The Eurasian Dream. In the pursuit of splendour

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

Understandably enough, the idea of uniqueness always seems to concern a good leadership. In fact, such ideals constitute the goal that every nation strives for in the long run. Surely enough, no one would ever publish a manifesto about a country being average rather than great.

This greatness is something for which Russia has truly sought throughout the ages, at least since Philotheus and his idea of the Third Rome. Throughout the last 500 years, the Kremlin has looked for different ideas to strengthen the country in its pursuit of greatness. Benefitting from various intellectual and political legacies, the concept of Eurasianism is just one such idea today.

Sparks of inspiration

Imperial status, overconfidence in relation to the West, and interest in Asia all influenced Russia throughout the 19th century. Specific elements of the future Eurasian worldview subsequently emerged at this time, as the thoughts of particular intellectuals and movements introduced new themes during pivotal political moments. Certainly, “Slavophilia” must be mentioned as the main predecessor to Eurasianism. This movement was based upon a strong opposition to the West, the rejection of individuality and advocacy in favour of Slavic unity under the command of the Tsardom. The idea first emerged in the 1830s among some thinkers in Russia who naturally found themselves in opposition to the development model supported by the Tsar Peter the Great. According to Matthew J. Schmidt, a professor of national security at the University of New Haven, Eurasianism was a variant of Slavophilia. In the late 19th century, philosopher Vladimir Solovyov argued that the movement’s linguistic nationalism narrowed the scope of potential expansion. This is why the idea was reshaped and became more inclusive later on.

Another reason for many Russian intellectuals to “drift away” from the West was the Russian defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-56. Although Russia belonged to the “Concert of Europe”, this conflict highlighted much of the external opposition to Tsarist aspirations. This encouraged domestic debate about the West and the role it should play in Russian politics. Nikolai Danilevsky’s Russia and Europe published in1869 was one of the most recognisable and influential volumes in this regard. He was the first to use the term Eurasia, which was viewed as a landmass separated from Europe and Asia by various mountain ranges covered with steppe and plains. He called for the tribes and peoples of this area to unite under the Russian banner. When he was not writing novels, Fyodor Dostoevsky also discussed the rebirth of his motherland, the Orthodox Church and promoted the “Rotting West” cliché.

Aversion towards Europe had to be accompanied by some alternatives. In 1833, Mikhail Magnitsky’s article “The Fate of Russia” claimed that the Tatar invasion of Rus’ ultimately saved the country from Latinisation. At the end of the 19th century, Asian studies were quite advanced in the Russian Empire, which had seized substantial territory in Central Asia and the Caucasus between 1847 and 1896. Józef Sękowski, Sergey Uvarov and Mikhail Pogodin were the pioneers of this increasing interest in the East. Both Uvarov and Pogodin were very influential. They chaired the country’s education ministry and called for redirecting imperial expansion towards the East. The interest in that direction was another message conveyed by Dostoevsky. He called for rediscovering Asia as the cradle of Russian spiritual values.

Shortly before the official emergence of the Eurasian movement, Eastern affairs once again attracted much attention in St Petersburg. This was especially true during and after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. More and more books and publications in the Tsardom treated Asia as a truly advanced culture that should no longer be perceived simply as inferior to Europe.

The interwar period phenomenon

Eurasianism was officially conceptualised in the 1920s and became yet another embodiment of the glorious anti-western dream. The ideology emerged following the defeat of the White Russian movement during the country’s civil war (1917-1922). With the Tsardom shrinking, the old regime replaced and the Orthodox Church undermined, many intellectuals fled the state. These figures settled in various European cities, which quickly became centres for new thought on the future of the supposedly doomed homeland. According to historian Irina Kandrova, the idea attracted great attention as it expressed the wishful thinking of thousands of émigrés who left the motherland after the October Revolution. The concept quickly ignited discussion concerning Russia’s failure in the First World War, as well as the communists’ eventual success. The Tatar rule of Rus, the era of Peter the Great, and the First World War remained these émigrés’ main historical fields of interest. The original idea’s popularity was surprisingly short-lived. Yet, shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War Eurasianism was just shadow of its former self.

Many Russian outcasts were clearly disappointed with the country’s alliance with England and France during the First World War. These countries were naturally associated with Russia’s recent predicaments and the rise of Bolshevism. At the same time, many émigrés ended up in countries like Czechoslovakia or Germany, which influenced the prevailing thoughts of this group. During this period, the Russian philosopher and linguist Nikolay Trubetskoy published Europe and Mankind in Sofia, Bulgaria. Although by accident, this work would ultimately inspire the fledgling Eurasian movement.

