Religion as a powerful foreign policy tool

Sameba Tbilis, largest orthodox Cathedral in Caucasus region. Officially the Georgian Orthodox Church supports the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, but in reality it opposes this direction because it believes the West is responsible for spreading anti-church propaganda. Photo: Georgia_2011_343b (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

From 1921 to 1991 the country was part of the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, Georgia regained independence. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation continued its violent policies toward its small neighbour. When war broke out in Abkhazia, a breakaway region in northeast Georgia, Moscow backed the separatists and provided them with military and economic assistance. In 2008, Russia directly invaded Georgia. The main aim of its campaign was to prevent Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. As a consequence, the Russian Federation now occupies 20 per cent of Georgia’s internationally-recognised territories. The Kremlin continues the illegal process of borderisation as well as kidnapping Georgian citizens almost every week.

After the military campaign of 2008, Russia launched a full-scale hybrid war against Georgia. This concept consists of an integrated use of multiple political, military, technological and societal tools deployed in a synchronized manner. The most important aspects of hybrid war, beyond military attacks, include propaganda and disinformation, in which the spreading of fake news and religious superstition play a crucial role. Russia, throughout its history, actively used religion as a tool of influence in Georgia. The same is happening today. The Kremlin tries to demonstrate that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is a main historical ally of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), which has been shaping Georgian culture and society since the baptism of the country in 326 AD. Russia also tries to manipulate Georgian citizens with pseudo-conservative values. The principal aim is to stop Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and return Tbilisi to the Kremlin’s political orbit.

Early history

Russia first began paying attention to Georgia in the 16th century, when the latter was fighting for its independence from Ottomans and Persians. Due to the same confession (they both were Orthodox Christians), Russia was perceived as a beacon of hope for many Georgians, which could help them regain independence. At the end of the 18th century, the Ottomans and Persians were losing influence while Russia was strengthening its position in the South Caucasus. The king of eastern Georgia, Heraclius II, decided to invite Russia to the region. He signed the Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia in 1783. According to the treaty, Eastern Georgia became a protectorate of the Russian Empire which was responsible for defending its independence and territorial integrity. In exchange, Russia gained almost full control over the foreign affairs of eastern Georgia. Georgians did not fully realise the consequences of the signing of the Georgievsk Treaty. They thought that Russia was the best possible option for preserving independence and statehood because of their common faith. Unfortunately they were mistaken and in 1801 Russia annexed eastern Georgia to the empire.

In 1811 the Kremlin abolished autocephaly (religious independence) of the Georgian Orthodox Church. In the same year, the Georgian Orthodox Church was transformed into the Georgian Exarchate, which was under the direct control of the Holy Governing Synod of Russia. The Georgian Exarchate existed for more than a century. In March of 1917, the Georgian Orthodox Church benefited from the dismantling of the Tsarist regime and regained its autocephaly. Yet after the 1917 October Revolution, the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia and established the Soviet Union in 1922. Along with fourteen other states, Georgia compulsorily joined the USSR. The communists started taking actions to neutralise the church, and most churches were closed and thousands of clergymen, as part of Georgian intelligentsia, were murdered. During Soviet times, the Georgian Orthodox Church was the key driver for the independence movement. In 1977 Ilia II became Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia which is the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church. He managed to get recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, followed by the recognition of other Orthodox churches, including the Russian Orthodox Church. Despite this fact, the Russian church continued to behave like an “older brother”.

Kremlin’s religious narratives in Georgia

After the Cold War, Russia’s strategy towards the Georgian Orthodox Church changed. After restoring its significance in the 1990s, the Russian church became the main ally of the Russian government. The Kremlin now uses it as an extremely important soft power tool in both domestic and foreign affairs. In present day Russia, religion is a continuation of politics – the Russian Orthodox Church believes the country has superiority over other civilizations while Russian policies aim to strengthen its influence on neighbouring countries. The Russian Orthodox Church’s notion of a Russian/Slavic world (Russkiy Mir) supports the country’s leadership over other Orthodox churches. Consequently, one of the main strategies of Russian foreign policy is consolidating the Orthodox Christian world.

Georgia is no exception. Russia’s principal aim towards Georgia, as was mentioned already, is to reverse its Euro-Atlantic integration and return Tbilisi to the Kremlin’s political orbit. To achieve this strategic goal, Moscow actively uses various methods, including the spread of disinformation and creating non-existent myths, in order to convince Georgian citizens that Russia is the best possible choice for ensuring the country’s future security and prosperity. Taking into account that around 84 per cent of Georgians consider themselves Orthodox Christians, they are vulnerable to Russia’s propagandist machine.

The main religious narrative of the Kremlin in Georgia is that Russia is the last bastion of Christianity and conservative values in the world. The Kremlin actively resists the ongoing process of globalisation, claiming it erodes national borders. Furthermore, the main narrative of anti-globalism is that globalisation promotes sole sovereignty, and consequently diminishes nation-states as principal actors of the international system. According to Moscow, the driving force behind globalisation is the West, which tries to undermine the traditional, conservative social order. That is why the Kremlin cordially opposes LGBTQ+ rights, as well as abortion rights.

This means the majority of Georgia’s citizens, who are Orthodox Christians, share the more traditional, conservative views than liberal ones. In this way, the Kremlin can flare up anti-liberal sentiments in Georgia and use the Georgian Orthodox Church to create anti-West public opinion. Officially the Georgian Orthodox Church supports the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, but in reality it opposes this direction because it believes the West is responsible for spreading anti-church propaganda.

Russia has also tried to get involved in the domestic affairs of the Georgian Orthodox Church. One of the clearest examples has been the Russian Orthodox Church’s appointment of a special “representative” in Georgia, Vladimir Aleksandrov. Officially, his main mission is to deepen co-operation between the two churches. In reality though, Aleksandrov is considered as the “eyes and ears” of the incumbent patriarch of Russia, Kirill. He is responsible for gathering “valuable” information and strengthening the pro-Russian faction in the Holy Synod of Georgia.

Presently, the Kremlin appears satisfied with the Georgian Orthodox Church since it preserves the so-called “historical friendship” with the Russian church and helps undermine Georgia’s western integration. Yet the incumbent Patriarch of Georgia, Ilia II, is 87 years old. That is why the Kremlin is actively trying to support the candidature of a new patriarch who will continue these “friendly” relations towards the Russian Orthodox Church. It is interesting to see that the incumbent regent, Shio Mujiri, who will take the position as the new patriarch after the death of Ilia II, was the special “representative” of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Russia. He graduated from Saint Tixon’s Orthodox University in Moscow. His connections with the Russian Orthodox Church are therefore quite significant.

The Kremlin has also tried to use the Georgian Orthodox Church to create disorder and chaos within Georgian society during the COVID-19 pandemic. Before Easter 2020, the main advice of the Georgian government was for people to stay at home, and not to go to church. However the Georgian Orthodox Church tried to convince believers that going to church would not jeopardise their lives. The heads of the Holy Synod of Georgia blamed the government for “trying to destroy the faith”. Apparently there was Russian meddling, and it is well known that the Kremlin’s disinformation aims to undermine the Georgian state and governmental structures.

Independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church

One of the clearest examples to show how strong the Kremlin’s influence is on the Georgian Orthodox Church relates to the recent independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). The latter separated from the Russian Orthodox Church and gained autocephaly on January 5th 2019. The UOC received recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople followed by other Orthodox churches, including the Patriarchate of Alexandria and the Greek Orthodox Church. The separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was a disaster not only for the Russian Orthodox Church, but also for the Kremlin. The Russian Church increased pressure on other Orthodox Churches, hoping they would not recognise the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church.

One principal direction of the so-called “non-recognition” policy was Georgia. The Kremlin needed to avoid undesirable complications and therefore used its main leverage on the Georgian Church by manipulating the status of Orthodox Churches in the occupied territories of Georgia. Unlike the Russian government, the Russian Orthodox Church has not recognised the independence of the Abkhazian Church. Today, the Russian Orthodox Church considers the latter an inseparable part of the Georgian Orthodox Church. However, it has warned the Georgian Patriarchate that if the Georgian Church recognises the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, it would recognise the autocephaly of the Abkhazian Church as a retaliatory action.

The above illustrates how Russia has used religion as a key policy tool against Georgia throughout history. Religious factors have become exceptionally impactful since the tenure of the incumbent president, Vladimir Putin. Moscow continues to gain political influence by manipulating the emotions of Georgian citizens and by spreading fake news and disinformation to showcase the Russian Federation as the only protector of faith across the Orthodox world. Moscow creates disorder and chaos by both enhancing the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church and undermining the Georgian government and its institutions. Unfortunately, Russia’s hybrid war, including its religious influence, remains a very serious challenge for the Georgian state and its declared priority, namely, becoming a member of the European Union and NATO.

Giorgi Jokhadze is a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Council, a think tank based in Tbilisi.

Georgia, hybrid war, Orthodox Church, Russia