Crisis like a dream

Photo: gato-gato-gato (CC) www.flickr.com

Instead of focusing on real social problems (e.g. the pandemic generated economic crisis, rising debt, unemployment, weakening currency and the problematic vaccination process), politicians were instead fighting a long-term battle which ultimately weakened Georgia’s international reputation and undermined its status as a democratic country. Given all that, it is not surprising that 30 per cent of the public has no preference in regards to political choices.

Opposition’s boycott

In terms of transparency and maintaining democratic standards, the 2020 parliamentary elections did not differ much from the elections that took place during Mikheil Saakashvili’s time as president. Consequently, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) observers assessed the elections as free, but pointed to numerous flaws. Among them were the abuse of administrative resources by the ruling party; a lack of media balance; strong political polarisation; and pressure put on state employees. The opposition, splintered and quite unpopular among voters (many still hold a negative memory of Saakashvili), could not take advantage of the new electoral law which, after many years, was negotiated with the Georgian Dream. The current system is still a mixed system, yet the proportional component has been enforced and the threshold reduced from five to one per cent.

Despite public disillusionment with the Georgian Dream, it received the most votes (90 out of 150 seats), while all eight opposition parties did not have enough seats to even consider the possibility of a coalition government (together they only received 60 seats). The truth, however, is that the Georgian Dream’s victory had more to do with the opposition’s weaknesses than their own specific qualities. Running as a united front, the opposition decided not to participate in the second round of elections in single-member constituencies, and announced a parliamentary boycott. It called for a repeat of the vote, electoral law reform, a change of the chairman of the Central Election Commission, and the release of Giorgi Rurua, whom it considers a political prisoner. The opposition also organised several fairly large street protests. In the end, the ruling party entered into negotiations with the opposition. However, after five rounds of talks, no breakthrough materialised.

In the meantime, some significant changes were taking place. First and foremost, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the Georgian Dream, announced his resignation from politics. Yet, many still believe that he will still continue to pull strings and rule the country from behind, as he did from 2013 to 2018. Ivanishvili’s position was taken by the former speaker of the Georgian parliament, Irakli Kobakhidze, known for being firm with his adversaries. There was also a reshuffle in the ranks of the main opposition party, the United National Movement. Its current formal leader (Saakashvili, in fact, runs the party from Ukraine), Grigol Vashadze, resigned. He stated that it had to do with differences he had with other party leaders in regards to the boycotting of parliament and negotiating with the authorities. Vashadze was replaced by Nika Melia, an emotional and somewhat radical politician.

The leadership of the second opposition party, Movement for Freedom-European Georgia, also changed. Its former leaders, David Bakradze, (former chairman of the parliament) and Gigi Ugulava (former mayor of Tbilisi) resigned from the party. Earlier, a similar decision was made by the charismatic Elene Khoshtaria, who founded a social movement called Droa! (The time has come!). The party is now headed by the former secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, Giga Bokeria, who is known for his uneasy political temperament. The smaller opposition parties were also not saved from splits and reshuffles. For instance, four politicians broke away from the pro-Russian and nationalist Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. They founded a new group called the European Socialists. A division also took place in the ranks of the New Political Center – Girchi (Shyshka). Its leader, Zurab Dzaparidze, founded a new party called Girchi – More Freedom. Two politicians of a small party, called Citizens, broke the parliamentary boycott and formally entered the legislature to work on a new electoral law in agreement with the Georgian Dream.

 Tightening up

In mid-February, endless rounds of meaningless talks between the ruling party and the opposition were interrupted by Melia’s arrest. He was accused of persuading demonstrators to storm the parliament building during protests in June 2019. By October 2020, Melia was released on bail with an electronic monitoring device. He ripped it off as a sign of protest to the alleged electoral fraud. He also refused to pay his second bail. Melia’s arrest was a spectacular media event. The state’s special forces stormed his party headquarters where he was barricaded together with other opposition leaders. Tear gas was used and the party premises were damaged.

A few days prior to these brutal scenes, Georgia’s Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia resigned. Gakharia had earlier been the minister of the interior. However, when he stood against the detention of the opposition leader, he turned from being a hawk to a dove. Consequently, he clashed with other leaders of the Georgian Dream who did not agree that Melia’s detention would make matters worse. Gakharia was replaced by the Minister of Defence, Irakli Garibashvili. Interestingly, Garibashvili had already been head of the government from 2013 to 2015 which is around the time Ivanishvili formally left politics for the first time. Garibashvili’s promotion was a prelude to a tougher stance taken towards the opposition. Not only did he call those in the opposition as criminals and radicals, but also announced that parties that boycotted parliament would be deprived of state financing.

