Macron’s Eastern Europe rethink

President Emmanuel Macron recently obtained a rock-solid political victory, whatever the pundits might say to minimise his feat. Photo: macri roland / Shutterstock

 Overall, 58.55 per cent of the voters chose him over the far-right leader. His party is now very likely to achieve an absolute majority in the lower chamber of the parliament (Assemblée Nationale) this June. In other words, the victory at home looks much like a triumph abroad.

The state of international relations in general and the war in Ukraine in particular played a significant role in Macron’s re-election. The Russian invasion discredited his main opponents and competitors. Far-right (Le Pen and Éric Zemmour) and leftist (Jean-Luc Mélenchon) leaders had always been vocal in declaring their admiration for the master of the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin. Yet, in France at least, politicians must always take a significant step – actually a leap – to discuss international policies. It is well known among spin doctors and electoral moguls that foreign policy shows a candidate’s statesmanship but does not secure any votes. For French voters, international prestige is important but it is not a pressing matter.

First time around

Let us take a closer look at Macron’s policy for Eastern Europe and Russia during his first term (2017-21). This will help us scrutinise whether his success might play a decisive role in the reshaping of Eastern Europe’s strategic balance. French voters and leaders are usually not at ease with this part of Europe. They often struggle to grasp what is at stake east of Berlin. Yet, this does not prevent them from taking a profound interest in the critical situation faced by Ukraine and the other countries of the region. The war in Ukraine is no longer considered a regional issue in Paris. It is now a direct strategic, political and economic challenge for the French government.

In light of the current situation in Eastern Europe, several paths taken by Macron during his first mandate clearly led to nowhere. First and foremost, formats designed to improve relations with Russia, such as the “Brégançon spirit” and “Trianon Dialogue”, are now to be set aside for the foreseeable future. Inspired by the Soviet policy of Charles de Gaulle during the Cold War, Macron tried to establish and maintain direct communication channels with Vladimir Putin. The meeting of the two leaders in August 2020 just before the Biarritz G7 Summit at the official summer residency of the French presidents, the Brégançon Fort, showed these ambitions to the world. As of today, such direct dialogue would appear to be a fool’s errand, as such actions did not deter Russia from attacking Ukraine. The reshaping of the bilateral French-Russian relations is unavoidable.

Everyone in Eastern Europe remembers Macron’s 2019 statement that NATO is “brain dead”. Even then, the declaration was rather bitterly received in Riga, Warsaw and Sofia. But now it appears completely outdated. The more lives, infrastructure and cities that are destroyed in the war, the more NATO membership appears to be the only security guarantor for the region and Ukraine. Even historically neutral Sweden and Finland shifted their position and applied for membership in the Alliance. The French president can no longer advocate for any kind of European strategic autonomy in the region by criticising NATO.

Open political confrontation with Poland’s government was the third trend of Macron’s first mandate. This led to successes at home but setbacks in the region. Indeed, confronting the leadership of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has been a long-lasting goal for Macron. He has explicitly sided with the Polish opposition in the media, as well as during the country’s judicial and abortion rights reforms. He has subsequently left his mark on the European elections of 2022. The confrontation with PiS did not exclude a pragmatic alliance with regards to the European five-year budget. Yet, this long-term struggle diminished the French president’s prestige in Poland, the leader of the region and perhaps all of Eastern Europe.

Despite all of Macron’s international efforts and achievements during his first mandate, his history with Eastern Europe is far from a love affair. It remains to be seen whether he can do something about this and finally get what he wants: leadership of the continent.

Old challenges, new constraints

The current crisis in Eastern Europe leaves the re-elected French president with no other option but to reshape his foreign policy in the region. With a long war in Ukraine, inflation boom and energy crisis looming, Macron must rethink his strategies for Russia, the Balkans and non-EU states such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

For the French president, the first challenge is an old one: how to deal with a non-democratic and aggressive nuclear power such as Russia without undermining support for Ukraine and Eastern EU member states? Many of his predecessors grappled with the same dilemma. Macron’s second term will most probably reinforce the sanctions strategy against the Russian authorities. It is indeed one of his first mandate’s most important achievements and was organised in close cooperation with Berlin and Warsaw. It not only damaged Russian GDP in 2015-16 but also secured the position of EU member states throughout the continent. The French position will first set out to maximise the economic, diplomatic and military sanctions. Second, Paris will attempt to leverage them in order to obtain concessions from Russia when ceasefire talks seriously begin. The new constraint is that a revival of the “Brégançon spirit” is unacceptable. But the old goal of France remains the same: resist Russia without fighting it directly.

The Western Balkans will also be a top priority for Macron’s second term agenda. Indeed, in the last few months of its EU Council presidency, France will host a summit on the development of the region and on the EU candidacies of Serbia, North Macedonia and Albania. In the context of fast track membership for Ukraine, the summit will provide the re-elected French president with a unique opportunity in Eastern Europe. If he wants to display a sincere interest in the region, he will have to set a clear path for a new wave of enlargements and investments. If the French perspective on investment and enlargement remains unclear, a huge opportunity will be missed to bridge the gaps between France and Eastern Europe. Once again, the challenge is traditional: how can France be heard in a region where other voices (Germany, Austria, Russia) are historically louder? But the constraint is new: can EU membership be granted quickly to Ukraine without discouraging efforts in Belgrade, Tirana and Skopje?

Opportunity for a new approach?

Regarding support for Ukraine, the coming months will be decisive for the French president’s status in the region. He is sometimes accused of being only a tepid supporter of Kyiv. At the same time, he has been granted the title of “true friend of Ukraine” by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The challenges here are long term in nature. To tackle the emergency of the day, France will have to bolster Ukrainian military efforts with equipment, intelligence and logistics. But, in the medium term, it will have to exert maximum pressure on Russia to enter ceasefire talks and make concessions, so that Ukrainian sovereignty can be restored.

The “hour of truth”, however, will also involve discussions on the unavoidable reconstruction of the country. The business friendly former investment banker in charge in Paris has a vital role to play here. He can set up a brand new kind of relationship between France and Ukraine by gathering investors – both public and private – to give Ukraine a future. Whilst the challenge is largely predictable, the constraints are quite new for the French president. Indeed, prospective NATO and EU memberships can no longer be treated as distant questions. Eastern Europe wants clear and quick answers from the EU’s founding countries.

In spite of appearances, Eastern Europe has never been a marginal factor in Macron’s domestic agenda. In his first mandate, he suffered setbacks in his dialogue with Russia and the survival of NATO. Yet, he also engaged with PiS and the leaders of Hungary’s Fidesz to launch a new political trend in Brussels. With Germany and Poland, he managed to secure a sanctions strategy on Russia that asserted the geopolitical role of the European Union on the continent. Hence, his second and final term as president is supposed to be one in which international maturity wins over the fights of domestic politics. The critical situation facing Eastern Europe certainly will require the newly re-elected French president to find a new approach that will also strengthen his bonds with the continent as a whole.

Cyrille Bret is an associate researcher at Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors.

Emmanuel Macron, France, Russia, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine