How a free Belarus can join the anti-Putin coalition

Many acts of Russian aggression against Ukraine have originated from the territory of Belarus, including rockets attacks. Photo: Valeriya Zankovych / Shutterstock

The second states that regardless of all the atrocities, the status quo in Europe should be maintained. In other words, while we need to punish Russia for attacking Ukraine and the consequences of its military activities against this country and its nation, we should also allow the Kremlin to maintain its relatively strong position in international affairs. Put simply, Russia cannot come out of the current conflict weak and humiliated.

 While the first idea is supported by the current foreign policies of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, the Baltic states and a few Central European countries, the second one is the basis of activities (or lack thereof) of the French and German governments (along with a few other EU states). As a result, the current division within the West revolves around the question of whether Putin should receive a life jacket or not.  

Where opportunities lie

There are a few reasons why some western states cannot accept the end of the Russian empire. The most plausible is the continuing influence of the so-called “brotherhood of former empires”. Its elements can be noticed even today, which indicates that the old connections have not yet been overcome. It is also clear that some of the former colonial powers have not rid themselves of their imperial pain. As a result, they cannot stop thinking about Russia’s imperial role, even if they are convinced that Putin needs to be stopped. Thus, they would argue that we need to find a proper balance of power in international affairs.

I am not going to discuss whether the assumption that Russia’s imperial position should be maintained is realistic or not. In my view, it is simply impossible to engage in talks with Putin after what has taken place in Bucha, Irpin and other sites of genocide committed against the Ukrainian population by the Russian army. It is also clear and unquestionable that, at least with regards to Ukraine, the Kremlin pursues policies that allow it to engage in 20th century-style warfare and avoid internationally accepted diplomatic means and procedures.

It is also quite clear that after three months of war in Ukraine, neither Germany nor France have had any impact on the scale of the military activities undertaken by the Ukrainian side. There is no doubt that at the end of the day it will be the Americans and the British who will decide on how much military support Ukraine will obtain.

Returning to the first idea, its assumption that a weak Russia must be forced to introduce reforms and large systemic changes once it loses the war is not only welcomed by Central European and Baltic states, but also could be highly beneficial for several post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. In fact, it would mean a huge developmental opportunity for both of them.

And this is where the main difference between the two outlooks lies. Namely, the thinking that Russia needs to maintain its post-imperial position gives no room to an independent Belarus. Recognising this should encourage discussion on Russia’s position and role in today’s Europe. We may indeed not be able to find answers to such questions when intense military activity is still taking place in Ukraine, but we cannot help but notice that the US government has already started making efforts to expand the anti-Putin coalition beyond the borders of the European continent. This is evidenced by US talks with potential partners in Asia and Africa. In this process, we should not yet overlook the fact that a candidate willing to join such a coalition can be found very close to the frontline in the middle of Europe. There, it borders both Russia and Ukraine.

Backing a loser

Of course, the country in question is Belarus. Since at least 2020 we have known that we should not “leave it behind” to allow it to be taken over by Russia. However, in light of the current Russo-Ukrainian war, it is important to determine which side Belarus is really on. Alyaksandr Lukashenka is evidently Putin’s client. It is also quite clear that in recent months he has been paying his patron back for the support he received in 2020. It has also been recognised that some acts of Russian aggression against Ukraine originated from the territory of Belarus. This includes numerous rockets attacks.

However, the moment Lukashenka realised that Russia was not doing so well in Ukraine, he (unsurprisingly) took a few steps back and opted for a “wait and see policy”. Being in power for over a quarter of a century now, he knows all too well that the truth can be cruel and inexorable and that one day he too will be seen as responsible for the current atrocities. He also knows that he decided to help Putin against the will of the majority of Belarusian society. The population, unlike their Russian counterparts, do not support the war in Ukraine en masse. This is evidenced by public opinion polls showing that only a very small group (a maximum of six per cent) of Belarusians support their country’s engagement in the current war on the Russian side. Also, only a mere 30 per cent support Russia in this conflict.

These numbers, especially if we take into account the scale of the Kremlin’s propaganda in Belarus, may indeed suggest that the opinion of Belarusian society regarding the war runs contrary to the position of the Minsk authorities. They may also explain various cases of social discontent that have recently been recorded in Belarus. These include acts such as not allowing supply trains to continue their journeys. It is thus justified to say that Lukashenka decided to support Putin in his war against Ukraine because he was scared for himself. He wanted to protect his family fortune and his own position. However, Putin’s failure in Kyiv also placed Lukashenka in a losing position.

Keeping in mind the staged presidential elections of 2020 and continued protests, as well as the repressions that have been taking place in reaction to them, we know that Lukashenka does not represent Belarus. Even more importantly, regardless of the scale of the repressions, the Belarusian nation is not the dictator’s property. It continues to fight for its freedom and independence and now has been directing its attention towards the anti-Putin coalition that started to form in the aftermath of the February attack on Ukraine. Such activities can be observed among both the Belarusian political leaders who have been forced into exile since 2020 and the political oppositionists who are now kept in Belarus’s prisons.

