Legacies of the real and imagined Soviet Union 1991–2021

A Monument to Vladimir Lenin in Magadan. Soviet traces are very visible throughout Russia. Photo: Andrei Stepanov / Shutterstock

The complexity of the Soviet legacy can probably be attributed to the fact that it involves two distinct entities which, while sharing the same name, have little to do with each other. One of these entities is the real Soviet Union not discussed in state propaganda, with its planned economy, omnipresent shortage of goods, dominance of informal networks, authoritarian regime and powerful security services. Soviet rule changed the lives of people across Eurasia and some of these changes seem to persist not only among the generations that directly experienced communism. Indeed, these changes are also present among those born after the end of the USSR and this is sometimes not even realised by this group. Another entity is the imagined USSR, which remains for many the subject of nostalgic admiration. Interestingly, many of those born after 1991 or who were very young during the Soviet era express a longing for the communist period. This imagined USSR is associated with social justice, high-quality food, excellent public medical services, great scientific advances and friendly people ready to help each other. While this imagined Soviet Union never existed in reality, it remains an important part of official state history for many authoritarian regimes in Eurasia.

The real Soviet Union: ideology and opportunism

As of 2020, there were more than 12,700 “Soviet” streets in Russian cities, as well as more than 7,600 “Lenin” streets and 7,000 “October” streets. From this point of view, Soviet legacies are visible and present throughout many countries of the former Soviet Union. Only some states pursued a systematic “decommunisation” programme, which was most recently seen in Ukraine. Indeed, the Soviet Union introduced so many changes in its citizens’ physical environment that many still exist 30 years later. Eurasian cities are still dominated by giant panel buildings housing hundreds of families, whilst Soviet architecture remains very visible from Minsk to Vladivostok. Key elements of modern Eurasian infrastructure (railroads and pipelines) were constructed during the Soviet era and, contrary to early expectations, trade ties between Eurasian countries did not dissipate over time. In some cases, new market-based social norms emerged that were deeply rooted in Soviet history. For instance, Russia became a magnet for labour migrants from Central Asia. This would hardly have been possible without the Soviet Union’s effort to spread knowledge of the Russian language throughout its territory.

More importantly, the Soviet Union appears to have deeply influenced the behaviour and values of people across Eurasia. Whilst somewhat simplified, there are two main views on these behavioural legacies left by the USSR. On the one hand, some point to the fact that the Soviet Union made substantial efforts to indoctrinate people with the values of communism. Due to this, it would be logical to expect this indoctrination to last in the form of greater demands for redistribution and equality. Some evidence in favour of this argument certainly does exist. As of September this year, according to a survey by Levada Center, 62 per cent of Russians preferred redistribution and a planned economy over the free market (this is the highest reported number since 1992). It should be remembered, however, that genuine belief in Soviet ideology and communism hardly existed during the period of stagnation that began under Brezhnev. On the other hand, another view regarding these legacies believes that the generations that lived through the Soviet Union were also forced to develop coping strategies in response to the intrusive and omnipresent state. These strategies included keeping as much distance from the state as possible, retreating into the private sphere (relying on informal networks and contacts) and cynical opportunism (paying lip service to Soviet ideology and rhetoric for career advancement).

These coping strategies seem to have a strong influence on how Eurasian citizens act even today, as well as on political developments in their respective countries. In our past research, we documented the legacy left by one particularly powerful Soviet institution – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We were able to show that regions of Russia that were home to more communist party members during the Brezhnev era were also more likely to develop authoritarian political practices and have corrupt and inefficient bureaucracies. This appears to be the result of unchecked opportunism, as post-Soviet bureaucracies saturated with former party members are more likely to maintain historical patterns of behaviour. This includes a willingness to adapt to the current political environment and leadership, with many regional leaders using these norms to consolidate their power. Despite this, the legacies of cynical opportunism are evident outside bureaucracy and can be seen in the ordinary lives of Eurasian citizens.

Attitudes that existed during Soviet rule appear to be more persistent than the physical manifestations and symbols of the communist past. Streets and cities can ultimately be renamed, new pipelines can be (and are) built and factories can be equipped with new machines. However, attitudes and behaviours survive and are inherited across generations. In addition to the family, schools and universities also play an important role in maintaining these outlooks. In most post-Soviet countries there was substantial continuity with regards to both teaching staff and their curriculums. Both the content of teaching and the practices students observe at schools may therefore contribute to the persistence of Soviet legacies. In Russia, teachers often play an important role in practices that are related to regime preservation, such as electoral manipulation.

The USSR as a rhetorical construct

Feelings of nostalgia with regards to the communist past have been rather strong in many post-Soviet countries. This is hardly surprising since many people associate the transition of the 1990s with significant loss in status and economic hardship. In Russia, the loss of the country’s great power status was especially painful and early positive attitudes towards the US very soon gave way to widespread anti-Americanism. Under these conditions, the Soviet past became an object of extensive mythology. Overall, this mythology had three sources. The first source was Soviet propaganda, which presented the USSR as a country of technological progress, equal wealth distribution and peaceful coexistence between its many peoples. Another source was the simple nostalgia of older generations, who looked to the Soviet Union as the country of their youth. By the 2000s, members of these generations remained in power in many post-Soviet countries. Finally, Soviet art, literature and especially cinema massively contributed to myth-making. In Russia, Soviet movies are still widely popular (far more than Hollywood or new Russian films) and play an important role in how people perceive the past.

The idealised image of the Soviet Union did not develop spontaneously within societies across Eurasia. Certainly, it plays an important role in the stabilisation of authoritarian regimes, including that of Vladimir Putin. Autocrats strategically borrow elements of Soviet rhetoric and symbols to legitimise their rule. It was no surprise, then, that one of the first steps that Putin took as president was to restore the old Soviet anthem (although with new lyrics) in Russia. President Vladimir Putin himself continues to capitalise on Soviet nostalgia and even called the collapse of the USSR “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century”.

At the same time, post-Soviet leaders are very selective in what aspects of the Soviet past they refer to in line with contemporary policies. In Russia, for example, the authoritarian regime is by no means left-wing and has gradually dismantled the remaining elements of the Soviet social security system. Putin is subsequently more likely to refer to aspects of the Soviet past related to geopolitical greatness (and the greatest achievement of the USSR – victory in the Second World War) than redistribution or state planning. In contrast, Belarus’s Alyaksandr Lukashenka preserved the state-led economy and large redistribution system. These aspects of the Soviet past have often been highlighted by Minsk as a means of contrasting the country with Russia and its liberal reforms.

Will the Soviet legacies disappear?

Over the last 30 years, Soviet legacies have persisted and it remains difficult to imagine under what conditions they will disappear. The main reason for the persistence of the Soviet legacies is that they are ultimately self-enforcing. For example, while there are very few people in the modern Russian bureaucracy who personally remember the Soviet past, today’s civil servants are still socialised in line with old values and practices. These bureaucrats will subsequently pass on these norms to newcomers in the future. Therefore, it seems that the legacies of the Soviet Union appear to reinforce each other.

Generational change, international (academic and/or youth) exchange programmes, and (to a lesser degree) tourism could all potentially weaken the influence of these legacies over time. Travelling abroad would give new generations the opportunity to witness and experience radically different social realities in terms of behaviour, attitudes and values. Some recent research from Russia has shown that the youngest generations differ substantially from their older counterparts when it comes to their values and behavioural attitudes. In general, they appear to closely resemble their western counterparts. From this point of view, Russia now appears to be a modernising (or even modern) society ruled by an archaic repressive regime unable to understand its citizens.However, whether the Russian (and, generally, the post-Soviet) youth is now indeed free from the Soviet legacies remains a matter of debate. In the political sphere, youth socialised in the Eurasian authoritarian regimes can often be even more loyal to the existing (inherently post-Soviet) system than people who have experienced the more pluralist era of the 1990s.

In contrast, major external shocks, such as a deep economic crisis, may further strengthen beliefs in an external enemy (be that the US or the European Union) attacking from the outside. Rhetoric related to the Second World War may subsequently be used by governments to encourage distrust of the West. However, the consequences of such potential changes remain uncertain. In the turmoil of the 1990s, the opposition Communist Party became particularly successful in Russia. Crisis can further reinforce communist nostalgia and strengthen the image of an external enemy. To some extent, this process is already happening in modern Russia.

The Soviet past still maintains a firm grip on the societies of most post-Soviet countries and this is particularly true in Russia. Whether this will change in the future, however, remains to be seen.

Alexander Libman is a professor of Russian and East European Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin (Germany). His most recent publications include Historical Legacies of Communism and Authoritarian Regionalism in the World of International Organizations, which were both co-written with Anastassia Obydenkova. He was awarded the Knut Wicksell Prize from the European Public Choice Society and the Gordon Tullock Prize from the Public Choice Society.

Anastassia Obydenkova is an associate professor at the Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES), Faculty of Social Sciences at Uppsala University (Sweden). Her most recent books were published by Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and Routledge, co-written with Alexander Libman. She was awarded a Fung Fellowship at Princeton University, Fox Fellowship at Yale University, and Davis Senior Scholarship at Harvard University.

Collapse of the USSR, Eastern Europe, Russia