The book discussed the author’s views on Europe’s true identity and how Russians should approach the West. Trubetskoy offered few solutions or political direction regarding this supposed divide. However, the author still tried to promote a new direction for the country in a conservative manner, following the example of the Slavophiles. He wished for Russia to follow a path wholly different to the ideas of the Europe. For him, Soviet rule was yet another western experiment in Russia, similar to the seemingly troubled reforms under the reign of Peter the Great. According to Trubetskoy, that era marked the beginning of the country’s Europeanisation, which only inevitably led to the Bolshevik Revolution. The father of the Eurasianists criticised the various secular reforms undertaken by both Peter, Catherine the Great and the Bolsheviks. As for Trubetskoy, all these actions resulted in the weakening of the Orthodox Church, which was deemed an essential institution by the Eurasianists.

Referring to the title of the book, it is Russia that represents “Mankind” – the mass of people whose fate could be decided by a more advanced western civilization. Trubetskoy subsequently argued against a world dominated by one culture. As a result, societies should remain somehow isolated in order to develop naturally without foreign intervention. For him, Romano-Germanic influence was a threat against which other cultures had to unite. Whilst he could not work out how to properly challenge Europe, he believed that its superiority would not last forever.

One may say that Trubetskoy’s book is about Russian complexes and a need for comparison with Europe. Despite this, it found many supporters. A reviewer of the book, Pyotr Savitsky, approved of Trubetskoy’s thoughts and become one of the fathers of Eurasianism. He later named his publishing house “Eurasianism” and forged a new movement that announced its manifesto and programme in 1921. The community advocated for the renewal of “Russia-Eurasia” as an entity different from Europe and Asia due to its mix of European, Byzantine and the so-called Turanian (associated with Central Asia) cultures. The first and most iconic books and leaflets were published in the early 1920s in Sofia. However, soon enough, Prague became the leading centre for Eurasian studies. The movement operated in many distant cities, including Berlin, Belgrade and Paris.

Until 1925, all the authors of the popular movement peacefully coexisted and inspired one another. Everyone could add their intellectual insights as long as they were anti-western and oriented towards patriotism. But soon enough, differences between particular authors emerged, with various understandings of communism eventually leading to a breakdown in unity. Trubetskoy and Savitsky believed that there could be no compromise with Bolsheviks, who were perceived as barbarians (still the lesser evil regarding Russia’s fate, compared to classic western influence). Some others were ready to negotiate, including one of the movement’s founders, Lev Karsavin.

In 1927 the Eurasianists tried to unite and organise a political party. A programme called “Eurasianism” was issued but its inner structures proved to be underdeveloped. Grigoryi Florkovsky, an initial supporter of the movement, admitted that too many Eurasianists’ assumptions relied on emotions. He also came to believe that condemning Peter the Great’s legacy was a mistake.

The first summit of the Eurasianists took place only in 1932, too late for the movement to truly become a formidable force. Indeed, the idea had already lost much of its popularity. With Trubetskoy’s death in 1938, Eurasianism would almost be forgotten until after the fall of communism. Still, much like every reactionary movement, it was a threat to the Soviet Union. Many Eurasianists were subsequently persecuted by the authorities. In 1945, with the liberation of Prague, Pyotr Savitsky was arrested and put in the Gulag by the Soviets. Lev Karsavin shared the same fate. He was jailed in 1949 and sent to the Gulag for membership in the White Russian organisation “Eurasia”, which apparently aimed to overthrow the communists.

Inventing uniqueness

Classic Eurasianism is remembered as yet another Russian approach with regards to its imperial status, which was to be anti-western in nature and supportive of the country’s supposedly unique heritage. The last aspect turned out to be particularly important, as Eurasianists believe that their culture’s achievements should be spread and promoted across the region. Overall, Eurasia was deemed to be a distinct part of the world with Russia as its geographical heart.

As aforementioned, Eurasian culture, rather than Slavic heritage, was the cornerstone of the Eurasianists’ outlook. Konstantin Leontiev openly spoke of Russian society as not purely Slavic but affected both by Byzantine and Turanian elements. For Florkovsky, the core of the Russian spirit was Asian, with a European layout applied at the time of Peter the Great and his successors. This mixed culture was nonetheless substantially strengthened by the Orthodox Church, “the living organism” distinct from the Catholic Church disregarded as too rational by nature. This spiritual heritage was the crucial element of Eurasianism and its “mission” to expand beyond Eurasia and to the West in order to promote true Christendom.

