The West Berlins of our time

Photo courtesy of Brian Whitmore

What is it that we are going to talk with them about? Are we going to talk about Ukraine’s sovereignty? Because that is what Russia really wants to talk about. They won’t put it in those terms, of course, but that is exactly what they want to discuss – the limited and conditional sovereignty of Russia’s neighbours. This is something that the West does not have the ability to give, let alone the right to give.

Again, when voices in the West call for dialogue, what do they really want to talk about? We talked to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. We talked about preventing an accidental conflict from breaking out. We could talk to Russia about these issues and others, like like strategic arms control. But we should not even consider a conversation about whether or not Ukraine should be able to pursue its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. That is for Ukraine to decide. Russia has no part in that conversation.

So, I am very sceptical when I hear voices like Macron talk about how we should have a strategic dialogue with Russia. I think there is a tendency among the elite in the West, on both sides of the Atlantic, to see dialogue in and of itself as a virtue. I disagree with that. It depends on what you are talking about. If we were to have a dialogue about Russia respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty, leaving Donbas, returning Crimea to Ukraine, returning Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region to Georgia – then I support that dialogue. But I do not support a dialogue where we will talk about limiting the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbours. We have to understand that Russia wants things that the West cannot give. Therefore, such a dialogue is pointless.

Given that, why do you think there are voices in the West calling for dialogue?

Certainly there is pressure in some places in the West, on both sides of the Atlantic, to get back to business as usual with Russia. A lot of people were making a lot of money from this. The Kremlin is very aware of this fact. They managed to use finance and corruption to establish networks of influence – that is part of the picture. The other part is, as I said in the beginning, a certain level of naivety about the regime in Russia and what it wants. I think that the Russian regime in its current form and the West are incompatible and, as a result, we will be in conflict. What we should be focussing on in the West is how to contain this regime and how to contain the damage it is inflicting on western institutions and discourse.

How would you describe the mood in Washington right now? How does it view the current situation? There seems to be a lack of clarity on US policy towards Russia…

Among the security and foreign policy professionals in Washington there is a consensus that Russia is a threat and something that needs to be dealt with. The problem is in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the issue of Russia has become a partisan issue and we have to get out of that mindset. The threat coming from Russia needs to be seen as a national security issue. Being a hardliner on Russia is now seen as partisan. I hope we can move away from this. I hope what we are going through right now is the exception and not the new normal. If we look at something that is clearly a national security threat through a partisan lens, that is potentially dangerous. The good news is the consensus of the professionals. When you look at the various assessments coming from the think tank and expert community, they clearly understand the situation.

But does that have an influence on the administration’s foreign policy?

It certainly does. If you look at the actions of the administration – they actually have not been bad on Russia. Sanctions are in place and even stronger. Ukraine, despite everything, has been given defensive weapons. Assistance to Ukraine has been increased. If you look through all the noise, the policy does not look so bad. My concern is that we need to forge a bipartisan and transatlantic consensus that this regime is a threat and needs to be contained. That has to extend into the political realm.

That seems very challenging in the current environment…

In the current environment, it is extremely challenging. But I am hoping this can change.

If we think about US politics and the role Russia plays in terms of disinformation and interference. Do you expect a Russian hand in the 2020 election?

Absolutely.

Do you think there have been lessons learnt from 2016 that can be applied this year? Or are we doomed to repeat the same situation…

I do not think we are doomed to repeat it in the same way, because we were really caught off guard in 2016. No one thought that Russia would have the audacity to try that against the US. We have seen it before in many other countries, but no one thought they would interfere in the American process. This time we will be a lot more prepared. We are certainly not immune, but in terms of activities like social media campaigns, disinformation, cyberattacks, hacking and doxing – I think the public and the elite will be more ready for it this time. Russia will not have the element of surprise.

But, again, a part of this is viewed in the lens of partisanship, and I think in order to be really effective we need to move beyond that. This includes proper election protection legislation. The current challenge is that if you want to get tough on Russia, you are seen by many as anti-Republican.

You mentioned Ukraine and the support that it has received, despite all that has happened over the last few months. And we have seen Ukraine at the centre of the impeachment process which has also put a huge media focus on that country. Has the American public learnt anything about the situation in Ukraine as a result? Or has it been completely politicised and we missed a moment to teach about the current geopolitical issues in Eastern Europe?

It depends what part of the American public you are talking about. Those who are more informed have certainly learnt something. But I would say that there is a good side and a bad side to all of this. On the good side, it is now going to be very difficult for the administration not to support Ukraine. It has actually given Ukraine a degree of protection. One of the damaging things here, is that it is creating the impression of Ukraine as a dysfunctional state, which it certainly is not. By and large, the US support for Ukraine is safe and secure. Any attempt to end it will look suspicious.

I had a sense that Ukraine has almost become a toxic word in Washington discourse…

That has not been the case. In fact, there are a lot of people who have done a good job explaining why Ukraine matters. Several think tanks teamed up to have an event on Capitol Hill to explain to policy-makers why the country matters, why it is not a partisan issue and why it is more about national security. Ironically, it is one of the positive developments in this situation. It has reinforced the sense of urgency among Ukraine’s friends in Washington.

I would like to come back to Russia and get your view of the domestic situation, as someone who always has a finger on the pulse of Russian politics. Last summer we saw the outbreak of protests against not allowing independent candidates to run in the Moscow city duma elections; and there are signs that Putin’s popularity is fading. What could this mean for the internal situation?

It is a very interesting and paradoxical situation. Nobody is really happy with the situation right now, nobody knows how to get out of it, and nobody knows what follows. Putin’s popularity is at an all-time low, but nobody can articulate or even imagine what happens after Putin. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is busy trying to construct scenarios for keeping Putin in power beyond 2024. They are looking at forcing Belarus into a closer union state – a de facto annexation. They are looking at constitutional changes to create a so-called State Council that would rule Russia and that Putin would lead. The resignation of the government and the constitutional changes Putin proposed – which include elevating both the State Council and the Security Council, effectively making them new versions of the Soviet Politburo – suggest that the regime is getting an early start on preparing to keep itself in power beyond 2024. My feeling is that we are heading into a prolonged period of stagnation for Russia, much like the late-Brezhnev period.

And if Putin leaves, who and what will replace him?

Actually, I do not think it really matters. If Putin falls, he will fall in one day and be replaced by something exactly like him the next. We do not have a Putin problem, we have a Russia problem. It is a systemic problem. Russia is basically governed by a system based on institutionalised kleptocracy, arbitrary rule and patron-client relationships, and it has always been this way. I have conversations with people in the Russian opposition about this, and I say if you get another chance you have to find a way to break this system and set up a new one based on accountability and rule of law; not like what happened in the 1990s, when there was a nominally democratic and nominally pro-western government that operated according to the same system based on patronage. That is doomed to foster continuity. But my hopes are not high for deep and serious political change in Russia in the short term.

In fact this is one of the key differences between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian society has made a conscious decision, and brought enough of the elite along with them, that they have to break out of the sistema that had existed in the Soviet times; and existed in Russia since the Grand Duchy of Moscovy. They are not out of it entirely, but they are making good progress. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, every single election in Ukraine has been competitive. Only one incumbent, Leonid Kuchma in 1999, won re-election. In Russia, not a single election has been competitive. Not a single incumbent has lost. This illustrates a key difference. We may see cosmetic political change in Russia, but right now it is hard to see how Putin goes and under what conditions it happens. Even with a re-energised opposition and more street protests, I just don’t see how this regime can change. In that sense, I expect 2020 to be similar to 2019.

You have illustrated nicely the key difference between Ukraine and Russia, and I wonder, now with Volodymyr Zelesnkyy as president, do you think that Ukraine can serve as some sort of inspiration for Russians? That things can change democratically?

What is very interesting is that during the Ukrainian elections, the Russian media was trying to show Ukraine as a chaotic place where people were debating and having arguments. But as Russians were watching, many were thinking “wow, I wish we could have that.” There was a quote on social media by someone in the Russian opposition who said “I feel we are is still in kindergarten and Ukrainians have grown up and dating girls.” With the Zelenskyy phenomenon, the Kremlin does not know how to deal with him precisely because he is a Russian speaker who is a Ukrainian patriot. Russian political analyst Konstantyn von Eggert put it perfectly when he said that the leader of the opposition in Russia is now the president of Ukraine. Zelenskyy has done quite well; and Ukraine is doing better. The economy has improved. For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, the minimum wage in Ukraine is actually higher than in Russia. That is remarkable.

So you would assess Zelenskyy positively so far…?

So far, so good. I was a little worried going into the Normandy talks last December, but Zelenskyy held his own. He didn’t give up anything. And what was telling in fact was how the Russian media focussed almost obsessively over Zelenskyy’s notes, making a big deal that his notes were written in Russian. And it shows how the language issue, which is one of the divisive issues pushed by Russia, is no longer a big deal in Ukraine; and the Kremlin doesn’t know how to react.

Maybe we could end with some of your insights and thoughts on what we can expect for 2020 and the year ahead beyond Russia and Ukraine. There is potentially a lot of developments that can happen in the region; I am thinking of Belarus, Moldova and Georgia… In your opinion what should we be looking for in the coming year? Any expectations or predictions? Perhaps something that is not on the radar that you are watching closely…

Belarus is clearly on the Kremlin’s radar. That is completely obvious. We have had this long term relationship between Belarus and Russia under the Putin period where Alyaksandr Lukashenka has looked at the relationship basically as transactional; while Putin views it as imperial. They have mostly tolerated each other throughout this period, but it has gotten to the point where something has to give. Putin is no longer happy with the transactional relationship. And despite all his faults, Lukashanka is not interested in Belarus becoming part of Russia. He wants to preserve the country’s sovereignty. Russia has been putting a lot of pressure on Belarus to accept a new airbase, for example, which Lukashenka has so far resisted. My big question for 2020 is how much longer can Lukashenka hold out? Russia will probably take escalation in three steps. The first one would be to pressure Lukashenka into accepting Moscow’s terms. That basically means turning Belarus into a de facto extension of Russia’s western military district. But Lukashenka has no interest in being on the frontlines of a conflict between NATO and Russia. The second step would be an attempt at regime change. Belarus has presidential elections coming up this year which could be an opportunity for Russia to create problems in Belarus. Failing that, the third step of the escalation ladder would be a military option. So we should definitely keep our eye on Belarus.

Georgia is another interesting case. What we have always suspected is becoming very clear, that Bidzina Ivanishvili is doing the bidding of the Kremlin. This has led to a conflict between the Georgian civil society and a government that is effectively run by an unelected oligarch who appears to be beholden to Moscow, which is not representing Georgia’s interests. In a lot of ways, Russia has learnt some lessons in Georgia and is now using a different approach. I think we are headed for a decisive round in Georgia and the ruling Georgian Dream coalition is doing everything in its power to ensure it wins the elections later this year. They were supposed to switch to a proportional system, which would have benefitted the opposition, but has backed down on that. The big question here is – are we about to see another big change in Georgia? And how would Russia respond to that?

Are you watching Moldova as well?

Moldova is also another interesting country to watch in the region. The pro-western government fell at the end of the year being replaced by a more pro-Kremlin one and setting up elections for this year. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is a very divided society; virtually split evenly in terms of which direction the country should go. And I expect these divisions to maintain and manifest in the elections this year. What would be helpful would be a serious recognition on the part of the West that Ukraine and Moldova are the front lines in a war of governance that is going on right now between Russia and the West. We have to expend resources in order to win that war of governance. We need to understand that what happens in these countries really matters. These are the West Berlins of our time.

Brian Whitmore is a senior fellow and director of the Russia Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), in Washington DC. He is also the author of The Power Vertical Blog and host of The Power Vertical Podcast, both of which focus on Russian affairs.

Adam Reichardt is the editor in chief of New Eastern Europe and co-host of the Talk Eastern Europe podcast.

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