The political psychology of war
Political ideologies are influenced not only by socio-demographic factors, but also by psychological variables such as personal needs, social identity processes and information processing. It is difficult to give a simplistic answer as to why people follow the ideological constructs of lies. The rejection of information, the instrumentalisation of the media and the erasure of dissenting voices, as well as the creation of confusion and fear, create weaponised narratives aimed at undermining civilisation and the personal as well as cultural identity of the opponent.
The current Russian war in Ukraine raises many questions about the human willingness to use violence and especially so when the justifications for war are based on false and fabricated claims. Systematic manipulation and ideological indoctrination have been clear parts of Vladimir Putin’s leadership style for quite some time now. He has almost perfected the tactics of psycho-political governance. This is accomplished through certain tactics and mind tricks that mobilise people to support the war or even participate in it.
July 14, 2022 -
Rasan Baziani
Raze Baziani
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AnalysisIssue 4 2022Magazine
Aggressiveness expressed in wars is often closely connected to the aggressiveness fomented internally by political elites in authoritarian systems. Photo: Lumen Photos / Shutterstock
Why war?
It is said that if you want to understand autocracy, you have to understand the autocrat. Yet, anyone expecting a remote psychological diagnosis of Vladimir Putin in this article will be disappointed. Whilst this would represent a break with professional practice, an identification of the leader’s core beliefs is also hampered by a lack of evidence. Remote diagnoses always remain speculative and therefore offer very little. However, it is possible to observe political behaviour and classify the basic logic of political patterns. Psychological models can then help us to understand the causes of political preferences or explain why certain tactics and policies are particularly effective.
In wars, political and/or economic interests gain validity and power. Linked to these, psychological factors can also push people to war and influence the way they conduct themselves. On the one hand, war, defined as armed physical conflict, seems to be a group phenomenon. On the other, it is based on psychological impulses that predispose individuals to their hostile and aggressive actions. Individuals have to deal with their own positive or negative emotions regarding war, while groups replace such emotions with social norms. Individuals can be more or less aggressive, but the aggressiveness of collectives must be formed from the aggregate of individuals. The individual will must therefore be generally ready to accept the collective phenomenon of war. But how do such social norms arise?
Aggression is fundamentally a natural human phenomenon. For a long time, it was assumed that the use of violence against other social groups served as a means of survival. But humans also managed to use this natural readiness for aggression to pursue the interests of ruling elites. At the same time, elites promote the idea that the people are pursuing their own interests when they participate in political violence. As a result, individuals declare themselves willing to risk their survival for the interests of elites. If we look at the perpetrators of violence on the front line, in other words the military, as well as their path to participation in war, it becomes clear that oppressive logics shape the pattern of action. Often humiliating military training and the orders of superiors ultimately generate hatred against those superiors among soldiers. But since aggression cannot be directed against superiors, it must be shifted to the enemy. This first occurs on an individual level and then as a military unit part of the collective. In this way, the image of the enemy is mixed with the individual’s projected aggressions. It then becomes easier to fight this enemy by all means. The idealisation of military goals leads to a rationalisation of collective projections and ultimately the legitimisation of destroying the enemy. At the same time, however, the distorted image of the enemy makes it more difficult to take note of reality. This leads to strategic misjudgements and makes it more difficult to bring about peace and reconciliation.
Another crucial element in the psychological mobilisation of people is the breaking of the taboo surrounding killing and the framing of conflict as a kind of “holy war”. The act of killing is a central taboo in every human culture and serves to protect the lives of all people. The prohibition of taking the lives of others is considered to be of paramount, sacred importance for human coexistence. In war, this logic is reversed both culturally and psychologically, as states demand that their soldiers extinguish other human lives in war. Such a breach of this sacred taboo subsequently requires particularly sacred justifications. In modern societies, the reversal of this ideal is usually justified by the defence of important cultural values. In this context, the enemy must represent a form of demonic evil. This is especially true when it comes to wars of aggression, which are precisely not aimed at self-defence. Indeed, these conflicts pursue other goals and often exploit the dictum of self-defence. The ideal of “holy war” demands that it always be presented as an act of self-defence against an insidious enemy who has forced (supposedly) peace-loving peoples to take up arms.
