Text resize: A A
Change contrast

The Baltic states. Three peas in a pod?

The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are often together associated as a bloc, with a similar history, culture and politics. While there are some commonalities among the three countries, there are also some key characteristics that make them quite different from each other.

From the outside, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are usually viewed as one – “the Baltics”. However, their fates have only been intertwined during the last century. Prior to the end of the First World War, Lithuania had been closely connected with Poland, while Estonians and Latvians had been under Baltic German domination for seven centuries, no matter whether the ruling power was Sweden, Poland or Russia. Lithuanian and Latvian are the two surviving Baltic languages, whereas Estonian belongs to a completely different language family, together with Finnish and Hungarian.

April 11, 2021 - Andres Kasekamp - Hot TopicsIssue 3 2021Magazine

Photo: Michele Ursi / Shutterstock

Lithuanians are Catholic, while Estonians and Latvians are mostly Lutheran, though the latter are among the world’s least religious societies. Of the Baltic states, Latvia is the most “Baltic”, with two Baltic neighbours, while Estonia usually looks northwards towards Finland, and Lithuania westwards towards Poland. The Latvians, understandably, have always been the greatest proponents of Baltic solidarity.

Baltic Entente

In 1920 negotiations were held to form a regional alliance among five nations that had freed themselves from the Russian Empire: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. However, the Polish takeover of Vilnius and Finland’s decision to pursue a Scandinavian orientation resulted in a defence treaty being concluded narrowly between Estonia and Latvia in 1923. In 1934 this was extended to include Lithuania, creating a Baltic Entente, but without any military commitment. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declared neutrality, but this did not save them from Nazi and Soviet occupations. The failure of co-operation in the interwar period and a lack of allies were painful lessons, which has shaped contemporary foreign and security policy. The Baltic states are determined to never be alone again or to silently submit to aggression.

Ironically, it was after the three countries were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 that they became lumped together. A major legacy of nearly half-a-century of Soviet rule was the massive influx of Russian-speakers into Estonia and Latvia. This radical demographic change was a trigger for the “Singing Revolution” in 1988. In a struggle against the common foe, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians displayed remarkable co-operation, epitomised by the Baltic Way, the human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius, formed in 1989 by close to two million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. 

When the Baltic states recovered their independence in 1991, they wanted to distance themselves from the Soviet legacy as quickly as possible and “return to Europe”. A Baltic Assembly and Baltic Council of Ministers, patterned after Nordic models, were established to institutionalise co-operation. Coming from the same place and going in the same direction, they generally followed a similar path to democracy and free market economies, but individually they chose different paces of transition; for example, in privatisation. Estonia made the sharpest rupture with the past, while in Lithuania the successor to the communist party returned to power.

Unlike its northern neighbours, Lithuania did not have the burden of integrating substantial numbers of Russian-speakers, a challenge which attracted much international scrutiny. This was a factor why Lithuania was already able to secure the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory in 1993, a year earlier than Estonia and Latvia. Had Russian troops remained, the Baltic states might have ended up in a similar situation to Moldova or Georgia, and they would not have been able to successfully integrate with the West.

Friendly competition

Though the three had a shared goal of joining Euro-Atlantic structures as quickly as possible, there was keen competition to be the first. Estonia was invited to begin negotiations for EU accession before the others in 1997, due to its more rapid reforms. Lithuania believed it had a better chance to be taken into NATO before the others. Neither country wanted to be held back by being placed in the same basket as the other two, less successful, Balts. Thus, they all strove to differentiate themselves. In the late 1990s, for instance, Estonia began to consciously construct a Nordic identity for itself, while Lithuania started emphasising its Central European identity. Nevertheless, EU and NATO enlargement happened in 2004 according to the “big bang” model. Though they were judged on their individual merits, the Baltic states were still treated as a package.

Friendly competition between the three states found a new expression in the accession to the Eurozone – Estonia leading the way in 2011, Latvia in 2014, and then Lithuania in 2015. Joining the single currency was part of the successful exit strategy from the 2009 global financial crisis which hit the Baltic states especially hard. They applied drastic austerity measures which allowed them to rapidly recover. Having joined almost every international fora available to them by the end of the second decade of this century, the last big challenge was to win a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Estonia is currently in the UNSC, but Lithuania was the first in 2014, and Latvia is currently campaigning for a seat. In these international efforts, they have all learnt from each other’s experience.

