20 years of NATO’s flagship Multinational Corps Northeast

Photo courtesy of Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast

Have the expeditionary missions and the supplementary role of the Corps in such missions moved further to the background.

Yes. What was referred to 20 years ago as being “unlikely”, has become the most probable and only scenario. Because of the intensity of the threat, we don’t consider other options than the regional ones. And we openly declare that we are not moving anywhere. This is because the three countries that make up the basis of the framework – Poland, Denmark and Germany – are all connected to the Baltic Sea region. Furthermore, the events that occurred over the last few years have contradicted the world order that stemmed from the collapse of the bipolar system. This is shocking. We’ve been having problems in understanding what is happening and in reacting quickly. NATO is a consensus driven organisation, which makes it operate slowly. Let’s be honest, Russia is a factor influencing the threat perception and this perception isn’t just a perspective from capitals 2,000 kilometres away, but also from those that are in Russia’s vicinity.

It is Russia’s right to have a capable military. What it does within its own borders is an matter of its own sovereignty. Nonetheless, if we analyse how they communicate their doctrine and operations within Europe, as well as on their borders, we notice that the security balance has tipped in favour of Russia. Another trend is a vigorous remilitarisation of how they view security. It is contradicting the processes which we discussed in the context of 1999, where NATO was reducing its headquarters, structures and units. Back then, there was a larger emphasis on the multi-national aspect, interoperability and modularity as a remedy to this downsizing. It is difficult to turn this trend around. We do however know what we have to do this, as weakness is encouragement for hostile action.

This means that we see two dominating processes in the international security environment. First, there is the assertiveness of Russia, and second is that NATO is forced to adjust itself to this assertiveness. What about other global processes that influence regional security?

We are so interconnected that a cough in one place could trigger an avalanche in another. The growing economic power of China is no longer a secret. For China, upholding such dynamics requires a policy of using all means available, including the use of force. The growth of power and increased influence generates potential conflict situations where two spheres of influence could overlap. We have seen this in the neighbourhood of China with the allies of the US, among them Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. A second issue is the political problems in Muslim countries, the Middle East and North Africa. Problems of migration from those areas and the recent activity of ISIS are also issues for Russia, Turkey, NATO member states and the European Union. Another less visible factor is the demographic situation in Africa where the population has fewer opportunities and where there are ties with the former colonial metropoles in Europe. We should also keep in mind that there is a strong confluence between internal and external issues. A federal China is still working to prevent an internal dissolution and Russia continues to use foreign policy in order to provide internal cohesion. These issues overlap and intertwine with almost no one free from their reach.

Do you agree with the understanding that this is the swan song of the unipolar moment in time?

This has been visible over the last few years. The question is rather if the United States is committed to maintaining its role. The US also has internal problems, such as migration from the south and social stratification. The US may therefore not remain eager in keeping its role in the system – a role that it created itself – but where it is no longer the sole influence and beneficiary. The domination that stems from globalisation at the same time fuelled and backfired at the US. It is a paradox that China has become more interested in upholding this system, as the rules have changed and as they have learnt to function within it. It is obvious that the economic and demographic base of China is incomparable with anything while its technological advances have started to surpass that of its competition. It is thanks to these competitors that they have reached these advances, encouraging investments and incorporating technological advances. It is within this system that they operate across the globe.

Where is Poland’s place on this chessboard? What are its strategic goals and what tools does it have to pursue them?

The way we read the constitution and some of the official strategic documents literally, our strategic goal is the existence of the state and the nation itself. And this actually remains the only goal. We don’t have broader ones. I have not heard that we had strategic regional goals, although it seems that they have been formulated on an ad hoc basis, and as a state we see ourselves rather as an element of broader strategies, either of NATO or the EU or bilaterally. If we say that our ultimate goal is to provide security for the Polish state and ensuring its development and prosperity, this is being somewhat fulfilled. Our dilemma today is if the decisions and courses of action we take correspond to the situation and changes in our environment. This is very uncertain. In this respect we would have to return to our discussion about the role and place of the US in the world, as well as our place in the EU and the role we would like to play in it, including as a regional leader.

What are the internal and external expectations?

If there aren’t any external expectations yet, they are surely probable to materialise. It is likely we would have to adjust, because such a role could be naturally expected of us. The question of how we understand these expectations remains. If we engage more, would it mean higher costs and investments that we would have to cover? If we decide on a small isolation it would be a kind of zone of self-indulgence that we could not necessarily afford. Another question is whether we are mature enough to fulfil this role. We need to be aware of our own ambitions, aspirations and our real capabilities compared with all partners and how far our reach is. This reach seems to be the Baltic and Central European region, with some countries of southern and eastern Europe as well. In other words, we return to the starting point from 300 or 400 years ago.

Doesn’t this forced role correspond with how Poland would want to view itself in this part of Europe? Does Poland have any strategic sovereignty in this respect?

I believe that everyone has strategic sovereignty in some area. One has to accept the consequences of decisions. But no one is sovereign in the pure meaning of the term. The strategic question is how much we want to take part in alliances such as the EU or NATO, and how much we would like to be separate. Both options have their price. Do we want to have a strategic partner who has the same interests as us in the region, with those interests not being permanent? This cannot be done with a decree, but it could turn out that it will just develop naturally because of military and economic potential or demographic and geographic factors. It would require the agreement of all international actors and of ourselves, with choosing the right resources to implement it. The unilateral declaration that “I will be the leader” means nothing, as there are concrete actions needed in order to become the leader. Furthermore, I believe that any of the arrangements we discussed above would lead to Poland having many responsibilities.

How is Russia a challenge for Poland’s national security and what tools could be used to threaten Poland’s safety?

I personally do not feel any direct fear when it comes to Russia’s day to day behaviour. It is rather the potential that Russia has, paired with a defined course of action that gives it a broad playing field. Yet, even a one per cent probability is still a probability. Russia is a large actor that could be motivated, internally or externally, to use one of the many tools in its arsenal. In 1999 we would have siad that something like that would be unlikely. Fifteen years later it turned out that it may be highly likely. It is clear that Russia has global ambitions, this is no secret. Territorially, Russia is the largest country in the world, and it wants to prove that it is a superpower which can broaden its influence. As Thomas Friedman put it: “Our capabilities motivate our intensions”. If we have the right capabilities we can reach our goals. In the case of Russia, the potential and course of action, together with Russia’s narrative and communication tools that it uses every day, makes it an unpredictable challenge.

The capabilities Russia possesses don’t necessarily mean it will be forced to use physical means against neighbouring countries. And there is no need to invade and occupy anyone. It is enough to carry out a cyberattack, a disinformation campaign, influence the political process, disrupt a sector of the economy or in an extreme situation “accidentally” detonate a warhead. What is more, Russia has the decision-making advantage. I believe that Russia’s leadership remains pragmatic and rational. But there is no way to be sure that these tools will not find their way to less responsible leaders. In Russia’s context this is a historical issue. History plays a significant role in this region. We are incapable of removing the issues from the past that obstruct dialogue. The absence of dialogue is always disadvantageous, because when we don’t talk we won’t resolve our differences.

I understand that you don’t notice any immediate existential threat to Poland. What about the Baltic states?

In my view the Baltic states are always under threat.

This is directly related to the security of Poland. We are connected to the Baltic countries by our NATO obligations which means that if we do not react to even small-scale actions against an ally, we automatically lose credibility with the Alliance.

This is an indirect problem. In the Baltic states, we have countries where 30 per cent of the population are Russian speakers still fighting for their identity. These societies are dealing with large emigration of youth. It is a significant problem stemming from historical memory. It is also a problem of geography. These countries are not large areas, something that makes them easily accessible. In this case the internal and external threats converge. There is clearly a large disproportion in the relations. On one side we have a nuclear power, and on the other side small societies organised in sovereign states with few tools to safeguard their sovereignty. That said, I still believe that we are not dealing with an excessive desire to use military might in this part of the world, yet…

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, responsibility for defence against hybrid threats was moved to the national level. How likely are these threats today in the Baltic states?

Some claim that we are already experiencing it. Hybrid threats, by their nature, are difficult to recognise. The wide range of instruments that make up hybrid threats aim at creating a crisis or shake up social cohesion. Non-kinetic activities are more likely than military action which would be used if the former are not successful. Thanks to the presence of NATO, the situation is not as obvious as it was five years ago. We are now dealing with an increased preparedness to react. Nevertheless, hybrid activities remain problematic because they exist in a situation where no military action is declared. Therefore, we cannot legally use armed force within the framework of the Alliance. Retaining cohesion is a challenge. Our regional nature and the fact that our Corps Headquarters is close to Vilnius, Tallinn and Stockholm is an advantage.

And also to Moscow…

And also to Moscow. No wonder therefore that Sweden has also changed its perception of reality, in its recent declarations and actions.

Returning to the Multinational Corps. It has gone through significant changes after the situation in Ukraine and since NATO adapted to the changed environment. What has been the character of these changes?

The Corps has always adapted to the requirements. For five years it was not even a NATO Corps. Later it was declared a unit of lower readiness that would have a supplementary role by sending soldiers to the mission in Afghanistan, after 2001. Soon, it had its preparedness raised and received a certificate of high readiness. Today, the Corps is the highest ranking NATO structure in this region of Europe. It is an unconventional corps, as it is an international military formation and simultaneously an element in NATO’s force structure. We face hybrid challenges on a daily basis and do not operate only during war time and crisis. In fact, we are the first who would response in NATO’s name in this region.

What is the structural relationship between the Corps and it’s two multinational divisions?

This relationship defines our experience and the direction NATO is heading. The region in which we find ourselves has two multinational division headquarters. There is a headquarters in Elbląg (responsible for forces in Poland and Lithuania) and another headquarters being created in Ādaži (responsible for Latvia and Estonia). Their dependence stems from the relationship in our command structure, which explains why we are above them. We give orders that are connected to commitments that have been delegated to us from the Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum. The relationship between the Corps and the two divisions is a kind of novelty – or rather a return to earlier norms and practices.

Is including Sweden and Finland in the work of the Corps’ headquarters only an element of strategic communication?

This issue is not only related to strategic communication, but rather it questions to what degree we can include Sweden and Finland in NATO structures in general. These two countries are independent states that are technically prepared to join NATO at any time, while at the same time they remain undecided politically.

Is this all a consequence of 2014?

Surely 2014 played a part, but there were a number of incidents that followed which somehow confirmed some earlier fears. The war in Donbas was a factor that changed the perception of the entire problem as it was a more aggressive move compared to Crimea – where there was a window of opportunity for Russia. In addition, there is increased Russian activity in the Baltic Sea, development of the Baltic Fleet, increased intensity of combat aircraft flights and military expansion in the Kaliningrad Oblast. These are factors that influence the perception of the threat in Sweden and Finland. Both these countries have increased defence co-operation, which is an exception in their history. They are being perceived as one in terms of defence.

A northern tandem?

Whatever happens, these two countries will remain within Russia’s reach. The countries therefore have a dilemma. Because joining NATO is mostly a political issue. Our common problem is that NATO rarely accepts partners who have a special status (the earlier Russia-NATO relations is another problem). We have soldiers from both Sweden and Finland in our Corps organisation. NATO already works together with Sweden and Finland in many of the exercises and the Swedish army is already present in the Baltic states. I think this is a process that we would want to continue in a low key fashion so there wouldn’t be too much tension. We need to keep in mind that many NATO members have bilateral relations with Sweden and Finland, which often have a defence element.

So it may be understood the way that Multinational Corps North East is the only unit that can coordinate the NATO Response Force in the region?

It is the only unit that is already present. The operations of the response force can be organised by other units that reach us. It all depends on the will of member states, who are ultimately responsible for keeping the various forces operational.

The downing of a Russian fighter jet on the Turkish border with Syria proved that tensions can arise in more than one place. Is one NATO Response Force enough?

We are all aware it could be too little. But we have to keep in mind that the purpose of the response force is to act in a crisis environment. Taking into consideration that the crisis situation could erupt in several places at once makes us aspire to raise readiness of all other forces as well. NATO is pushing the concept of having an increased number of squadrons, battalions and ships ready to be deployed regardless of how the response force acts.

What about the direction of the Corps itself?

We aim at retaining two of our capabilities. First, being a regional integrator as a land forces component, while coordinating with the navies, air forces and special forces in the region. At the same time, we have the challenging objective of being able to maintain our potential and capabilities of being a full-scale land force fighting Corps in time of conflict. And in this respect we are still a unique combined force entity and headquarters within NATO.

Translated by Daniel Gleichgewicht

Lieutenant General Sławomir Wojciechowski is the commanding General of Multinational Corps North East.

Jakub Bornio is an assistant professor with the Chair of European Studies at the University of Wrocław.

Multinational Corps, NATO, Poland, Russia, security