The dilemma of autocracy
Aggressiveness expressed in wars is often closely connected to the aggressiveness fomented internally by political elites in authoritarian systems. Authoritarianism is a system that forces people to obey governments and is often linked to fundamentalism, ethnocentrism and prejudice. In personalised autocracies such as Russia, state power is concentrated in the hands of a single person. There may be parties, a legislature and an influential military, but the most important administrative and political decisions are made by one single person. This in turn makes these personalised autocrats dependent on an informal inner circle of decision-makers that gets smaller and smaller over time. Important political positions are thus filled with loyalists instead of experts. The autocrats also distances themselves more and more from critical impulses, which in turn are crucial for political decision-making. This is a dilemma often faced by autocratic rulers. In turn, they often compensate for this issue by invoking the support of the people and abusing their support as a pretext for covering up their wrong decisions.
When people get into uncontrollable positions of political power, desires for power can be reinforced. Studies have shown that power changes thinking and feeling, especially when no limits are set. Those who get into positions of power often see it as proof of their superiority. This reinforces claims to authority and devalues those who think differently. Powerful individuals often develop a dehumanised and functional relationship with their fellow human beings, who are valued first and foremost for their usefulness. In psychology, this is called “objectification” – people are degraded and viewed as objects. Looking at it rationally, this is a zero-sum game in which it is only a matter of time before this position of power is undermined.
For Putin’s siloviki – members of the country’s vast security services – the situation is probably becoming increasingly dangerous. The war continues on and the more reality intrudes into the parallel reality of Putin’s echo chamber, the angrier the leader could become with his military and intelligence chiefs. In contrast, the siloviki could turn against their master. However, this does not seem to be happening at this point.
Weaponised narratives
It may seem contradictory, but autocrats love confirmation and want approval. If they do not get it, they will get it by using force if necessary. A fear-mongering ruler can induce an attitude of obedience among their people, putting them in a state of political powerlessness in which their options for action seem useless. This mindset is often reinforced with an element of threat, an antagonist to be fought. When a social group feels existentially threatened, its collective identity is formed under this threat. A struggle against the supposed danger then becomes a struggle to secure one’s existence. Not infrequently, this image is constructed under false premises and spread with the help of propagandistic media. The phenomenon of social groups projecting fear or hatred onto other groups is not new. In the modern world, however, humans are not automatically each other’s enemy. Understandings of the enemy are rather the result of learned and indoctrinated categories of thought. In particular, the constant repetition of (invented) threat elements creates the appearance of truth among people. Once people believe a theory, their perception is subject to cognitive influence. Whatever strengthens an individual’s position is filtered out and the person thereby enters an echo chamber. In this way, opposing viewpoints are less and less allowed and a simple theory can quickly become an ideology.
Putin alone controls power in his country. Evidently, the Russian system itself causes economic disadvantage and a lack of political participation among the population. But this responsibility is systematically shifted to others, such as the West and Ukraine. Domestic causes are simply ignored by the authorities. Dualistic thinking is very persistent in Moscow’s national narrative and historiography, which constantly emphasise Russian exceptionalism in relation to other political systems and worldviews. The Russian president is described by many voices as an eclectic, someone who picks approaches from different ideologies and uses them situationally to build his own theory. Indeed, Putin often links imperialism with neo-Eurasianism and pairs this with a revival of the Russian Orthodox Church. This makes sure that multiple belief systems are addressed among the people. Based on this, he has built a patriotic political programme that has been combined with controversial historical arguments. However, these constructions do not correspond with reality, so how can it be that they nevertheless bear fruit socially?
Political ideologies are not only influenced by socio-demographic factors, but also by psychological variables such as personal needs, social identity processes and information processing. Discriminatory prejudices and personal satisfaction with life also play a key role. It is therefore difficult to provide a simplified answer as to why there are people who follow the ideological constructs of lies. A lack of information, media manipulation and the eradication of dissenting voices strengthen the narrative of a “holy people”, which on the one hand need to be protected and on the other are themselves upgraded to saviours.
