The brief alliance, short memory

Józef Piłsudski i Symon Petlura (1920). Photo (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

A series of talks had been ongoing since the start of July, as both sides attempted to conclude an armistice in Eastern Galicia. A conflict had been raging in this region since November 1918. Eventually, a ceasefire in favour of Poland was concluded on September 1st 1919. Nevertheless, sovereignty over the area was set to remain a bone of contention in any further negotiations between the two recently reborn countries.

Planning the resistance

In October 1919 Andrij Livytsky, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, was appointed head of Kyiv’s diplomatic mission to Poland. Almost immediately, he tried to conclude a pact against the Soviets. In order to increase the chances of such an alliance, Livytsky declared on December 2nd that Ukraine would accept Polish territorial conditions. Preparations soon began to resist the Bolsheviks. On January 2nd 1920, the former POW encampment in Łańcut was reorganised as a meeting point for Ukrainian soldiers. Kamianets-Podilskyi was subsequently established as a second recruitment base. By the end of April, the Sixth Division was training in Brest under the command of Colonel Marko Bezruchko and  General Oleksandr Udovychenko had formed the Second Division. By the end of April, no more than 5,000 soldiers were ready to fight the Bolsheviks. At the same time, in Ukraine there were many uprisings against Soviet rule. General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, who commanded more than 10,000 men, was the most prominent Ukrainian officer at this time. He was also known for his great sense of loyalty to Petliura.

On April 21st 1920 Warsaw and Kyiv signed a secret border agreement in the spirit of the newly proclaimed right of self-determination. Poles acknowledged the Ukrainians’ right to establish their own state and recognised the Directorate as the government of an independent Ukraine. Poland also recognised the eastern, southern and northern borders of its neighbour. In return, the boundary at the Zbruch River was acknowledged. On April 24th both parties declared a military agreement to be an integral part of their treaty. The deal was signed by Livytsky and Jan Dąbski, who presented himself as the head of the Polish foreign office despite the fact that he was only the deputy minister.

The military convention was signed by Captain Wacław Jędrzejewicz and Major Walery Sławek, both close lieutenants of Piłsudski. On the Ukrainian side, General Volodymyr Sinkler and Lieutenant Colonel Maksym Didkovskyi signed the treaty. Generally, it could be argued that the Poles were the privileged party in this alliance. For example, it was the Polish text of the agreement that was deemed the international version. At the same time, the treaty’s signatories were not of equal standing in their countries. The Ukrainians were represented by high-ranking politicians and officers, but the Polish government selected lower-ranking officials. From a contemporary point of view, this does not appear to be in line with the concept of comitas gentium. This strengthened Petliura’s desire to treat matters of equality seriously. Overall, Polish attitudes appeared to somewhat disregard its ally, which was largely dependent on Warsaw’s support. 

The pact turned out to be a difficult agreement for both parties. Petliura found plenty of opponents. Nevertheless, the leader believed that there was little room for nuance in relations with Poland. The majority of MPs accepted Piłsudski’s foreign policy direction. Nevertheless, the Polish parliament never ratified the treaty.

Swift victory

The Second, Third and Sixth Polish Armies had begun preparations for the offensive against the Bolsheviks. The Third Polish Army was strengthened by the Ukrainian Sixth Infantry Division, which was led by Colonel Bezruchko. The Sixth Polish Army was assisted by General Udovychenko’s Second Ukrainian Division, who were now advancing along the Dniester. Piłsudski wanted to destroy Sergei Mezheninov’s Twelfth Soviet Army and push back Ieronim Uborevich’s Fourteenth. Despite the Red Army’s success against Anton Denikin, the Bolshevik forces in Ukraine could not hold on to their offensive. Soviet command was well aware that the Poles could easily reach as far as Smolensk and Gomel in the case of an immediate offensive. By the end of April, allied forces still outnumbered the Soviets on the Ukrainian front five to one.

The offensive commenced on April 25th 1920. The next day, the settlements of Berdychiv and Zhytomyr were captured. The entire Bolshevik front collapsed rather quickly. Three Ukrainian brigades fighting on the Soviet side surrendered as they did not wish to be part of the Soviet Fourteenth Army. On April 26th, both Piłsudski and Petliura issued declarations describing their military aims. The Polish leader proclaimed that the army would stay in Ukraine as long as it was necessary for Petliura to take control. He also addressed his country’s citizens, promising that Polish troops will withdraw after a successful war against the common enemy. On April 27th and 28th, the Bolsheviks suffered heavy losses. At the same time, the Soviet Politburo agreed plans for a further offensive towards Warsaw.

When the Polish command was informed that the Bolsheviks would not be supported on the frontlines, Warsaw’s forces prepared for a final assault on Kyiv. After days of regrouping, the offensive resumed on May 6th. According to Colonel Pavlo Shandruk: “On May 6th the Army of the UNR, following in the glory of its legendary Winter March and brilliant victories, entered the Mohyliv regions from the rear of the Bolsheviks under heavy fighting. During this fighting, the army completely annihilated the Fourteenth Soviet Army in the Rybnytsya-Rudnytsi regions.”

The Ukrainian Sixth Division was ordered to participate in the joint attack on the capital. Soviet forces surrendered the city without a decisive battle. On May 7th, the first detachments entered Kyiv and secured strategically important bridges. By the evening, the city was no longer in Bolshevik hands. Despite this, some fighting occurred on the left bank of the Dnieper the next day.

As a result of the Kyiv offensive, the Twelfth and Fourteenth Soviet Armies were left exhausted. The Polish command considered the operation a success from a military point of view. Despite this, Polish General Tadeusz Kutrzeba noted that for most of the fifteen-day campaign, the allied forces had been waiting for a Bolshevik attack. In other words, the Twelfth Army was not totally destroyed nor successfully pursued.

Changing tides

With the capital taken, the Poles tried to strengthen Petliura’s governance over Ukraine. On May 8th the Polish command issued orders stating that the Polish occupation should end as soon as possible. As a result, a proper Ukrainian army had to be established in order to ensure that Polish troops could withdraw within a few months. The Sixth Polish Army was meant to assist the Ukrainians in their march towards Odesa. On May 9th a military parade in Kyiv was organised and Bezruchko’s Division marched on Khreshchatyk, the main street of the city. Then, on May 14th, the Soviets made advances on the Belarusian front, which forced most of the Polish troops to move north. On May 27th Sixth Ukrainian Division was sent back to the line of the Markivka river. As Shandruk and his brigade were about to leave their posts, he noted that a delegation of local Jews from the city of Ozaryntsi bade him farewell, claiming that after the 1917 revolution the local area was never as peaceful as under Petliura’s regime. Unfortunately, this time was about to come to an end.

Early in June 1920, Soviet commander Semyon Budyonny gathered his forces in the region of Lypovets. He initiated his offensive in late May, but it was only after several attempts that he managed to break the defensive lines in Samhorodok. On June 6th, Berdychiv and Zhytomyr were recaptured by the Bolsheviks. A retreat began on June 10th as Ukrainian units moved to secure the rear of the Polish forces. The entire frontline from Kyiv to Dniester was retreating, but neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians were encircled. Nevertheless, on June 12th Kyiv was decisively reoccupied by the Soviets. Four days later the retreating forces returned to the same positions from where their offensive had begun on April 25th. According to Shandruk: “The situation was aggravated by desertions caused by our defeat. Yes, desertions were not on the same scale as the previous year because the people had already experienced the Bolshevik ‘paradise’, but nevertheless our ranks thinned.”

Still, in the beginning of August Petliura’s army had five infantry divisions and one cavalry unit. At the time of the Battle of Warsaw in August, Ukrainian forces were forced to resist the Soviets on the right flank in Galicia without assistance. Colonel Bezruchko was protecting the Zamość fortress in the hope that he could stop Budyonny’s offensive.

Bitter victory

After the Battle of Warsaw, the Ukrainian army in Galicia hoped to use this turning point to prepare for a counterattack. On September 24th General Zygmunt Zieliński addressed the commander of the Polish forces, making reference to the military convention and Poland’s obligation to equip three Ukrainian divisions. Up to that moment, Poland had managed to provide only half of the agreed resources. In terms of boots and arms only a quarter of what was needed had been delivered. In the end, Warsaw was unable to meet the expectations of its Ukrainian ally.

On September 21st, the Third Ukrainian Division reached the Zbruch River after four days of marching across 120 kilometres. General Udovychenko was still attempting to push back the Soviets in order to secure better negotiating conditions. The Ukrainians managed to take control of Podolia and reach the suburbs of Braclav. It was around this time that the joint Polish-Ukrainian cause ultimately came to an end. According to Shandruk: “We had to stop the fight for the liberation of our native land because the Poles had signed an armistice which included the entire front of our army. … It was quite clear to me that our struggle against the Bolsheviks, considering Red Moscow’s potential strength, had entered into a new stage of crisis”.

On October 12th a cease-fire was signed between Polish and the Soviet authorities. With the armistice concluded, Warsaw ended supplies to Petliura’s army. Poland acknowledged the “independence” of Belarus and Ukraine by recognising their Soviet-supported authorities. The Ukrainians considered this decision to be a great betrayal. The government did not decide to disarm allied units which now had to leave Poland to make their final stand. By November 21st, most of Petliura’s defeated forces crossed the Zbruch river and ended up in Polish-run internment camps. Shandruk was among the thousands of Ukrainian soldiers interned in these camps. Conditions were said to be horrific. Interventions by the Directorate’s representation in Warsaw managed to secure some changes to the situation in the camps. Finally, the Polish authorities offered jobs to many former soldiers who left internment. Shandruk also praised  the strength and will of the Ukrainian women who worked hard for little money: “Modest indeed, for example: an artistically embroidered tablecloth with 12 napkins, over which a woman had to work four to five weeks, including long nights with candlelight, fetched only five to six dollars in equivalent Polish currency”.

In May 1921 Piłsudski visited the Ukrainians in the internment camps and apologised for the political defeat. In 1922 Bolshevik representatives met interned soldiers in order to encourage them to return to Soviet Ukraine. According to Shandruk: “In our camp all the residents were assembled in the square and in reply to the delegates’ call for us to return to the homeland, there was deep silence, not one person came forward and this probably happened in all the camps.”

On January 27th 1923 the Polish parliament dissolved the internment camps. It was only in 1928 when Polish authorities started to properly take care of the Ukrainian soldiers. Disabled veterans of Petliura’s army were placed on a “nearly equal footing with Polish veterans and after going through examination by a qualifying commission, they were granted modest pensions”.  Shandruk was proud of his comrades:  “It can be stated generally that during the period to 1926, all our interned soldiers in Poland proved themselves to be of the best calibre in every respect. They kept their patriotic spirit, high morale, and military discipline, based, under existing circumstances, mainly on mutual confidence and respect”.

Is there any legacy?

Polish-Bolshevik negotiations, which took place in Minsk and later in Riga in late 1920 and early 1921, overall proved that there was a distinct lack of Polish solidarity with Ukraine. Poland ended its support for Petliura when he tried to sit at the negotiation table. The Bolsheviks were surprised that the Polish delegation even recognised the authority of Soviet-Ukrainian representatives. In the Treaty of Riga, Poland accepted Russian domination in Ukraine and in return received control of Eastern Galicia. Shockingly, it was Jan Dąbski, who had earlier signed the Treaty of Warsaw, who accepted the protocol terminating the right of asylum for Petliura and his troops.         

In general, Polish public opinion did not support or even understand the idea of Ukrainian statehood. There was not much interest in eastern affairs at the time. After the war, the idea of an independent Ukraine disappeared from Poland’s foreign policy goals. Only a small group of visionaries, like Józef Piłsudski and Leon Wasilewski, continued to believe in the importance of this question. Jerzy Stempowski, an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and son of a minister in Petliura’s Directorate, claimed that Poland betrayed the Ukrainians by signing the Treaty of Riga. Yet in the 1920s, Polish public opinion considered the Kyiv expedition to be a political disaster. Its importance was neglected and the first serious book focusing on the subject was only released in 1937. This book was written by General Kutrzeba, who claimed in its preface that the campaign was too important for Poland to erase from collective memory. 

Kutrzeba tried to explain and justify Poland’s decision. After a successful battle at the Niemen river in September 1920, most of the Polish army was deployed to Belarusian territory. They needed at least one month to be moved to Ukraine. Consequently, this meant that the Poles could have begun their offensive in the winter. Postponing military arrangements until the spring of 1921 would have been a disaster for a Polish state that required peace. Those several months could had been used by the Soviets to reorganise their forces.

Moreover, Vilnius, a strategic city for Poland, was under Lithuanian control by the fall of 1920. For these reasons, Kutrzeba claimed that the Ukrainians should not have considered the Treaty of Riga as a betrayal. This is because Poland continued to provide support to the Ukrainian People’s Republic as long as it realistically could. As soon as Poland’s fate was at stake, however, it decided to think of itself. Despite this, the general acted very naïvely in 1937, as he stated that in the end a Ukrainian state did in fact exist despite Petliura’s failure.

Was this explanation fair? It is impossible to say. However, it is true that Petliura remained in Poland until 1923. Marko Bezruchko and Pavlo Shandruk also stayed in the country for the next 20 years. Due to further conflicts and misunderstandings between Poland and Ukraine, the memory of this ambitious and short-lived alliance has become a marginal and largely forgotten example of co-operation between the two Slavic nations.

Grzegorz Szymborski is a postgraduate student at the College of Europe in Natolin (Poland), a graduate from the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw, author of the books: Wolność niejedno ma imię (2013) and Wyprawa Fryderyka Augusta I do Inflant w latach 1700-1701 w świetle wojny domowej na Litwie (2015).

history, Józef Piłsudski, Polish-Ukrainian relations, Symon Petlura