The more things change in the Southern Caucasus, the more they stay the same

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan speaks during a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia. Photo: Asatur Yesayants / Shutterstock

Surprisingly, the Armenian parliament immediately adopted a five-year action plan that would see the country normalise its relations with Turkey. In light of these developments, it seems that the two countries may finally understand that relations do not work without the involvement of both sides.

One fundamental motivation

When taking a closer look at these developments, it is clear that they are far from simple. Some may claim that the idea of a stable state of affairs in the Caucasus, in which the potential of the region’s historical and cultural wealth can be fully exploited, is a wholly romantic notion. Certainly, the reasons for Armenia and Turkey’s strained relations today are multifaceted and complex. However, for Turkey, which closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, this move is part of a wider strategy. The geopolitical game in the South Caucasus has changed significantly since Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war over the disputed region in 2020. Following its extensive support for Baku, Turkey emerged as a clear winner and can now lead the way in negotiations over diplomatic relations with Armenia.

Fighting broke out between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh (referred to in Armenia as Artsakh) as early as the perestroika era. This disputed area has been traditionally populated by an Armenian majority. However, the region was made de jure a part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in 1921, and then de facto handed over to Baku under Stalin. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh declared itself independent with Yerevan’s help on September 3rd 1991. These developments were followed by countless wars and military conflicts between Azerbaijan on the one side and Armenia and the self-proclaimed republic on the other. Armenia was able to hold onto the territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh until November 2020, when the Azerbaijani army conquered large parts of the disputed territory with Ankara’s help. This forced Armenia to its knees with a peace treaty signed under Russian auspices. Under the new treaty, Armenia surrendered all of the Nagorno-Karabakh territories except for a small core area.

A peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has always been a precondition for Turkey with regards to resuming diplomatic relations with Yerevan. Since a peace agreement is now seemingly in place, nothing should stand in the way of a rapprochement between the two neighbours. At least, one would think that this would be the case.

Two months after his proposal for diplomatic normalisation, the Turkish president surprisingly set new conditions for the Armenian side. On October 28th, Erdoğan stated during a visit to the recently captured city of Zangilan (Kovsakan in Armenian) that only “if [Armenia] shows goodwill towards Azerbaijan, then there will be no obstacles to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and Armenia”. He has yet to define what exactly he means by “goodwill towards Azerbaijan”. However, it seems that Ankara is likely to add even more preconditions regarding diplomatic normalisation.

Asymmetric power relations

The Armenian-Turkish border was unilaterally closed by Ankara, which immediately informed Armenia as to the conditions in which it would reopen it again. Even though Armenia has urged Turkey to finally recognise the Armenian Genocide and compensate its victims, the country has not made this a precondition for normalisation. Pashinyan thus follows the narrative of his predecessors and does not impose any conditions on Turkey. This exemplifies the unequal positions of Armenia and Turkey in ongoing negotiations. At the same time, this decision can be seen as a practical political one. After all, negotiations and demands require a relationship in the first place. Perhaps it is true that different and often difficult topics  need to be negotiated at different tables. Other aspects, especially economics and strategic concerns, seem to be the driving force of the negotiations.

At the moment, both Azerbaijan and Turkey continue to maintain closed borders with Armenia and have subjected the country to an economic blockade. Armenia has open borders only with Georgia to the north and Iran to the south. Of course, Tehran faces its own problems with economic isolation. One tangible way for Armenia to move on from this isolation and end the blockade is to accept the conditions set by Turkey. On the other hand, Ankara is a regional power with a growing military and a more stable economy. Due to this, it has much less to fear if it decides to hold onto the border closure and blockade against Armenia. This inequality between the negotiating parties is also reflected in the Armenian parliament’s five-year action plan to reinstate diplomatic relations with Turkey. The action plan shows that Armenia is under no illusion regarding relations, as it has been named “For the sake of stability, security and the economic development of the region”. It is not a matter of establishing truly friendly relations with Turkey but rather pragmatically securing Armenia’s economic growth and stability.

The Armenian side is well aware that Turkey has more leverage in this situation. Armenia needs normalisation with Turkey to develop and diversify its economic sectors and increase trade. New routes and access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean may boost trade and tourism. This would greatly benefit an economy and population suffering from widespread poverty and unemployment. For the Turkish side, an open border with Armenia would not, at first glance, bring about any decisive changes. One of the few advantages for Turkey would be the use of Armenian airspace and land routes for trade with Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

However, an open border could also entail risks for Yerevan. Could domestic products compete with cheap imports from Turkey? What about the future of various economic sectors? The country has already ceded much of its energy industry to Russia and hence cannot afford to lose control over other important supply sectors. In addition, there are serious national security concerns. After Ankara’s extensive involvement in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war, levels of trust in their Turkish neighbour are now even lower among Armenians. It is likely that Turkey could sooner or later find itself paying a price for its actions.

