The Zangezur corridor: An Azerbaijani perspective

Zangezur Mountains in Goris Skyline landmark of Syunik province of Armenia Photo: By OSTILL is Franck Camhi / Shutterstock

The inclusion of this condition into the deal was reportedly obtained with a significant pressure placed on Armenia. Naturally, the text is considered to be a great achievement for Azerbaijan. Recent tensions between the both countries’ armies in the borderland regions are directly related to Baku’s dissatisfaction with Yerevan and its alleged attempts to disregard any potential transport links. Indeed, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated in April that “there can be no corridor for Azerbaijan”. Although it was not entirely clear what exactly these words meant in practice, many Armenians believe that any corridor would effectively constitute handing over land to Azerbaijan. This is obviously not the case.

Connecting Asia with Europe

Growing tensions over the corridor appeared amidst repeated statements by Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev concerning the prospects of restored regional transportation links. For example, he stated that this corridor would constitute an important element in the transportation network connecting Asia with Europe during a session of the United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Asia and the Pacific. This was an important development as the restoration of links has traditionally been discussed as a matter of regional importance. 

Despite this, the importance of restoring a direct link with Nakhchivan for Azerbaijan is rarely known to the wider public. This significance cannot be explained through purely economic considerations. Indeed, the railway line that had been connecting the areas before 1990 no longer physically exists, as the rails were most probably sold for scrap metal during the Armenian occupation. The restoration of the railway would not only involve laying track in the relatively short section that falls within the borders of Armenia. Certainly, a much larger section between Horadiz in Azerbaijan (which before 2020 had been the town closest to the line of contact with the so-called ‘Nagorno-Karabakh army’) and the border with Armenia would have to be created. This line would measure approximately 120 kilometres.

A study conducted by International Alert in 2014 projected that the construction of the missing parts of the railway along the Kars–Gyumri–Nakhchivan–Meghri–Baku route (KGNMB) would cost USD 433.7. The group estimated that the re-establishment of the Azerbaijani section of the line would cost 277.1 million, while the Armenian and Turkish sections would require USD 104.6 million and 52 million, respectively. Even though the railway price tag now generally exceeds these projections from 7 years ago, a revitalised KGNMB line still seems to make more economic sense than its alternatives. Although Turkey’s transport and infrastructure ministry has estimated that construction of the Igdir–Kars–Nakhchivan railway would cost less (USD between 180 and 240 million) than the KGNMB, it would take much longer (via the more-than-1,000 kilometre Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway) for transport from Baku to reach Nakhchivan compared to the Zangezur corridor (426 kilometres).

Moreover, it must be remembered that Azerbaijan has already invested an amount exceeding USD 1.4 billion into the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway (USD 750 million of this amount was given as credit to Georgia to cover its construction costs). This was yet another project that was supposed to establish an efficient overland connection with Turkey that could be integrated into global logistical networks, such as China’s One Belt-One Road, Turkey’s Middle Corridor or the North-South line connecting Russia with Iran and South Asia.

Real opportunities lie in the expansion of trade between Turkey and Central Asian countries via the routes passing through Azerbaijan. Currently, this trade amounts to EUR 6 billion. Given Ankara’s obvious interest in intensifying cooperation with the countries of the region on all levels, this figure could grow in a rather short amount of time. This is especially true in the case of the populous Uzbekistan, which is now experiencing an economic boom. Baku takes its potential transport capacity quite seriously. For instance, the capital’s port registered an unexpected surge in traffic last year despite the pandemic. The throughput of large vehicles and containers using the port last year represented a 30-year record. In 2020 the number of trucks passing through increased by 28 per cent, whilst container exports increased by 15 per cent and the volume of cargo transported through the dry cargo terminal grew by an impressive 28 per cent.

Seeking a win-win

Given that there already are existing roads suitable for transport purposes, it is difficult to discuss the potentially expensive Zangezur corridor in purely economic terms. As a result, various political and security issues must also be carefully examined. First of all, it is clear that Aliyev has stressed the importance of the Zangezur corridor as it helps promote Azerbaijan’s image as a state that supports ‘win-win’ solutions capable of strengthening regional security and cooperation. Speaking at an international press conference on May 20th, Aliyev claimed that he is ready for a comprehensive peace with Armenia and hopes to pursue cooperation as quickly as possible. He even mentioned that the demarcation process can proceed even without the mediation of third parties (obviously, implying Russia).

