The challenge of reintegration

OSCE SMM monitoring the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine in 2015. Photo (CC) Commons.wikimedia.org

Yet already before the elections, the term “reintegration” was being discussed even more controversially than the unexpected election of the political newbie Zelenskyy itself. The mere word “reintegration” ignites mistrust and polarises the Ukrainian civil society. Initially, the term reintegration was conceived simply as the social, institutional and territorial integration of the non-government controlled areas (NGCA) into the Ukrainian state and society. Yet different scenarios regarding how this reintegration should take place lead to completely different outcomes regarding the future of the country.

Reintegration vs de-integration

Analysing these different variants in the Ukrainian public and political discourse, experts from the Ukrainian National Platform for Peace and Secure Reintegration developed the understanding of the so-called “secure reintegration”. Oleh Saakian from the platform says that the key element of this concept is security. In other words, any kind of reintegration policy and all forms of political dialogue can only be conducted in a safe environment, preventing substantial risks in the course of the process – neither for the citizens involved nor for the Ukrainian state as a whole. Saakian sees it as his platform’s success that Zelenskyy adopted the political concept of reintegration into his statements.

“Secure reintegration” takes elements from both of the two polarising understandings of reintegration in the Ukrainian discourse. On the one hand, Saakian identifies the discourse of “de-integration” primarily prevalent among the pro-Ukrainian patriotically-minded community. In the view of this group, the Ukrainian state is defending itself successfully – but cannot win this war. Thus, they argue that the non-government controlled areas should be separated from the rest of the country, a wall built around them and the issue of regaining these territories postponed indefinitely. According to a survey by the Razumkov centre from the end of February 2020 around 20 per cent of the Ukrainian society supported this course of action, which problematically entails that control over the territories can be regained only militarily.

According to Saakian this radical position is based on a dichotomous understanding of war. Adherents of this position think merely in two categories: in terms of a complete victory or a complete defeat. The inevitable consequences of such an approach, however, seem not very well thought out. The economic blockade in the east of the country, which has resulted from this position, has led to the loss of economic control over the territories, and by this to the loss of one of the very few opportunities to influence the political and economic developments in those areas.

Moreover, the hostile rhetoric of this group against the inhabitants of the “people’s republics” and lumping them together with “separatists” contributed to the alienation of the people living there. Yet recent research illustrates that the simplified stereotypical view that only separatists have remained in the so-called DNR and LNR is twisted. The reality, identities, and political affiliations in these regions remain complex and in constant flux. A study by the Berlin-based research institute Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) revealed in 2019 that around 13 per cent of the people remaining in these territories still identify as Ukrainian citizens mainly. Around one-fourth sees themselves as either only “ethnic Russians” (12 per cent) or as residents of the self-proclaimed Donetsk or Luhansk People’s Republics (12 per cent). Moreover, a bit more than half of the survey participants still living in these regions indicated a preference that their region should be part of the Ukrainian state – be it either in the form of a special status (31 per cent) or even under pre-war conditions (24 per cent).

The second discourse, which, according to Saakian, is dangerous for the societal cohesion and stability of the Ukrainian state, is often built around the obfuscating term “peace” and is pushed by pro-Russian groups in Ukraine and political stakeholders directly controlled by the Kremlin. Their understanding of reintegration seeks to undermine the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. This position envisages reintegration without the precondition of restoring Ukrainian control over the non-governmentally controlled territory – in plain language reintegration without de-occupation.Thus, to find a comprehensive definition that avoids existential risks triggered by these positions for both citizens and the Ukrainian state as a whole, while considering the fragile environment in which people live on both sides of the contact line, the platform developed the concept of “secure reintegration”.

Security first

A secure reintegration policy should include two dimensions: a process of de-occupation and a strengthening of national cohesion. Every political step that emphasises one of these dimensions at the expense of the other jeopardises the security of those involved and thus the foundations for a sustainable political dialogue. Only if both a process of de-occupation together with the strengthening of the social and political cohesion in Ukraine have positive cumulative results, a space for the Ukrainian government to take political action opens up. Such cohesion presupposes a common vision inside the Ukrainian society about the borders of their state – despite the natural, democratic prevalence of social and political cleavages between different interest groups in the society.

This definition of reintegration should not detract from the claim that the integration of people should come first, instead of sticking to a schematic understanding which focuses only on regaining the territories. Therefore, enhancing an honest and open dialogue with the aim of mutual understanding between people living across the contact line is essential, however bound by the conditions that everyone feels safe to do so.

“In any kind of peace process, particularly under the conditions of ongoing Russian aggression, we need to have basic security ensured as a first priority”, says Denys Bihunov, a Sloviansk-based representative of the NGO “Strong Communities”. Sloviansk is a city of around 110,000 people located approximately 70 kilometres away from the contact line in the Donetsk region. Bihunov works closely with local authorities and civil society to research the socio-economic and demographic situation in frontline cities. Based on the findings, he develops joint action plans and political recommendations to local, regional and central authorities with his NGO.

However, Bihunov does not see any chance that these necessary conditions for a secure reintegration could be provided anytime soon: “The Russian Federation continues the occupation of a part of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and its armed mercenary groups continue active combat operations.” According to him, the shelling and offensive operations by the Russian proxies first need to stop, and artillery has to be withdrawn as agreed in the Minsk agreements.

Thus, elections cannot be organised without the complete withdrawal of military units as stated in the Minsk agreements and the restoration of Ukrainian control over the eastern border. According to Bihunov, political dialogue with the inhabitants of the so-called republics would not be possible under the conditions of an ongoing Ukrainian-Russian war, and as long as the “military dictatorships in Luhansk and Donetsk” prevail. It would put the people at risk who are involved and discredit the instrument of dialogue itself.

Civil society snubbed

Despite all the criticism from many corners of the Ukrainian civil society and by both Ukrainian and EU political analysts, the Razumkov Centre named the preservation of the European and Euro-Atlantic course by Ukraine as the key political achievement by the new government for the year 2019. Zelenskyy stayed committed to co-operation with the EU within the Association Agreement and continued the NATO-Ukraine Commission’s work.

Yet, Berlin-based Ukraine expert Wilfried Jilge, an associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), notes that the efforts of the Ukrainian foreign ministry and presidential cabinet to formulate the state’s diplomatic strategy towards the conflict do not seem transparent enough to Ukraine’s European and transatlantic partners, nor does the Ukrainian diplomatic strategy in general. Thus, attempts by the Ukrainian leadership to negotiate bilaterally with Russia caused concerns not only among foreign policy analysts, but also among Ukraine’s political allies in Europe who firmly support the push for sanctions against the Russian politicians and businessmen until they scotch the Kremlin’s involvement in East Ukraine.

Saakian goes as far to say that despite the adoption of the concept of reintegration in speeches, the presidential administration seems to lack a political strategy on how to mainstream this concept throughout governmental institutions. Jilge, meanwhile, says that the Ukrainian presidential administration seems fairly active behind the scenes and committed to a “secure reintegration”. He highlights, however, that Zelenskyy’s team fails to consult representatives of Ukrainian civil society into their policy planning processes.

Particularly regarding high-level negotiations on the Donbas conflict, the presidential administration did not communicate a clear strategy with civil society representatives, criticises Alena Lunova, an advocacy manager at the Ukrainian human rights NGO “Zmina”. Lunova focuses on the protection of human rights of people living in the conflict region. Civil society representatives like Lunova struggle to find the relevant points of contact in Zelenskyy’s cabinet, who are in charge of decisive policies on the Donbas regions. These activists demand way more involvement in political decision-making processes of the current government. This would be relevant in order to reduce the substantial risks accompanying even well-meaning initiatives by the government.

Although it is crucial to establish more dialogue initiatives for people from both sides of the contact line to enable a “secure reintegration”, movement across the contact line and thereby people-to-people contacts persist. These contacts did not even stop during the most intense periods of fighting. According to statistics provided by UNHCR and the Ukrainian NGO Right to Protection (R2P), in the month of January 2020 alone more than one million people were crossing the contact line regularly. The same source illustrates that six per cent of the respondents living permanently on the non-government controlled territory indicate that the main reason to cross the five exit/entry points is to see their relatives and to check on their real estate. Other pressing issues are inheritance and issuance of documents to people living in these territories. More than 90 per cent of the residents of the “people’s republics” surveyed by the NGO R2P and UNHCR were older than 60. For this cohort, everything related from pensions and social payments to cash withdrawal were the strongest motivations to take the physically and psychologically strenuous journey.

Lawlessness

In terms of social rights particularly of pensioners living in the non-government controlled territories, the Ukrainian state can arguably do better. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission demands the Ukrainian state to regulate the payment of pensions by a special law. The law would be a crucial part of the Donbas reintegration policy. Cash payments, however, will not be introduced without safe and transparent cash delivery mechanisms. In general, the communication between residents across the contact line of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions remains at the level of individual and family contacts. Any expression of a political opinion not in line with the de-facto authorities can lead to severe punishment. “People who live under occupation are very afraid – they are afraid to speak, afraid to openly express their thoughts, feelings and pain,” says Natalya Bondarenko, who is head of the Sloviansk-based foundation for support of elderly people called “the age of happiness”.

She considers the people living in these regions as Ukrainian citizens no less than anywhere else in the country – yet stuck in a system of lawlessness. “They live in a system in which armed people arbitrarily decide about fundamental rights and freedoms.” And the longer the war continues, “the further away people will get from each other”, Bondarenko says. She puts all her trust and hope in the younger generation, in “young people who study at Ukrainian universities and get the opportunity to travel to Europe, who communicate on equal terms with each other, regardless on which side they live.” These people could bring their experience back to their families, Bondarenko argues.

But this generation is exposed to the closed propaganda environment like everyone else living in NGCA. As research commissioned by the Berlin-based NGO DRA in 2019 illustrates the younger generation seems deeply anxious about its future and to reach out for contact to the other side. To counter such stereotypical mistrust among people on both sides, Bihunov suggests that the regional authorities in the government-controlled parts of Ukraine should increase their outreach efforts and launch accessible hotlines and other informational campaigns targeting residents beyond the contact line. The people in non-government controlled areas should be informed about plans and programmes that the government creates concerning social protection of internally displaced people and citizens of Ukraine still living in the region.

“Citizens of Ukraine in the occupied territory should see that Ukraine and the region of Donetsk have not forgotten about their existence,” Bihunov says. Everything else would be just lofty promises.

Tim Bohse is a Berlin-based political scientist focusing on Poland, Ukraine and Russia. He is a project manager at DRA, heading a programme on civic monitoring in eastern Ukraine and support for civil society on the government-controlled territory.   

Igor Mitchnik is the head of the office at Drukarnia-Civil Society Centre Sloviansk in the Donetsk Region of Ukraine. Prior to joining this project in 2019, he worked as a Mercator Fellow on International Affairs at People in Need in their field office in Sloviansk.

Donbas, re-integration, Ukraine, War