From emperors to refugees: Russian emigration to Armenia and Georgia

Photo: Telsek / Shutterstock

Many young, intellectual Russians, who are outspoken against the Russian government and the war in Ukraine, are among those settling abroad. They are afraid of repressions at home and want to live an independent life in freedom. Some of them contribute to initiatives that support Ukraine from abroad. But not all of them have these noble intentions. Many Russians leave Russia because they fear the impact of western sanctions, want to continue consuming western brands and products, and want to escape possible conscription in the war against Ukraine – all without questioning their government or opposing the conflict. As a result, the Russian population migrating abroad is a heterogeneous group that has left the country for a variety of reasons.

Two countries that have attracted particularly large numbers of Russian citizens since the war began are Armenia and Georgia. How this wave of Russian migration is perceived in each country has a lot to do with its respective national identity, trauma and narrative.

Georgia’s trauma and Russia

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, around 30,000 Russian citizens have emigrated to Georgia, more than doubling the number of Russians living in the country. In addition to the capital Tbilisi, where the majority of Russians have settled, some have also moved to the Black Sea coastal city of Batumi. The majority of the Georgian population is extremely critical of these new Russian citizens in their country. Many are now demanding a stronger visa regime regarding Russian immigration. Elene Khoshtaria is one of the most outspoken Georgian politicians in this regard. She has received much support for her strong views from the Georgian public.

Recently, it has not been uncommon for public quarrels and mutual attacks to occur between Russians and Georgians. Georgian society, otherwise globally known for its hospitality, greatly resents this latest wave of Russian emigration as it fears its possible consequences. The most obvious reason for this broad rejection stems from past direct and indirect wars with Russia, as well as the country’s occupation of about 20 per cent of Georgian territory. The trauma of the 1992-93 Georgian-Abkhazian War, in which Russia was an indirect warring party supporting the Abkhazian separatists against Tbilisi, is still fresh. More than 250,000 Georgians were forced to flee Abkhazia and about 4,000 Georgians were killed in massacres that the OSCE and UNHCR repeatedly described as ethnic cleansing (Budapest Declaration and Geneva Declaration on Ethnic Cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia between 1992 and 1993 adopted by the OSCE and recognized as ethnic cleansing in 1994 and 1999).

The next major trauma suffered by Georgians at the hands of Russia was the August War of 2008, when Moscow moved military forces into the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These units then fought alongside Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists against the Georgian military. At the end of the war, Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s “independence”. Despite this, these areas are now militarily and economically dependent on Moscow and have been occupied by Russian forces ever since. The loss of these two regions that belong to Georgia under international law, as well as the trauma of war and the creeping Russian occupation that has continued since 2008, has encouraged antipathy toward Russia in Georgian society.

On the Georgian side, there is much trauma directly connected with the Kremlin’s actions. Since the 2008 war, Russia has been moving the military contact line that separates Russian troops from the Georgian-controlled territories further and further into the country’s heartland. Many Georgians fear that the Russians now living in Georgia could be used as a “Trojan Horse” by the Russian government. They could provide Russia with an opportunity – as it has already done in Ukraine and Moldova – to invade Georgia under the pretext of protecting Russian-speaking people and Russian citizens in its neighbouring states. Russian troops are currently only about 60 kilometres away from the Georgian capital. Realistically, the small Georgian army would hardly be able to oppose the Russian Goliath. Moreover, Georgia and Russia share a border that is more than 700 kilometres long. This remains a constant source of worry from a Georgian point of view. The fact that both Georgians and Russians predominantly belong to the Orthodox Church could also be used by Russia as an ideal pretext for re-establishing Russkiy Mir in Georgia.

The fear of Russification

Besides the military threat and the real occupation of parts of Georgia, however, Georgians are concerned much more with regards to their rejection of Russian immigration. Fear is spreading that Georgia could become increasingly Russified and many are now concerned with preserving their own national identity and culture. Many want to leave behind the country’s Soviet legacy, as well as the lingua franca of the Soviet Union – Russian. A large number of Georgians perceive growing Russian immigration as a danger that could once again see them forced into a Russian and Russian-speaking dominant culture.

This discontent among the Georgian population has given rise to a number of civic ideas and initiatives that demand that Russian immigrants come to terms with Georgian history and language. For example, some Georgian banks have allowed Russian citizens to open bank accounts only if they sign a document recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parts of Georgia and condemn Moscow’s occupation of Georgia and war in Ukraine. In some Tbilisi bars and cafés, people are even forbidden to speak Russian and are encouraged to speak Georgian or English.

Whilst these actions may seem extreme, Russia does pose a real threat to Georgia. This goes beyond the danger of new military confrontations. For example, many citizens now think that uncontrolled immigration could allow dangerous Russian nationals to challenge Georgia’s national security. As former Georgian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Giorgi Badridze notes, there is a risk that Russian security forces could smuggle themselves into the country and carry out attacks on Georgian pro-western politicians or Russian opposition figures. This would resemble the attacks that occurred in the past in the UK and Germany. For this reason, he has called for a new visa regime for Russian citizens. This would allow the Georgian authorities to determine the political backgrounds and potential security risks of Russian nationals wishing to enter the country.

The Russian war in Ukraine has driven another wedge between Georgia’s current government and the country’s young, liberal intellectuals. In spite of the country’s tremendous solidarity with Ukraine, not all Georgians are on Kyiv’s side. The current Georgian Dream government, for example, failed to take a clear stance on the war and did not join western sanctions against Russia. One might suspect that this strategy was designed to discourage the Kremlin from also attacking Georgia. The current government’s actions do sometimes seem to follow this logic. While virtually all Russian citizens, regardless of their political views and background, are currently allowed to settle in Georgia, the country’s border authorities have refused entry to liberal Russian oppositionists, such as journalist Mikhail Fishman, who worked for the independent media outlets Ekho Moskvy and Dozhd. This unsettled not only the pro-western segments of Georgian society but also the West, which is now asking itself whether Tbilisi is still the “beacon of liberty” that George W. Bush described it as in 2005.

Russian emigration to Armenia

Georgia’s southern neighbour Armenia has also witnessed an unprecedented influx of Russian citizens. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, more than 20,000 Russian citizens have been registered as new residents in Armenia, with the actual number present in the country likely to be even higher. Before, only up to 4,000 Russian citizens lived in Armenia. Most of these people were affiliated with the Russian 102nd Military Base in Gyumri.

A good number of Armenians acknowledge the positive effects of Russian emigration to their country. Many new businesses have been registered in Armenia, especially in the IT sector, bringing investments, human capital and money into the country. Within only three months, Yerevan’s gastronomy sector has been boosted significantly, with new cafés, bars and restaurants opening every week. In addition, the tourism sector grew considerably within this short amount of time. These investments are hugely appreciated in Armenia, especially after the destruction brought about by the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Yet, this boost in investment also has its downsides. Apartment rents in Yerevan skyrocketed over the last three months. Landlords have subsequently been incentivised to evict their local tenants in order to jump on the bandwagon of renting out their property for double or triple the normal price to generally wealthier Russian citizens. This has led to the segregation and gentrification of the Armenian capital.

Whilst apartment rents have gone up, the overall cost of living has risen dramatically in the country and rendered many things unaffordable for the local population. This tendency has raised concerns regarding an increasing social divide and polarisation. Discontent over rising price levels is especially clear among lower income households in Armenia. The same factors have also affected Georgia’s rent and general prices, despite being a popular tourist destination for Russians and westerners alike.

A shield of protection?

Armenia’s national trauma differs significantly from that in Georgia. In contrast with the Georgian experience, Russia has been historically perceived as more of a saviour than an enemy in Armenia. During the Armenian Genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire, it was Russia that accepted major Armenian refugee influxes. This saved a considerable share of the Armenian population from almost certain death at the hands of Turkish nationalists.

Whilst Russia has controversially given weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, many Armenians perceive Russia as their protector thanks to generous loans and a strong military presence in their country. Despite this, many Armenians were surprised by the Kremlin’s non-intervention during the last outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. While Baku was massively supported by Turkey, Armenia found itself largely fighting on its own, leaving many Armenians disillusioned with their alleged “saviour”. Russia’s popularity decreased massively in Armenia and many concluded that Russia is not an actual ally. For many, it now seems that Moscow rather only intervenes when it serves its own interests.

While the perception of Russia as a friend and saviour has suffered increasing unpopularity among Armenians since the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, many still understand that they do not have a choice. Realistically speaking, Russia is the only significant actor in the region that could come close to resembling an ally for Yerevan. Otherwise, Armenia would be completely on its own. Militarily, it is already a constant struggle for Armenia to keep its positions in Nagorno-Karabakh. Economically, Armenia would be very isolated without Russia, as the borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey are closed. Armenia’s southern neighbour Iran is itself suffering financially from decades-long sanctions.

From this point of view, Russian emigrants to Armenia can even serve as a certain shield of protection for the country. Russia’s instrumentalisation of its diaspora is widely known and many Armenians believe that a growing Russian population will lead Moscow to have a more vigilant eye regarding the security of Armenia. In the face of centuries-old threats from Turkey and Azerbaijan, many Armenians hope that a larger Russian presence in their country will counter pan-Turkic ambitions in the region. Whether such calculations will pay off in the end is yet to be determined.

Armenia’s trauma regarding Turkey and Azerbaijan leads the majority of Armenians to fear their Turkic neighbours instead of Russia. This point of view is perpetuated by two further factors. The first is the fact that Armenia, unlike Georgia, does not share any land border with Russia. This makes it impossible for the Russian army to simply enter Armenia. The second one is that – precisely due to its trauma – Yerevan has integrated into several Russian-led organisations. This includes the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). At least for now, the Kremlin does not fear a significant political pivot towards the West in Armenia, such as in Georgia and Ukraine. This is because the Russian leadership is well aware of Armenia’s dependence on Russia.

Armenia’s “mixed feelings”

Despite Armenia’s dependence on Russian security protection, the country’s population is very much divided on the question of Russian emigration to their country. Many perceive it as an economic opportunity and a potential additional security shield. Others, just like in Georgia, fear for Armenia’s cultural and linguistic independence. This is especially true among Armenians from historic Western Armenia and the Middle East, who do not share any common history or (post-) Soviet culture with Russia. People from these backgrounds more often advocate for more independence from Moscow.

In addition, Armenian society is also divided when it comes to Russia’s war in Ukraine. While most Georgians oppose Russian immigration because they believe Russians should feel the economic consequences for tolerating and supporting a regime so often hostile to Tbilisi, Armenians have mixed feelings about the conflict. While most Armenians have experienced the horrors of war themselves and therefore feel for Ukrainians, the current government in Kyiv is perceived with suspicion in Armenia. This is because the Ukrainian leadership openly supported Azerbaijan in the last war in Nagorno-Karabakh and has even delivered weapons to Baku. Given Ukraine’s struggle with separatist forces in Donbas and Crimea, Kyiv chose to support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity over the proclaimed self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population.

The Secretary of the Security Council of Ukraine Aleksey Danilov even went so far as to publicly encourage Azerbaijan via Twitter to start new military clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh. The politician hoped that a new military front would be opened against Russia, thus weakening Moscow’s advancements in Ukraine.

“Every man for himself” goes the old saying. Armenians understand very well that Ukraine is not their ally and they know that a weakened Russia will only weaken Yerevan. Any wish that Russia’s population suffer economic, financial and political consequences for the war in Ukraine is therefore not widespread in the country. With an Armenian diaspora of well over a million in Russia, Armenians know that economic sanctions will also affect their friends and relatives living there. Many Armenian households are dependent on money transfers from the diaspora and seasonal workers in Russia. If these transfers decrease, this is yet another reason for Armenians to regard the influx of Russian citizens and investment as an overall positive contribution to their country’s economy.

Svenja Petersen studied political science, European affairs and political economy at Sciences Po Paris, the Free University of Berlin and the London School of Economics. In June 2021, she graduated from the College of Europe in Natolin, where she specialised in the EU’s Eastern Partnership and EU-Russia relations.

Armenia, Georgia, migration, Russia, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, War