Brussels to the rescue

Once matters deteriorated further, the West decided to step in. First the ambassadors of the EU and the United States participated in talks between the parties. Later, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, came to Tbilisi to push for an agreement. He noted all points of contention and even got a promise from the Georgian Dream and the opposition that they would return to the negotiating table. Yet after his departure, the parties returned to business as usual and mutual accusations. Thus, in the end, Christian Danielsson, an EU diplomat and Michel’s special envoy, was assigned the task of resolving the conflict.

Despite spending more than a week in Tbilisi, Danielsson did not get any closer to an agreement. He returned a second time and presented a draft six-point agreement which was rejected by both the ruling party and the opposition – who blamed each other for the talks failing. Danielsson’s document contained provisions ensuring the opposition’s entry into parliament and some posts for its representatives. It also provided amnesty for Rurua and Melia, as well as reform of the electoral law and justice system. However, the document was unsatisfactory for both the opposition, which did not want to approve the results of the vote, and the Georgian Dream, which did not want to release political prisoners.

Danielsson suggested that the talks be resumed, but did not seem to have much hope he could do anything further. Thus, the opposition prepared for further protests. Unexpectedly, after less than three weeks, the document put forward by Danielsson was signed by the Georgian Dream. However, the opposition did not withdraw its decision. In mid-April, Michel proposed a new version of the agreement. It included amnesty for Melia and Rurua and early parliamentary elections in 2022, should the Georgian Dream get less than 43 per cent of the vote in the upcoming local elections later this year.

Finally, in the second half of April, the document was signed by all opposition parties except the largest ones – the United National Movement and the European Georgia. Initially, Saakashvili was very critical of the agreement. Then he changed his mind, stressing that it was imperfect, but the opposition should focus primarily on winning the autumn local elections, which will be a kind of plebiscite on the rule of the Georgian Dream. Opposition representatives began working in parliament. Charles Michel returned to Tbilisi to encourage the former ruling party to join the agreement. It is possible that in the end this will happen after the release of Nika Melia. However, he opposes the amnesty law which would also apply to law enforcement officers who allegedly violated the law during the pacification of a demonstration outside the parliament building in June 2019. There is an ongoing tug of war between the Dreamers and the opposition in this matter. Ultimately, the bail for Melia’s release was paid by the European Union. On the other hand, President Salome Zourabichvili pardoned Giorgi Rurua.

Irritation

It seems that scuffles in Georgian politics are endless. This has led to the public becoming exhausted by politics and more disengaged. Most people are sick of hearing about disputes and fighting. Their primary concern is survival at this difficult time. The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and the public lockdown, which took place in the autumn and winter of 2020, has had a really negative effect on the domestic economy. The greatest hit came from the collapse of tourism which, together with other services, generates almost one-third of the country’s GDP. The number of visitors dropped from over nine million to one million. As a result, many owners of hotels, restaurants and travel agencies lost most of their income, and many are still paying off loans. The government’s support was insufficient due to the modest size of the state budget.

The number receiving state financial aid has increased by over 80,000. Now, more than half of Georgia’s 3.7 million citizens are financially supported by the state, and for 150,000 families this is the only source of income. This in turn explains why public debt has continued to rise, which was a serious problem even before the pandemic. Also indicatively, in recent months there have been several large-scale bank robberies in Tbilisi and Zugdidi. One of the raiders said he did so out of despair and an inability to pay off his debt. He complained about high interest rates, expensive medicine and gambling being a social problem. His deed was a gesture of despair. The additional problem is the continuing weak exchange rate of the Georgian currency, the lari. This in turn explains a serious decrease in people’s purchasing power.

All these problems are reflected in opinion polls. Recent data show that as many as 59 per cent of Georgians think unemployment is the country’s biggest problem. Forty-five per cent sees high and rising prices as their biggest concern, almost one-third (28 per cent) point to poverty, and 27 per cent to the lari’s depreciation. Opinions about Georgia’s future are almost evenly split: 38 per cent believe that things are going in the wrong direction and 32 per cent think things are good. The remaining 22 per cent believe they are neither good nor bad.

These numbers could of course become further exacerbated by the expected third COVID-19 wave. The partial lifting of restrictions in February and March of this year translated into higher COVID-19 cases and deaths. Another lockdown could bring about complete economic collapse and lead to further social unrest. However, for the moment it is difficult to put much hope into mass vaccine roll out as a quick remedy. The truth is that the first shipment of Astra Zeneca jabs arrived in Georgia only in March. According to Our World in Data, on the 28th April just over one per cent of the Georgian population has received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine.

