One year on. What has changed in Belarus?

Maria Kalesnikava calls for peaceful protest last August in Minsk. Kalesnikava was later taken to the Ukrainian border by regime forces, to be expelled from the country. She tore up her passport before she could be deported and is currently on trial in Minsk and remains defiant. Photo: Andrei Bortnikau / Shutterstock

The press conference illustrated one thing above all: the bizarre narcissism of a politician who perceives himself under attack yet continues to see himself as the personification of the republic that he led, and continues to lead through brute force, for the past 27 years. Yet if the elections and ensuring events showed one thing above others, it is that a once-consummate politician has become increasingly erratic, making the sorts of errors one associates with hapless leaders who try to rule after losing credibility and the support of their citizens.

Past elections

Elections in Belarus have always given hope for the opposition. They provided one occasion at five-year intervals when it might be possible to listen to alternative views on official media, to gather people, disseminate ideas and discuss how the country might improve its living standards, move closer to Europe or Russia, or very occasionally see independent thinkers advance into parliament. Yet, in truth, none of the preceding elections really made a breach in the armor of the Lukashenka-run state. It was always possible to deal with traditional opposition. For one thing, they could be branded as tools of the West, especially if they had worked in any way with, or received funding from, western NGOs, as indeed many of them had.

In 2001, after a violence-filed interlude of two years from the date when the elections should have been held by law, the head of the Minsk OSCE office Hans Georg Wieck, a seasoned German diplomat, helped to ensure a unified opposition campaign led by a trade union leader, Uladzimir Hancharyk. According to official figures, Hancharyk received over 16 per cent of the vote, easily the highest number accorded to an opponent of Lukashenka by the state election commission run by Lukashenka’s close ally, Lydzia Iarmoshyna.

In 2006 the attempts to provide a unified candidate resulted in the nomination of an academic, Hrodna professor Aliaksandr Milinkevich, representing the United Democratic Forces of Belarus. The date coincided with a period of “colour revolutions” in Europe that embraced Serbia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, among others. Though Milinkevich officially received only 6.2 per cent against Lukashenka’s 84.4 per cent, a lengthy protest followed with a camp being set up in Minsk’s October Square. The opposition campaign was also not united because the former Rector of Minsk State University, Aliaksandr Kazulin, decided to run on behalf of the Social Democratic Party. In his brief cameo on official television, Kazulin startled the audience by ripping up a photograph of Lukashenka and stamping on it. He was detained and beaten while trying to enter a meeting of the Belarusian People’s Assembly and later given a six-year prison sentence. The camp was broken up after five days of protest involving an average of 5,000 people daily, including many from outside Belarus.

The elections of 2010 also ended in violence and over 700 arrests and the beating of many people, including two of the main opposition candidates, Andrei Sannikau and Uladzimir Niakliaeu. Seven of the ten official candidates were in jail on the night after the official results were announced. Lukashenka’s vote this time was declared to be just under 80 per cent, and Sannikau’s a derisory 2.43 per cent. Just prior to the election, Sannikau’s press secretary Aleh Biabenin, one of the main founders of the opposition organisation Charter-97, was found hanged. As with Vitaly Shishov in 2021, there were few signs to suggest a suicide. Biabenin was expected by friends at the local cinema and had been in touch with them shortly beforehand.

These past elections demonstrate several points. First, the selective use of state violence to eliminate enemies. Second, the fabrication of election results after every election other than 1994. While Lukashenka was undoubtedly more popular in those years than in 2020, he could not reasonably have been expected to win more than 50 per cent in a free vote, based on surveys by organisations such as the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (NISEPI), which operated in Minsk until 2016. Third, each election saw a ritualistic process controlled by state authorities: from the appointment of officials to the commissions; gathering and monitoring of signatures (many were invalidated by the Central Election Commission); and control over polling booths and counting votes.

After 2010, however, the authorities applied much more force against recalcitrants. Organisations and homes were raided and computers confiscated. Random attacks took place against prominent oppositionists. Public gatherings were banned. Many political leaders fled abroad, including Sannikau, who moved to the United Kingdom not long after his release from prison. People gathering in the streets of Minsk would signal discontent merely by clapping, but they were arrested too. Above all, the detained received heavy fines rather than the lengthy prison sentences deployed hitherto.

Belarus relations with Russia and the EU

In the background to these campaigns was a state with a relatively sound economy and a façade of stability. Belarus achieved high growth rates in 1994-2007, largely through Russian subsidies and low energy prices. Cheap oil could be refined and sold for high profits to the countries of Western and Central Europe. But by 2008, the situation began to change as a result of the global recession that sent oil and gas prices plunging. The economic downtown coincided with a deterioration in Russian-Belarusian relations. In 2008, then Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, broke off personal relations with his Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yushchenko, whom he considered too nationalistic. But relations with Belarus also began to decline. By 2012, when Vladimir Putin returned for a third term as president, the bilateral relationship was marked by rancour, petty disputes and higher oil and gas prices for Minsk to pay. Exported Belarusian dairy products failed to pass the standards set by Russia.

In 2009, Belarus also joined the European Union-led Eastern Partnership, which included other countries from the former Soviet Union: Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The links with the EU came at a price: demands for more democracy, openness and freedom of assembly. Belarus fulfilled none of them, but since it was the most stable country politically, the contacts were maintained. The vision of Belarus as a go-between country between Russia and the EU, and even as a counter to Moscow, also explains the persistence of the dialogue with official Minsk that continued for several years.

In 2015, the EU suspended most of the sanctions against Belarus, imposed after the violent events of 2010. The 2015 presidential elections had taken place smoothly and without violence. The opposition, divided or exiled, chose for the most part to ignore it. An opposition candidate, Tatsiana Karatkevich, representing a “People’s Referendum”, received 4.48 per cent, placing second behind Lukashenka’s 84.14 per cent. Just prior to the election, a NISEPI poll estimated the incumbent’s support at 47 per cent.

2020 saw a regime that felt fairly secure. That is perhaps one reason why Lukashenka began to make some fundamental mistakes. Before analysing them, however, it is worthwhile to note several previous examples of his irrational and violent actions, which became magnified after the contentious results of August 9th were declared.

Deaths and explosions

Changes to the Belarusian Constitution that followed referenda in 1995 and 1996 strengthened the power of the presidency over the parliament and constitutional court. Lukashenka then decided to date the start of his rule from 1996, meaning that there would be no elections in 1999 as expected. The parliamentary opposition tried to impeach the president who survived partly through Russian intervention (Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin) as an intermediary. A mock election nevertheless took place, with a new commission chaired by Viktar Hanchar, who had been a key worker for Lukashenka in his 1994 election campaign but later turned against him, joining the opposition United Civic Party.

In September 1999, Hanchar was abducted on the streets of Minsk along with his friend Anatol Krasouski. According to a December 2019 report by Deutsche Welle citing Yurii Harauski, a former member of a special unit of the ministry of internal affairs, the pair were executed and the bodies buried. Six months earlier, the leader of the United Civic Party, Hienadz Karpenka, suddenly became ill and was taken to hospital where he died of a cerebral haemorrhage, despite being in good health previously.

Following the 2010 elections, an alleged terrorist attack took place in Minsk at the Kastrichnitskaia metro station on April 11th 2011 during evening rush-hour. A bomb exploded killing 15 people and injuring 204. About an hour later, a grim-faced Lukashenka appeared on the scene, along with his son Mikalai, then aged six, to inspect the scene. Two suspects were arrested a couple of days later; they were tortured and confessed to the crime and executed promptly. They also confessed to two previous bombings, one in Minsk in 2008 and an earlier one in Viciebsk.

But the question that intrigued many was how the president could have known there was only one explosive device and endangered the life of his young son. And why would terrorists have targeted Belarus, a homogenous society without any civil strife? The same question arose after a Ryanair flight was forced to land in Minsk in April this year on the grounds that there was a bomb on board planted by Hamas (see below). Suffice to say that selective violence and unexplained events have been a key feature of Belarus under Lukashenka.

The presidential elections of 2020

The 2020 elections took place in the middle of a pandemic, dismissed by the president as a “psychosis”. They were the first elections to be contested by other sectors of the Belarusian elite (a banker and a former ambassador), as well as a popular vlogger on social media. The official response mirrored earlier reactions to the more traditional opposition from political party leaders or unified candidates: detain or disbar the most dangerous and control the elections through the official apparatus. Having arrested those perceived as leading opponents (Viktar Babaryka and Siarhei Tsikhanouski) and with the other (Valerii Tsepkala) fleeing over the border into Russia, Lukashenka miscalculated by permitting the campaign of Tsikhanouski’s spouse, Sviatlana, belittled as a housewife with no knowledge of politics.

The three campaigns soon unified with three women leading: Tsikhanouskaya, Veranika Tsepkala (the wife of Valerii) and Mariia Kalesnikava, the campaign manager of Babaryka. Their rallies, even in remote places, attracted thousands – peaking with 60,000 in Minsk’s Bangalore Square. Their campaign attracted both young and old, focused on changes in Belarus, and avoided partisanship. There were no Russian or EU flags on display, and both official and unofficial (white-red-white) flags were in evidence at their early rallies.

The three women appeared to herald a peaceful change to the Lukashenka years and indeed signalled a change of generations from a 66-year old authoritarian to a 38-year old woman, though the latter insisted that she had no goals other than the release of prisoners and new elections. The decision (presumably on the orders of Lukashenka and Iarmoshyna) to declare Lukashenka the winner with 80 per cent elicited shock and anger, following the initial elation and mass gathering in the streets to celebrate a victory.

