The public diplomacy of the Associated Trio: Singing in unison?

Presidents of the Associated Trio together with Charles Michel (far right), president of the European Council. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine (CC)

Another new foreign policy initiative of Ukraine is the “Associated Trio” format. A memorandum of understanding between the Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian foreign ministries regarding enhanced co-operation on European integration was signed on May 17th. This Associated Trio was signed into existence by the Georgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs David Zalkaliani, Moldova’s acting Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Aureliu Ciocoi, and Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba. This format was presented on June 24th in Brussels to various EU commissioners and parliamentarians. Less than a month later, on July 19th, the group released the Batumi Summit Declaration, which was jointly issued by Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili, Moldovan President Maia Sandu and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Wider ambitions

The Associated Trio’s initiative provides for enhanced coordination in the field of European integration. Overall, the agreement emphasises the European aspirations of the three EU-associated partners and their ambitions for membership. Both the memorandum and presidential declaration identify the coordination of strategic communications as one of the initiative’s main priorities. Since public diplomacy occupies a prominent position within the group, the question arises as to how this will work in relation to the Associated Trio’s wider ambitions for European integration? Indeed, is such an approach even commensurate with the ambitious intentions of the tripartite initiative?

Overall, it seems that the three Eastern Partnership (EaP) states’ steps towards integration would be incomplete without the use of public diplomacy tools that focus on two audiences. Whilst these states must promote a positive image of themselves in the EU (external dimension of public diplomacy), they must also encourage pro-European public opinion among their own populations (internal dimension of public diplomacy). This internal dimension ultimately relates to how European integration is discussed by these states within their borders and how the public is informed about the ongoing process. The formation of public opinion and feedback related to these state goals also play a key role.

In this context, it is important to identify the success indicators related to this public diplomacy. Studies that identify changes in public opinion over recent years may subsequently prove effective in understanding the success of this push for European integration. Among these studies there is the example of the annual survey in the EU’s six Eastern Partnership countries, conducted by the EU Neighbours East group. According to the 2020 survey, 49 per cent of the Eastern Partnership countries’ citizens have a positive perception of the EU. This represents a rise of four per cent from 2016. Around 57 per cent of this population are aware of the EU’s financial support, whilst 53 per cent believe that the support is effective. Once again, this represents a rise since 2016 (ten per cent). More than half (53 per cent) of EaP citizens aware of the EU’s financial support are able to identify at least one specific programme financed by the EU in their country. Compared to 2017, this represents a significant increase of 18 per cent.

The same survey shows that the EU is considered to be the most trusted international institution, as well as the only one trusted by the majority (60 per cent) of EaP citizens. Trust is higher in Georgia (69 per cent), Ukraine (66 per cent), Moldova (63 per cent) and Armenia (60 per cent), and lower in Belarus (45 per cent) and Azerbaijan (41 per cent). This is just one example of a survey that provides a fairly approximate and tentative answer to whether the Eastern Partnership countries in general and the Associated Trio, in particular, communicate effectively with their internal audience regarding European integration.

At the same time, last year’s data raises another additional question, or even a methodological dilemma: is it possible to define the boundary between the influence of these states’ internal public diplomacy and the EU’s own external activities regarding the countries’ populations? After all, the target group in both cases remains the citizens of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s hand?

Apart from the EU and the Associated Trio, Russia remains a key actor in this “triangle” of soft influence. The most well-known actor of Russia’s public diplomacy is “Rossotrudnichestvo” (the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Co-operation). The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund is also an important organisation and has even helped organise the Georgian-Russian Civic Center in Tbilisi. However, the fund has recently been less active in all countries of the Associated Trio.

On the Rossotrudnichestvo website there is a subsection on “CIS countries, Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, which contains information about Moldova and Ukraine. The Russian Center for Science and Culture operates in both states’ capital cities. In particular, the Chișinău branch of Rossotrudnichestvo is quite active and, among other things, largely organises the recruitment of Moldovan youth to study at Russian universities at Moscow’s expense.

In contrast, the Kyiv branch of Rossotrudnichestvo, which has been operating since 1998, was recognised by the European Parliament in 2016 as a propaganda tool. This move, however, did not affect its further functioning. The branch even declared that Taras Shevchenko was a “Russian-Ukrainian poet” during celebrations in early March. This caused righteous indignation within the Ukrainian foreign ministry. A month later, in early April, Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded by issuing a decree enacting the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine that imposed sanctions on a number of Russian companies, including Rossotrudnichestvo.

