Learning “history” with Putin

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

These ideas were also present in his July 2021 essay. All three “lessons” outlined ideas of loss and betrayal. For example, he mentioned Russia’s loss of territory (or “stolen” as he claims) and Ukraine’s betrayal, both in terms of the country’s supposed denial of its shared history and its move towards the West. Either way, Putin has been carving out this discourse over the past few months. How many people have accepted this point of view?

Unclear support

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one of the main questions that scholars and outsiders are trying to make sense of is whether or not Putin’s propaganda machine is working? Do regular Russian people believe in Putin’s fables? After several weeks of war, things remained uncertain. At the beginning of Russia’s invasion, thousands of Russian people came (and still come) onto the streets to protest Putin’s decision. Many others, while angered by the Russian president’s approach, did not take to the streets, mainly in response to the country’s repressive laws on protest and opposition action. The general sense was that Russia’s population was not supportive of war.

However, opinion polls and information that has been released over recent weeks indicate that this is not wholly the case. For example, when asked whether they did or did not support war in Ukraine, the Russian public opinion research centre “VCIOM” reported that over 60 per cent of respondents supported the military action. Conflicting views of Russia’s war are also being reported in outlets like the BBC. Their recent article, titled “Ukraine war: ‘My city’s being shelled, but mum won’t believe me’”, shows that tight controls on media discourses are heavily influencing citizens’ beliefs that Russian bombing is an accidental by-product of its “liberation” campaign. That being said, it is worth noting that often the most extreme cases are magnified, and opinion polls are not wholly reliable in Russia.

On March 4th the Levada Centre (an independent polling agency in Russia –editor’s note) outlined that 60 per cent of Russians believed that the United States and NATO caused the escalation in Ukraine. However, it is unclear how this outcome sits across generations. VCIOM’s most recent opinion poll shows a generational divide, with older generations showing great support for Russia’s invasion in Ukraine. The younger generations have demonstrated discontent with Putin’s action, not only in such opinion polls but in individual testimonies found in media outlets like the Guardian. When the Guardian called for Russian views on Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, they received several submissions from younger Russians stating that they “got in touch to say that they were opposed to their government’s actions in Ukraine, with many emphasising they had family, friends and partners in Ukraine”. While some protesting “babushkas” that survived the Leningrad blockade and young people displaying the “Z” movement symbol on their chest do exist, how will Putin reconcile these large generational divides?

Youth indoctrination

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russian politicians have made changes to how historical education is taught. One aspect of this was the way in which key historical events in Russia are spoken about in public. This is especially clear with regards to the Great Patriotic War. In a 2020 referendum, several amendments were made to the country’s constitution, including the protection of “historical truth”. This amendment prohibited activities and statements that diminished “the people’s heroic protection of the Fatherland”, further restricting the popularisation or creation of diverging narratives concerning this historical event.

The state has also established numerous extracurricular initiatives in recent years to raise patriotism among young people. The youth movement Yunarmiya is one of these projects. The movement was established in 2016 by the Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu as a place where “young soldiers master the basics of initial military training, develop leadership skills, acquire scientific and technical competencies.” By participating in an all-encompassing educational system that glorifies military victory and promotes essential life skills (appropriately attached to military training), the youth is exposed to several “good” civic values that promote pride in the nation and a willingness to sacrifice for the fatherland. The Nashi movement would have been the perfect vehicle for promoting Putin’s propaganda initiative but the group’s aggressive tactics led to its dissolution in 2019. Yunarmiya prides itself on promoting both patriotism and discipline as propagated through its militaristic elements.

The youth is an important societal category as it is the future generation that will carry Putin’s “liberation” message forward. With young impressionable minds, school education has often been considered an effective vehicle for perpetuating and disseminating state-led propaganda. In addition, a military-patriotic education has long existed in Russia (both Soviet and post-Soviet), with students learning about Russian/Soviet military victories and participating in the “Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy” (a predecessor of Yunarmiya). What Putin has now created around Russia’s “special military operation” will fit easily into pre-existing educational structures because, if anything, they have only strengthened over time.

Putin delivered a state-wide history lesson on Monday February 21st. Since then, the youth has become the main group targeted by state-led propaganda. On Thursday March 3rd, for example, the television channel Rossiya-1, at 12 midday in Moscow, held an hour-long “All-Russian lesson on the war in Ukraine”. The aim of this lesson was to teach students “why the liberation mission in Ukraine is a necessity”. Alongside this lesson, teachers have been given manuals on how to explain Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and specifically to reiterate the idea that Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine is a “special military operation” and not a war.

Alongside directives given to educators, resources have been created by the state to perpetuate discourses found in Putin’s February 21st speech. Tsargrad.tv, for example, created a short cartoon sketch for children. In this cartoon sketch, five children (bearing the flags of their country in the form of t-shirts) are used to portray the supposed territorial disputes in the Donbas region of Ukraine. The video involves a showdown between the various countries (the US, Germany, Russia and Ukraine), Ukraine’s betrayal of Russia and the subsequent bullying of Russia by other countries. Russian students are being indoctrinated across several societal institutions with “history lessons” that fit Putin’s justifications to invade Ukraine.

A return to Soviet practices and isolation

These history lessons are enhanced by extracurricular activities that promote support for the “refugees” of Donetsk and Luhansk who have been “evacuated” to Russia. One example of this can be seen in the activities undertaken by Yunarmiya. On March 2nd, the organisation launched a “relay of kindness” event that started in Moscow and ended in Donetsk and Luhansk. The students of the Tula educational and methodological centre, for example, have staged activities for 95 children displaced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The children take part in various activities, including “Patriotic graffiti”. The Yunarmiya web page stated, “In the future, similar street art will appear in all cities where internally displaced persons are located.” The “relay of kindness” is set to grow and is envisaged to become an interactive programme that will see exhibitions and activities come to life in museums and cultural events. These activities reflect the Soviet volunteerism associated with groups like Komsomol but with a fresh coat of paint.

Over the last few months, many independent media platforms, such as Dozhd, Ekho Moskvy, and non-governmental organisations like Memorial and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, have either been silenced by the Kremlin or are heading that way. It seems that Putin has been preparing for his invasion for some time now. Initial figures documenting a lack of support by the youth for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were positive. This suggested that the youth’s access to global social media platforms like TikTok, Twitter and Facebook meant that they were still able to access a mix of attitudes on events that were taking place in their country. Yet Putin has now banned Russians’ access to Twitter and Facebook, with VPN structures having limited success.

In addition, on March 4th, 89 per cent of the State Duma voted for prison sentences for those spreading “fake news” about the “special military operation”. Smaller sentences were also approved for those calling for sanctions against Russia. In the space of a few days, Russians have been stripped of various civil liberties that enable them to access different voices on events that are taking place around them. As the country’s young people become even more isolated from global perspectives and ideas, it becomes more likely that they will grow receptive to Putin’s “history lessons” and his wider war-propaganda machine.

What would usually take years has been orchestrated within a few weeks. But will it be successful? It is vital that we do not ignore the power of peer-to-peer messaging via WhatsApp and Telegram and people’s access to VPNs. What may look like the growth of a young army could also end up being a “Potemkin Village”.

Allyson Edwards is a teaching fellow in History at Warwick University. She holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from Swansea University.

history, Russia, Ukraine, Ukraine at war, Vladimir Putin