Do European values still matter in Ukraine?

Activists protest outside the Constitutional Court of Ukraine after its decision to cancel the electronic declaration by officials in October 2020. Photo: Review News / Shutterstock

At that time, I called the Zelenskyy phenomenon “populism 2.0”. During the election campaign, Zelenskyy was not proposing ideas, values or even slogans. He was proposing himself, his (real or imagined) character. The major emotion behind this character was the emotion of belonging: “I am one of you”, he tried to say, “I am not a politician, not a part of ‘them’”. Contrary to other politicians, he moved from political slogans (“vote for us, and we will give you justice/peace/security/welfare/order”) to political memes: funny play of words mocking current politicians or corrupt civil servants, but not proposing anything like a plan or goal. He mobilised his voters with a suggestion to laugh and to reject, but with little understanding of where to go.

Current constellation of players

This emptiness was Zelenskyy’s key drawback – but also his key force. The ideology of the Servant of the People was unclear but also sufficiently comprehensive to attract different people and different expectations. This inclusiveness gradually made Servant of the People a key centrist force in the Ukrainian political landscape. It also helped crystalize two oppositions to the Zelenskyy party: the patriotic pro-western opposition embodied by Poroshenko’s European Solidarity and the pro-Russian, anti-western opposition embodied by Viktor Medvedchuk’s Opposition Platform for Life (OPSZ). Two lesser political forces are worth mentioning here as well: the liberal (and probably the most pro-western) Holos, led by rock singer Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, and the aggressively anti-western party of video blogger Shariy (the Shariy Party). The difference is that Holos is gradually dying out, “squeezed” between centre-right Poroshenko and centrist Zelenskyy, while Shariy is gaining popularity, especially among younger audiences in the east and south. Shariy is increasingly acting as a younger and anti-systemic ally of the Opposition Platform for Life.

Another important Ukrainian political player, Yulia Tymoshenko, one of the leaders of the Orange Revolution (2004-2005), is drifting more towards the influence of oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyy and is increasingly playing an anti-western card, pushed by him and his entourage. Add to this a bunch of local parties which were born as fruits of decentralisation reform; some new oligarchic political projects – and you will see the usual complicated character of the Ukrainian politics. It would be very tempting to present this constellation in a European-style ideological matrix: centre-right European Solidarity (a bit similar to the German Christian Democrats); the “centrist” Servant of the People; the liberal Holos; the centre-left Tymoshenko party; the pro-Russian “left” of OPSZ; the radical far-right Ukrainian nationalists (balancing between 2-3 per cent), and the “far-left” Shariy.

But all these familiar adjectives – “right”, “left”, “centrist”, “liberal”, “nationalist”, “socialist” – are hardly applicable as such to Ukrainian politics. Politics in Ukraine is still not driven by ideas or ideologies, but rather by personalities and money. And while on the pro-western flank there are at least signs of demarcation between more liberal forces and more patriotic/identity politics, the pro-Russian flank is still characterized by a chaotic mixture of ideas. Therefore, when I use the adjective “left” with regard to Medvedchuk and Shariy, I use it as a metaphor, rather than an exact description. They are trying to attract the attention of the European “left”, arguing that they are the key force opposing Ukrainian “nationalists”. But their “leftism” is illusory and has nothing to do with a genuine European left; it is not about a welfare state or social redistribution, but about pro-Soviet nostalgia and pro-Russian rhetoric, acute anti-western rhetoric, and pathetic claims that they are fighting against “nationalists”. There is also, quite probably, Kremlin financial support. They often show nostalgia about the Soviet industrial, authoritarian and imperial past.

Second, Zelenskyy’s “centrism” is rather wishful thinking. Its “inclusiveness” is often a synonym of its emptiness. While it was rather empty at the beginning and it is becoming increasingly empty in the making: the 2020 local elections are poor, even in terms of political campaigning, compared to 2019 election.

Third, there is no balance in this system. Currently the “patriotic” and “pro-western” flanks (Poroshenko, Holos and pro-western MPs of the Servant of the People) are losing popularity and losing resources, being targets of a huge anti-western information campaign, which we study thoroughly at UkraineWorld.org. Instead, the “anti-western” flank (Medvedchuk, Shariy, Kolomoyskyy’s close politicians from Servant of the People and new parties like the Kolomoyskyy-linked For the Future) are gaining popularity – primarily because of the huge financial and media resources they have behind them.

What does this trend mean for Ukrainian values? Nothing positive, that is certain.

Liberal-patriotic alliance

The liberal-patriotic alliance was a key for the emergence of modern Ukraine. It was a significant factor in the Ukrainian dissident movement in the Soviet Union of the 1970s-1980s which tried to combine the liberal discourse of human rights and the patriotic values of community rights and identity. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which emerged in 1976 in protest against the Soviet Union’s neglect to the Helsinki Final Act (eventually the USSR signed it), was a symptom of this. The opposition to Soviet totalitarianism, which was suppressing both individual rights and national/political identities of its “republics”, demanded a unified front of liberals and patriots.

Throughout the 1990s, this liberal-patriotic alliance was dominating the intellectual discourse. However, it had little understanding and support with the general public. The majority of Ukrainian society in the early 1990s was made up of the post-Soviet elite and ordinary citizens who had not taken the competition of ideas seriously and were focusing on material concerns. Some were able to earn a lot of money through corrupt rent-seeking schemes or other successful business, while others were focused on economic survival during the harsh 1990s and the everyday fight to ensure minimal welfare of themselves and their families.

During the two Maidans (the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 and the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014), this liberal-patriotic discourse, stressing the importance of both human rights and the rights of the Ukrainian political community (against Russian expansionism, for example), was able to mobilise citizens and provide them with ideas that inspired action of resistance and even a readiness to sacrifice themselves. What is more, this liberal-patriotic alliance was not unique for Ukraine. In a way, it was dominant throughout the western world, which took hold in the late 1970s – from Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan – through the late 1990s in a liberal-conservative consensus. This consensus replaced the liberal-socialist alliance of the 1940s-1960s, which created a European social model and welfare state balancing the values of freedom and equality. Contrary to the liberal-socialist consensus, the liberal-conservative alliance of the 1980s-1990s rejected the role of equality as a key value and stressed the role of the rule of law, in addition to the liberal idea of freedom.

Today, this liberal-conservative alliance has collapsed throughout the world. Former allies are turning into bitter enemies. Both liberalism and conservatism are becoming increasingly radical and intransigent with regards to each other. Ukraine, in this sense, is not an exception. Several trends put the former liberal-patriotic alliance into question. First, “liberals” and “patriots” are increasingly in opposition towards each other. Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas made patriotic discourse more radical, with many representatives of it doubting that liberal values of human rights can be applied to the enemy, in a country at war. “Liberals”, on the contrary, argue that radicalising patriotic, security and identity discourse is beneficial to Russia which presents Ukraine as a “fascist state” and is turning Ukraine into a mirror of its enemy. The collapse of the liberal-patriotic consensus endangers the very resilience of the Ukrainian political project, facing increasing threats from Russia, not only from the outside but also from within the country.

The warrior vs. the bourgeois

The clash between liberalism and patriotism/conservatism is a mirror of a fundamental axiological clash which we see around the world, including in Ukraine: a controversy between the “warrior ethos” and the “bourgeois ethos”. By the warrior ethos, I understand a set of values valorising the ideals of victory on a battlefield, glory, honour and pride. By the bourgeois ethos, I understand values valorising the ideals of exchange, mutual respect, and of a positive-sum game.

The warrior ethos has been a long-lasting foundation of European ethical doctrines. It has been the ethical basis of the European antiquity, primarily the Ancient Greek city states and the foundation of western democracy. It is based upon the idea that a true “virtue” is won on the battlefield, on an agon. The ideal citizen is supposed to be able to fight, to win and to earn glory. The warrior ethos stresses the values of fight for national sovereignty and identity, of sacrifice, of heroism and victory in war.

The bourgeois ethos, on the contrary, came about in European modernity, with the rise of capitalism and the subsequent invention of political liberalism. It can be attributed to philosophers like John Locke, David Hume and broadly 17th-18th century Britain. Contrary to the values of sacrifice, victory and glory, it puts an emphasis on mutual exchange and recognition. It stressed the values of a positive-sum game and compromise. It believed that the best metaphor to describe human society is not agon but agora – or, in other words, the meeting point, the market.

In my recent essay titled “Ukraine, Europe and dignity”, I argued that the combination of the warrior ethos and bourgeois ethos is key for the development of the idea of dignity (dignitas). Dignitas is important for both European Union values (“dignity” comes first in the list of values of Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union) and for Ukraine’s recent history, whose EuroMaidan was called, from the very beginning, the Revolution of Dignity.

In a way, a united Europe was the result of an alliance of these two sets of values: A Europe of glory and a Europe of exchange; a Europe of victory and a Europe of compromise – both needed each other. Dignitas is unthinkable when there is no mutual respect and equality, which comes from the bourgeois ethos; but it is also unthinkable when everything is subject to exchange and when there are no red lines for compromise. These red lines come primarily from the warrior ethos and its emphasis on the value of honour.

For Ukraine’s recent history, both played a significant role. The bourgeois ethos helped many citizens to overcome their Soviet past, to become more individualistic and less dependent on the state, and more valorising horizontal relations, mutuality and trust. But the warrior ethos was also key for Ukraine’s defence against foreign aggression. The value of sacrifice was acutely present both during EuroMaidan and during the war. It is remarkable how the word “warrior”, voin, has returned to the Ukrainian language.

The importance of the warrior ethos is the reason of scepticism many Ukrainians have with regards to Europe’s policy towards Russia – which is considered by many as too soft, too compromising, and too unwilling to confront danger (i.e. too bourgeois). Today, however, these two sets of values are also entering a confrontation within societies – as it has become one of the lines of conflict between liberalism and patriotism. Moreover, both are also facing attack from a third player – the Kremlin. Putinist Russia is perfect at imitating European values but turning them into its benefit – and it is skilfully playing on the controversy between liberalism and conservatism, helping radical conservatives when it needs, or imitating liberal discourse on “freedom of speech” when it needs.

Zoopolitical ethos

In Ukraine, the Kremlin is also promoting what I call a “zoopolitical ethos”. By zoopolitics, I understand a specific worldview, in which politics – or the political as such – is understood not as a warriors agon or as the merchants’ market, but as a big jungle where animals fight for survival. Zoopolitics valorises aggression, force, expansion – i.e. the values of social Darwinism which flourished in the western world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; and finally led to the age of right-wing and left-wing totalitarianisms of the 20th century. Social Darwinism argued that human beings are neither warriors on the battleground, valuing their honour, nor are they merchants meeting on the market, valuing their mutual revenues. Instead, they are but animals fighting for survival, with no mercy towards each other. According to the zoopoolitical ethos, political competition is one big fight among big animals (nations, states, empires) trying to acquire more living space.

The zoopolitical discourse, typical for today’s Russia, is also exported into Ukraine and other European countries, promoting the triumph of the cynical mind, which assesses the situation only on the basis of survival instincts and an aggressive capacity to destroy others. When I refer to zoopolitical (or social Darwinist) discourse in Ukraine, I mean primarily the abovementioned pro-Russian and anti-western forces – represented by Medvedchuk’s OPSZ, Shariy’s party, Kolomoyskyy-aligned political actors, both within the Servant of the People and outside it. They are characterised by an excessive use of hate speech, political incorrectness, a rejection of both liberal (human rights) and identity (community rights) discourse. Openly or latently, they express their support for Russkiy Mir (the so-called Russian World) – a Russian imperial idea attempting to re-establish its zone of influence and furthermore to re-establish its political empire.

Interestingly, the zoopolitical ethos is mimicking both the bourgeois ethos and the warrior ethos. It is using the liberal discourse against the democratic world. It argues that the western world promotes “liberal fundamentalism” and that the Russian-backed discourse – on RT, Sputnik, Medvedchuk’s channels in Ukraine, etc. – actually provide the true alternative, genuine critical thinking and therefore should be defended according to the democratic principle of free speech. The truth is, however, that its goal is to use information not to inform, but as a tool to harm – i.e. to extend imperial power, not human knowledge.

It also mimics the warrior ethos as it argues that Russkiy mir is endangered, encircled by its enemies, while the Russian people are the fighters who shall oppose the western attempt to weaken it. The truth is, however, that the European warrior ethos has been rooted in the Greek polis, and was citizen-focused, not empire-focused. It was initially much more anti-imperial than imperial. It was born much more as an ethos of the defender than that of the occupier – and therefore is much more applicable to the current anti-imperial Ukraine than to imperial Russia.

Compromise?

The Ukrainian liberal-patriotic alliance has been the key driver of Ukraine’s way towards European values of dignity. Today, however, it is not in the best of shape. But it certainly can be reborn again. The problem is whether we can still find a universalist vocabulary to describe what is going on in today’s world, or even what is going on among our neighbours. Take the Belarus protests, for example. Belarus’s uprising against Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Ukraine’s EuroMaidan in 2013-2014 have much in common. The true mobilising force behind both of them was a response to direct police violence. It was this moment that provided the moral motivation to protest against the violence and surpassed the civic motivation to protect citizens’ votes from fraud or the country’s geopolitical direction.

Yet, many see it important to not stress the similarities of the Belarus and Ukraine protests, but their differences. Some see Belarus’s lack of identity politics (for better or for worse); others see the Belarus protests as less violent (the beginning the EuroMaidan was non-violent as well); while others complain that even Belarus’s opposition is too soft on Russia. All these differences seem to be less important to me than the things which unite them – and despite this we find it difficult to find a common narrative.

Yet, the lack of a common narrative that goes beyond any particular state makes the very discourse of values senseless. Contrary to postmodern scepticism about grand narratives, I believe that our inability to embrace them makes us weaker, not stronger. In this sense, the split between liberal and conservative values in the world, the split between liberal and patriotic values in Ukraine – or in other countries – and radicalisation of opposing discourses drives us away from the idea of “European values” as such.

“European values”, with their focus on dignity, is a compromise between what I call the warrior ethos and the bourgeois ethos. And it is increasingly falling victim to the neo-authoritarian zoopolitical ethos, intransigent in its wish to survive. This zoopolitical ethos has only one motivation: destruction as a tool of survival. As one famous French writer put it, “destroy, she says”.

Volodymyr Yermolenko is a Ukrainian philosopher, writer and journalist. He has doctoral degrees in France (political studies) and in Ukraine (philosophy). He is chief editor of UkraineWorld.org, an English-language website and podcast about Ukraine. He works as analytics director at Internews Ukraine and as a lecturer at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Author of several books in philosophy and literature, and of numerous articles published by Ukrainian and international media. Winner of Sheveliov Prize (2018) and Book of the Year Prize (2018) for his book Liquid Ideologies. Editor of Ukraine in Histories and Stories: Essays by Ukrainian Intellectuals (Kyiv, 2019).

European values, politics, Ukraine, values