As for Georgia, the country is not present on the political map of the world according to Rossotrudnichestvo. As was already mentioned, however, the group appears to operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It should be noted that Georgia is also pursuing various public diplomacy initiatives related to the unrecognised republics. However, unlike Russia, Tbilisi is carrying out radically different activities aimed at easing the confrontation between both sides of the frozen conflict.

Chairs of ministries

In some way, public diplomacy has always been present in the foreign policies of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, but above all through the efforts of progressive civil society. As for the state sector, the strategic use of public diplomacy tools was for a long time not directly associated with state institutions or their structural subdivisions. Currently, the situation is gradually changing, yet are things moving at the same pace in all the Associated Trio countries?

Considering the state, official level of public diplomacy, without being distracted by the non-state NGO sphere, it is clear that one should focus on the three countries’ foreign ministries and their institutional support for public diplomacy. ] Moldova’s foreign ministry now possesses a separate structural unit called the public diplomacy, strategic communication and media interaction service. Whilst in Georgia, public diplomacy is headed by the General Directorate of Information and Public Relations. This consists of two departments – press and information and strategic communications – that answer directly to David Zalkaliani. Unfortunately, the websites of these foreign ministries offer little with regards to the details of their activities.

The website of Kyiv’s foreign ministry is more eloquent in this respect. This is not surprising given that Dmytro Kuleba was one of the key thinkers behind the Ukrainian state’s increasing embrace of public diplomacy. It is quite logical, therefore, that the politician was ultimately responsible for the formation of the foreign ministry’s public diplomacy department. This move has been complemented by two dedicated documents – communication strategy and public diplomacy strategy.

It should also be noted that the Ukrainian Institute has for more than three years operated as a public institution affiliated with the foreign ministry. ​The organisation’s numerous activities have not been significantly affected by either the coronavirus pandemic or subsequent financial cuts in the cultural sphere. There are currently no equivalent organisations in Georgia and Moldova.

Logos as new state symbols

The visual component of the state’s communication about itself also plays an important role in strengthening public diplomacy efforts. In this context, the branding campaigns of all three countries are quite successful and generally aim to form (and maintain) a positive international image, attract foreign investment and develop each country’s tourism potential. In Ukraine, since May 2018, the main logo of the state brand is a combination of the country’s name with the communication message “now”, i.e. “Ukraine NOW”. There is also a corresponding icon in the colours of the state flag with the national top-level domain “ua”. 

This logo is widely used and has already become quite recognisable, including on the official multilingual website of Ukraine – www.Ukraine.ua. This website is administered by the foreign ministry and the aforementioned Ukrainian Institute.

Georgia is more experienced in terms of state branding. For example, a branding campaign under the slogan “Europe started here”, complete with an artistic rendition of the cross of St. George from the times of the Kingdom of Georgia, was officially used since 2011 as part of a campaign that promoted the state as a tourist destination.

Later, the logo changed to resemble fireworks. Since 2018 this symbol is accompanied by the slogan “Emotions are Georgia”, emphasising the full range of positive emotions associated with traditional Georgian hospitality.

A large-scale campaign was also launched to create an “emotional guide to the country” using more than seven million publications about Georgia available on social networks. The current logo is mainly used by the Georgian national tourism administration, which operates under the auspices of the ministry of economy and sustainable development. 

In terms of its state branding campaign, Moldova seems to be the most stable and has used the same logo since 2014. This consists of a stylised “tree of life” with elements of national embroidery based on the letter “M”. In combination with the slogan “Discover the routes of life”, the logo is used primarily for tourism promotion. However, it has also been used as part of investment forums and other events in line with economic diplomacy. During the celebration of the 30th anniversary of Moldova’s independence, an explanatory campaign was conducted to interpret the symbolism of each of the elements of the long-used state logo.

At the same time, Ukraine decided to create a distinct logo in the form of a flower in national colours for its own 30th anniversary. Moreover, each of the Ukrainian regions has been given its own unique flower based on the region’s flag, colours and symbols. 

Overall, it is clear that the visual identity of the state in the form of an official logo is considered to be important by all three countries.

(Inter)national broadcasting

Official state international broadcasting forms another component of the Associated Trio countries’ public diplomacy tools. This strategy targets a wide range of foreign populations in order to promote the country’s own interests, objectively inform audiences about national events, and form and maintain a positive image abroad. After all, if you remain silent, there will always be someone ready to speak for you.