Since that day, the situation has changed. Over 38,000 people have been arrested, and over 500 have been declared political prisoners. Peaceful protesters, peaking in numbers at around 250,000 in Minsk but significant in all cities, have been arrested, tortured and in several cases, murdered. The streets are the domain of the security forces run by the ministry of internal affairs. The white-red-white flag became a symbol of the protests after the elections but not all the population unites behind it. After some initial uncertainty, Lukashenka remained in his position, firmly backed after a two-month delay by Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation. Tsikhanouskaya fled to Lithuania and her partner Veranika Tsepkala to Latvia. Kalesnikava was taken by her captors by car to the Ukrainian border, but she tore up her passport before she could be deported. She is currently on trial in Minsk and remains defiant.

The future of the Lukashenka regime

Tsikhanouskaya and Pavel Latushka, the former Minister of Culture (2009-12), helped to form a coordinating council to organise a transfer of power. Its members in Belarus were all arrested while others fled abroad. Tsikhanouskaya has taken on the role of an international ambassador for her country, explaining the opposition position to political leaders across Europe, the United States and Canada. While she is effective, there is little prospect of her returning to Belarus.

Lukashenka, meanwhile, unrecognised as a leader in the democratic world, goes through the rituals of leadership. He plans to hold a meeting of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly – a hand-picked body that follows his instructions – to discuss constitutional changes. He has rebuffed Russian attempts to set up pro-Russian political parties in Belarus but succumbed to other demands, resulting in the destruction of independent media and the loss of a national foreign policy. Russian propaganda is now predominant in Belarus. Most of Lukashenka’s high-level meetings are with Putin, and they are lengthy, but discussions remain secret.

In late April 2021, after the Ryanair flight was diverted to Minsk, while en route from Athens to Vilnius, so that authorities could detain opposition activist Raman Pratasevich, the international outcry far exceeded anything that happened during the mass detentions. Much stronger sanctions were applied by the EU and the United States, this time covering investments, insurance and the exports of potash and tobacco; their impact will be long-term rather than short. Belavia airlines was essentially banned from European airspace. Such measures push Belarus further into the Russian camp. Its borders have been closed and it is in a state of cold war with Lithuania and Poland, where most exiles are now domiciled.

Lukashenka predictably blames the West and especially the United States for his situation. He believes Donald Trump was illegally removed from office. He claims that he is the victim of a recent assassination attempt – just as prior to the elections he spoke about a terrorist plot to disrupt them. He also maintains he has helped avoid a third world war through his resistance to western intrusions and his friendship with Vladimir Putin. His relations with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy are hostile, ending his role as a mediator in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia over Donbas. Thus, he is very isolated other than to the east with Moscow.

None of this suggests that he has a firm hold on reality. His comments indicate that he regards his presence in the presidential palace as the only guarantor of peace and stability in Belarus. He identifies his own cause with that of the state. If the people transgress, then by his logic, they must be punished. Punishment is harsh, but necessary.

Prognosis

Last month when I spoke by phone to a friend, who is around the same age as Tsikhanouskaya, she informed me that the entire mindset of the country has changed over the past year, but no one is safe from arrest. The incarcerations are often random and unexpected. A middle-aged couple in Minsk, likewise, declared their anxiety to leave “this concentration camp.” How long will Lukashenka remain in office? Will he act on his statement to step down “very soon”?

The answers to these questions can only be speculative, but some brief prognoses and conclusions can be made:

1. The opposition cannot hope to defeat the regime by peaceful protests alone.
2. Russia’s support for Lukashenka is short rather than long-term. There is a serious risk of antagonising a largely Russophile population otherwise.
3. The ruling elite has remained mostly behind Lukashenka but the situation is not static. The authority of the security council has been enhanced and its membership widened. Conceivably, it could choose to take power itself.
4. No solution to Belarus’s problems is likely to emanate from constitutional changes without the prior departure of Lukashenka and the dismantling of the current security council.
5. The European Union, in imposing sanctions, needs to consider how to assist the working population of Belarus that will be most affected.
6. The release of political prisoners will not be negotiable as a bargain chip for ending sanctions, as it was in the past. There are no prospects of a return to normality between Lukashenka and the EU.
7. Most Belarusians are quite comfortable with Russia as a neighbour and partner. Thus, while asserting the importance of continued Belarusian independence, the EU has the option to approach Russia (including a reduction of current sanctions on that country) in order to assist in finding a solution to the impasse in Belarus. Such a move, which is not so far-fetched, would not be well received in Ukraine, Poland or the Baltic States, but it is rational given the lopsided balance of forces in the region.
8. The United States has not intervened in the Belarusian imbroglio but it is far more concerned about the situation under President Joe Biden than it was under Trump. Its presence as an active but cautious player is critical.

David R. Marples is a distinguished university professor of Russian and East European History at the University of Alberta. He is the author of sixteen single-authored books, including Ukraine in Conflict (2017), Our Glorious Past: Lukashenka’s Belarus and the Great Patriotic War (2014) and Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (2008).

belarus, lukashenka, protests, Sviatlana Tsikhanouksaya