Borderisation. The Kremlin’s unending war

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

What does the FSB exactly have to do with this? After all, both separatist areas were recognised as independent states by Russia, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and a couple of other relatively unknown regimes; as if both have their own currencies, languages, army and special services. In other words, they appear independent.

Well, this is not exactly true. In reality Russia does not even fully recognise the independence of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. The Kremlin has several military bases in these regions, as well as dozens of armed “border” posts. Russian authorities have also signed contracts with local representatives so that the FSB can continue “ensuring security”. The Russian government even pays out pensions and prohibits the learning of any other language ​​than Russian. Moscow forbids the teaching of Georgian, which is spoken by a considerable proportion of the population in the occupied territories. 

No rights

Counting the number of human rights violations on the lines of occupation has lost its meaning, since local residents there have very little rights at all. One example of how the Kremlin has stripped people of their rights is the borderisation process.

Imagine for a moment that you have returned home after a long working day and go to bed. When you wake up in the morning, you find that part of your apartment now belongs to someone else. Overnight, in the middle of your house, robbers armed with machine guns have drawn a line and stretched barbed wire along it. This is how the FSB carries out borderisation. In short, this is theft of property. This example is not just some old story from a past war. It happened yesterday, it is happening today and it will happen tomorrow.

In August 2019, several families in the Georgian village of Gugutiantkari woke up to find that they had lost access to their land plots, where they were growing crops. For these local residents their crops are their only means of subsistence. This, however, does not stop Vladimir Putin and his subordinates from taking advantage of their neighbours.

The number of kidnapped Georgian citizens on the line of occupation by year

The illegal detention of people crossing the administrative line, which Moscow and Tskhinvali call “a border,” are described as “kidnappings” by the Georgian authorities. Since there is no border, either theoretically or practically (most of the line is not fenced off in any way), those who walk to a store, church or cemetery do so under constant fear of being arrested. After an arrest (in fact, abduction), families of the kidnapped are required to pay a fine for “crossing the state border”. In addition to the fact that there is no official state border, just a line of occupation, the problem is aggravated by the fact that FSB border guards constantly enter territories controlled by Tbilisi and kidnap locals in order to pressure Georgia. During 2018-2020, occupying forces kidnapped more than 250 Georgian citizens in order to demand a ransom from relatives.

Since 2011, there have been 155 cases of borderisation:

Creeping annexation

Kidnappings and borderisation have remained common tactics in Putin’s aggression against Georgia over the past 12 years. Since August 2019 the FSB has been carrying out continual “engineering” works in the Chorchana forest, deep in territory controlled by Tbilisi. The occupation line has moved 1.3 kilometres further into Georgian territory. At the time of writing, FSB engineering troops are digging Georgian soil in the country’s Karelian region. Along with misinformation and propaganda, especially in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Kremlin is using borderisation to pressure an already frightened society in order to, once again, demonstrate that Georgia and its partners cannot do anything against its aggressive policies. In practice, Putin is attacking small neighbouring countries as a means of maintaining the remnants of his influence. As of 2018, at least 34 Georgian villages were separated by fences built by Russian forces. Around 800-1000 families have also lost access to their land plots.

One might say: “Well, Putin’s Russia is an occupier. In 2008 Russia occupied 20 per cent of Georgian territory. For 12 years the Russians have been building a ‘border’ for themselves at the line where their army stopped. Occupiers obviously need to fix the border of their occupation”. Again, this is not the case. The Kremlin has shown “creativity” in this matter too. They are not building a “border” along the line that was occupied in 2008. They continue to move the line of occupation wherever they want.

After the 2008 war, Georgian authorities made the status of the occupied territories official within the framework of the so-called “South Ossetia Autonomous Region”. The law enforcement agencies of both Georgia and Russia have a map which clearly marks out this area. To one degree or another, this region is reflected on Google Maps.

Having gained a foothold in the occupied territories in 2008, Russian forces began to use this map of the region as proof that Georgia recognised the area as an occupied zone. But they did not begin to build a “border” along the entire line of occupation. On the contrary, signs that designate the “border” were placed far away from the actual line of occupation. This was done in order to gain tactical leverage over the Georgian government already pressured by the occupation, with the “border” moved whenever the Kremlin and FSB felt it was appropriate.

Such movements have occurred on numerous occassions, especially during important events in Georgia such as NATO exercises, visits by senior American officials and elections. On every such occasion the Kremlin has moved and built a “border” within the occupied territories “map” in order to intimidate local residents and cause panic in Tbilisi.

Later, the Kremlin and their separatist supporters in Tskhinvali began to move the so-called borders even deeper into territory controlled by the Georgian government. This process is called “creeping annexation”. As a result, there is now even more pressure being placed on Georgia before the upcoming elections, as the country suffers not only from the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns and its ongoing support for pro-Russian politicians and media, but also from physical reduction of Georgian territories when Moscow needs it.

Again imagine for a moment that you are at home, where robbers armed with machine guns have taken half of your house and divided it with barbed wire. It is your birthday, your family has gathered together and everybody is in a good mood. You try your best not to notice the guns and barbed wire in order to not to spoil the celebration. Suddenly, the robbers decide to move the barbed wire exactly when you decide to blow out the candles on the cake. On the other side of the barbed wire, you now also see that the robbers have taken over your kitchen. All the dishes for your birthday are there and your aunt now finds herself trapped on the other side. Can you imagine how you might feel in such a situation? Multiply this feeling by a thousand and you will understand how Georgians feel every day.

Confuse and divide

In the summer of 2019, when some European countries once again decided to be friendlier with the Kremlin, Putin’s Russia “unexpectedly” began to actively “make friends” with their neighbours. This resulted in an “exchange of prisoners with Ukraine”, as well as Kremlin disinformation campaigns in Georgia. These campaigns tried to convince Georgians that the enemy and occupier is not Russia, but other countries. Instead of themselves, the Kremlin labelled Turkey and Azerbaijan as the enemies of Georgia, using old territorial disputes as part of their disinformation campaigns.

In September 2019, the foreign ministers of Georgia and Russia met during the United Nations General Assembly. This was the first such meeting in 11 years. Little occurred during this meeting, but the headlines worked in the Kremlin’s favour: “Putin exchanged prisoners with Ukraine” and “the Russian and the Georgian foreign ministers meet for the first time since the 2008 war”. These events were welcomed especially by those who wish for greater “friendship” between the EU and the Kremlin.

It was during this period that Putin launched a new strategy for borderisation. In line with the ongoing occupation, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism format has been operating for many years. Georgia, the occupation regimes, Russia and international observers all participate in this structure. During one of these meetings in August 2019, the occupation regime informed participants that the territory of South Ossetia (occupied territory) should not be established according to the “map” of South Ossetia Autonomous District, but according to a map from 1922. This map depicts the famous Georgian resort of Borjomi, the ancient capital of Georgia Mtskheta, and other lands as belonging to South Ossetia. This map, which seems to have appeared out of nowhere, has nothing to do with reality. It did, however, have a very definite purpose. When the separatist regime declared its right to more territory, the Russian delegation, despite financially supporting the breakaway authorities, acted extremely “surprised” and opposed the position of the separatists.

How are we to make sense of this? The separatist chiefs, supported by the Kremlin, appeared to increase pressure on Georgia so that Russia could step in and act as the peacemaker in a situation for which it was responsible. This action was seemingly meant to strengthen the idea that “the enemy is not Russia and Putin”.

Who is the audience for this show? Clearly, the Europeans who participate in the negotiations and write the reports after the meetings noted Russia acting as a peacemaker. It is like killing Ukrainians and Georgians and then speaking on television about “protecting the Russian world from Nazis”. However, this strategy does seem to work.  

Political intervention

In the winter of 2019 the Russian foreign ministry and representatives of the State Duma “supported” the release of the well-known Georgian doctor, Vazha Gaprindashvili. Tskhinvali’s KGB illegally kidnapped the doctor from a village and subsequently imprisoned him. The region’s KGB is led by an FSB officer. Despite this, Russian authorities pretended that they had nothing to do with the arrest and “demanded” that Tskhinvali release the doctor. There have been many similar cases like this since August 2019.

At the same time, these actions have allowed the Russian government to resolve a number of issues. First, as aforementioned, they help to convince European mediators that the Kremlin has a peaceful stance towards Georgia. This is often reflected in the mediators’ reports. Second, the Kremlin aims to “prove” to Georgian citizens, who are often susceptible to Russian propaganda, that the “Ossetians” are to blame and the “Russians are trying to help”. Third, such events effectively allow more pressure to be placed on the Georgian government, with Ossetia acting as the Kremlin’s “bad cop” by seizing even more land.

As a result of these actions, the Kremlin continues to successfully intervene in all of Georgia’s political processes, especially elections. In October this year Georgia is scheduled to have one of its most important parliamentary elections in the last decade. Russia is already taking active steps to ensure that a fairly large number of seats go to openly pro-Russian political candidates. Considering this, it is clear that we should expect an increase in the number of Kremlin provocations against Georgia in the months prior to the elections and thereafter.

Egor Kuroptev is the director of the Free Russia Foundation in South Caucasus.

borderization, Georgia, hybrid war, Russia