In the event of another clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an open border with Turkey would immediately be seen as a threat by Yerevan. This is one of the reasons why Armenia has entered ongoing talks with Moscow to open up another military base in the country. Even though trust in Russia has declined dramatically in Armenia since the November 2020 peace treaty, the country still sees the Kremlin as its only remaining ally. From this point of view, the possible creation of a new Russian military base is hardly surprising. Several locations in southern Armenia, a narrow territory that separates Azerbaijan from its Nakhchivan exclave, are currently under discussion. Armenia’s geostrategic moves therefore always seem to be linked to the interests of surrounding nations, which, for their part, are striving to (re)consolidate their influence in the Caucasus. The country is located at a critical geographic point and could easily become the scene of further power struggles between Russia and Turkey.

Ideological regional integration?

While an unstable political landscape in this region naturally creates an incentive for Turkish involvement, support for pan-Turkism in Central Asia and the Caucasus adds another layer of complexity. On the Armenian side, the ideology of pan-Turkism and its prevalence is perceived as a threat by most in the country. The Christian Armenian nation does not identify with this ideology in any way and has suffered as a result of it. This was made clear by the long history of pogroms against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, which culminated in the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and 1916.

The ideology of pan-Turkism is by no means a new idea. Its origins go far back to the mid-19th century and included campaigns to unite the so-called Turkic peoples from the Balkans to China. Proponents of pan-Turkism promoted a key slogan: “Where there are Turks, there is Turkey”. Despite this, pan-Turkism seemed to lose its significance in the 20th century. This all changed with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when new opportunities arose for Turkey to co-operate with various newly independent Turkic republics. This has led to a number of collaborations in various fields, such as education and culture. Over the past decades, these moves have raised Turkey’s profile in the Caucasus and Central Asia and created new links with regional elites.

It would appear that Turkey is now promoting itself as a fraternal alternative to various European powers and Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. As a result, Ankara can use this feeling of commonality as a means of staying one step ahead of its rivals. The ideology of pan-Turkism therefore appears to be a key part of the country’s soft power. Erdoğan appears happy to play the ideology card, be it pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism, whenever it fits his agenda. It is very unlikely that such ideologies could subvert Armenian society, as the state is very much conscious of its cultural and ethnic identity. Ideological ties can be the driver of regional integration, and Armenia will remain an outsider in this regard.

The position of civil society

Both parties are also not on an equal footing when it comes to the domestic political consequences of any potential diplomatic normalisation. In fact, civil society has hardly been involved in this process. It is currently only the politicians who are publicly communicating with each other on this issue. Within Turkish society, reconciliation with Armenia would in the worst case scenario be met with indifference. At best, people may express enthusiasm for Erdoğan as a “peacemaker”. This outcome would allow the government to maintain the historical illusion of the supposedly exemplary Young Turks, who often serve as a template for Erdoğan’s rule.

Overall, it will be difficult for Yerevan to justify the establishment of diplomatic ties with Turkey given that the country still does not recognise the Armenian Genocide and has imposed a harmful blockade on the country. The trauma of the genocide still plays a crucial role in Armenian society and represents a focal point for many people’s sense of identity. In light of this historical issue and Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan, the normalisation of relations at the societal level could prove to be a particular challenge.

History has taught us that it takes more than simple political declarations to reconcile peoples with each other. Indeed, neighbourly relations begin with recognition and honest respect for mutual interests. But how can the parties in question meet on equal ground? It would be difficult for any Armenian government to communicate the normalisation of relations with Turkey to its population. The country’s current political crisis would deepen even more and further mass protests could be expected. An Armenian government that agrees to an unconditional relationship with Turkey is risking its very survival. Yet Armenia needs stable, functioning politicians trusted by the population. Many institutional issues remain in Yerevan to this day. This has only caused societal division and provided a breeding ground for populism in Armenia.

Socio-economic difficulties make dissatisfied citizens impressionable and amenable to mobilisation. Pressure from the Armenian diaspora abroad also weighs heavily and not always for the better. During the previous negotiations, it was the Armenian diaspora that demanded an end to the diplomatic rapprochement due to the conditions Turkey imposed on the country. At the same time, it should be remembered that this group is not at the mercy of existential economic and political questions while living abroad.

But it was not only the Armenian diaspora that put an end to the talks between Armenia and Turkey in 2009. Above all, Azerbaijan effectively torpedoed the talks as it saw them as a threat to itself and its position in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan could once again move to stop today’s talks. Simultaneously, new conditions could also be imposed on Armenia by Baku and Ankara. The latest round of fighting on Armenia’s sovereign territory around the localities of Kut and Verin Shorzha shows how fragile the peace treaty is between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The French saying “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (the more things change, the more they stay the same) probably best describes the current situation in the South Caucasus. It is clear that traditional powers continue to dominate politics in the region. Talks on normalising relations between Armenia and Turkey are likely to face a long and rocky road. National, geopolitical and security interests continue to overlap and influence each other in the area. While Turkish strategy is guided by ambitions of forging a great empire, it is up to Armenia not to simply move from one dependency to another.

Svenja Petersen studied Political Science, European Affairs and Political Economy at Sciences Po Paris, the Free University of Berlin and the London School of Economics. In June 2021, she graduated from the College of Europe in Natolin, where she specialised in the EU’s Eastern Partnership and EU-Russia relations.

Raze Baziani studied Law at the University of Bonn and Politics and Law at the University of Münster, Germany. She specialises in the International Law of Economic Relations, with a special focus on the Caucasus and the Middle East. 

The authors met during a summer school at Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences in Yerevan, Armenia.