Quite worrying is the public’s attitude towards vaccination. Research suggests that over half of the public (53 per cent) do not want to take the jab, only 35 per cent are willing to get vaccinated, and 12 per cent do not have an opinion. In order to convince Georgians to get vaccinated Zourabichvili was filmed getting her shot. However, only a few days after her public vaccination, the media announced that a young nurse died in Akhaltsikhe after she had experienced an anaphylactic shock.

Nobody to vote for

The social mood is often reflected in polls. One recent poll indicated that as many as 60 per cent of the public were against the opposition’s parliamentary boycott. Opinions were more divided on the need to hold early elections. Forty-five per cent were in favour and 45 per cent were against. Social trust in public figures is extremely low. The public has no trust in party leaders. Eighty-nine per cent has a positive view of Patriarch Ilia II, the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church. Former Prime Minister, Giorgi Gakharia, is trusted by 65 per cent, followed by Tbilisi mayor Kakha Kaladze with 54 per cent. The leaders of the Georgian Dream and the political opposition have more critics than supporters.

A third of voters do not know which political party they would vote for. The Georgian Dream is on 35 per cent while the United National Movement has 18 per cent support. Support for other parties remains at zero to three per cent. Georgians have long been waiting for a third, alternative player to emerge. For some time, it seemed that the party Lelo for Georgia, founded by two bankers in late 2019, could be it. However, this party has not gained much support. Evidently, Georgian politics lack young faces. Voters are tired of the same political figures who have continuously failed to solve Georgia’s most fundamental problems.

Possibly, the void will be filled by the former Prime Minister Giorgia Gakharia, who has announced he is founding a new party. This initiative has already been joined by six deputies of the Georgian Dream. Yet, it is rightly feared that Gakharia’s project could become something of a pseudo opposition – something controlled by Ivanishvili. Giorgi Margvelashvili, Georgia’s former president, called it Georgian Dream 2.0. Even if these fears prove invalid, the question remains what new could be offered by a man who was the country’s prime minister for only a year and a half and who, apart from the effective management of the pandemic during the first wave, does not have any other success.

Grim prospects

The Georgian authorities have recently faced another problem which has resulted in a growing wave of protests against the construction of one of the largest hydroelectric plants in the country. The plant is to be built near Kutaisi, Georgia’s second largest city. The investor is a Turkish company called Enka. Locals and environmental activists oppose the construction and three mass demonstrations have already been organised. And the protesters have outnumbered those who usually come to opposition rallies.

For the time being, authorities have decided to suspend the main construction, only allowing some preparatory tasks. Yet the government emphasises that the investment, as a response to growing demand for electricity, will contribute to Georgia’s energy security. The plant’s opponents point to an unfavourable contract (i.e. high energy prices, an obligation to sell to the state for only 15 years, compared to the 99 years of leasing the area where the hydroelectric plant will be built) highlighting the need to displace several hundreds of families. Other costs of the project would include the flooding of several villages and its negative impact on local wine production and tourism. Additionally, the facility is to be erected in a seismic and landslide area.

Instead of dialogue, the government has used force, summoning protesters to police precincts, blocking road access to the Rioni Valley, and liquidating the protest camp. Natela Turnava, the minister of economy and sustainable development who has been the face of the project, abruptly left a meeting with local community leaders after just five minutes. The project is also contributing to tensions in Georgian-Turkish relations. The Turkish ambassador to Georgia has claimed that anti-Turkish sentiments were driving the protesters.

***

Both politically and economically, Georgia is in an extremely difficult situation. The level of aggression and detachment from reality among the political elite is shocking. For several months now the country has become a one-party system which has little to do with western democratic standards. In light of this, the idea of ​​Georgian authorities officially applying for membership in the European Union in 2024 is a grim joke. Economic collapse is a brutal fact. The vaccine rollout will probably be difficult – there is a shortage of vaccine supplies compounded by a society reluctant to get vaccinated. Unlike EU member states, Georgia cannot count on a post-pandemic recovery fund. For now, it is difficult to predict when tourism will return to pre-pandemic levels, and it is equally hard to say when the domestic economy will recover.

As the overall situation in the country has been deteriorating for years now, the public has expressed greater apathy and discouragement. Given all that, a change in social attitudes can never be ruled out. Should the level of impoverishment worsen, Georgians may take to the streets and threaten the dysfunctional political class, putting the country’s fate into the hands of a new, younger generation.

Wojciech Wojtasiewicz is a journalist, a regular contributor to the Polish Nowa Europa Wschodnia and a member of the Association “Bridge to Georgia”. He has been published in Polityka, Krytyka Polityczna, Newsweek Polska and OpenDemocracy.

elections, Georgia, Georgian Dream, politics