pragmatic choice to clearly and undoubtedly express a position that the country is part of “team Ukraine”.  The war in Ukraine is now a critical moment for the ruling party, especially since its policy seems less pragmatic regarding its own people. The steps derived from this policy harm Georgia’s interests in the international arena and the party faces growing criticism for not being able to do the right thing.

Relations between the current Georgian and Ukrainian governments were troubled even before the war. This is due to the fact that some former government members in Georgia, perceived as criminals by the authorities, including former President Mikheil Saakashvili, were appointed to high positions in Ukraine. The Georgian government’s positions on this matter are deeply rooted in interparty enmity between Georgian Dream (GD) and the United National Movement (UNM), which was the country’s previous ruling party. The fact that many UNM figures went to Ukraine created an awkwardness between the two countries for years. However, the tensions became serious after Russia invaded Ukraine, when the Georgian government had to choose a side and express clear support for Kyiv. Going beyond narrow party interests and not putting relations in danger during today’s critical situation appears a difficult task for GD.

On February 25th, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili commented on the events in Ukraine and stressed that Georgia is not going to join sanctions against Russia. He argued that such a move would harm “national interests”, as Georgia’s dependence on Russian energy is still high and other commercial trade also takes place. At the same time, the government made no announcement that it was seeking ways to ease its dependency on Russia – a move which could enable Georgia to act more freely.

Once asked if he was going to visit Ukraine, Garibashvili said that he did not have such plans, leading to scathing criticism not only from opposition parties but also from the Georgian public. In the following days, huge demonstrations broke out in Tbilisi. The majority of them involved young people protesting against the government’s position on Ukraine. The demonstrations did not go unseen in Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy commented that the Georgian people understand the need to stand with their friend. He then added that “there are times when citizens are not the government, but better [than] the government”. This was a clear signal to the Georgian government of Kyiv’s dissatisfaction with Tbilisi’s policies.

The Georgian government did not respond with words but with actions. The decision regarding sanctions was not changed and in some cases the government even created obstacles for those volunteers from Georgia who wanted to go and help Ukraine. In one case, the government refused to allow a plane for these volunteers to land in Tbilisi. The government justified this move by saying that it could have been perceived as direct Georgian involvement in the war. However, Kyiv was angered by the move. On March 1st, Zelenskyy recalled his ambassador for consultations due to the volunteer issue and called the Georgian government’s position on sanctions “immoral”. This caused another wave of demonstrations in Tbilisi and other cities, where people started voicing demands for the resignation of the prime minister and concrete steps to help Ukraine. Protesters also demanded that the government follow Ukraine’s lead and apply for EU membership.

Widening gap

Georgian Dream responded to the situation by saying that the country supports Ukraine on every international platform. At the same time, it started building a narrative that the opposition United National Movement are trying to “drag Georgia into the armed conflict”. The polarising conflict between GD and UNM, the biggest opposition party in Georgia, has a long history. The war in Ukraine has become just one more aspect of this dispute. Facing great public dissatisfaction, GD tried to frame the Ukrainian issue in a narrow domestic context and make the public, or at least its supporters, believe that the United National Movement was influencing Kyiv’s decisions against the Georgian government.

Early in March, Zelenskyy addressed Georgian citizens and the residents of other European countries, asking for support for Ukraine. Zelenskyy’s words were broadcasted live on Tbilisi’s main Rustaveli Avenue. Again, thousands gathered in the centre of the capital to listen to the Ukrainian president’s speech. Representatives of the government did not attend.

What became clear during this time, both at the international and domestic level, was that the government and the public were on opposite sides of the issue. The ruling party was apparently unable to listen to the public. This growing gap between the government and the public became visible internationally as well. A distinction between the government and the Georgian people was visible in the statements made by Ukrainian officials, including Zelenskyy. Declarations would thank Georgians for their support, but not the government. Over the last few months, Ukrainian officials have addressed the citizens of Georgia many times, declaring that open support is not about being “dragged into a war” but about choosing a side between the aggressor Russia and Ukraine.  It seems that the majority of the Georgian public understands that Ukraine and Georgia are in the “same boat”. According to one poll from March, 87 per cent of Georgians perceive the war in Ukraine as their war as well, and that it affects Georgia fully or partially.

Georgian Dream’s attempt to blame dissatisfaction on the United National Movement in order to shift attention away from its Ukraine policy might have worked for a part of the GD’s supporters. However, it has not worked for the wider public as a whole. The society sees the developments in Ukraine and understands that tomorrow Georgia might find itself in a similar situation in which international support is needed. One must stand with Ukraine today, firmly and undoubtedly, against the common enemy to ultimately earn support from partners. As a result, “not irritating Russia” in light of the war in Ukraine does not seem pragmatic for many in the country. It is not because any Georgian irritation of Russia is necessary, but because the case of Ukraine shows that Russia does not need any reason to be aggressive.

Change in direction?

Tensions between Ukraine and Georgia flared up again when Zelenskyy expressed dissatisfaction with his ambassador’s inability to convince the country to take productive steps to support Ukraine. Due to this, Zelenskyy recalled the diplomat. After a few days, Ukraine’s defence ministry stated that Russia was working to establish smuggling routes for military goods in order to bypass sanctions. Ukraine argued that routes through Georgia could be used. The Georgian government demanded evidence for such accusations and called the statement “unfriendly”. In the end, no evidence was presented.

