Great power competition returns to Central Asia

U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo meets with Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi in February 2020. Photo US State Department (CC) https://www.flickr.com/photos/statephotos/49475879388/in/album-72157712901160913/

The United States seeks to bolster its presence in the region, which is dominated by the Russia and China geopolitical duopoly. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia’s influence in Central Asia somewhat weakened, Moscow remains an important security and political player in the region, and still retains significant cultural clout. Russia also hosts large numbers of Central Asian migrant workers who provide much needed financial assistance for their families at home and the status of these diaspora can potentially become a political bargaining chip between Moscow and Central Asian states. Due to geographic proximity, Moscow sees Central Asia as a buffer of instability coming from the Middle East and Afghanistan. Yet despite the fact that several Central Asian nations are members of the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Russian economic weight in the region is weaning at the expense of China, whose posture in Central Asia is growing.

Strategic co-operation and balancing

Beijing’s rising economic clout in the region is tied to its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative which is largely unfolding in Central Asia. Massive Chinese investments in the region are accompanied by Beijing’s cultural offensive which aims to promote Chinese culture and build people-to-people contacts between Central Asian nations and China. However Beijing’s rising economic weight in the region has caused rapid deterioration of social attitudes towards China among Central Asian nations, which often results in mass protests. As a rule, Central Asian elites, which benefit from the Chinese model investment based on corrupt practices, have more favourable views of co-operation with China than the local citizens.

There is also a lingering danger that Central Asian states become overwhelmed and economically dependent on their powerful neighbour. The case of Turkmenistan can serve as a cautionary tale. In the last few years, energy-rich but landlocked Turkmenistan became dependent on China as its biggest gas client and its gas revenue has been limited by the debt it owes to China for the construction of the Central Asia-China pipeline and development of the Galkynysh gas field.

At first glance, the geopolitical configuration between China and Russia in Central Asia might lead to a fierce rivalry. However, Moscow prioritises its strategic partnership with Beijing and avoids overt competition with China because the latter is becoming increasingly important for Russia as a counterweight to the West. Also, there is a visible power asymmetry between Russia and China, particularly in terms of the economy. Moscow is unlikely to succeed in challenging Beijing’s position in the region, but could benefit from partnership with China. The power dynamics between Russia and China in Central Asia are based on separate spheres of influence – Moscow dominates in terms of politics and military, while China is responsible for economic and infrastructural development. Chinese and Russian interests in the region overlap and their strategic co-operation is aimed at containing western (mainly US) encroachment. This might change over time though, as there are numerous predictions that regional competition between Russia and China will increase in security and energy. But for the time being, Sino-Russian duopoly is focused on minimising western influence in the region and the latest signs that the US wants to strengthen its presence have unnerved both Beijing and Moscow.

The US took a serious interest in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and ascribed much geopolitical importance to the region which is located in the close neighbourhood of America’s great rivals – Russia and China. American interest has grown stronger with the start of US- and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, when Central Asian states provided their territory for military use and logistical arrangements as part of the Northern Distribution Network to and from landlocked Afghanistan. Since the US has started to reduce its presence in Afghanistan, the significance of these ties has also waned.

However Washington has not altogether lost its interest in this strategically important region. In 2015 the US established the C5+1 format, which is a vehicle for dialogue and co-operation between five Central Asian states, and it aims to foster co-operation on a number of issues, including security, facilitating trade and improving the business climate, and addressing environmental challenges. Lately Central Asia was put in the spotlight again after the US signed a landmark peace agreement in February with the Taliban after 19 years of conflict. The agreement lays the groundwork for withdrawing the remaining US and other NATO troops from Afghanistan.

Transitions as opportunities?

The official reason for Pompeo’s visit to Central Asia in February was to reaffirm the US strategic partnership with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and to discuss trade and investment opportunities. The US also looks forward to positive results of economic and political reforms which have been undertaken in both countries, and to pave the way for more US investment there. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are energy-rich countries which seek to bolster their economy with foreign investment.

Both countries are also currently undergoing a political transition. After the death of long-time president Islam Karimov in 2016, Uzbekistan has been implementing political and economic reforms to end the Karimov-era isolationism. Kazakhstan underwent political transition last year when Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down and his successor promised to conduct much needed reforms. Apart from that, proximity to troubled Afghanistan makes Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan important security partners for Washington, as both are vital parts of the US Northern Distribution Network and their governments are engaged in fighting terrorism. What is more, Tashkent is playing an increasingly important role in the peace process and stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan.

During his brief visit in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Pompeo held several high-profile meetings. In Kazakhstan, Pompeo met with the new president, Qasym-Jomart Toqaev, Nazarbayev and Mukhtar Tleuberdi, the foreign minister. In Uzbekistan Pompeo met with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov. During his visit in Tashkent, Pompeo also participated in the C5+1 meeting with foreign ministers representing five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

At first glance, Chinese influence in the region was the most consistent topic during this trip, as the US Secretary of State called his hosts to eschew co-operation with Beijing. The anti-Chinese angle was particularly pronounced in Pompeo’s speech during the joint conference with Kazakhstan’s minister of foreign affairs, where he explicitly warned against close co-operation with China and straightforwardly praised benefits of partnering with US companies rather than Chinese ones. During the same event he also criticised China’s crackdown on Muslim minority groups. This problem was even more highlighted during Pompeo’s meeting with ethnic Kazakhs living in China, who are campaigning to bring attention to government-sponsored crackdown on Muslims in China’s Xinjiang region.

In its effort to counterweight China in the region, the US focuses on two countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – which are predicted to offer promising political and economic outcomes. Trump’s administration has already made overtures to Nur-Sultan and Tashkent. In 2018 Nazarbayev and Mirziyoyev made rare visits to the White House. Additionally, to date there have been several promising high-level meetings within the C5+1 format. Washington is looking for more progress in Uzbekistan, in terms of the rule of law and improving the business climate to create more opportunities for US companies to engage in the country. Nevertheless, despite undertaking bold market-oriented reforms, which aim to liberalise Uzbekistan’s economy, the country’s human rights record remains disappointing.

New old strategy

Pompeo’s trip to Central Asia was a prelude to unveiling the US’s Strategy for Central Asia. The updated strategy is based on the six core policy objectives which include supporting the independence and sovereignty of the Central Asian states, counter-terrorism measures, ensuring regional support for peace and stability in Afghanistan as well as developing connectivity between Central Asia and Afghanistan, and promoting political and market reforms in the region to facilitate US investment.

The action plan for 2019-2025 emphasises continuity in the US approach while acknowledging that the political and economic environment in Central Asia has changed, which prompts Washington to engage more in the region beyond traditional security interests. Pompeo’s trip to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan shows that the US does not intend to shy away from stepping into competition with big powers in the region and wants to counterweight Chinese and Russian influence. The official visit to Kazakhstan was a clear effort to exploit anti-Chinese sentiments which have been present for many years among large swathes of Kazakh society. In the past year, anti-Chinese attitudes in Kazakhstan have grown rapidly and turned into mass protests fuelled by the plight of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang and China’s exploitative business model employed in the country. Kazakhstan is currently in a vulnerable period caused by crucial political transition in the presidential seat and general socioeconomic unrest, but authorities seem largely to ignore the public sentiments and opt for even closer economic co-operation with China. The Kazakh government must have agreed to a specific agenda with the US Secretary of State’s visit, but carefully avoided any anti-Beijing statements and did not publicly respond to Pompeo’s call for US partners to unite in order to end repressions in Xinjiang.

Uzbekistan poses an even bigger challenge for US diplomacy in the region because the country is being pressured by Moscow to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and possibly renew its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which Washington vehemently opposes. Debate about Uzbekistan membership in the EEU comes at a time when Russia is eager to speed up integration in the post-Soviet space under its own auspices and exerts not so subtle pressure on Uzbekistan and other post-Soviet countries to join Moscow-led integrative blocs. Uzbekistan has been in talks with Moscow about joining the EEU, but remains hesitant for several reasons. Taskhent wants to preserve economic and trade independence and to avoid pitfalls associated with membership of the EEU. The recent example of Belarus, which is relentlessly pressured by Moscow for deeper integration, serves as a warning to Tashkent about the possible implications of joining Moscow-dominated integrative organisations. In January, Mirziyoyev, for the first time, addressed possible Uzbekistan’s co-operation with the EEU and said that his country opts not for the full-fledged membership but rather having an observer status. Having said all that, Pompeo’s visit to Uzbekistan could not be more timely as Tashkent can use its partnership with the US as a geopolitical counterweight to Moscow and an opportunity to diversify its foreign investment portfolio away from Russia and China.

Geopolitical counterweight

The Russian-Chinese duopoly retains strong clout in Central Asia, but western overtures to the Central Asian nations are still worrisome to Beijing and Moscow, which treat the region as their own backyard. Even though the US is unlikely to replace Russian or Chinese influence in Central Asia, Washington can offer a geopolitical counterweight and expand its ties with the region, where a western presence is limited.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are unlikely to join the US in openly challenging China, but would use relations with the country as a foreign policy and economic alternative, which would allow them to withstand pressure coming from China and Russia. However, US inroads into Central Asia can spark geopolitical competition between the big powers which the Central Asian political elites want to avoid in fear of becoming pawns in the “new Great Game” and being dominated by more powerful external actors. At the same time, US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan poses a security challenge for Central Asian states and raises fears about growing unrest in Afghanistan which could spill into the region. Washington will have to work closely with Central Asian partners to minimise any security risks.

Natalia Konarzewska is a graduate of the University of Warsaw and is a freelance expert and analyst with a focus on political and economic developments in the post-Soviet space.

Central Asia, China, Great power competition, Russia, United States