Russia’s young generation and the Soviet myth

A Lenin Statue in Komsomolsk-na-Amure (Khabarovsk region). As of 2020, there were more than 12,700 “Soviet” streets in Russian cities, as well as more than 7,600 “Lenin” streets and 7,000 “October” streets. Photo courtesy of Victoria Odissonova

The party that came second after UR was the Communist Party, which won 18.93 per cent of the votes running on the slogan “Russia, labour, democracy, socialism”. However, it should be remembered that this vote for the communists by no means represents a conscious desire to return to the Soviet Union and the idea of rebuilding socialism.

Nostalgia and myths

A key factor that explains this outcome is the “Smart Voting” strategy, created several years ago by Alexei Navalny and his team. This strategy is based on opinion polls and automatically chooses the most popular candidate according to the list who is not from UR. Due to this, the main goal of voting “in the Navalny way” is to knock out as many UR candidates from the Duma as possible and replace them with the second most popular party from any region that can compete. Neither the liberal party Yabloko, which has existed in Russia since the 1990s, nor the Liberal Democratic Party fit this role, as the popularity of Communist Party candidates remained comparatively high in many areas of the country. Overall, UR received 324 seats in the Duma while the communists gained 57. Certainly, it is impossible to call this an absolute victory for the Russian opposition.

On the other hand, voting for the communist party in modern Russia can be quite a natural choice for many voters. A kind of nostalgia for the past exists, especially among the older generation, who were born and lived during the Soviet period. Among the middle-aged generation (those in their 30s and 40s), the Soviet myth may also be appealing in the face of modern Russian reality.

The Soviet political myth died with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite this, its symbolic legacy continues to this day. The legacies of the political myth are embraced by a significant part of the population, who use it to understand the special meanings behind certain events that are comprehensible only to those who share this outlook. Overall, the myth is devoid of contradictions and is based on a simplified model of reality. In order to perceive the myth, you do not need to have special skills. The translation of a myth into reality is based on an appeal not to the human mind but to individual and collective emotions, which become “infected” with this myth. A political myth is useful for people facing societal insecurity, as well as manipulation of the population by the ruling elite.

In his essay titled “The Soviet political myth: causes of death, meaningful and symbolic legacy”, Sergey Belov writes that the main reason the Soviet myth exists today is a “lack of an effective alternative”. In fact, the last 30 years following the USSR’s collapse have not offered any events that could become new national symbols for Russia. The Soviet period generally offers an excellent “cement” for identity, including the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 and a collection of “firsts” in areas such as the space race. These are the two topics that the modern government is trying to build on to create a kind of “self-identity”. However, the Kremlin does not wish to go into all the details and circumstances of the Second World War and only embraces the symbolic meaning of this period.

Five years ago, my colleagues from the Russian opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta and I created a special project dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR. Our project was called “The Last Emperors”, which consisted of 25 stories of young people born in the same year as the Soviet Union’s collapse. Twenty-five years is the period in which the previous generation is replaced and a new one comes of age. In the project, 25 photojournalists from all over the former Soviet space (including CIS countries) contributed stories about those born in 1991 in the context of a “place of power” close to each young person. These places included the Chernobyl reactor, the 101st kilometre boundary outside major Russian cities, the Turkmen cotton plantations, the fields of Kuban, and Akademgorodok in Novosibirsk. These places were known to every person who lived in the Soviet Union, and until today remain strong symbols of the USSR. As a result, it seemed interesting to us to ask what has happened to these places? What did people who were born and grew up outside its temporary boundaries think about a project like the Soviet Union? We asked the same questions to our project participants. We began with simple questions about dreams, happiness, fears and wishes. We then asked the young people to try to compare their own lives at the age of 25 with the lives of their parents at the same age. Participants were then finally asked whether or not they would have voted “yes” or “no” in the 1991 referendum concerning the preservation of the USSR.

Having collected all of the answers, we then pieced together a picture of the first post-Soviet generation and their thoughts on such matters. Many of our participants even spoke Russian poorly, such as in the Baltic States or Central Asia. Despite this, they often repeated statements about the “friendship of peoples” when talking about the Soviet Union. Overall, many answered negatively to the question about the possibility of preserving the USSR in 1991. All 25 of these people, while no longer being Soviet people, still carry the “Soviet gene” or “Soviet myth” – a sign of a shared past.

The image of Stalin

Anastasia is 24 years old. She graduated from the Higher School of Economics several years ago. When I asked her to say five words she associated with the Soviet Union, she said “Stalin” and “war”, among others. Anastasia was born six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ksenia is 15 and is still at school. “Censorship” and “Lenin” were among the words she offered when asked about the USSR. She was born 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite their lack of direct experience with the Soviet period, the modern generation of Russians is still aware of various historical figures that the current authorities are trying to promote. There is a new kind of system of self-identification and recognition: Yuri Gagarin as the first man in space, and Lenin and Stalin as ideologists of the communist era.

In 2013, the Laboratory of Ethnic Sociology and Psychology at St Petersburg State University conducted a study that asked city residents about their perceptions of various historical Russian figures. In particular, about 16 per cent of respondents singled out Stalin and Lenin as those who gave them a sense of pride. Almost one in six survey participants viewed Stalin in a positive light. Almost three quarters (73.9 per cent) of those who admired Stalin were between 18 to 29 years old and had at least a secondary education. About 20 per cent of people who admired the former Soviet leader were over 60 years old.

Today, the existence of these young Stalinists raises a lot of questions. Despite ambiguous attitudes to the role of Stalin in Russian history, more and more people either agree or completely agree that “Stalin was a great leader” (56 per cent, according to polls by the Levada Center in May 2021). Since 2016, this approval has doubled from 28 to 56 per cent. The survey was conducted in Russia among people over the age of 18. It is worth noting that a similar survey in Ukraine resulted in the exact opposite outcome. There, the attitude towards Stalin is rather indifferent or hostile.

In response to the Kremlin’s current willingness to label people and organisations as “foreign agents”, many people have made comparisons with the events of 1937 – a year which corresponds with a period when mass repressions, restrictions, and deportations began across the country. Many people then were also labelled as “unreliable citizens”. Discussing the repressive measures of the Soviet government of the 1930s was not accepted and generally was quite dangerous.

According to Alexey Levinson, head of the Levada Center’s department of socio-cultural studies, negative attitudes towards Stalin were strong in Russia after the collapse of the USSR. This time saw the leader’s crimes become widely known during a period of transparency. Later, the ideas of perestroika and glasnost simply fell out of favour in the country. Russians have increasingly demanded a new “great leader” to create a sense of stability with regards to the country’s past, present and future. Levinson believes that this attitude in modern Russian society reflects a symbolic identification with the Soviet Union which, as we know, is highly encouraged in the Putin era. The ruling elite continues to use the symbolism of the Soviet myth as a means of self-identification. It is also used to mobilise and unify citizens who were not offered an alternative identity after 1991.

Today, of course, it cannot be said that the Russian authorities mythologise the figure of Stalin. However, the Russian government continues to stray far from the European norm of equating the crimes of Nazism and communism. During the 2015 edition of Direct Line, an event in which Vladimir Putin talks with citizens and answers their questions, he stressed “the impossibility of putting Nazism and Stalinism on the same level”. This was because the Nazis destroyed entire ethnic groups, whereas even with all the repressions, there was no such thing in the Soviet Union. In July, the president signed a law banning public comparisons between Stalin and Hitler, as well as the overall role of the USSR and Germany in the Second World War.

Memorials and memory

In every Russian town it is almost certain that you will find a street named after Lenin. In small towns, it is usually the largest and the main street. Thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, such names do not just remain in these settlements. Indeed, they continue to be a clear memorial of the Soviet Union for the modern generation. A Lenin statue is likely to stand in the main square of the city and is often at the centre of attention for locals, as it is usually located opposite various local administrative buildings and public institutions.

According to the Russian ministry of culture, 1,085 monuments to Vladimir Lenin have been erected in Russia. There are also more than 4,000 monuments in the country dedicated to the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. As the “cement for identity”, memorials of the Second World War remain a key means of reminding the younger generation again and again about the importance of the conflict for Russia. This is especially true as an increasing number of young people do not have grandparents who participated in the war. Instead, they may learn about their ancestors’ experiences through the words of their parents. Today’s schoolchildren are often very well informed about the main events of the Great Patriotic War. This is partly because of the need to take exams. However, it is also partly due to the annual Victory Day celebrations on May 9th, which take place in schools as well as on the main streets of cities.

Describing their attitude to monuments and memory (for example, about veterans), many young people note its circumstantial nature. For example, the Russian authorities usually remember to focus on veterans’ issues and erect monuments closer to May 9th and other important dates. For example, a few months before the Duma elections, pensioners and veterans received about 110 additional euros to their basic pension (the average pension in Russia is about 230 euros, whereas war veterans with various bonuses can have up to 800).

While not so many people oppose building and maintaining monuments to the heroes of the Second World War, Stalin’s role during this period is still actively debated. A few years ago, about 60 per cent of people approved of the idea of building monuments to Stalin. Around 77 per cent of young people between 18 and 24 years old were also in favour of this move. However, people aged between 25 and 34 were more actively opposed to any new monuments to Stalin (70 per cent). Last year, a monument to Stalin was unveiled in the small town of Bor, located on the other side of Nizhny Novgorod, Russia’s fifth largest city. This three metre statue was unveiled to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the country’s victory over Nazi Germany. The monument was funded by private money from the first secretary of the local branch of the Communist Party. According to party representative Vladislav Egorov, “It is necessary to honour the memory of the head of state who led the country to victory in the Second World War. This is important from a historical point of view.”

It also seems that the relative victory of the Communist Party in the recent Duma elections is important from a historical point of view. After all, if most of the candidates had not been supported by the opposition’s “Smart Voting” strategy, the party’s results would have been significantly lower. It seems that for the new generation, the communist past of Russia, represented by the modern Communist Party, is seen as the only alternative to a “democracy” that has effectively turned into the authoritarian rule of one person.

Victoria Odissonova is a Russian journalist and photojournalist based in Moscow. Her work, including articles and photos, frequently appears in the prominent independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta.

Collapse of the USSR, politics, Russia