At the same time, the world discovered the massacres that took place in Bucha, with many international figures visiting the site to pay their respects to the victims. The head of Ukraine’s parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, invited his Georgian counterpart, Shalva Papuashvili, for a visit to see the scale of the tragedy, alongside other colleagues. Georgian Dream expressed a “general readiness” for the visit. However, the party listed some preconditions – issues they wanted to resolve before the visit. This included the return of Ukraine’s ambassador, evidence for the smuggling route allegations and an end to “radical” opposition leaders holding high positions in Ukraine.

Despite this, it seemed that GD then changed its position overnight. On April 13th Papuashvili expressed his readiness to visit Ukraine. Two days later, a parliamentary delegation consisting of parties from the parliament (except the United National Movement) led by Papuashvili travelled to Ukraine. There, they met Ukrainian officials and expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people.  

This sudden change surprised the Georgian public and brought new questions about what could have caused such a move. The authorities mentioned that it was due to consultations between the heads of the two countries’ parliaments and their agreement to continue friendly and constructive relations. Yet, for many this argument was not enough to explain the sudden change after several months of refusals to visit Ukraine.  

Indeed, it is difficult to explain. Yet when looking at the big picture, we know that the Bucha tragedy changed how the whole world viewed the war in Ukraine. It revealed the brutality of the Russian forces and the scale of the war crimes committed by the country. The number of high-level visits by western leaders after Bucha did not go unnoticed among the Georgian public, including the supporters of the ruling party. It became more and more difficult to explain why Georgia does not stand where its partners stand. On the other hand, it became known that the parliamentary opposition parties were planning a joint visit to Ukraine to express solidarity in the name of the Georgian people. Perhaps Georgian Dream came to understand that not being present during the visit would only further damage its domestic and international image. Consequently, this coincidence of circumstances forced the authorities to go against their own policy, abandon their preconditions and finally travel to Ukraine.

The Ivanishvili factor

Nevertheless, this change did not last long. Ukrainian officials began to openly talk about Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream party, and his Russian business ties. Some even called for sanctions against him as a pro-Russian oligarch. The Georgian government responded by blaming the desires of the United National Movement and its “Ukrainian partners” to drag Georgia into the war and open a second front.

The Ivanishvili factor, which is believed to be influencing the Georgian government and ruling the country from the shadows, gained significant importance in June. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia was denied candidate status by the European Union at this time. Georgia was given a list of conditions it needed to fulfil to gain full candidacy status. “De-oligarchisation” is one of the recommendations that the European Commission gave to Georgia.

To add insult to injury, the European Parliament held a debate in June about the media situation in Georgia and adopted a resolution describing Ivanishvili’s role in Georgian politics as destructive; stressing the need for the EU and its democratic partners to impose sanctions against him. Georgian Dream immediately began a campaign to defend Ivanishvili, saying that he cannot be considered an oligarch. They then argued that it was in fact the former president, Saakashvili, who should be subject to de-oligarchisation.

At the same time, the ruling party’s leaders have linked the EU decision with the Ukrainian government and said that leaders from the country have been “begging the EU not to grant Georgia candidate status”. The decision and the government’s response caused massive anti-governmental protests in Georgia, in which tens of thousands participated. A new popular pro-western movement was even launched during this time. The group’s manifesto describes Ivanishvili as the main obstacle on Georgia’s European path.

Does Georgia still have any friends?

The lack of a clear position towards Ukraine during the war has been surprising and even disappointing for many close partners of Georgia. Georgia has close relations with many Central and Eastern European countries, including the Baltic states and Poland. Key figures from these countries, who know Georgian politics well, have stressed their disappointment and confusion regarding Georgia’s unclear position on Ukraine. This is especially true given Tbilisi’s calls for its partners to condemn its own occupation by Russian forces. Members of the European Parliament have repeatedly expressed concerns not only about the situation of democracy in Georgia but also about Georgia’s positions towards Ukraine, calling it “difficult to understand”.

It is clear that Georgia’s traditional partners in the EU do not necessarily understand its unclear positions. This demonstrates not only the government’s inability to stand above domestic interests, but also raises questions about Georgia’s civilisational choice and future path. For many outside Georgia, the country’s lack of a clear and firm position is closely linked with its internal democratic problems and oligarchy. Thus, more and more high-ranking European figures have voiced the need to take action against the Georgian government and specifically the one person behind it, who rules the country in practice – Bidzina Ivanishvili. 

Today, in Georgia, the common belief is that Ukraine is a key test for the ruling party. For many, Georgian Dream has already failed this test. GD’s continued negative outlook on the presence of former high-ranking Georgian officials in the current Ukrainian government, as well as their unwillingness to discuss these issues constructively, have damaged both relations between the countries and Georgia’s international image. If the Georgian government continues its game of sending mixed signals to Ukraine in the future, it might harm the history of friendship between the two countries. The policy of supporting Ukraine in international organisations, but not being “too loud” in order to not irritate Russia, is no longer considered pragmatic by the Georgian public. This point of view is also taken by Ukraine and Georgia’s international partners.

For many in Georgia, this kind of positioning no longer serves the national interest. After all, it might contribute to the end of a good relationship with an important friend and strategic partner, whose fate is interconnected with the fate of Georgia. Moreover, Russia’s demands for a halt to NATO enlargement and regional states’ neutral status are not limited to Ukraine, they affect Georgia as well. Needless to say, Russian success in Ukraine will result in Georgia facing the same demands and aggression again. Hence, taking effective steps to contribute to Ukraine’s victory and restore trust among international partners is what Georgia’s national interest needs now more than ever.  

Nino Chanadiri is a Georgian analyst focusing on developments in Eastern Europe and beyond. She has conducted analysis for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.

Georgia, Georgian-Ukrainian relations, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine