Redefining US strategy in the region

US President Joe Biden addressing the Ukrainian parliament in 2015, then as Vice President. The United States is the only power in the transatlantic community that can act in the region not simply as a leader of the West, but also to play the role of a uniting force. Photo: Sodel Vladyslav / Shutterstock

The question is not only about overcoming the unsystematic approach of the 45th president of the United States. Nor is it about restoring trust between Washington and Berlin, or about restraining Russia and China.

Challenges that change the current geopolitics

This complexity can be seen best in Central and Eastern Europe – a frontier of the transatlantic West. It is in this region that the unity of the West goes beyond the official borders of the European Union and NATO. Despite the framework of the EU and NATO uniting part of CEE, the region is still confronted by illiberalism, right-wing populism, corruption, a lack of social cohesion and traditional nationalism.

In other words, Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania are more united by these challenges than divided by the Schengen Area or membership of the EU or NATO. Similarly, these countries are also united by energy security issues, which may reach a critical point should Nord Stream 2 be completed. In Central and Eastern Europe, the idea of “selfish diplomacy” (i.e. the feeling of being neglected by the “big nations”) have triumphed over transatlantic unity. This leads to an instrumentalisation of the West – even by the EU and NATO member states, when they look at the transatlantic community as a security shield and cash machine. Such a vision, along with this challenge, has unified the countries of the region, despite their disunity caused by different levels of integration. Moreover, in the case of countries that are not members of the EU or NATO (i.e. Ukraine), this challenge is compounded by the uncertainty of their Euro-Atlantic prospects. 

This vulnerability has turned the region into a springboard for Russia and China to promote their strategic interests in Europe, and to challenge the transatlantic community from inside. In the past few years, Russia and China have achieved considerable success in the region through well-coordinated actions and by deploying familiar tricks – blackmailing and spreading disinformation. 

It is important to understand that Russia and China do not care much about the borders of the EU or NATO. Their actions and strategies constitute something larger than mere attempts at expanding “grey zones” in Europe. This fact is corroborated by explosions at military depots in the Czech Republic, the military aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, and of course the Belt and Road Initiative. This is a clear sign to the West, and the US in particular, that a new strategy for the region is needed that would go beyond the current borders of the EU and NATO.  It is more obvious than ever that the inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe as part of a fully consolidated transatlantic West is no longer possible without Ukraine’s involvement. Yet, Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO in the next few years appears uncertain at this moment. At the same time, it is this uncertainty that demands a new strategy which includes Ukraine. The US should take the lead in this unification and consolidation process, adding Ukraine and drawing a new line between Europe and Eurasia.

Legacy that matters exactly now

This would mean the implementation of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s legacy on US primacy and its geostrategic imperatives, presented in his book The Grand Chessboard. He wrote that “if Ukraine is to survive as an independent state, it will have to become a part of Central Europe rather than Eurasia, and if it is to be a part of Central Europe, then it will have to partake fully in Central Europe’s links to NATO and the European Union. Russia’s acceptance of these links would then define Russia’s own decision to be also truly a part of Europe. Russia’s refusal would be tantamount to the rejection of Europe in favour of a solitary ‘Eurasian’ identity and existence.”

There are few specific reasons why the US should initiate a close strategic involvement of Ukraine into the consolidation of CEE. First, Washington should provide a mirror response to Russian and Chinese actions in Central and Eastern Europe, where Ukraine is part of the unified springboard of Moscow and Beijing. Second, it is in America’s interest to strengthen the effect and irreversibility of US and western support for Ukraine in countering Russian military aggression and providing reforms that could have multiple effects.  Third, the US should compensate for the current uncertainty of NATO and EU enlargement in the East due to the “keeping Russia engaged” approach in containing China (which is seen as more urgent). The US is the only power in the transatlantic community that can act in the region not simply as a leader of the West, but also to play the role of a uniting force, despite all the institutional limitations of the EU and NATO. Fourth, Ukraine’s engagement in a new US strategy may play an important, wider consolidating role and provide a new agenda with new incentives. Considering all the problems with corruption, the judicial system and the inconsistency of the elite, Ukraine still pursues its western course, withstanding Russian aggression and holding free elections.

Multilateral diplomacy for CEE

The fifth reason for engaging Ukraine is to further promote transatlantic multilateralism and inspire a new “division of labour” in the region, which is now the core principle of Biden’s foreign policy. What does this mean in practice? Ukraine could become the “success story” of its neighbours among EU and NATO countries, which could take more responsibility for Kyiv’s engagement with the West. Simultaneously, it means states taking more responsibility for transatlantic unity on the eastern flank. In fact, it is dictated by time: in the next seven years, the Council of Europe will be chaired by four countries in the region – the Czech Republic (2022), Hungary (2024), Poland (2025) and Lithuania (2027). This could mean seven years of successful multilateralism.

Effective multilateralism in the CEE with a new US strategy in this region should also not be based solely on the leadership of the US or its alliances with Berlin and Paris. They should provide intermediary support and strategic thinking. It also means not to be stipulated by the sole need of restraining China and Russia, but implying the co-operation of the countries of the region as a part of a united West. In other words, the main goal should be not containing China and Russia, but to make CEE states find it more profitable to co-operate under a rules-based order. As mentioned above, the new strategy should go beyond the institutional framework and borders of the EU and NATO. It should also be based on emerging challenges and have a long-term approach. Yet at the same time, it should not replace EU integration, but build upon it.

Paradoxical as it may sound, for the last four years during Donald Trump’s presidency, the US returned to the region after years of neglect. In this regard, we could mention Wess Mitchell’s (Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs from 2017 to 2019 – editor’s note) intellectual ambitions to implement his own doctrine of supporting “America’s vulnerable frontier allies”, over a full-fledged and long-term US strategy in the region. However, Washington’s attempts were undertaken with a clear plan, which produced good results. First, the US signed a military agreement with Warsaw (the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) and a wide range of other contracts for delivering military equipment to countries in the region (i.e., Hungary, Slovakia). And the US extended its military presence in Poland by adding another 1,000 troops stationed there.

The US also organised a series of visits to the White House by many of the state leaders from the region to discuss the enhancement of bilateral relations with Washington. For Hungary and Slovakia, for instance, this was the first visit of their leaders in over a decade. The LNG-terminals were launched in Poland and Croatia in order to reduce the dependence of Central and Eastern Europe on Russian gas by means of other liquefied natural gas, including from the US. Meanwhile, Washington provided support for the Three Seas Initiative, which stands every chance of becoming a serious non-political platform for co-operation in the region, since it possesses the mechanisms for attracting new projects from EU states and beyond.

During this time, Washington also took effective steps beyond the official borders of the EU and NATO, taking care of their interests and the unity of the western world. The US played the role of moderator in a feud between Ukraine and Hungary over education policy. It also tried to build new bridges with Belarus – the then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, even visited Minsk at the beginning of 2020. And there was clear Washington support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

Yet, all of these initiatives lacked a systematic approach, leadership or a vision. There are not enough such initiatives within the EU, either. Yet as I have argued here, such a role could be assumed by Washington. The first steps of the Biden administration in Europe –  particularly the prioritisation of Ukraine in CEE – are already proof of this path.

Tools for consolidation

How should a new US strategy in the region be implemented? If Washington is really planning its own infrastructure and investment response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which Joe Biden has discussed during a recent phone call with British prime minister Boris Johnson, this could be “the hard basement” of such a new strategy here as well. Such an initiative could consolidate the region in a sense of connectivity, cohesion and mutual commitment. The existing instruments of the Three Seas Initiative along with the EU’s neighbourhood programmes make it possible to involve Ukraine as much as possible. This could add up to 3.7 trillion US dollars of combined investments.

Another possible initiative, “the soft basement” approach, could be the development of a separate programme of the German Marshall Fund for Central and Eastern Europe. This programme, for instance, could be initiated by the Ukrainian MFA, the Lublin Triangle, the Visegrad Fund, and USAID with a strict goal to consolidate the region in dealing with common challenges. All this would enhance and systematise previous US efforts on the Eastern flank, and top them up with strategic thinking and a long term vision.

Indeed, similar attempts were undertaken by the US in the 1990s in the Baltic states and some Central European states, which led to the start of the region’s consolidation process. The time has come to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic unity on its Eastern flank. This strategy should aim towards drawing a new line between Europe and Eurasia, and send a signal that the transatlantic community and Central and Eastern Europe can be united.

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi is a political analyst of Central and Eastern Europe with a special focus on Hungary. He was a Think Visegrad Fellow in 2020, and is a 2019 alumni of the US State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program.

Eastern Europe, Joe Biden, Ukraine, United States