In Putin’s constructed worldview and the propaganda of state media, it is the Russians who are the saviours of the Slavs, or even the whole world. Counter-movements can be perceived as threatening by the adherents of these theories because they fundamentally question their own self-image. In an increasingly complex world, and especially in multicausal events such as wars, it is very comfortable and palliative to assume that one bears no responsibility. The human need for simplification is not only theoretically understandable but can also be explained through psychology. Cognitive dissonance, that is, an inner tension arising from contradictory perceptions, is emotionally unpleasant. To end this negative emotional state, the tension is attributed to other causes. Bogus solutions and excuses are then sought.
Another coping mechanism is externalisation, in which behaviour is presented as being forced by outside actors. This allows the individual to avoid responsibility and confrontation with their own thoughts. Putin has adopted precisely these dissonance reduction strategies for his people. He shifts responsibility, declares war as inevitable and externally provoked, and soothes the soul of the Russian people through the ideological valorisation of national sentiment. This should not be interpreted as an appeal for understanding regarding the Russian people and their current situation. However, it should show how dangerous Putin’s manipulation is and how effectively it appeals to many people in multiple ways.
Psychological trauma
Wars “benefit” only a small number of elites, but they result in material and emotional devastation for countless people. The loss of loved ones, a permanent state of fear, and disconnection from one’s homeland not only disturb the psyche but also demonstrably disrupt the hormonal balance of human beings. In the course of warfare, the lifting of the killing taboo releases psychological processes that are later difficult to bring under control again. Trauma and the experience of extreme helplessness can be forever inscribed in the psyche. It can lead to emotional numbness and loss of trust in the social environment. Increased irritability, social withdrawal and uncontrollable anger are part of the behavioural repertoire of many affected people. The prevalence rates of psychological trauma among civilians in conflict zones are around 15 to 26 per cent. This massively exceeds the global average of 3.2 per cent. Civilians are more likely to experience intrusive memories, which means that traumatic experiences can unintentionally reappear in their minds again and again. Numerous studies also show that children who experience wars are more likely to suffer from various anxiety disorders than those who grow up in peace. There is also evidence that the stress hormones of mothers can be transmitted to children born under war conditions. Further implications have not yet been conclusively proven, but there are various indications that transgenerational trauma can also be directly inherited across generations.
Direct exposure to warfare causes civilians to experience a strong discrepancy between real and imagined threats, blurring the line between soldiers and civilians in many ways. The justification of acts that the population was previously incapable of doing due to moral convictions causes trust in fellow human beings to fade. Fighting for the security of the country may provide a group feeling and a sense of agency, in other words, the feeling of being in control of one’s actions. However, this lasts only for a limited period of time and the constructs responsible for maintaining mental health sometimes falter irreversibly. The feeling of self-efficacy, namely a person’s conviction that they can successfully overcome challenging situations on their own, can be weakened in the long term. Socially, such developments can encourage a feeling of political powerlessness that favours further authoritarian governance under strong rulers. The instrumentalisation of this condition by violent regimes manifests at this point once again through the objectification of the individual, who is insidiously developed into an empty shell for the benefit of the regime.
After all, it is important to mention that psychological models do not work like a mathematical formula. Human behaviour is very complex and not so easily predictable. Providing simple explanations for it would only create a warped picture of reality. Nevertheless, people are suggestible and history has shown that a toxic political environment often leads people to disastrous behaviour. Therefore, it is of particular importance to deal with political psychology, create sensitivity to manipulation and, in the long run, make it more difficult for authoritarian regimes to “psychologically weaponise” their population.
Rasan Baziani studied psychology at the University of Bonn, Germany, where she specialised in legal psychology, organisational psychology, clinical psychology and psychotherapy. She is currently pursuing a master’s degree in both Applied Cognitive and Media Science and General Psychology at the Universities of Duisburg-Essen and Hagen, Germany. Her work focuses on human-computer interaction and communication.
Raze Baziani studied law at the University of Bonn and political science & law at the University of Münster, Germany, where she specialised in the international law of economic relations with a focus on the Caucasus and the Middle East.




































