Understanding the Kremlin’s logic after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

"Russian Peacekeepers" - Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

The fact is that the Kremlin considers the current status quo around Nagorno-Karabakh not to be a defeat. Rather, it views the current situation as an open opportunity to pull the region into its sphere of influence. This situation has created a new system of challenges and risks for the South Caucasus. The Kremlin’s rationale in moderating the conflict also explains its attitude towards transportation infrastructure projects that are now being talked about as a result of the ceasefire agreement. I would like to point out that I am not insisting that this logic will eventually succeed. Moreover, I personally wish it would not. Yet, understanding the Kremlin’s strategy, as well as the challenges and risks resulting from this logic, ensures that states may be able to create more effective counterstrategies. There are three major outcomes that the Kremlin may have planned for after deciding to help end last year’s conflict. These include the effective “defeat of both parties” in the conflict, an absence of a de jure and de facto mandate for so-called “peacekeeping” activities on Azerbaijani territory, and a revitalisation of the OSCE Minsk Group with its old agenda.

Bet on defeat

Before, during and after the 44-day war, Moscow has built a regional policy that effectively views both parties involved in the war as on the losing side. This is despite the unconditional military victory of Azerbaijan. Such an approach is clear with regards to the Kremlin’s interactions with Armenia during the conflict. Yerevan was de facto deprived of any possibility of having its voice heard regarding the agenda surrounding Karabakh. Having taken charge of ongoing talks on the region, Moscow is now attempting to control Armenia’s domestic and foreign political discourse. Meanwhile, Russia has developed plans for various  potential scenarios in the region and how it may subsequently increase its presence and power on the “Armenian front”. These plans directly concern new transport infrastructure corridors and various old projects currently under renovation.

The implementation of these scenarios has already partly begun. For example, Moscow has started to enforce its military presence in Armenia and this is best seen in the Syunik region. With regards to the demarcation of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, it appears that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) may well be involved in securing the line along the entire Armenian border. This could also be a sign of potential escalation. Such actions hint at a possible worst case scenario, in which Yerevan is officially tied to Russia through a project such as the Union State. Recent escalations on the border only contribute to the expansion of Russia’s military activities, especially the duties of its “peacekeepers”. The Kremlin will certainly benefit from any situation in which the two parties attempt to escalate a conflict already under close Russian mediation.

It is important to understand that there is no unanimous opinion in Moscow regarding  the South Caucasus in general and the Armenia-Azerbaijan agenda in particular. Different oligarchic power blocs are competing for their own visions. The Armenian front has provided fertile ground for this internal Kremlin competition and the parliamentary elections in June only further revealed this fact.

As for Azerbaijan, Moscow will likely exploit various opportunities to support and exacerbate a “syndrome of high expectations” that has been provoked by the incomplete liberation of the Karabakh territories. This relates not only to the moderation of tendencies within Azerbaijani society and its influence on Baku’s domestic agenda. Indeed, the Kremlin has taken a “show them who is the boss” approach, and this will soon become evident in international relations and geopolitics. Now it seems obvious that Baku, although strongly reluctant to have ‘peacekeepers’ on its territory, knew from the very beginning that the implementation of this aspect of the agreement was inevitable. It understood and was ready to counter Kremlin hybrid expansion in the context of the new status quo around Karabakh. As a result, out of all three South Caucasian states, it is only Azerbaijan that can exercise influence on the regional processes and the approaches of regional and external players. Baku’s power benefitted strongly from the military victory, but Moscow will systematically attempt to undermine it.

“Peacekeepers” mandate 

The Kremlin has been planning to deprive Baku of any real leverage over the military aspects of the “peacekeeping” contingent, as well as any activities related to transport through the Lachin corridor, since the very start. Moscow still has not agreed to establish a clear definition of what its mission or mandate is on the territory of Azerbaijan. The reasons behind this are clear. Any clarification of the mission’s purpose would limit the Kremlin’s chances to control the politics of the separatist government in Stepanakert, which is now effectively a Russian military protectorate. Moscow will not waste its chance to exercise its influence over this issue, as well as the various infrastructure projects in the region.

Despite this, Azerbaijan is still attempting to respond to these steps and promote its own agenda. In particular, it has conducted a series of information operations, which is atypical when compared to the previous stages of the conflict. The case of the Iskandar-M missiles found in Shusha made the most headlines but this is not the only case. The fact that the results of these campaigns are questionable and the motives behind them are not straightforward is less important. What should be noted is the fact that Baku systematically refuses to play along with the rules imposed from the outside (i.e. from Moscow).

At the same time, Azerbaijan has experienced various problems in trying to turn the Russian military contingent into a cooperative peacekeeping force. For instance, the Kremlin does not tolerate the participation of Turkey in this format. Aligning the activity of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ with the activity of the joint Russian-Turkish monitoring centre has turned out to be an issue as well. This issue is not necessarily a decisive loss for Baku. However, it is clear that the Kremlin does not wish to consider the internationalisation of the mission in any way at all and especially with regards to Turkish participation.  

Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s strategy to pretend as if both parties in the conflict were defeated creates a legal uncertainty that benefits Moscow. The Kremlin aims to make Baku vulnerable in the face of its ongoing hybrid confrontation and destroy Azerbaijani national resilience, which was developed and fortified during the 44-day war for Karabakh.

Revitalisation of the OSCE Minsk Group and its old agenda

At this stage, the Russian-Turkish competition for influence in Karabakh is the only game in town. One can consider this a simplified point of view though this format is much clearer than the Astana talks over Syria and more effective than the stillborn OSCE Minsk Group. This situation has proven advantageous for Baku, not least due to Yerevan’s current lack of opportunities. However, this does not mean that the aforementioned approaches of the Kremlin might preclude attempts to revitalise the OSCE Minsk Group. There are already some clear signs that Moscow may be interested in restarting these talks.

The 3+3 framework of regional co-operation (Iran, Russia, Turkey – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) was recently revived and has been presented as an alternative to the Minsk Group. In my view, these frameworks of co-operation do not possess the same influence and it would be wrong to view the Minsk Group and the 3+3 format as competitors. This is especially true given the new realities of regional security in the South Caucasus. The Minsk Group has already demonstrated its ineffectiveness. The 3+3 format is amorphous as it does not suggest realistic and consensual scenarios regarding regional defence and security. Proponents of this approach seem to suggest simply ignoring these issues but this is practically impossible.

The enhancement of the three regional powers’ positions has occurred at the exact same time. Despite this, it is not clear how it may be possible to maintain this reality given the substantial, profound contradictions they face in the region. The Kremlin’s “peacekeeping” logic is not difficult to understand. According to it, the transportation infrastructure projects should be controlled by Russia and serve to pull Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into its sphere of influence. This approach aligns with rhetoric surrounding the global US-China confrontation that has already been called a new Cold War. This includes Washington’s opposition to Kremlin expansion, the transformation of American policy towards Iran under Joe Biden, and the revitalisation of transatlantic unity regarding policies such as approaches to Ankara. If confrontation proceeds, China (which is in no rush) may simply agree to more “military mediation by the Kremlin” in the post-Soviet space.

Due to this, Moscow’s attempts to revitalise the OSCE Minsk Group with its old agenda of negotiations should not be surprising. The Kremlin maintains a military base in Armenia and could use the Minsk format in the case of confrontation with Turkey. In reality, however, it will likely prove difficult to revive the operation of the Minsk Group without completely changing its outdated agenda. Azerbaijan would not agree to such changes for obvious reasons.

So far, Washington has formally approved a renewed focus on the OSCE Minsk Group and expressed a call for restraint. Yet, there has so far been no sign that the US will be returning to the South Caucasus or Karabakh agenda in any meaningful sense. Whilst Vladimir Putin’s regime becomes increasingly controversial on the international stage, Washington continues to treat the Minsk Group as practically the only platform for periodic discussions with the Kremlin about a wide range of issues.

As the most prominent public proponent of the Minsk Group, France could support Moscow’s initiatives. This is not only due to Paris’s solidarity with Armenia but also Turkey’s continued infringement of the Total S.A. oil company’s business interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Interestingly, President Emmanuel Macron has recently presented himself as someone who understands the Kremlin and not only with regards to the Karabakh agenda.

Under certain circumstances, especially in the case of escalation, the Kremlin could benefit greatly from the revival of the OSCE Minsk Group. This is because any changes would affect the current line of contact along the borders of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Moscow understands very well that Baku could move quickly and decisively to repopulate and restore the infrastructure of the seven districts retaken by the country. This includes the cities of Shusha and Gandrut, as well as the settlements of the Khojavend and Khojaly districts. There should be no doubt that the Kremlin sees this new infrastructure and, most importantly, people as potential hostages in a possible new round of pressure and bargaining.

Translated by Anna Efimova

Volodymyr Kopchak is the head of the South Caucasus Branch of the Ukrainian Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies in Tbilisi.

Nagorno-Karabakh war, Russia