But these activities can also be seen among Belarusian artists in the country or in exile, social activists, clergymen, and the assumed silent majority of citizens that now make up the independent part of Belarusian society. This clearly means that there is a “non-Lukashenka Belarus”. Not only is this Belarus real but it also supports Ukraine in its war against Russia. It is therefore in the West’s interests to include this non-Lukashenka Belarus in the anti-Putin coalition, in a similar way to how de Gaulle’s France was included in the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War. 

Democratic post-war Europe?

If we want to see a new democratic order in a post-war Europe, we need to start investing now. This will require us to focus more of our political capital on building a “new Belarus”. The first step in this process of empowering a post-Lukashenka Belarus involves the development of strong Belarusian political institutions in exile and their gradual recognition by the West. Since 2020, the US has almost no relations with Lukashenka’s government and there are no American diplomats in Minsk. At the same time, only three Belarusians work at their embassy in Washington DC. The situation in other western countries is similar. It is now high time that we stop fooling ourselves and finally place our bets on the collapse of the remains of Russia’s imperial power, which includes current Belarus’s status as a satellite state.

The 2020 and 2021 protests have created a paradoxical situation. While Belarusians became empowered as a society, in the end they lost control over their state. After 2020,  Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office was created in exile to give a voice to the country’s opposition. This centre of political representation of free Belarus is located in Lithuania. It is indeed a form of presidential office, even though it may not be called this officially. Warsaw, in turn, is home to the National Anti-Crisis Management group, which is an organisation comprised of Belarusian civil servants, social activists and former diplomats. The group is headed by Pavel Latushko, former Belarusian politician and diplomat.

We may say that this group is in a way Belarus’s government in exile. It recognises the supremacy of Tsikhanouskaya’s power and her role as representative of Belarus and the Belarusian people abroad.  Unfortunately, the western world has not decided to recognise this body either. It also does not recognise the Coordination Council, which resembles a national parliament and gathers such prominent figures as Svetlana Alexievich, Belarusian Nobel laureate in literature. These three political bodies of independent Belarus in exile work together, even though some of their members compete with each other for influence.

With most western attention now focused on Ukraine, interest in the situation in Belarus has naturally decreased. Consequently, the Belarusian political institutions in exile have also received less attention. Ideally, the situation should be the opposite. Belarusian émigrés should be given a clear signal that it is time for them to get organised and complete the process of establishing political institutions in exile.

The West should also admit that the framework of Belarus’s political system has already been established in exile. This includes three key institutions: the office of the president, the parliament and the government. Now it is time to complete the process and show them adequate support. This would be beneficial both for the West and the Belarusian society, which clearly does not support the war against Ukraine or Lukashenka’s involvement in it.  

The price of war

The second step for the true and real inclusion of Belarus in the anti-Putin coalition requires showing that the country does not support Putin militarily and is in fact fighting on the side of free Ukraine. In this regard, many things have already taken place as well. That is why all we need to do now is recognise and accept some facts. This includes the existence of an independent Belarusian battalion (known as the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment), which is made up of around 1,000 soldiers and officers. There are also other Belarusian military formations in Ukraine. To mark their importance and show on which side free Belarus stands in the current war, Tsikhanouskaya should oversee an oath of allegiance from the Belarusian soldiers who are now fighting in Ukraine. Finally, the third step in the fight for free Belarus should include a large information campaign, which would be directed at the Belarusian society. This would involve one simple message: Lukashenka is pushing you into a war that will shame you for decades.

In the coming months, we may witness a situation in which Putin temporarily gains the upper hand in the war against Ukraine and the repression of the Belarusian society gets even worse. This internal crackdown by Minsk will affect first and foremost those last Belarusian political activists who are not yet in prison. That is why we cannot allow Lukashenka to strengthen his position.  

Once he realises that the new Belarus indeed exists and constitutes a true alternative to his rule, and once he knows that after the war he will find himself on the court bench with Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka will be forced to make new calculations. It is indeed clear already that Belarusian institutions in the West will not get automatic support in countries such as France, Germany or Italy (I hope I am mistaken here). But this will only make Lukashenka’s life more difficult. He will have to operate in such a way that his silent patrons and impatient allied leaders in the West will have no reason to decide that the Americans were right when they placed their bets on Tsikhanouskaya. He will have to roll back the repressions against Belarusians in his country.

The ideology of Russkiy Mir (Russian World) is one of the foundations of the Russian war against Ukraine. In geographic terms, this vision is based on three states: Ukraine and Belarus in an alliance with Russia. The price of the war, from Russia’s perspective, is to take over Ukraine, while Belarus has faded into the background. But in reality, Belarus is the most forgotten asset that the West has in this war. That is why it needs to find allies throughout the entire world. Breaking down Putin’s regime is now the obvious goal of key western players. A few key political steps and a bit of imagination could ultimately make Belarus at the very least a symbolically important part of the anti-Putin coalition.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Paweł Kowal is a member of the Polish parliament (Sejm) and deputy chairman of its Commission on Foreign Affairs. He is also an adjunct professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy and a member of New Eastern Europe’s editorial board.

belarus, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine