Zelenskyy’s populist learning curve

Photo: president.gov.ua (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

By late May, Servant of the People officially announced its bid in the election and launched a competition for potential candidates. The announcement called for prudent patriots capable of teamwork and leadership that are ready to support the president’s course. By late May, 20,000 people had applied, according to Dmytro Razumkov, the party head and now speaker of the parliament. The result was a motley crew of reform-oriented activists, unknowns with no experience in public affairs, and representatives of different oligarchic groups. Shortly after winning the majority in July 2019, the new Servant of the People MPs spent a week in Truskavets, a resort town in western Ukraine, getting to know each other and going through a crash course on running the country.

Rushing through the honeymoon

Those who were running the training at Truskavets for the MPs were soon appointed prime minister and ministers and the party went into turbo lawmaking. Over several months, the new parliament passed long-sought changes, including laws on stripping MPs of immunity; a law on the impeachment of the president to reinforce the previous vague and virtually non-implementable provision on this; criminal responsibility for illegal enrichment of public officials; and a new election code replacing the mixed system with a more transparent open-list proportional representation. On the downside, the MPs were often left with no time to study the laws they were to vote on – so they were essentially expected to rubber-stamp them. Some of the proposed bills were of poor quality or had caveats that undermined their effect and many were rushed through parliament in violation of procedure, which critics interpreted as a demolition of parliamentarianism and a potential loophole for interpretation of these acts as unlawful.

All this was accumulating negativity around the new regime. Many factors contributed to this. Zelenskyy started appointing loyalists, mostly from his Kvartal 95 business, to key offices despite his earlier pledge against cronyism. Investigative journalists turned their lenses to the new power holders, uncovering their contacts with oligarchs and business ties in Russia. The struggle between the different centres of power resulted in leaks compromising members of the presidential office, the government and parliament. Controversial conduct by some top figures in Zelenskyy’s team flared up high-profile scandals in the media. And the new government was a permanent target of criticism from political opponents.

The cabinet of ministers also became targets for criticism within several months, which is not unusual for Ukraine. It was staffed with “new faces” coming from a community of activists and technocrats previously engaged in international organisations and reform projects. Large segments of the pro-reform activists publicly supported Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s bid for the presidency during the election campaign and their expectations were initially met when some of their colleagues ended up in ministerial offices, while the president’s team seemed responsive to their proposals and criticism.

The cabinet also included people who came into government after the Maidan, such as Finance Minister Oksana Markarova, who replaced Oleksandr Danylyuk in 2018, or Education Minister, Hanna Novosad, previously in charge of strategic planning and European integration at the ministry. That signalled a continuity of the policies launched before.

Yet, the team delivered mixed results, especially on the economic front. On the one hand, Ukraine’s economy looked promising, including GDP growth, interest rate and inflation decline, solid foreign exchange reserves and a stronger hryvnia. The prosecutor general’s office under Ruslan Riaboshapka launched re-attestation of prosecutors and plan to complete it within two years.

On the other hand, industrial output started tumbling as a result of both domestic and international factors. Budget revenues and spending declined. This was in contrast to the expectations fuelled by both Zelenskyy’s campaign, and by Prime Minister Honcharuk when he pledged to deliver 40 per cent GDP growth and one million jobs in five years — seen by many as unrealistic — massive infrastructural projects and lower energy prices.

In parallel, a clash within Zelenskyy’s circle loomed. The media started reporting on escalating tensions between Andriy Bohdan, a key member of Zelenskyy’s team during his campaign and his chief of staff, and Andriy Yermak, then aide to the president. Bohdan focused on public policy coordination, worked with Servant of the People MPs for Zelenskyy, and was the one who proposed Oleksiy Honcharuk for prime minister, according to media reports.

Andriy Yermak was not in the spotlight as much, but he built his clout when dealing with the Americans during the Trump impeachment scandal and with the Russians during negotiations on Donbas. He appears more reserved in public and demonstrates full loyalty to Zelenskyy.

By the end of 2019, a poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center found that slightly more than 30 per cent of Ukrainians approved of Honcharuk as prime minister, and around 58 per cent disapproved (immediately after his cabinet’s appointment, he enjoyed 57 per cent of trust). Andriy Bohdan’s approval rating was twice as low.

Tossing the ballast of people and promises

Based on the confluence of these factors, Zelenskyy approved the resignation of Bohdan as his chief of staff in early February 2020, replacing him with Yermak. In less than a month afterwards, he reshuffled the government. The new cabinet was selected in haste as the COVID-19 emergency began to unfold. This time, Zelenskyy shifted away from “new faces” to more experienced managers. Some of the new ministers were actually tried and tested in multiple governments, including under the presidency of Yanukovych. When the new Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal presented his priorities, he mentioned decentralisation, a favourable investment climate, energy efficiency and industrial and agricultural development. Social policy rhetoric was in focus as well. In this context, the cabinet’s plans included an increase of pensions, rehabilitation of depressed mining regions or pumping of public funds into road construction as a way to both demonstrate the government’s efforts to the communities and create new jobs, especially in the face of the COVID-19 economic consequences. In June, parliament repeatedly voted down the new cabinet’s programme presented by Shmyhal, thus failing to give it a one-year immunity against dismissal. This does not necessarily mean that the new cabinet will follow in the footsteps of its predecessor soon. But its position is not solid and it could become a ballast to shed if socio-economic, electoral or other factors call for that.

Meanwhile, several reform processes have stalled under the new government thus far. Healthcare reform – which has been much needed but painful for patient, and medical staff – is now under threat as Zelenskyy has asked the new ministry team to “improve” it. It looks like the plan for the moment is to simply increase funding for hospitals, which will be a challenge given Ukraine’s budget difficulties. The administration has not presented any plans for improving the sustainability and quality of healthcare services in the long run. The media has reported on the return of people linked to corruption and anti-reform lobbyism to the ministry of health.

Under the new minister of defence, the reforms project office, a group of civilian experts contributing to reforms in Ukraine’s armed forces, was suspended and replaced with a new directorate of defence policy without any explanation. Observers are alarmed by the reluctance of the new defence minister to communicate his perspectives or action plans on further developments.

There are other alarming developments as well. The new prosecutor general proposed by Zelenskyy has been reversing reforms aimed at cleaning up the prosecutor’s office, while expanding room for loyalism and non-transparent appointments. The president’s initiative to reset the judiciary has largely failed. Developments in the energy sector favour Rinat Akhmetov’s energy business, which he has developed into a monopoly under previous administrations. When the COVID-19 crisis broke out, Zelenskyy met with Ukraine’s top oligarchs asking them for assistance in handling the pandemic and assigning them different regions to take care of.

This signals a time when the anti-systemic, anti-establishment campaign of populism faces reality, where actually changing the system is difficult, requires making unpopular decisions and leads to negative publicity. Someone who does not want to lose popularity needs to replace the promise of change rhetoric with the more traditional and realistic trade-offs. The result has been patchy politics of progress in some areas, backtracking on essential reforms and close attention to how the public responds to every single move.

This process is likely to intensify as local elections loom this autumn and the Servant of the People is preparing to take them by storm. This time no open calls for applications have been announced. What Servant of the People needs is well-known, local and experienced candidates capable of competing with the incumbent local elites — especially as mayors in some large cities across Ukraine, from Lviv to Dnipro, have strengthened their positions via their role of handling the COVID-19 crisis.

Interestingly, this has not yet affected Zelenskyy’s personal rating. Two polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center in late April this year showed that 40-45 per cent of Ukrainians would vote for Zelenskyy if the election were to take place now; and around 40 per cent would support Servant of the People. At the same time, Zelenskyy’s approval has fallen from 70 per cent in September 2019 to just over 40 per cent. Several factors contribute to this. The benefit of the doubt and general enthusiasm about Zelenskyy remains high and many voters seem to dissociate him from the power institutions. Zelenskyy stirs this impression through public statements that draw on the popular dislike of the state bureaucracy, shaming or dismissing officials or MPs associated with controversies or inefficient work, while focusing on empathy and care for the public in his rhetoric. Voters do not see a comparably charismatic alternative. And there have been no serious economic shocks since the 2019 elections — this may change, of course, due to the COVID-19 quarantine and its consequences. In fact, a survey by the Razumkov Center in late June 2020 – after Ukraine has gone through a strict lockdown and as it still tries to curb the spread of the virus – shows that the balance of trust and distrust for Volodymyr Zelenskyy has turned to negative (41 per cent of respondents trust him and 51 per cent do not), even though he remains the most trusted politician in Ukraine and far ahead of others from his team, Cabinet or his political opponents. 20.5 per cent of all respondents would support his Servant of the People if parliamentary election took place now — down from over 43 per cent in the 2019 election.

However, support for Zelenskyy is fragmenting is in the activist and pro-reform community. He has lost support of some of those who showed enthusiasm right after the elections: while they expect him to invest into long-term institution building in Ukraine, he seeks more short-term results he could demonstrate to his voters. The activist community does not represent the majority of the electorate and it struggles to communicate with the vast swathes of the voters as effectively as Zelenskyy did it during the election campaign. And the pro-reform community is fragmented.

Foreign policy

The area where Zelenskyy moves more consistently is seeking a resolution to the war with Russia. This started with Zelenskyy’s own contacts with Russia’s leadership and communication between Yermak and his Russian counter-part, Dmitry Kozak. In contrast to the previous administration, Zelenskyy moves on the political, humanitarian and security tracks of the Minsk Agreements simultaneously, pledging repeatedly to accomplish a resolution during his term in office and to hold elections in the occupied parts of the Donbas this autumn. The latest developments towards that goal include political initiatives within the Minsk Trilateral Contact Group — from the idea of the consultation council to developing legislative and constitutional changes, to proposals on restoration of Ukraine’s control over its border with Russia for elections, and the upgrade of Ukraine’s representation in Minsk with high-profile political figures. In parallel, Zelenskyy and his cabinet have downgraded their rhetoric on Russia not to be seen as aggressive towards the Kremlin or Vladimir Putin. All these moves have thus far done little to deliver real progress in the conflict management process.

Meanwhile, relations with the West remain Ukraine’s priority in official rhetoric. However, they have become more pragmatic in terms of speaking less about EU and NATO integration and more about co-operation in the economic, energy and digital spheres, as well as trade and access to the EU market for Ukrainian producers. At the same time, Kyiv eyes developing relations with other regions, such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East, which have not enjoyed as much attention in the past.

One of the important safeguards for Ukraine’s co-operation with the West — and for the fulfilment of conditions envisaged by it — is its dependence on international organisations for financial support, especially now as the COVID-19 crisis begins to undermine earlier economic performances. It was under this pressure that on March 31st the parliament passed the long-resisted law on the sale of land for agricultural use, as well as the law preventing the return of the nationalised PrivatBank to the oligarch, Ihor Kolomoiskyy, on May 13th. MPs from Kolomoiskyy’s orbit of influence, including those within the Servant of the People faction, tried to sabotage this by submitting over 16,000 proposed amendments. In early June the IMF announced it would approve an 18-month Stand-by Arrangement of around five billion US dollars for Ukraine.

There will be some other important areas to watch out for as indicators of Ukraine’s political course in the near future: for example, possible changes at the ministry of defence under its new leadership; or policy in the energy sector. These are some of the key safeguards of Ukraine’s security. Such developments can shed light on how the current administration sees its long-term prospect.

Anna Korbut is a Robert Bosch Associate Fellow with the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, Chatham House. She was previously the deputy editor in chief of the Ukrainian weekly Tyzhden.

Editor’s note: This version was updated from the original to include information on the parliament voting down the cabinet’s programme in June as well as to reflect the new opinion polls on trust in Zelenskyy.

Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy