Russia’s war in Ukraine: perspectives from the South Caucasus

Photo: Alina Troeva / Shutterstock

None of the three states have joined the sanctions against Russia’s regime, underlining their vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia. The war’s security implications for the three countries vary from being extremely dangerous for Georgia’s statehood, to having negative economic and geopolitical impacts on Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia: abstention due to overdependence on Russia

Armenia’s reaction to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine on February 24th has been mostly shaped by Yerevan’s heavy reliance on Russia. However, this approach also indicates a certain level of agency. Russia is Armenia’s key security and military ally in the region. At the same time, the well-being of ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region depends on the Russian peacekeeping force, which was deployed there after Armenia’s crushing defeat in the war against Azerbaijan two years ago.

Since the beginning of Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, the Armenian authorities have been trying to strike a delicate balance between politically supporting Russia and avoiding international isolation by not crossing red lines in the eyes of the international community. Armenia did not join any of the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia and was the only country that voted against the suspension of Russia’s representation in the Council of Europe on February 26th. At the same time, Yerevan tried to establish its limits regarding how far it is willing to follow Russia by declining to recognise Ukraine’s separatist republics. Furthermore, Armenia abstained from voting against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Yerevan also abstained from voting on holding debates about the human rights situation in Ukraine in the UN Human Rights Council. On the societal level, a number of medium-sized protests in support of Ukraine have taken place in Armenia. Additionally, several pro-Russian rallies of a smaller scale took place in the country. Next to loyalty to Russia, Ukraine’s arms supplies to Armenia’s regional rival Azerbaijan in previous years could also have contributed to the reluctance of Yerevan and wider society to express more solidarity with Kyiv.

In the medium and long-term perspectives, Russia’s war against Ukraine will very likely have serious negative security and economic implications for Armenia. The country’s over-reliance on Russia’s security guarantees makes Yerevan vulnerable to Moscow’s demands. Should Russia start pushing Yerevan hard to actively align with its diplomatic position or recognise Ukraine’s separatist and annexed territories, it could bring Armenia to the edge of regional and international isolation. On the other hand, angering Russia could result in more instability and a deteriorating security situation both in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the Armenian economy too will suffer from the war and western sanctions against Russia. For the country, Russia is its main trade partner and main source of remittances and investments. All of these three areas may suffer significantly under western sanctions. At the same time, Armenia has been trying to capitalise on the crisis by inviting Russian firms to relocate to Armenia in order to evade the sanctions. This risky but smart move could really help the Armenian economy.

Azerbaijan: humanitarian aid and deepening relations with Russia

Azerbaijan’s reaction to Russia’s war in Ukraine is closely connected to Baku’s long-term objectives of securing influence over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and its “multi-vector” policy between Russia, Turkey and the West. Since the outbreak of the war, the regime of Ilham Aliyev has applied a tactic of strategic restraint towards Russia. It has also maintained its strong diplomatic ties with Turkey, as well as humanitarian engagement with Ukraine. Much like Ankara, Kyiv remains a key regional partner for Baku.

Shortly before the beginning of the war and after Russia’s recognition of the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev travelled to Moscow. The meeting, which was held to commemorate the 30th anniversary of Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia, ended with a declaration of “Allied Interaction”. According to Aliyev, this agreement will take co-operation between the two countries to a new level as allies. While the declaration includes clauses about deepening military co-operation, it also underlines the significance of economic ties, stating that the two sides “will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other party”. This may jeopardise Baku’s energy projects and its energy relations with EU states, which are frantically looking for alternative energy supplies to decrease their dependence on Russian gas and oil.

At the diplomatic level, Azerbaijan has been extremely cautious. Similar to its major ally Turkey, Baku has been calling for a dialogue between Ukraine and Russia and offered to mediate between the warring parties. While Baku avoided taking an explicit position on Russia’s recognition of the Luhansk and Donetsk republics, it indirectly supported Ukraine’s independence by making reference to the “sovereignty and territorial integrity issues of the states” when discussing conflict resolution. Baku also did not attend the United Nations General Assembly vote about the Russian incursion into Ukraine and remained largely silent when the Azerbaijani honorary consulate in Kharkiv was struck by a Russian missile. At the same time, Baku sent medical aid to Ukraine and has provided free gas to Ukrainian hospitals. At the societal level, medium-sized demonstrations took place in the country’s capital in support of Ukraine.

Russia’s war in Ukraine could have some profound security and economic implications for Azerbaijan. Already before the war the impression was strong in Azerbaijan that western influence in the South Caucasus was declining vis-à-vis an assertive Russia and Baku needed to adjust its standing accordingly. A deepening of its strategic partnerships with Turkey and Russia can be viewed as attempts by Baku to secure more external support for its position on Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, the ongoing war could result in Russia further consolidating its influence in the South Caucasus, endangering Azerbaijan’s balancing policy and making Baku vulnerable in relation to Russia.  

Georgia: gap in government and society response

Of the three South Caucasus countries, the most discrepancy between government and society can be observed in Georgia. Considering the close strategic partnership between Georgia and Ukraine and their co-operation as part of the Associated Trio, Tbilisi’s cautious position caused controversy among the Georgian public and frustrated Kyiv.

Earlier in February, before Russia’s invasion, the parliament of Georgia issued a resolution supporting Ukraine that failed to mention Russia’s involvement in the crisis. In his initial statement on the first day of war, the Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili  condemned Russia’s “military attack”. The Georgian government also allocated financial and humanitarian aid for Ukraine. Later, however, Garibashvili refused to participate in economic sanctions, considering them “ineffective” and harmful to the country’s economic and security interests. The Georgian government also denied landing a Ukrainian charter plane intended to take Georgian volunteers to Ukraine. In response to Georgia’s stance on sanctions, Ukraine recalled their ambassador from Georgia, describing the country’s political position as “immoral”. The ruling Georgian Dream party viewed Zelenskyy’s decision as an attempt to involve Georgia in the war. It has also accused the opposition United National Movement of doing the same.

Memories of the 2008 war, as well as the government’s vague stance, brought hundreds of thousands of Georgians onto the streets to protest in support of Ukraine in Tbilisi and other cities. Whilst they fiercely protested against Russian aggression, they also demanded the resignation of Georgia’s prime minister. The public pressure increased as Ukraine applied for EU candidate status, fearing that Georgia would miss the window of opportunity due to the government’s reluctance. As the Georgian society further challenged the government’s official position, the latter later adopted a more supportive tone towards Ukraine and even decided to apply for EU membership. This step was initially planned to take place in 2024. The most recent polls also confirm that the absolute majority of Georgians blame Russia for the war and want their country to show more support for Ukraine with both words and concrete actions.

Interestingly, this discrepancy could be observed not only between the public and the government but also between the country’s parliament and president. President Salome Zourabichvili, who has not enjoyed much popularity among Georgians and largely played a ceremonial role in Georgian politics, suddenly emerged as an actor with a voice. She tried to save Tbilisi’s reputation by loudly supporting Ukraine during her visits to Paris and Brussels to express solidarity. In terms of security implications, Russia’s war against Ukraine uniquely represents an imminent danger to Georgia. For Russia, Ukraine and Georgia are very similar in many regards as the two states stand in the Kremlin’s way of reintegrating the former Soviet space. Many in Georgia subsequently fear that their country could be Russia’s next target, again. The government’s cautious approach towards the Russo-Ukrainian War can be viewed as a part of its non-provocative policy towards Russia stemming from these security-related anxieties. Yet, the way the Georgian government communicated its strategy was diplomatically disastrous and resulted in avoidable damage to Georgia’s image, as well as diplomatic tensions between Ukraine and Georgia. Next to security threats, Georgia is also poised to suffer from international sanctions against Russia, as the country is highly dependent on Russian exports, imports, remittances and tourists.

Reactions from the de facto states in the South Caucasus

All three  de-facto states in the South Caucasus – Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia– welcomed Russia’s decision to recognise Donetsk and Luhansk, referring to the right of self-determination. While South Ossetia already directly recognised the republics in 2014, Abkhazia did so one day after Russia invaded Ukraine. Reportedly, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have sent soldiers and military equipment to Ukraine to support Russia’s military invasion. While it is difficult to identify the full scale of societal reactions in both de facto states, rallies have reportedly been held in both capitals – Sukhumi and Tskhinvali – in support of Russia. Sanctions targeted at Russia are expected to have a negative impact on Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s political economies, which are mostly dependent on Russian subsidies and tourists. Moreover, due to the looming crisis inside Russia amid the economic sanctions, Moscow may further reduce its already shrinking subsidies to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This would be a significant blow to the quasi-autarkic economies of the two regions. 

Nagorno-Karabakh’s Foreign Minister David Babayan called Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s eastern regions historic and emphasised that Nagorno-Karabakh should also be acknowledged as independent. Yet still, the so-called people’s republics in Donbas have offered no official recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh. This can be explained by the fact that Moscow has not recognised the area as an independent country either. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the security situation has deteriorated in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Ceasefire violations have allegedly accelerated, resulting in the death of an Armenian serviceman. Additionally, a critical gas pipeline to Nagorno-Karabakh was damaged, leaving the residents of the region without electricity for over a week. While some Armenian analysts fear that Azerbaijan could use Ukraine as a distraction to continue a “long-term policy of ethnic expulsion in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Yerevan officially remains calm and committed to peaceful solutions in both conflicts. Next to security issues, Nagorno-Karabakh could also suffer from negative economic implications. Since the region remains highly dependent on Armenia, economic problems including but not limited to declining remittances, inflation, and declining trade with Russia, will easily spill over into the area.

What is to come

Russia’s incursion into Ukraine marked the beginning of a new era in Europe and beyond. The rather peaceful security order established after the end of the Cold War was replaced by a more confrontational and dangerous system that amounts to a new Cold War between Russia and the West. The war in Ukraine also opened long-standing geopolitical wounds in the three states of the South Caucasus, which now find themselves on the frontline of the new Cold War.

Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan’s modest reactions to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine underline the precarious states that the three countries find themselves in. Georgia is the most vulnerable among the three and could be the next victim of Russia’s imperial plans. Perceptions regarding this imminent threat largely explain the Georgian government’s cautious position that puts it at odds with the public.

Russia has also been effectively instrumentalising the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to increase its influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This explains Baku and Yerevan’s self-restrained positions regarding the war in Ukraine. Azerbaijan even decided to boost its security by scaling up its partnership with Russia. Overall, the Russo-Ukrainian War has made the three South Caucasus states geopolitically more fragile and economically more vulnerable regarding the potential spillover of Russia’s looming economic decline.

Veronika Pfeilschifter is a doctoral candidate and research associate at the Institute for Caucasus Studies at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany.

Bidzina Lebanidze is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Institute of Slavic Languages and Caucasus Studies at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena.

Irena Gonashvili is a doctoral candidate and research associate at the Institute for Caucasus Studies at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, South Caucasus, Ukraine at war