Is the West ready to accept the challenge from Lukashenka?

Migrants gathered near a logistics center on the Belarusian side of the border with Poland last November. Even if the migrant crisis on the border has slowed down, it can be resumed at any moment. Photo: Djordje Kostic / Shutterstock

In truth, the 2020 protests in Belarus came as a complete surprise for the West. Before the presidential elections, relations between the Belarusian authorities and the West were entering a period of normalisation. After the West committed to co-operation with Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, its support for the Belarusian opposition and civil society rapidly decreased. The undemocratic presidential elections were not supposed to reverse this commitment. Both the US and the EU took the position that Lukashenka’s enduring regime simply does not provide the opposition with any chances to change the situation. For them, it was paramount that the inevitable protests caused by the elections would not result in people being murdered or imprisoned for political reasons. The OSCE election observation mission was supposed to suggest, as usual, that the elections were not held in compliance with democratic standards. This was meant to be the end of the story. The western powers could then continue to increase co-operation with Lukashenka’s regime much like before. 

Yet the scale of the protests, as well as the subsequent repressions instigated by the Belarusian authorities, made this policy impossible. The realisation of this new reality in the country happened very slowly in the West. The more the US was distracted by the dramatic presidential election campaign, the less attention it gave to Belarusians.

Effects of the migrant crisis

Minsk had two objectives when it decided to bring migrants from the Middle East to its borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia last summer. The regime at the very least intended to exact revenge on its European neighbours for their criticism of the Belarusian domestic political crisis. At the same time, optimists in Minsk thought that the situation would force the EU to negotiate on the terms of the Belarusian authorities. The EU aimed to both discuss Belarus’s domestic problems (repressions, freedom for political prisoners) and facilitate negotiations between the authorities and the opposition via new elections. Lukashenka intended to change this agenda by organising a migrant crisis that would only end once the West’s economic sanctions were lifted. Having started the conflict, Lukashenka stuck to his image of a strongman leader. He escalated the confrontation and is afraid to seem weak both at home and abroad. This has always been his political style, and this migration crisis is no exemption, especially since he had nothing to lose.

The shift in relations between Belarus, the EU and the US was made permanent following the forced landing of Ryanair Flight 4978 in Minsk (to abduct opposition journalist Roman Protasevich) and the subsequent artificial migrant crisis. Until then, the West had treated the situation in Belarus as a domestic humanitarian issue. After the Ryanair incident and migrant crisis, both the EU and US began to view the Belarusian authorities as a threat to international security. In other words, domestic Belarusian unrest transformed into a regional crisis. Belarus’s actions were destabilising the situation in Europe and beyond.

The states in the Middle East found themselves involved in this migrant crisis as well. Transit between the West and the East was endangered as Lukashenka promised to cut off Russian gas supplies to Europe. Trucks heading to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia formed queues on the Belarusian side of the border. Even if the migrant crisis on the border is brought to an end, it can be resumed at any moment. This is because its roots can be traced back to Lukashenka’s regime and Belarus’s ongoing domestic political crisis. Moreover, Lukashenka has threatened to start a war if the world does not recognise him as the country’s leader. A “black hole” of uncertainty has now been formed in the middle of the European continent.

The West was given a choice

Is the West ready to raise the stakes? The answer to this question is not obvious. We see that the western states are slightly confused as to how to act. In the middle of the migration crisis, several telephone calls took place. First, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke with Lukashenka. Then, Belarusian foreign minister Vladimir Makei talked with Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Lukashenka was undoubtedly satisfied with these conversations. In fact, his moves forced the EU to engage in a dialogue with him against its own will. This is paramount for a politician enjoying international isolation. Moreover, these brief conversations were unfolding according to an  agenda suggested by Minsk. This agenda assumed that discussions would only concern a possible resolution to the migrant crisis on the EU borders. The question of issues concerning the refugees did not lead to discussions regarding Belarusian political prisoners. The EU risks leaving Lukashenka convinced that this migration blackmail is effective and can be used in the future.