Muslims were perceived as allies to the Eurasian cause as their mentality was meant to be closer to Eastern Christianity comparing to Catholic or Protestant outlooks. After all, it was Sunni Islam that inspired the Russian Orthodox Church to glorify secular authority as sanctified and ceded by God himself. As a result, both religions served as a tool for absolute monarchs. It was Eurasianism that showed the positive bond between Russians and Tatars, rehabilitating an often troubled past. Overthinking history led to surprising but inspiring claims by some Eurasianists. Namely, that the 16th century Tsardom of Muscovy was more an heir to the Golden Horde’s legacy than that of Kyivan Rus’s. Trubetskoy noticed that the latter covered just a small portion of the 19th century Russian Empire, while the Golden Horde almost overlapped this territory. This is why Genghis Khan was praised as somewhat of a father of Eurasian uniqueness.

It should be noted that Eurasianism faced many contradictions in this regard. On the one hand, it bolstered isolationism as a means of cultural preservation. At the same time, it advocated for intervention elsewhere, since Eurasianists wished to spread the true Orthodox message abroad. Whilst some believed that the Orthodox Church should have a leading role in Eurasia, others supported religious equality. Although Eurasia theoretically consisted of equal tribes and cultures, Russia was granted the title of “first among equals”. According to political scientist Iwona Massaka, these contradictions show the theoretical vagueness of the Eurasian project.

It is about history, but not about the past

As vague as it is, Eurasianism survived throughout the Soviet era and re-emerged nowadays thanks to Soviet historian Lev Gumilyov, who had studied this subject since the 1970s. He believed that Russia must establish a Eurasian empire if the country was to be reborn. The downfall of the USSR led to the rebirth of Eurasianism in the security vacuum of the 1990s. The interwar worldview filled this gap for many nationalists in Russia, who viewed it as an alternate road to imperial success.

Today, “neo-Eurasianism” is an even more diverse movement than its predecessor before the war. Whilst the ideology continues to influence contemporary Russian politics, it is by no means the official ideology of the state. Nowadays, Aleksandr Dugin appears to be the chief ideologue of this dogmatic neo-Eurasianism, which is more oriented towards geopolitics and conquest than the cultural and philosophical concerns of Eurasianism. However, Dugin still supports the claim that the Tatar invasion of Rus’ turned to be beneficial for the nation. He supports traditional Russian values – orthodoxy, monarchy and nationalism – which reflect Sergei Uvarov’s classic Tsarist motto. At the same time, he openly speaks of rivalry with the US and the necessity of the conquest of Europe.

Given the current relations between Moscow and the West, Eurasianism has proven to be a useful tool for the Kremlin. Indeed, Putin’s establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union as a challenger to the European Union in 2015 showcases the continued influence of the ideology. Despite this, the bloc has not lived up to Moscow’s hopes. The project’s focus was narrowed down to economic co-operation due to resistance from other member states concerned about their sovereignty.

The academic Nadezhda Arbatova often criticises the Eurasian tendencies of the Kremlin. According to her, “the three faces of Russian neo-Eurasianism are reactionary ideology, imperial expansionism and economic integration; but as the first two grow stronger, the third becomes increasingly less likely.” She further believes that Moscow largely inherited from the Tatars the negative “horde system”, namely backwardness, poor governance and bureaucratic uncertainty. In this sense, what Eurasianists and neo-Eurasianists praise is actually a burden that prevents Russia from proper development. The true legacy, but burden.

In 2013, Professor Vladimer Papava claimed that since the collapse of the Soviet Union Kremlin decision-makers had been unable to find a new role for their country. Although these words were written almost a decade ago, all of Moscow’s actions undertaken since 2013 prove that this issue remains an important topic. This is especially true given Putin’s recent nostalgic comments made on the 30th anniversary of the fall of the USSR. As long as Russia drifts away from Europe, the imperial dream becomes more seductive. According to geographer and economist Aleksandr Druzhinin, Moscow’s “return to the East” (разворот на восток) is a necessary development. Russia supposedly faces a geopolitical choice given its ongoing crisis with the West and rivalry with China. For him, this situation is more of an opportunity than a danger. The country should subsequently prepare itself to take advantage of these circumstances in the upcoming years. Perhaps such a move will allow Moscow to face the future and finally grant the country the proper place in the world it so desperately seeks.

Grzegorz Szymborski is a graduate at the College of Europe in Natolin (Poland), a graduate from the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw and author of the books: Wolność niejedno ma imię (2013), Wyprawa Fryderyka Augusta I do Inflant w latach 1700 – 1701 w świetle wojny domowej na Litwie (2015) and Działania zbrojne w Rzeczypospolitej podczas intwerwencji rosyjskiej 1764 roku (2020).

Eurasianism, history, Russia