A crisis in Georgia’s politics

Photo: Seif Sallam (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

As of writing (beginning of March 2020), both the Georgian opposition and the government have agreed on the long disputed issue of the electoral system, providing some hope for the stabilisation of the political situation in the country. However, it does not change the fact that the closer we get to the October elections, the easier it might be for a provocation or economic crisis to cause an escalation of tension.

Broken promise, long awaited agreement

The main issue over which the political opposition (and civil society) and the authorities were in open conflict until March was the plan to change the electoral system. Last summer, when mass protests erupted in Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and chairman of the Georgian Dream party, promised that the 2020 elections would not be run based on the existing mixed electoral system (where half of the mandates are filled with a winner-takes-all system), but on a fully proportional model. Georgian society was taken aback by this decision, but it was accepted by the opposition. However just a few months later (in November 2019) the Georgian Dream backed off from its earlier declarations, abandoning the constitutional changes that were discussed in parliament.

Since then both sides have showed no desire to compromise. And even after a few rounds of negotiations, which were moderated by the European Union and the United States and have been taking place since December, they have brought no tangible results. When one party was presenting its ideas, they were automatically refuted by the other side. This was true both with regards to the idea to introduce the “German model” (which was proposed by the opposition) and to decrease the number of single-member districts from 73 to 50 (which was proposed by the government). Moreover, the talks were even suspended in early February after the Supreme Court decided to issue a warrant of arrest for Giorgi Ugulava, who is one of the leaders of the opposition party, Movement for Freedom – European Georgia, for 38 months. Ugulava was arrested on charges of financial misspending and money laundering during Saakashvili’s time, when he was mayor of Tbilisi, however this case remains very controversial and opposition politicians think it was politically motivated.

Ultimately the negotiations have been restarted – albeit informally – after a few weeks due to growing pressure from the side of foreign actors, including the US and the EU. As it turned out, this time the disputing parties managed to reach a consensus. Basing on the presented memorandum of understanding, it seems that the October elections will be held based on the mixed electoral system, however the number of single-member constituencies is to be reduced from 73 to 30 only and the electoral threshold is to decrease to one per cent. The sole condition in that regard is, however, that the changes still have to be accepted by the Georgian Dream-controlled parliament, being included into the constitution.

United opposition

Surely the agreement could have been reached easier, if the price was not the outcome of the parliamentary elections. The truth is that it was thanks to the current election system that the Georgian Dream managed to have a constitutional majority (75 per cent of the mandates) in 2016, even though it only received 48.68 per cent of the national vote. If the proportional system had been in place in 2016, Ivanishvili’s victory would have been much more modest. Similarly today, despite falling support of the Georgian Dream, the mixed system of dividing seats in parliament would still privilege that party, which would probably get a majority.

Putting the question of the election system aside, clearly the main strength of the current government is the weakness of the opposition. Even though it has been eight years since the Georgian Dream came to power, Georgians still cannot break the Saakashvili-Ivanishvili dichotomy. This is true even though the former refuses to take the highest offices in the country, while Saakashvili still lives in exile and is no longer an official representative of the United National Movement party, although – as he himself declares – he is planning to take an active part in the election campaign. Yet considering the negative attitude voters have towards these two politicians, it is not surprising that as many as 20 per cent of those surveyed by the National Democratic Institute declare that there is no party which they could regard as being “the closest to them”.

As a matter of fact, throughout the whole period since Saakashvili lost power, none of the new parties – whether the post-Saakashvili European Georgia or Mamuka Khazaradze’s movement Lelo – have been able to become the opposition’s leader. There is no doubt that a “third force” is what the political system needs. However for the moment no group that could play such a role is to be seen on the horizon. As a result, the only hope is that the opposition finds a way to unite itself, even if it still would be perceived as a Saakashvili-esque.

