Crimea has returned to the heart of Ukraine, now it must return to its body

Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

There has never been an international summit of a similar scale held in Ukraine before. The most important thing for us is that all participants confirmed their disagreement with the constant violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, stressing that Crimea is an integral part of the Ukrainian state. It is also very important that all states and international organisations that took part in the inaugural summit of the Crimea Platform managed to adopt a joint declaration, which in fact fixed all the key issues related to the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Eventually, the August summit confirmed that the activity of Ukrainian diplomacy on this issue is on the right path. This began in 2014, which means at the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine that resulted in the temporary occupation of Crimea.

You underlined the overall success of Ukrainian diplomacy. Nevertheless, many commentators point out that this is primarily the political success of President Zelenskyy.

Undoubtedly, the Crimea Platform is a very important initiative for President Zelenskyy. He has taken personal responsibility for this project, as it lies within his formal competence as well as that of the agencies that work with him. One of the concrete outcomes of this initiative is the establishment of a dedicated office for the Crimea Platform in the centre of Kyiv. It is being managed by a newly established structure, which is institutionally a part of the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. It is worth adding here that this office is located close to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Office of the President. This is extremely important, both in practical and symbolic terms. In other words, Crimea is not pushed to the “outskirts” and has returned to the heart of our state. Its representatives are in the government district of the capital city. Crimea is where crucial decisions are made.

Returning to the topic of the inaugural summit of the Crimea Platform, I wonder whether it was disappointing for Ukraine that some of its most important partners – such as the United States and Germany – did not send their representatives in the highest rank to the August summit?

Let me note here that personally I am not responsible for foreign policy, but the internal component related to the functioning of the office of the Crimea Platform. Nevertheless, I do believe that the rank of the representatives of the United States and Germany, as well as all other countries, was sufficiently high. We shall also understand that in each and every state different issues are on the political agenda at any given moment. What we would certainly like to improve in the future is our ability to convince the states in other regions of the globe to be more active in different activities related to Crimea.

I perceive this summit, first of all, as a great victory for the Crimean issue. Let us emphasise it very clearly that such an event took place in the eighth year of the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. 

Why has it taken so long for Crimea to return to the international agenda? For example, this issue has been absent in the so-called Normandy Format, which involves talks over the hostilities taking place in Donbas.

This is obviously a key question, which we also often try to address. There seems to be only one correct answer: Ukraine should be the initiator of such formats. Without a doubt, one may say that initiatives, such as the Crimea Platform, should have been put forward already in 2017, 2018 or even 2014 – right after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. I do not want to criticise now events that did not happen, but focus on what could be done in the future. Since 2014 Ukraine has adopted a policy of increased activity in different international organisations, which – it is worth stressing – has resulted in a number of resolutions condemning the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation by Russia. They also pointed out constant violations of international law and human rights by the Kremlin.

Thus, the Crimea Platform is meant to be a step forward. Its goal is not only to react to Russia’s activities but to also be proactive. One of these proactive actions is the creation of a group of experts working on Crimea in Ukraine and also in other countries. In this way, we can expand the number of states supporting our efforts to de-occupy Crimea. We see a network of analysts as a key to success in this endeavour.  

As we can gather from your words, the Crimea Platform is designed to strengthen and accelerate efforts regarding the preparation and implementation of a strategy, which is specifically concerned with the de-occupation and reintegration of the Crimean peninsula with Ukraine. What are the most important points of this strategy?

In fact, the exact text of this strategy that you are referring to is available on the website of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.  Matter of fact, it was prepared as a political document six months prior to the Crimea Platform summit, which as we said before was held in August 2021. On the website, you can read about the position of the Ukrainian state, as well as the activities that are planned once the temporary Russian occupation of Crimea is over. It is important for us that our international partners are aware of how Ukraine sees the future of the peninsula.

What needs to be stressed is that this strategy of de-occupation and reintegration of the Crimean peninsula was signed by President Zelenskyy as a decree, which means that it is a binding document for all state agencies. Consequently, they no longer can take a different position on this matter. The strategy is based on the following pillars – humanitarian, economic, information and legal. This, for example, means that Ukraine does not recognise any of the consequences of Russia’s forced campaign to impose Russian citizenship on Crimea’s residents.

Finally, I would like to stress that this strategy should not be analysed in isolation from other normative acts that have been enacted by our parliament –  the Verkhovna Rada. They include the Law on the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine (it recognises Crimean Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks) or the repeal of the disgraceful Law on the Free Economic Zone “Crimea”. The second law was passed in August 2014 to enable some Ukrainian oligarchs to do business on the Russian-occupied peninsula. It is good that it is no longer a binding legislation.

