Eastern Partnership and Azerbaijan. Balancing values and interests

Photo: European Commission

Only nine per cent are negative about the EU. Thirty per cent of Azerbaijanis are aware of the EU’s financial support to the country, and 76 per cent of them felt it was effective. Sixty-nine per cent of Azerbaijanis who are aware of the European Union feel that relations with the EU are good. This positivity notwithstanding, Azerbaijan and the EU have not yet signed an association agreement despite the negotiations which began in 2016. During the EaP summit in June 2020, President Ilham Aliyev stated that 90 per cent of the text of the agreement was ready. Let us take a look at the bigger picture to understand the underpinnings of the process. In July 2020, while appointing the new minister of foreign affairs, the president returned to the issue of the agreement and urged the government to speed up the process.

Two sides of the story

The EU, in the context of the Eastern Partnership, defines its relations with Azerbaijan around two key principles. First, the need for a differentiated approach as Azerbaijan is free to choose to what extent it will participate in political association and economic integration. The second principle states that in the implementation of deep democracy, the EU will not compromise on the core values of the Eastern Partnership which can be summarised as democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

On the other hand, in 2018 a new set of priorities between the parties was established. The first aimed at strengthening institutions and good governance, including public administration reform. The second focussed on economic development, sustainable diversification of the economy, support for membership in the World Trade Organisation and improving the business and investment environments. The third focussed on connectivity, energy efficiency, the environment and climate action. Mobility and people-to-people contacts, including support for education and human capital, made up the fourth principle.

While the first two principles can be basically interpreted as “you are free to choose, but if you want to integrate deeper with the EU you cannot avoid democracy,” the new priorities, adopted in 2018, do not use the language of core values and do not include the areas of democratisation. This seems to reflect the adjustment of priorities towards the Azerbaijani approach. This adjustment has started from the very beginning and reflects the geopolitical and domestic considerations of the Azerbaijani elite vis-à-vis the EU.

It seems that relations between Azerbaijan and the EU have been developing along these two tracks and, at times, have been contradictory. Relations can be viewed within the frame of “values vs interests” – which was a prominent debate in the 2010s particularly with regard to Azerbaijan, an oil country where the EU has strong energy interests and investments. This discussion involved various stakeholders from both sides. Proponents of values claimed that in order to be part of Europe, Azerbaijan should adhere to the European values. Interest-based proponents, however, claimed that relations between EU and Azerbaijan should be strengthened regardless how things stand with regards to core values.

Since the inception of the Eastern Partnership in 2009, civil society institutions in Azerbaijan have supported the value-based approach and have engaged with various European governmental and non-governmental organisations to advocate the EU for pushing more on democratisation. In parallel, the government of Azerbaijan and the EU, who both advocate more for more interest-based approach, built their own agenda. Hence, the current state of relations between the EU and Azerbaijan can be regarded as a compromise with more proclivity towards the interest-based side.

The EU and Azerbaijan co-operate largely on energy and economic projects. The EU, which is Azerbaijan’s largest trading partner, has invested around 600 million euros into the country. With regard to core values, it seems that the EU has accepted the terms of the Azerbaijani side and does not rock the boat too much in terms of democracy and human rights. In turn, Azerbaijan engages with EU projects in the areas of public administration, development of small and medium enterprises, education reform, regional development, and diversification of the economy. Although the EU is usually careful, sometimes it has to prove it does not support revolution in Azerbaijan. In the autumn of 2019 an EU delegation in Azerbaijan issued a press statement responding to allegations claiming that the EU was provoking people to take to the streets. The statement read that EU supports the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Vulnerabilities

A combination of external and internal factors precluded further integration of Azerbaijan with the EU. On a geopolitical level, Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty have become key determinants in relations with external actors. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the occupation of 20 per cent of Azerbaijan’s territory by the Republic of Armenia have become a constant irritator and obstacle for a sound relationship with its neighbours and the rest of the world. For Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh is not a simple conflict but a motivation for post-Soviet nation-building. Therefore, Azerbaijan considers outside actors’ attitudes towards the conflict and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as the main hint of genuine co-operation.

In this regard, the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on June 19th 2020 has created a wave of appreciation in Baku by the government and civil society. The resolution stressed the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the EaP states and emphasised the “external aggression and the on-going occupation of the territories of some of those countries”. It also claimed that this undermines the human rights situation, “representing a barrier to enhancing the prosperity, stability and growth of the EaP and compromise EU action, thus endangering the whole EaP project”.

The Azerbaijani elite, like many others in the European neighbourhood, has always conducted a balancing act to provide for its national security. In this sense, the European neighbourhood is also a Russian neighbourhood. Russia is another factor affecting Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU. However, Russia’s power is not only in the form of domination, but also in the form of soft power, a proliferation of hegemonic discourse that included elements such as sovereign democracy, anti-westernism and illiberalism. The Azerbaijani ruling elite has been influenced by this discourse and has started using it. Hence, there is a duality in the relationship with Russia. The Azerbaijani elite had to secure itself from direct Russian interference and influence on domestic affairs, and, at the same time, falling into the hegemonic discourse of the Russian state model.

The domestic vulnerability concerning interaction with the EU was related to the nature of the political regime in Azerbaijan, structured around a strong state and a strong president model with a weak civil society. Anything that would endanger this model would not be accepted and has to be re-negotiated. That is why a pragmatic type of relationship was established since the “democratisation” requirements from external actors would undermine the existing model. Democratisation was replaced with “good governance”, “reform in public administration”, “anti-corruption” and other demands that do not pose an existential threat to the ruling system. The relations between the EU and civil society in the EaP Civil Society Forum should also be considered in that sense. The Azerbaijani ruling elite’s approach to NGOs, particularly those supported from the West, has been unambiguous. The state does not trust those NGOs and considers some of them a nuisance, and even a threat. Allegedly, perceived threats from NGOs was at the centre of the repressions against civil society in 2014. The current format of relations with the EU is a result of lived experience and an inter-subjective knowledge acquired throughout years of negotiations that reflects the interests of both Azerbaijani and European elites.

Way forward

As we can see from above, relations between Azerbaijan and the EU have focused more on economic, reformative and technical matters rather than political ones. What both sides agree upon is an incremental process, which seems to have prospects for the future.

Azerbaijan, facing shocks from the current oil crisis, is in desperate need of reform. The changing domestic situation in Azerbaijan since 2015, linked to the fall of oil production and related structural challenges, has generated a strong need for economic and political transformation. This momentum can create a window of opportunity for the EU to step-up efforts to reform the system of governance and public administration. In order to respond to structural pressures, the government of Azerbaijan has embarked on a path of modifying public administration. Yet this has not been a process of political and economic reform that could liberalise society and offer more public freedoms, something that could save the country from radical stresses and shocks.

What the country now needs is a reform plan that would, first, stabilise the economic situation and give new direction to the post-oil economy and, second, pave the way for more political liberalisation and citizen engagement with gradual transformation to a democratic form of governance. The EU has a unique capacity in this regard. It is present in Azerbaijan and has established channels of communication with the government and civil society. The EU, today, also has an ever-increasing legitimacy in Azerbaijan as suggested in public opinion polls.

Rashad Shirinov is a political analyst working with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and a PhD candidate in political science at the Radboud University in the Netherlands.

Azerbaijan, Eastern Partnership, EU-Azerbaijani relations