The battle of the USSR in Georgia rages on

Protests from last summer in front of the Georgian parliament. Photo: Kober (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

For its western and European aspirations, the Kremlin punished Georgia – provoking a civil war and an overthrow of power. Moscow is also responsible for two ethno-political conflicts in the country.

As a result, Georgia changed its political vector and reluctantly joined the CIS. The regime change transformed Georgia’s foreign policy: instead of the non-communist leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, came into power. Despite this, Georgia has never stopped its fight against the Soviet legacy. At times, the policy of the ruling elite and the will of the public coincided; other times opinions differed. This is how the present moment can be described: fear that the Georgian authorities may harm the national interest with their indecisive steps.

“Two Russias”

The core of Shevardnadze’s foreign policy was reflected with this expression (which he stated while being the leader of Soviet Georgia in the 1970-80s): “The sun of Georgia rises from the North” (i.e. Russia). During his first term as leader of independent Georgia, Shevardnadze was fully subordinate to Moscow. Ministers of the law enforcement agencies were appointed with the recommendation of the Kremlin, while the Georgian defence minister, Vardiko Nadibaidze, was the godfather of the then Russian minister of defence, Pavel Grachev. In the second term of his rule, Shevardnadze started to become disappointed with Moscow. He was unable to enlist the support of the Kremlin regarding the conflict resolution in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (the so-called South Ossetia region). Yet Shevardnadze never crossed any red lines in relations with Moscow.

Tbilisi did not directly blame Russia for instigating conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Instead, Shevardnadze created the concept of “Two Russias”, which argued for the existence of two types of Russia – one which was “good” (with its intelligentsia, culture, etc.) and the other, the “bad Russia”, with its hawks and military generals. Despite the flexible policy, Shevardnadze began to develop large-scale geopolitical projects for Georgia which laid the foundation for a new geopolitical function for the country. In particular, Georgia was included in projects for the transportation of Caspian Sea energy resources. Thanks to this project, Georgia gradually became a more attractive place for the West. By the end of his rule, Shevardnadze began the process of rapprochement with NATO and officially declared Georgia’s desire to join the Alliance.

After the 2003 Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili came to power and abandoned Shevardnadze’s delicate approach towards Russia, becoming much more confrontational. Starting from 2003, Saakashvili began the process of full-scale de-Sovetisation and de-Russification. The country left not only the political orbit but the Russian cultural space. The Russian language under Shevardnadze naturally began to lose its status in Georgia, but during Saakashvili’s time, the collapse of the Russian language and its cultural tradition became visible. Following the end of the Soviet Union, almost no ethnic Russians lived in Georgia and the Russian language lost its position. Russian remains the lingua franca only for ethnic minorities living in Georgia (e.g. Armenians and Azeris).

The authorities, led by Saakashvili, contributed to the spread of English through various free programmes. In fact, one could say this was a linguistic revolution: a huge step in the de-Russification process and the integration of Georgia to the West. The sharp turn towards the West was not only the choice of the political elite; it was the wish of the whole nation. Georgians believe they are Europeans and have chosen to abandon the Soviet past and its legacy. The then ruling elite attempted to accelerate the “arrival” of the West in Georgia and the withdrawal of Russia. It was already clear that the Soviet Union in Georgia was losing.

The 2008 Georgian-Russian war became a turning point. The Russian army invaded Georgia and occupied two of its regions, recognising their independence. Georgia cut diplomatic relations with Russia, withdrew from the CIS and officially labelled Russia as “an occupier”. Only the Georgian Orthodox Church keeps contact with Moscow. The Georgian authorities were able to maximally neutralise the church’s involvement, which the Kremlin was trying to use as a political tool. Russia lost all the levers (political, cultural and economic) of pressure on Georgia. Georgia focussed on economic independence from Russia, diversifying the country’s energy supply by abandoning Russian gas supplies and electricity.

Georgia was also able to overcome the economic embargo placed on it by Moscow. Instead of the traditional Russian market, Georgian wine (which was one of the most exported goods to Russia) found new markets in Europe, Asia and America. A new iron curtain was erected in the Caucasus, and Georgia managed to stay on the side of the West. This was a huge moral victory, despite the fact that 20 per cent of its territory was lost. Georgia continued its de-Sovietisatoin by banning Soviet symbols and opening a museum of Soviet occupation, to demonstrate that Georgia was never voluntarily part of the Soviet Union. The Stalin Museum, in his native city of Gori, was renamed the Museum of Stalinism (a museum of totalitarianism). It seemed that the Soviet period had finally come to an end in Georgia and the battle against the USSR had finally been won.

Path divergence

In 2012, a new political force called the Georgian Dream, led by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, came to power. At first, the government began to maintain the western path established by its predecessors. Ivanishvili put in place a governing team that had many pro-Western leaders and the country officially remained committed to joining NATO and the European Union. It was the Georgian Dream government that signed the Association Agreement with the EU and achieved the visa-free regime. Yet the party gradually diminished the influence of pro-Western forces, and now informally works with pro-Russian political groups such as the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia, an anti-western group that opposes the country’s integration into NATO and who many believe to be Moscow-funded.

 Georgia’s foreign policy has sharply dwindled. Ivanishvili put forward a new concept for the ruling party – a policy of non-irritation of Russia. He claimed that Georgia’s foreign policy should be more like the Armenian model, and created a new position in the government: a special representative of the prime minister for relations with Russia. In the absence of diplomatic relations, this format has become a kind of behind-the-scenes instrument for negotiations with Russia. The topics the special representative discusses with the Russian deputy foreign minister, during regular meetings, are classified.

This suggests that the Georgian authorities are trying to find a new path towards the hearts of the Russian authorities, which is what Moscow has been trying so hard to achieve. The Kremlin suggests that Georgia accepts the occupation of 20 per cent of its territory in order to restart relations from scratch. It still remains unclear why, in the absence of diplomatic relations, after a 12 year break, the Georgian foreign minister met his Russian counterpart in an informal format in New York in September 2019. The real goal and content of this meeting has not been publically released. Yet the meeting has raised a lot of questions towards the Georgian authorities.

More Russia in Georgia?

Since 2012, a Russian presence has quietly crept into Georgia. Russian is heard more and more often in Georgia’s cities. Russian tourists have flocked to the country. Before 2012 around 410,000 Russian tourists came to Georgia, in 2018 this number increased by 3.5 times – up to 1.4 million. According to official Georgian statistics, in the first quarter of 2019, 222,700 Russians visited Georgia, which is 21.4 percent of the total number of tourists. In comparison with the 2018 figure, there was a 24.3 percent increase. Since that time, thousands of Russians have also migrated to Georgia permanently. Russians have begun to purchase real estate in vast numbers. According to the National Agency of Public Registry, in the period of 2012-2016, 18,000 real estate properties were purchased by Russian nationals – 53 per cent of all real estate sales by non-Georgian nationals. Many small Russian businesses and NGOs have opened up in Georgia. Restaurants have begun to play Russian music and Russian signs can be found on shop windows, restaurants and hotels, not to mention souvenirs with Soviet symbols. Russian-language media have also returned to Georgia, targeting Russian speakers and promoting Russian propaganda and anti-western narratives.

Moreover, Georgia has resumed economic trade with the Russian Federation, including wine and agricultural goods. Between 2006 and 2013, there was an embargo on the sale of Georgian wine to Russia. This embargo has since been lifted, and according to the National Wine Agency, out of the 68 million bottles of wine that were exported in 2018, 62 per cent went to Russia. The Georgian authorities also signed a new agreement with Gazprom which would increase the supply of natural gas from Russia. In 2015 Georgia signed a memorandum on the creation of a unified electric grid between Georgia, Russia, Iran and Armenia, which fundamentally contradicts the declared western trajectory.

Participation in joint energy projects with Russia could lead to Georgia’s participation in the formation of a so-called liberal empire under the leadership of Russia. The doctrine of a liberal empire in the former Soviet space was first invoked by Anatoly Chubais, a Russian politician. Chubais put forward this idea back in 2003 with the aim of building political influence in the region, which included the creation of a single energy space. Ironically, several years ago, the Georgian authorities (under the Georgian Dream) and NATO announced a new formula in the relationship between NATO and Georgia: “More NATO in Georgia and more Georgia in NATO”. In fact, the opposite may well be happening, as the Georgians might discover there is actually more Russia in Georgia.

A cold shower

On June 20th 2019 an inter-parliamentary assembly of Orthodox states was held in the Georgian parliament. During this meeting, Sergey Gavrilov, a member of the Russian parliament, sat in the chair of the Georgian Parliament’s speaker and gave a speech in Russian. This was a cold shower for many Georgians which has been steeped in economic problems, unemployment and poverty in recent years. The topic of occupation has not been a priority over the last number of years. However, the presence of Gavrilov in the Georgian parliament sparked a series of protests, led by a generation of young Georgians that does not want to return to the Soviet Union. These demonstrations are also a warning to Russian officials. The warning has not come from the Georgian government – the authorities are frightened by the threat of Russia, such as economic sanctions.

Nearly 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgians who have a sense of pride after they have defeated the Soviet Union suddenly find themselves drifting back towards the cultural, informational and economic space of Russia. Michael Carpenter, a former adviser to US Vice President Joe Biden, after his visit to Georgia in June 2019, tweeted: “I’m not sure the government fully understands the implications of its open door policy with Russia. With so many ‘tourists’ (ehem FSB) and so much land being bought up by Russian businessmen, they may wake up one day and find not 20% but 100% occupied.”

According to a 2019 survey by the National Democratic Institute in Georgia, the collapse of the USSR was considered by half of the respondents as a positive phenomenon, while 39 per cent see it as a negative one, and 11 per cent has no opinion. The survey also found that 77 per cent supported Georgia’s accession to the EU, and 74 per cent to NATO. Yet it seems that Georgia’s battle against the Soviet Union has resumed, and the main question now is: Will the Georgian ruling elite be the ally of the nation or the ally of the enemy?

There is no doubt that if the process of democratisation is weakened, it will bring Georgia closer to Russia. If authoritarian tendencies in the country instensify, Georgia will have few allies left in the West, and it will, again, be part of the club of authoritarian regimes under the leadership of the Kremlin. Strengthening democratic institutions in Georgia is therefore the only way to defeat the Soviet Union, once and for all.

Beka Chedia is a Tbilisi-based researcher and an associate professor of political science.

Georgia, Georgian Dream, Georgian-Russian relations