Does the strategy also include elements of a transitional justice toolkit as part of wider efforts aimed at the de-occupation and reintegration of Crimea?

Yes, transitional justice remains an important part of the strategy. Moreover, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea also has a mandate to propose specific legal solutions that fit into the concept of post-conflict and transformative justice. It has already been stipulated that Ukraine shall constantly document all instances of human rights violations conducted by the Russian Federation, as well as gather evidence for future prosecutions of its representatives and members of the occupation administration in Crimea for any crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Since 2016 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol began to bring the attention of the international community to the crimes committed in Crimea. Activities in this regard include co-operation with foreign experts, which is also an example of how transitional justice works in practice. It should also be added that in 2019 a special department was established within the structure of the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine to deal with crimes committed during the international armed conflict in Crimea and Donbas.   

Certainly, one of the most significant and, at the same time, controversial issues is the situation of the people who were relocated to Crimea by Russian authorities. Will they be able to stay in Ukraine once the peninsula is reintegrated into the Ukrainian state? If yes, then on what terms?

Let me start by saying Russia officially talks about nearly 200,000 people who have been relocated to Crimea. In Ukraine we do not believe this number.

Why?

First, because as a principle we cannot believe what the Kremlin tells us, and second, because the data does not include employees of many special state agencies, including the military, who have also been relocated to Crimea. According to our estimates, there are now at least 500,000 relocated Russians in Crimea. However, the estimates of the representatives of the Crimean Tatars, who stayed in Crimea and live under the Russian occupation there, point to between 600,000 to one million people who have been transferred by the Kremlin to the Crimean peninsula since 2014. Considering these numbers, you can now understand why our strategy regarding Russian policies towards Crimea are viewed as examples of war crimes committed by an occupant. This is in line with the language of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

We have no doubt that Russia’s main aim is to change the demographic structure of the population living in Crimea by resettling Russians in the peninsula and simultaneously displacing Ukrainian citizens loyal to Kyiv, including Crimean Tatars. However, once Crimea is again reintegrated with Ukraine, these “settlers” who moved there illegally will probably be forced to leave. Having said that, I do not exclude some exceptions that possibly will be created for the people who will fully recognise the territorial integrity of Ukraine and its domestic legislation.

Do these planned integration activities include mechanisms of dialogue, truth-seeking and truth-telling? For instance, have you thought of establishing a truth and reconciliation commission?

I would like to make it clear that one of the pillars of our concept is the right to truth. In other words, we believe that the public needs to have knowledge about the course of the armed conflict, the occupation, etc. We are also obtaining such knowledge through activities aimed at reconciliation. However, we do not try to hide the fact that it is not our aim to “reconcile” with the aggressors. Nonetheless, our work will for sure include all citizens from Crimea and Donbas, because our vision of reintegration does not separate these two areas. We see them together as part of the same international armed conflict, which has been taking place on Ukraine’s territory since 2014. However, whether the reintegration of these territories will take place under a truth and reconciliation commission or some other similar body is a question of time.

You have talked mainly about the people who live in Crimea. However, I would also like to ask about what will happen to the people who work for occupation structures? Will they have to undergo vetting procedures, if they wish to stay in Ukraine?

For them, we are thinking about the possibility of lustration as it is regulated in the framework of transitional justice and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. This has been prepared by the Working Group on the Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, which forms part of the Legal Reform Commission under the President of Ukraine. It assumes that, for example, people who worked for the structures of the occupation administration will not be able to work for Ukraine’s state agencies. Certainly, these issues require further work and their subsequent inclusion into specific normative acts in the future. However, it is worth emphasising that we believe that the most efficient way to pursue transitional justice is through  presidential decrees, supplemented by sectoral laws enacted by the Ukrainian parliament.

So far, a legal bill has been prepared to establish the framework for a transitional period. It was prepared by Oleksii Reznikov, who until recently was the Minister for Temporarily Occupied Territories (he is now the minister of defence). This proposal also envisages amendments to specific laws, including the country’s criminal code. Reznikov’s proposal should not yet be seen as some kind of rivalry to the work of our office or the entire Crimea Platform. On the contrary, we have worked in close co-operation with colleagues from other state agencies, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories, and many others (e.g. the Prosecutor’s Office). It is necessary to bring up, for example, the excellent work of the Ministry of Justice, thanks to which the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed in its recent decision that Russia has been effectively in control of Crimea since at least February 27th 2014. This was a few weeks before the so-called “referendum” that was held there. This ruling thus destroyed the Kremlin’s myth of the so-called “self-determination of the people of Crimea”. Such a judgment is certainly very beneficial from the perspective of the functioning and further development of the Crimea Platform.

