Bulba in a pickle: Belarus and the war in Ukraine

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

Russian aggression in Ukraine led to a multifaceted crisis that presented him as Russia’s errand boy, eliminated any hopes for a dialogue with the West and renewed internal opposition.

The crisis that follows the crisis

Lukashenka’s violent crackdown on protesters and the Belarusian opposition after the falsified presidential elections in 2020 led to the harshest western response to his policies to date. As a result, the West prepared phased sanctions that targeted the dictator and his entourage and significantly limited the sources of economic income for the government.

The EU and US finally restricted the trade of crucial exports, such as oil and potash products. This was a move for which many experts were calling for a long time. Moreover, new limitations targeted the trafficking of cigarettes and tobacco into the EU, another source of income for Lukashenka and his close circle. Another critical step was the EU’s decision to place sanctions on oligarch Mikhail Gutseriyev, a close business partner of Lukashenka and a crucial person in Belarusian-Russian relations. European capitals subsequently showed their understanding that Moscow’s economic support for the Belarusian regime was essential for its survival.

The Belarusian dictator responded with his usual policies. First, he escalated tensions with the West. The lowest point was reached when Minsk decided to use migrants as a tool to destabilise the situation on EU borders. He was hoping, much like before, that a mixture of aggressive statements with pressure on economic partners in European countries would lead to de-escalation on the West’s side.

It seemed, however, that this time the Belarusian dictator overplayed his hand. As a result, the West stayed relatively united in implementing sanctions against the Belarusian regime. It took longer than usual for any calls for appeasement among western politicians to re-emerge. But as 2021 was ending, and the number of victims at the EU-Belarusian border was growing, the then German Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to re-engage with the Belarusian leader. This was followed by a diminishing number of migrants trying to cross the border. It seemed that EU-Belarusian relations were returning to normal.

With friends like these…

Unfortunately for him, Lukashenka was simultaneously securing the support of his only meaningful ally – Vladimir Putin. As a result, he once more has given Russian forces access to Belarusian territory. This only allowed Moscow to use the area as a staging point for its invasion of Ukraine. The Belarusian dictator probably hoped that the significant Russian force’s presence would simply help him control internal instability.

To be fair, Lukashenka did not have much choice. Both countries have been members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation military alliance since 1994. They both conduct regular joint exercises and operations. Their military organisations are closely interconnected. Moreover, Moscow gives Lukashenka much-needed economic and political support. But Lukashenka now has to pay the price of further sanctions, more profound international isolation, and even a possible new wave of internal instability.

Stuck in the middle of the war, Lukashenka tries to save himself by using his old tricks. He officially supports the Russian invasion, stating that the Ukrainian army was ready to attack the Russian forces. He claims that Moscow was provoked into intervention by NATO. He also suggests that Poland and Lithuania were amassing a large number of troops at the Belarusian border before the Russian invasion.

At the same time, he is trying to demonstrate that he still has some sovereignty at his disposal. He has avoided fully backing the Russian side. He has not recognised the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. After Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree recognising their independence, the Belarusian authorities expressed only “understanding” of Moscow’s action.

In addition to this, the Belarusian dictator points out that his troops will not participate in the operation in Ukraine. Some saw the decision to withdraw the Belarusian embassy from Kyiv on March 19th as a sign that Minsk was ready to engage in the war openly. However, there was no explicit confirmation that Belarusian forces would participate in the aggression. In Lukashenka’s words, the main task of the Belarusian army is to protect the Russian army’s rear from possible NATO attack.

The final element of Belarusian policy is presenting itself as an intermediary between East and West. Since 1994, Belarus has been a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, formed to prepare negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After the first Russian invasion of Ukraine, the two ceasefires were negotiated and signed in Minsk. Later, the Belarusian capital was the meeting place of the Tripartite Contact Group, set up to resolve the conflict. Mimicking these earlier moves since the beginning of the second invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka has offered to host peace negotiations. The first phase of talks took place in the Belarusian part of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha forest.

Belarusian society remains active

After the falsified presidential elections in Belarus in 2020, mass protests faded out after brutal repressions. However, the networks that emerged during the protests remained. While people refrained from open anti-government actions, they continued to maintain contacts.

With the start of the Russian aggression, the post-protest networks reactivated. A series of small-scale protests against the war took place in different parts of the country. According to the Belarusian opposition, more than 900 people were detained during these actions. In addition, the so-called “rail partisans” conducted several sabotage actions to block the Russian army’s movements by the railways. Belarusian hacktivists at least twice attacked the servers of Belarusian Railways with the same goal.

Belarusians in exile actively support the Ukrainians in their fight against the Russian army. They gather equipment necessary for the defenders, help to collect essential pharmaceuticals, or evacuate civilians from conflict zones. Some of them also engage in direct combat.

During the 2020 protests, a few Belarusian anarchists formed a small armed unit that operated for a short period. The prevailing number of Belarusians chose the peaceful model of protests. Today, Belarusians in Ukraine are creating the “Kastus Kalinouski Battalion” to fight the Russian invasion. The team’s core is formed of Belarusians who joined Ukrainian forces during the first stage of the Russian aggression. Now they are joined by a new wave of volunteers. While probably not significant in number (the initial data suggests around 200 soldiers), the emergence of a unified, trained and experienced anti-Lukashenka military unit may become a problem for the Belarusian dictator in the future.

Meanwhile, the Belarusian opposition in exile seized the opportunity to strengthen its political position. Underlining the fact that Lukashenka’s support for Russian aggression means that Belarus is no longer a sovereign country, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya announced the creation of the Belarusian anti-war movement. Currently, most of the work of the Coordination Council focuses on informing people about the situation on the frontlines, promoting the anti-war protests of Belarusians and supporting the delivery of humanitarian transports.

The leader of the National Anti-Crisis Management organisation, Pavel Latushka, also stressed in a video statement that Lukashenka has no political legitimacy. Furthermore, Latushka announced the start of the “Not a cent to war” campaign, which aims to undermine the economic basis for Belarusian engagement in the war. This move follows an earlier political offensive to strengthen the economic sanctions against the regime.

Between a rock and a hard place

For the first time, Lukashenka is pressured from different sides simultaneously. First, Russia pressures him to engage in the invasion of Ukraine openly. Second, western countries continue their sanctions policy and keep the Minsk regime isolated. Third, the strongman leader is on the verge of severing relations with Ukraine, which was in recent years a very important non-Russian economic partner. Minsk’s engagement on the Russian side against Ukraine showed that the mood of protest is still relatively strong within Belarusian society. Informal networks remain an essential tool of anti-war mobilisation both inside the country and abroad. The longer the conflict will drag on, the longer they will stay mobilised, threatening Lukashenka’s internal position.

Even though Belarus and its world have changed, Lukashenka is not changing his tactics. He still believes that he will maintain internal stability through repressions and a “balancing approach” between Russia and the West. This may be the biggest mistake that he has made during his years in power. How deeply this will influence his future will depend on the dynamics of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the West’s response to it.

Kacper Wańczyk is an analyst focusing on Belarus, Russia and Ukraine and PhD student at Koźmiński University in Warsaw. He is a former diplomat who has served in Belarus and Afghanistan, among other places.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, belarus, Russia, Ukraine, War