Examples of these channels include Georgia’s First Informational Channel, which operated until 2013. This channel was broadcasted abroad, spoke Russian, and had a wide audience. As one of the projects of the Georgian public broadcaster, the channel was ultimately closed due to funding cuts following a change of government in the country. Currently, the public broadcaster in Georgia transmits content in the Georgian, Abkhazian, Ossetian, Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani languages. Programmes in these languages can also be heard on public radio. However, this is purely an internal project that targets ethnic minorities within Georgia. 

The situation is similar in Moldova, where until 2013 the public broadcaster provided services in Romanian, Russian and English. Radio Moldova International also operated as an international network that included content in English, French, Spanish, Romanian and Russian. Currently, the public broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova broadcasts information and analytical programmes in Romanian and simply translates textual content into Russian and English.

As for Ukraine, the situation regarding international broadcasting is simultaneously better but more complex. Between 2015 and 2020, UA TV (satellite broadcasting with an additional YouTube channel) produced programming in Ukrainian, English, Russian, Arabic and Crimean Tatar. Last year, the channel no longer operated in a meaningful sense and was simply broadcasting old content. UA TV was then replaced by the channel “Dom“, which during its short run has received a great amount of criticism. For instance, the channel showed a map of Russia that included the occupied Crimean peninsula. For now, Dom remains the only way to communicate with Ukrainian citizens living in the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Due to this, it is one of the most important tools regarding the reintegration of these territories.

In March, UA TV was restarted as a kind of international version of the state Russian language TV channel “Dom”. Its target audience is Russian-speaking foreigners abroad and a text version of the website is in English. UA TV covers almost 60 countries via satellite and also broadcasts through cable operators in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Canada, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Latvia, Moldova, Poland and the United States. It is interesting to note that the beginning of the year saw both UA TV and Dom come under the control of the ministry of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine instead of the ministry of culture and information policy of Ukraine as it was before.

The information campaign launched by the Ukrainian foreign ministry and the British BBC to commemorate the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence allowed the country to rise one step higher than the other Associated Trio states in terms of reaching a general foreign public. The project is run between August and November and consist of four components: an advertising campaign on the BBC’s official website, the creation of a special section on Ukraine, a promotional video for Ukraine on BBC Global News in four regions of the world, and research on audience perceptions of Ukraine.

Apart for Russian language content on UA TV, the countries of the Associated Trio do not currently conduct targeted international broadcasting outside their state borders and instead focus on their own populations. There are several explanations for this, including financial issues, lack of political will and a limited understanding of the need to assert state outlooks. As a result, questions may be asked as to who will counter the influence of RT?

Is the bare minimum enough?

As discussed above, changes in public opinion regarding European integration may among others depend on the effectiveness of the internal dimension of public diplomacy. In turn, the success of the Associated Trio’s external dimension may be evaluated through an analysis of the country’s positions in international rankings in terms of public diplomacy and soft power. So, how do the three countries perform in the five most important international rankings, such as the “Nation Brands Index”, the “Good Country Index”, the “Global Soft Power Index”, the “FutureBrand Country Index”, and the “Global Presence Index”?

In particular, the Brand Finance company is the creator of two international ranking formats. In their “Brandirectory” catalogues, the authors offer analysis of the global soft power index and study nations as if they were global brands. The second one (considering nation as a brand) takes into account three groups of indicators: investment (business, trade, governance, international relations, media and communications, education and science, people and values), equity (familiarity, reputation, cultural heritage, etc.), and performance (GDP, well-being, tourist attractiveness). In the Nation Brands ranking, Georgia moved from 89th place in 2015 to 99th in 2020. Between these years the country was not even included in the list at all. Ukraine has steadily improved its performance, rising from 63rd position in 2015 to 55th in 2020. Moldova, unfortunately, did not get into the top 100 nation-brands at all.

The second of the Brandirectory rankings – the Global Soft Power Index – appeared for the first time in 2020, so it is only possible to compare the country’s position in terms of the last two years. Only Ukraine made it into these rankings out of the Associated Trio. Overall, Ukraine weakened its position from 46 to 61 over the past two years but in terms of numerical score still – gained a few tenths of a point. This was because the rating expanded to 100 countries this year, while in 2020 there were only 60. Moreover, in the final report for 2021 there are two separate columns devoted to Ukraine. These offer a detailed analysis of the country’s soft power level and contain a description of certain areas where progress is being made. It also offers suggestions as to where the country needs to make reforms. The annual report includes an interview with Volodymyr Sheiko, the general director of the Ukrainian Institute, about the specifics of the institution’s activities, its regional component and difficulties faced during the coronavirus pandemic.