It seems that one of the greatest difficulties regarding the future de-occupation and reintegration of Crimea is overcoming Russia’s information power. Clearly, in both areas, eastern Ukraine and Crimea, many people still function under the so-called information umbrella put there by Moscow. What are your plans to change this?

Above all, our task is to overcome the main Russian propaganda myth that the so-called “people of Crimea” supported the annexation of the peninsula and its further incorporation into the Russian Federation. It is simply not true. The Crimean Tatars opposed Russia’s occupation of Crimea. As a result, they are still victims of Russia’s illegal activities, in particular unlawful searches and arrests.

We are in constant contact with our fellow citizens who stayed in Crimea after its temporary occupation, and what I can definitely say is that they too are waiting to become part of Ukraine again. Of course, it is difficult to break through Russian propaganda, but we are trying to do so.

It is important that during different Ukrainian state holidays the president continues to grant state decorations, awards or orders to people who are still in Crimea, or who have become political prisoners because of their strong pro-Ukrainian position and activities. These things are not only documents signed by the head of state, but also symbols that Ukraine does not forget about its people. This is something that gives them strength. Let me mention here  individuals such as Server Mustafayev, a defender of Crimean Tatar rights and coordinator of the initiative “Crimean Solidarity”, who is now jailed in Russia. We should also remember Archbishop Kliment, Metropolitan of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in Crimea, a denomination which in fact is now on the verge of annihilation. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning Nariman Jeljal, deputy chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars. Of course, there are also many others.

Let us talk for a moment about Nariman Jeljal. On September 4th 2021, he was arrested by Russian secret services. Later, the occupation court in Simferopol ordered his detainment for two months. Shall we understand such acts, which clearly are violations of human rights, as Russia’s reaction to the Crimea Platform?

 Without a doubt. Nariman Jeljal is a key figure who permanently lives in Crimea. All free people who live there unite around him. These are not only Crimean Tatars, but also all other people who are still living on the peninsula and who do not agree with Russia’s occupation of Crimea. For all these years in the aftermath of Russia’s aggression, Jeljal stayed in Crimea, helping human rights defenders, activists or families of political prisoners. He has been awarded a medal for distinguished services to the Ukrainian nation, which he received from President Zelenskyy in 2020. Jeljal also openly participated in the Crimea Platform summit. Additionally, he took part in the opening of our Crimea Platform office and delivered a beautiful speech in the presence of the president. That is why it is clear that his arrest by representatives of the occupation administration in Crimea was Russia’s reaction to these activities. Having said that, I want to stress that accusing Jeljal of “sabotage” is completely absurd and unlawful.

While giving his closing remarks at the August summit in Kyiv, President Zelenskyy invited Russia to join the initiative. This move would eventually result in a summit in Yalta, during which control over Crimea will be restored to Ukraine. This idea was criticised as absurd and inappropriate. Russia, after all, is an aggressor and an occupant. Nonetheless, I wonder whether this speech was just skilful rhetoric or Zelenskyy’s real political plan?

Before answering this question, we have to first say that I am very grateful to President Zelenskyy for accepting a significant part of our proposals on Crimea and implementing them as the head of state. Without a doubt, President Zelenskyy is very involved in working on the Crimean issue and takes personal responsibility for the success of the Crimea Platform. His position on Russia as an aggressor and occupant is very firm and unchanging. He emphasised it very clearly at the August summit. For this reason, I do not see any justification to criticise the words that you mentioned.

What should be remembered though, is that, as a principle, de-occupation can be done in two ways – peacefully or militarily. Clearly, for us the only path is a peaceful resolution to the conflict (enhanced by sanctions, political pressure, etc.). We have to be ready for the day when Russia will return control over Crimea to Ukraine. We must have everything documented by then (in particular, all crimes committed and violations of human rights) and estimate future compensation that we will demand from the Kremlin. If Russia joins the table of negotiations and participates in the process of Crimea’s de-occupation, the reintegration route will certainly be faster and more effective. The question is not whether Ukraine will return its flag to Crimea, but when it will happen.

Anton Korynevych is Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Head of the Office of the Crimea Platform, and associate professor of international law at the Institute of International Relations of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.      

Tomasz Lachowski is a legal scholar and Associate Professor and Chair of International Law and International Relations at the University of Łódź. He conducts research on the application of transitional justice mechanisms in post-Maidan Ukraine relating to the ongoing Russian aggression. He is editor-in-chief of the Polish online magazine Obserwator Międzynarodowy (International Observer).

Crimea, Donbas, Russia, Ukraine