Aliyev also declared that Azerbaijan stands ready to assist Armenia in its development policies. He has stressed that unblocking transport links would play an enormously positive role for Yerevan as well. “Two people must learn to live in peace side by side”, he concluded.

At the same time, it is worth mentioning that Azerbaijan’s president has not publicly touched upon the similar problem of the Lachin corridor. This corridor is made up of a stretch of Azerbaijani land between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh that is now controlled by Russian peacekeepers tasked with ensuring the free movement of Armenians. Issues such as the alleged use of the corridor by the Armenian military even after November 10th have remained a source of considerable irritation among Azerbaijanis. However, the fact that the Zangezur corridor is given much more attention and weight by Baku suggests that it hopes to represent itself as a champion of regional integration and development, prioritising such goals over short-term ambitions.

A publication by the government-affiliated Center for the Analysis of International Relations claims that “Azerbaijan is decisively committed to the creation of this corridor and restoration of transport links as it considers co-operation to be the main tool for creating durable peace in the region”. The same source also stresses the benefits that Armenia could receive from a new transport line with Russia. After all, transit through Georgia remains unstable and irregular due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. Baku’s continued attempts to encourage the opening of the corridor in the face of Armenian uncertainty only further strengthens Azerbaijan’s image as a benign and cooperative partner. According to a recent analytical paper on the corridor, the belief is strong in Baku that sustainable economic development and peace, spurred on by unblocked transport links, will prevent the spread of harmful nationalistic ideas and the creation of new conflicts in the future.

At the same time, the opening of the Zangezur corridor will play an important role in the security of Azerbaijan’s newly liberated lands as well. It would cement the implementation of the 10 November agreement and show that there is a new status quo. By providing serious security guarantees to potential investors in the Azerbaijani territories undergoing reconstruction, Baku could well succeed in restoring the war-torn Karabakh region. Such a move would also signify another psychological victory over the ‘old foe’, whilst demonstrating the country’s ability to achieve its goals by non-military means.

Obstacles to a breakthrough

Yerevan seems unwilling to embark on this project despite its earlier agreement stipulated in the November ceasefire statement. Moreover, the timing of the deal is very important. It is hardly a secret that Russia and Turkey’s ability to balance their interests was one of the major factors that made Azerbaijan’s success possible. However, there is no guarantee that the complex relationship between the two regional powerhouses will not deteriorate once again. This could possibly create obstacles for Baku and its reintegration strategy. Due to this, Aliyev will try to secure as many gains as possible during the current political climate in the region. Azerbaijan would also gain from decreasing its dependence on Iran, which up to now has provided uninterrupted overland connection with Nakhchivan. While Tehran generally maintained a benign neutrality during the war and officially welcomed Azerbaijan’s success, it is unlikely that the fundamental mistrust that exists between the two capitals will disappear. It will be much easier for Baku to pursue relations if Tehran loses one of its major bilateral advantages (anecdotal evidence suggests that Iran has made use of the Nakhchivan issue during previous bilateral crises).

At the same time, Aliyev will also gain domestically if he achieves a breakthrough regarding the transportation issue. Such success would further marginalise the minority view that the 44-day war was not a victory and was imposed by Moscow, which simply replaced Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. These voices will face even more challenges should the president overcome these transport problems. Furthermore, Nakhchivan has to some extent long been detached from wider socio-political trends in Azerbaijan and recent reforms have barely touched the autonomous republic. With stronger links and an additional boost to his legitimacy, Aliyev will likely push to enact similar changes in Nakhchivan as well.

Author’s note: this text was written in May 2021. Some details may have changed since then.

Murad Muradov is the co-founder and deputy director of the Topchubashov Center, a Baku-based think tank. An alumnus of the London School of Economics (2015), he covers European politics, politics of identity and nationality and international political economy.

Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh war