Who benefits from the CSTO?

While Russia's interest in the CSTO is easily understandable, the benefits to the organisation's partner states are less clear and deserve further investigation. Photo Russian Federation ministry of defence flickr page (CC)

The limits of Russian leadership 

The creation of the CSTO was generally perceived as a Russian attempt to re-establish a unified military bloc to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and, thus, balance the US-led unipolar system. The 2001 war in Afghanistan and the subsequent arrival of NATO in Central Asia thereby accelerated the transformation of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), founded ten years earlier, into the CSTO. This organisation was formed by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.  

Through the CSTO, Moscow aimed to maintain its role as a great power and hegemon over post-Soviet space. In addition, the CSTO was supposed to legitimise Russia’s actions, geopolitical vision, and therefore, its intervention in regions considered essential to its national interests. In this context, the organisation was meant to help Russia keep neighbouring countries in its sphere of influence. This prevents these states from hosting foreign military bases and joining other international or regional organisations of which Moscow is not a member. 

However, almost twenty years after the creation of the CSTO, its original ambitions have vanished. Russia seems to have become entangled in its own project. In fact, it has never really succeeded in transforming the CSTO into an effective and inclusive organisation. Moscow’s leadership and the huge disparity in economic and military potential compared to other member states strongly influence the activities of the CSTO. Russian interests and priorities often dictate the organisation’s agenda but have never won the hearts of its partners. Whilst the most volatile of these states have effectively made Russia wholly responsible for their defence, the more independent countries, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, have moved to seek new partnerships. This includes military cooperation with states in the Far East and the West. 

Russia’s inability to impose its vision on all members of the organisation is not the CSTO’s only weakness. Its geographic scope also undoubtedly contributes to its ineffectiveness. Indeed, the group cannot be defined as a truly regional organisation as it covers parts of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Since these three regions present different challenges and geopolitical contexts, CSTO member states have divergent interests. Examples of the lack of internal coherence within the organisation include the inter-ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, as well as Belarus’s support for Armenia’s historical enemy, Azerbaijan. The vastness of the Eurasian region that the CSTO aims to cover and the absence of a common denominator (dependence on Russia aside) among the member states make it difficult to find a shared strategy. These differences between official allies were made clear in 2009 by Lukashenka, who publicly asked “Why should our men fight in Kazakhstan?” This idea holds true even now for many member states. 

 An alliance with no allies 

While Russia’s interest in the CSTO is easily understandable, the benefits to the organisation’s partner states are less clear and deserve further investigation. Incentives offered by Russia to its “allies” include the opportunity to purchase Russian weapons at a reduced price and the chance for officers from member states to be trained in Russian military academies. These tools have allowed Moscow to create win-win relations and are viewed favourably by those states that cannot afford high military expenditures. Also, the sale of armaments to the neighbourhood allows Russia to maintain a strong grip on the CSTO states. For the smaller states this makes it possible to deploy a military potential that they could not otherwise have. The presence of foreign military officers in Russian academies allows Moscow to dictate its operational concepts as well as its worldview. This creates a kind of common thinking that facilitates interoperability and joint action. As a result, the CSTO can be defined as a perfect representation of Russian instrumental multilateralism. 

However, an alliance is something different and requires a shared strategy and common goals. Instead, different foreign policy visions and priorities remain clear among CSTO countries. These differences have resulted in a sort of paralysis, as the group has never acted in the vast region that hosts it. Instead of developing a “Russian NATO”, the CSTO has limited its activities to preventive and defensive measures. 

The inconsistency of the CSTO has led Russia to disregard the organisation when the country pursues foreign policy objectives or intervenes militarily as it did in Georgia and Ukraine. The only case of support for Russian action by a CSTO member was Armenia’s symbolic engagement in Syria. This was motivated more by newly elected Prime Minister Pashinyan’s need to show loyalty after the Velvet Revolution than by obligations related to membership. Not even Turkey’s shootdown of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M attack aircraft in 2015 led to a strong unanimous stance by CSTO member states. Similarly, the CSTO has always affirmed its intention to not intervene in internal crises or even international disputes, such as the recent border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The organisation has failed to act even when expressly invited to do so by clearly stating that it has no mandate to interfere in the internal affairs of its member states. 

 CSTO’s failure to support Armenia 

While the CSTO’s decision not to intervene in regional crises over the years has always been justified by the fact that the conflicts did not stem from external aggression, the organisation’s position during the 2020 conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was much more controversial. The decision not to intervene in the war that Armenia fought alongside the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh Republic against Azerbaijan was motivated by the fact that the fighting was taking place beyond the borders of the member country. Although from a legal point of view the position of the CSTO was consistent with its charter, the decision surprised Armenian society, which had expected support from partner states. Anger and a sense of abandonment led to a decline in Armenians’ overall trust in the CSTO from around 21 per cent in 2018 to 7.2 per cent in 2021, according to a recent survey. 

After the ceasefire, brokered by Russia, the CSTO had a further opportunity to show its effectiveness by deciding to deploy peacekeepers in the region. Instead, Moscow opted for unilateral action and sent its own peacekeepers. 

The CSTO then limited itself to carrying out consultations and issuing statements even when Azerbaijani troops encroached on Armenia’s sovereign territory in May. Although the CSTO’s failure to intervene in this case would appear to be a violation of the mutual defence clause of article four of the CSTO Charter, even Armenia itself avoided invoking the support of its allies. Instead, Yerevan, most likely after consultation with Russia, requested the application of article two, which provides for the initiation of consultations against a threat of aggression. Interestingly, while article four would have entailed an immediate reaction, including the provision of military and any other necessary support in accordance with the right to collective defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, it was decided instead to try to resolve the dispute by deploying Russian military personnel. This controversial decision taken to secure Armenia’s borders has subsequently made the country even more dependent on Moscow. 

 Afghanistan: last call for the CSTO? 

The attitude the CSTO has shown in dealing with recent conflicts that have destabilised the broader Eurasian region highlights how the organisation has systematically avoided any possible active involvement. While this rationale may be justified by a preference for diplomatic solutions and an attempt not to exacerbate complex situations, the CSTO’s lack of large-scale operations casts a shadow over its actual ability to intervene if necessary.  

In this context, a major new regional security challenge is now posed by Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US and NATO troops, as well as the subsequent return of the Taliban to Kabul. After two recent meetings of the CSTO’s Collective Security Council on Afghanistan, a series of large-scale armed forces drills near the Tajik-Afghan border was announced. In addition, it was decided to accelerate the adoption of Tajikistan’s special Inter-State Policy aimed at strengthening the border with Afghanistan. 

The practice of military exercises meant to deter aggression is not new to the CSTO. Recently, joint exercises have also taken place in Armenia with the aim of putting pressure on Azerbaijan. However, this kind of activity has proved ineffective in stopping conflicts because the CSTO’s inability to translate its potential into an effective military response is well known. Aware of these limits, Russia has once again taken unilateral action and promised to strengthen the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan through the supply of dozens of new tanks. 

The Afghan crisis poses at least two fundamental challenges to Russia and the CSTO. Firstly, it represents a decisive test for Moscow’s leadership in the region. Since Afghanistan is a priority for Russia’s security, it will be interesting to see if Moscow will be able to impose its agenda on its “allies” and convince them to proceed together.

Secondly, Afghanistan could represent a major challenge for the entire CSTO. Indeed, if the threat of renewed Islamic extremism strikes in the region, it is uncertain whether the organisation will be ready to take action. After repeatedly rejecting requests for help from some of its members, states far from the centre of Asia or the terrorist threat may prove unwilling to support Tajikistan – or even Russia – should security conditions deteriorate. In other words, the Afghan crisis could prove to be both a challenge and an opportunity for the CSTO, which could take the chance to finally show its membership benefits. 

Tiziano Marino is a political analyst and researcher specialising in international security and geoeconomics. He is a graduate of the College of Europe in Natolin and Roma Tre University. His research interests include the EU Neighbourhood, South Caucasus and South Asia.

Tatevik Hovhannisyan is a political scientist specialising in political communications and civil society affairs. She is a graduate of the College of Europe in Natolin and Yerevan State University. Her areas of interest include EU Neighbourhood relations, civic participation in developing countries and advocacy.

Afghanistan, Armenia, CSTO, Russia