The biggest, most expensive Baltic co-operation project, mainly funded by the EU, is Rail Baltica – a high-speed rail link connecting the three countries with Central Europe. Getting the project agreed upon, and now implementing it, has been an ongoing test for the ability of the three countries to work together to prioritise long-term common interests. Energy security is a field where all three have emphasised ending dependence on Russia. However, when it comes to the actual costs of projects, disagreements often arise. The most recent example is the lukewarm support of Estonia and Latvia for Lithuania’s uncompromising position on the Astravets nuclear power plant being constructed in Belarus close to Lithuania’s border.

Security and defence has been the area where interests are the most closely aligned, though it has proven difficult to overcome national preferences in areas where synergies would obviously be beneficial, such as joint procurement.  During the past four years, a common challenge had been surviving the presidency of Donald Trump, who recklessly undermined NATO. Despite Trump’s admiration of Putin, his administration actually increased US defence investments in the Baltic region. Baltic governments delicately tried to ignore his tweets and focus on opportunities for practical co-operation. They also boosted their defence expenditure to two per cent of their GDP – not in response to Trump, but to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. There is great relief in the region with hopes that the new Joe Biden administration will bring the US back to normalcy and restore respect for transatlantic relations, but faith in the US as a reliable partner has been shaken.

Overcoming populist challenges

In domestic politics there have been some similar trends, including a resurgence of populism. Populist parties, as elsewhere in recent years, have made big electoral gains and even obtained office. In the 2016 Lithuanian elections the established parties were swept by the Farmers and Greens Union, which went on to lead the government for four years. In Latvia, Who Owns the State? (KPV) emerged out of nowhere to the second place in the 2018 elections and was included in the broad governing coalition. In Estonia, the far-right Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) made the biggest gains in the 2019 elections and was surprisingly brought into government by Prime Minister Jüri Ratas of the Centre Party. EKRE soon began to act as the agenda-setter, and outrageous statements made by its leaders damaged Estonia’s international reputation.

However, the populist tide has ebbed. The first signs came in Latvia where the popularity of KPV rapidly collapsed, and in 2019 two highly-educated, accomplished figures with broad horizons – prime minister Krišjānis Kariņš and president Egils Levits – came to office. The October 2020 election in Lithuania led to the formation of a new female-led coalition government, headed by prime minister Ingrida Šimonytė. In January this year, EKRE finally overreached: they pushed a referendum on the banning of same-sex marriage. A new coalition excluding EKRE was formed by the liberal Reform Party, led by Kaja Kallas. Estonia caught up with its neighbours by appointing its first female head of government; Estonia is now the only country in the world to simultaneously have both a female prime minister and president, Kersti Kaljulaid. As of this writing, all three Baltic states appear to have rebounded from their bout of populism and their political systems have proven resilient (for now, at least).

Yet, the resilience of their societies was severely challenged by COVID-19. The Baltic states were among the most successful countries in coping with the first wave of the pandemic. While practically all of Europe was in lockdown, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the first states to open a travel bubble in spring 2020. Unfortunately, when the second wave of the pandemic hit, this exemplary coordination crumbled. However, in the most recent development in March 2021, when the number of cases in Estonia skyrocketed, Latvia and Lithuania both offered assistance, showing once again that true friends are revealed in a time of crisis.

Andres Kasekamp is chair of Estonian Studies and a professor of history at the University of Toronto. He is director-at-large of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies and the author of A History of the Baltic States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 2nd edition).

, , , , ,

Partners

Terms of Use | Cookie policy | Copyryight 2025 Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego 31-153 Kraków
Agencja digital: hauerpower studio krakow.
We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. View more
Cookies settings
Accept
Decline
Privacy & Cookie policy
Privacy & Cookies policy
Cookie name Active
Poniższa Polityka Prywatności – klauzule informacyjne dotyczące przetwarzania danych osobowych w związku z korzystaniem z serwisu internetowego https://neweasterneurope.eu/ lub usług dostępnych za jego pośrednictwem Polityka Prywatności zawiera informacje wymagane przez przepisy Rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2016/679 w sprawie ochrony osób fizycznych w związku z przetwarzaniem danych osobowych i w sprawie swobodnego przepływu takich danych oraz uchylenia dyrektywy 95/46/WE (RODO). Całość do przeczytania pod tym linkiem
Save settings
Cookies settings