In response to the situation in Belarus, the EU introduced five packages of sanctions against Minsk. Canada, the UK and the US have all introduced three similar packages. It is complicated to calculate how much the Belarusian economy has lost as a result of the sanctions. Roman Golovchenko, the prime minister of Belarus, argued that the country has lost not more than 2.9 per cent of its GDP. Independent experts believe that the numbers may vary from seven to 14 per cent. Different methodologies explain such a gap in calculations. While some evaluate only direct losses, others consider consequential ones too. This second kind of losses includes extra costs for bypass schemes and the loss of potential contracts and foreign partners, as companies avoid dealing with groups on the sanctions list. If the sanctions prove effective, Belarus may lose up to 15 per cent of its exports. This includes 25 per cent of its petroleum exports and ten per cent of potash exports (which go to the European Union).

However, the sanctions’ effectiveness will only become clear in the long term. It should be remembered that they are a tool of political, moral and psychological influence focused on both the elites and the masses. They are an attempt to pressure the political elite through the economy, which has an accumulative socio-political and psychological effect as time goes on. A consolidated society that does not question the legitimacy of the authorities can resist external threats. Yet, Belarusian society is now very fractured, traumatised and much more politicised than it was compared to only a few years ago. The political crisis continues and the government enjoys very little trust from the population as it expresses discontent with the current situation. The authorities have lost the monopoly over the media and will struggle to blame the West for the sanctions and growing opposition.

Against this backdrop, sanctions could potentially trigger a process that harms the current Belarusian social model. At the same time, society’s high level of politicisation would only encourage the people to blame the government for any new problems. The worse the socio-economic situation, the more obvious it would get even for Lukashenka’s supporters and politically disengaged people that he is the source of the country’s troubles. But no one can say when that would happen.

Why sanctions do not work

However, several obstacles prevent the international sanctions from being truly effective and achieving their aim. First, the government’s authoritarian nature means that economic problems are less likely to actively influence political processes. Also, it remains unclear to what extent Russia would be willing to assist Belarus in bypassing western sanctions. Russian companies, for example, may want to mediate between Belarusian producers and western consumers.

Nevertheless, the key issue remains the fact that the sanctions have not come into full effect. Most have been postponed, as the West does not want to harm the commercial interests of its own businesses. Paradoxically, the Belarusian economy has been experiencing anything but a decline since the EU introduced the fifth package of sanctions. For example, it doubled its export of goods to the EU over nine months in 2021. Whilst Belarusian exports to the Netherlands increased fivefold, deliveries to Germany increased by 105 per cent. In Latvia, exports increased by 92 per cent. It is also a similar story in Lithuania (41 per cent) and Poland (74 per cent). From January to September 2021, the supply of goods from Belarus to the United States tripled in spite of these sanctions.

According to Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Snopkov, the equivalent of up to ten million US dollars connected with Belarus was detained by foreign banks during the first  ten months of 2021. This equates to around 0.01 per cent of the foreign economic monthly turnover of Belarus. This is ultimately how the sanctions “work”. It should not come as a surprise that Belarusian politicians speak disparagingly about them.

American sanctions towards Belarus are still not as strict as the regimes imposed on Cuba, North Korea or Iran. According to official US documents, imposing secondary sanctions is possible. Transactions to bypass the sanctions are banned. However, this sounds more like a warning than something that will be followed by an actual punishment.

The authorities in Minsk have also succeeded in organising various “grey” schemes to bypass the sanctions. While oligarchs on sanction lists sign their assets over to their children, some legal entities change their names and continue to trade with the EU. For example, Belarusian transport cargo to Estonia increased 6.4 times over the first ten months of 2021 when compared to the same period during 2020. When asked about this situation by journalists, the Estonian foreign ministry responded that the sanctions do not ban the transport of goods as “the transport companies checked if the goods comply with the sanctions list and did not reveal any violations.”

This is why so much depends on how consistently and rigorously the EU and the US monitor the implementations of the sanctions. Increased pressure on the states that maintain good relations with Belarus could be effective. Nonetheless, it is paramount to remember that Lukashenka regards the western leaders who have unsuccessfully challenged him over the last 25 years as “weak”. This policy of ineffective sanctions will only further convince him that he is right.

Translated by Anna Efimova

Valery Karbalevich is a Belarusian political scientist and the author of many works on Lukashenka and his regime, including the 2010 book Alexander Lukashenko: A Political Portrait.

belarus, lukashenka, sanctions