In the year of its first publication, the Global Soft Power Index ranking was based on the analysis of four indicators, including the state’s familiarity, reputation, influence in the world, and seven soft power pillars. These pillars include business and trade, governance, international relations, culture and heritage, media and communication, education and science, and people and values. This year, the state’s response to COVID-19 was also included as an indicator.

However, this is not the only ranking by which public diplomacy can be analysed and where the only Ukraine among Associated Trio is represented. A similar picture is observed in the FutureBrand Country Index, which is produced by the global company of the same name. The groups of indicators here closely resemble those already mentioned above from other ratings and include tourism, heritage and culture, quality of life, business potential, value system and “made in” indicators. According to the rating results from 2020, Ukraine was in 71st place (among 75 countries), rising by three positions compared to 2019.

Despite poor past ratings performances, Georgia and Moldova are present in the Good Country Index and Global Presence Index. The Good Country Index is directly related to the work of Simon Anholt, a researcher of brands and state branding. He has suggested placing countries in accordance with their proportionate global contribution to areas such as science and technology, culture, international peace and security, world order, planet and climate, prosperity and equality, and health and well-being. During the period of 2016-19, all the countries of the Associated Trio in the Good Country Index moved sporadically in the rankings. This indicates the countries’ very weak claims to stability. For example, over the four years Ukraine ranked 78th, 54th, 76th, and 72nd, whilst Moldova was ranked 35th, 31st, 27th, and 42nd. Finally, Georgia scored 45th, 57th, 38th, and 43rd. It is worth noting that despite being absent from the other rankings, Moldova occupies the highest positions according to this ranking.

The final rating is the Global Presence Index, which was developed by the Spanish Elcano Royal Institute of Strategic and International Studies. In addition to country rankings, the rating provides a global presence index. This is derived from three components, including the nation’s economic, military and soft power as a percentage. Each of these components is divided into a range of even narrower and more detailed parts. During the period 2015-20, the results of the Elcano Global Presence Index proved to be a triumph for Georgia, which rose from 95th to 88th. Moldova dropped from 101st to 120th, whilst Ukraine experienced a minimal decline from 45th to 48th place.

Amateur approach

These rankings appear to employ indicators that could be of real use in analysing the still imperfect and underused tools of public diplomacy of the Associated Trio. At the same time, it is clear that countries are often placed in radically different positions despite the use of similar indicators. Without going into an in-depth analysis of the methodological approaches chosen to compile these lists of countries, it should be understood that they do not provide an objective picture when trying to assess the success and effectiveness of public diplomacy in each country.

Moreover, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are jointly presented in a number of other international rankings, such as the World Bank’s “Doing Business” ratings and those produced by Freedom House related to democratic freedoms. Of course, each state’s place in these rankings is determined not by issues of public diplomacy and soft power, but by completely different areas. Yet, it could be argued that the state’s position in such rankings may have a positive effect on its international image. As a result, these ratings may serve as a means of determining levels of soft power. At the same time, the state’s successful objective and transparent public diplomacy may also contribute to the presentation of the state in other areas.

The Associated Trio initiative is undoubtedly an appropriate response to the complex challenges faced by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on their path to European integration. In this context, however, the effectiveness of each state’s public diplomacy can be regarded as amateur rather than professional. Issues such as different national circumstances and differing approaches to the role and place of public diplomacy have all affected the individual performances of each state.

At the same time, the development of the three nations’ strategic communications has been influenced by a variety of domestic and international factors. Internal instability and various external threats must subsequently be confronted in a methodical, comprehensive and systematic manner. It is clear that under these conditions the countries of the Associated Trio will not be able to sing in unison. Despite this, it is still better to organise a powerful, ambitious and promising group, in which all three states are able to bring their own strengths to an increasing complex initiative, rather than going it alone.

Maria Protsiuk is an expert at the “Quadrivium” NGO working at International Office of the Chernivtsi Regional State Administration (Chernivtsi, Ukraine). She has a PhD in political science and is a former Lane Kirkland Program Fellow (University of Wrocław).

associated trio, Eastern Partnership, Moldova Georgia, Ukraine