Shadows

Importantly, even if the Georgian Dream wins this year’s election, Georgians will most likely still protest against them. A scenario like this can be foreseen based on statistical data or the experience from last year’s “Gavrilov night” which took place in June 2019. At that time, anti-Russian demonstrations rapidly turned into anti-government protests, revealing a deep level of social dissatisfaction.

According to the National Democratic Institute, Georgia had never seen such a high level of pessimism since the Georgian Dream party came to power in 2012-2013 (and in general since 2009, when NDI started to provide us with their opinion polling data). In fact, the most recent data show that as many as 53 per cent believe the country is going in the wrong direction, while 24 per cent claim that nothing has changed. Only 19 per cent have a positive view of the dynamics of change in Georgia. Equally important, the level of dissatisfaction has visibly increased over the last 18 months and it is possible that it will continue to increase.

The main reason for the negative assessment is, however, the state of the domestic economy rather than the controversies related to the current government. Despite growing GDP, the Georgian currency, the lari, has weakened significantly against the US dollar and other foreign currencies, which has had a negative effect on businesses and households. The latter, for example, sees higher mortgage rates and over half of mortgages in Georgia are paid in US dollars. In addition, society is negatively affected by problems such as unemployment, low wages and low pensions. According to NDI data, as many as 88 per cent of Georgians have no savings and as many as 61 per cent consider themselves as unemployed.

In the face of political and economic uncertainty, Georgia has become a place that is particularly vulnerable to all kinds of provocations. Such activities are expected to come from the Russian Federation which has all kinds of instruments and can benefit from their application. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the weaker and more unstable Georgia is, the more distant is its already uncertain future in Euro-Atlantic structures.

Clearly the situation with the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the Georgian Tskhinvali region), which are under Moscow’s protection, is what impedes Georgia’s stabilisation the most. The tension between Georgia and the separatists have recently been on the rise, as evidenced by the closing down of some crossing points on the demarcation line. Such was the case of the crossing near Akhalgori, in the Tskhinvali region, which remains closed since September 2019.

In addition, there is also the issue of the “borderisation” policy, that is, the Russian practice of gradually changing the physical barriers around the Tskhinvali region (further into Georgian controlled territory) and consequently an increased militarisation of this territory. Not to mention the recent disappearances of Georgian citizens from the para-states. Just last year there were two well-known such cases: the arrest and imprisonment of a prominent Georgian doctor, Vazha Gaprindashvili, in South Ossetia and the mysterious death of 29-year old Irakli Kvaratskhelia in Abkhazia.

There are also the various provocative statements and activities undertaken by Russian politicians that are not necessarily aimed at the “frozen conflicts” on Georgia’s territory. Their potential was seen last year when Russia tried to take advantage of the mass protests that took place at the Georgian parliament last June. In reaction, Moscow instituted a ban on flights into Georgia and threatened to stop the import of Georgian wine. But there were also other, less obvious, activities aimed at instigating the already tense atmosphere: like when Vladimir Putin falsely accused Georgians of the genocide of the Ossetians, or when Sergei Gavrilov, the Russian politician who took the place of the speaker in the Georgian parliament was trying to argue that even though the chair he was sitting on was not comfortable, he would happily return to Georgia on a family pilgrimage.

Georgia’s future remains largely unknown. It is impossible to tell whether the Georgian Dream will retain power and if so, for how long. It may turn out that some unexpected circumstances – such as a downturn in global markets (especially now, due to coronavirus impact on the tourism and global trade) or some cynically-orchestrated provocation – will effectively set off the already growing social discontent. Should there be no crisis, then Ivanishvili will probably stay in power indefinitely. However the current political model, over the long term, remains at risk of being rejected. That said, it is quite clear that what is going on in Georgia should not stop being of interest to the West. Even, if the US and EU-brokered agreement on the electoral system has been reached.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Mateusz Kubiak is an energy analyst with Esperis Consulting and author of the blog Kaukaz Kaukaz.

elections, Georgia, politics, protest