Russia and its Tatar diaspora in Europe

Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan. Photo: The Krasnoyarsk National and Cultural Autonomy of the Chuvash People (CC) www.flickr.com

In Lithuania they arrived to rebuild the destroyed harbour and shipping industry in Klaipėda, and to the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Visaginas. Similarly, since the 1940s there was a Tatar migration movement to Estonia from other parts of the Soviet Union, particularly from the Nizhny Novgorod region. This group arrived as construction workers, railroad workers, seamen and Soviet soldiers. Tatars and their descendants who came from the Soviet Union often speak Russian as their mother tongue and have much in common with Russian-speaking Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, who also came to Latvia and Estonia during the Soviet period. As a result, they are recognised as part of the Russian-speaking community there.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatars, regardless of their origin, were granted Lithuanian citizenship. A more serious scenario faced the Tatars in Latvia and Estonia, where they have been categorised as Russian-speaking colonists and have been denied citizenship.

Diaspora in Europe

There are also small groups of Tatars living outside the former Soviet space, particularly in France, Germany, and other European countries (though fewer than 1,000). Approximately 500 Tatars live in the United Kingdom while around 150 Tatars and Bashkirs live in Switzerland. These Tatar communities in Western Europea are relatively new. They started arriving in the middle of the 20th century and, in recent years, a new wave of Tatars have emigrated for work or study. Once abroad, they seek to maintain contact with their homeland and the local Tatar community. That is why Tatarstan, and particularly Russia, make efforts to advocate for the Tatar diaspora in Europe and try to shape a common Tatar and Russian identity under the umbrella of national and international projects.

The Tatar diaspora in Europe deals with several problems such as the lack of communication and financial support and the protection of its heritage. This provides an opportunity for Russia to patronise Tatars leaders and to strengthen the Kremlin’s influence in Europe. The Tatar diaspora in Europe is not relevant in size, but it has a potential to shape the political landscape of their European homes, particularly in the promotion of heritage and the lobbying their interests on the international stage.

Tatars regularly gather, have tea parties, give master classes on Tatar cuisine and organise religious festivals. The Tatar Association in France, for example, aims to preserve their national identity and the Tatar language as well as the acquaintance of French citizens to their history, customs and traditions. Each year they organise evenings of Tatar cuisine, performances of local musicians, classes in dance and exhibitions of outstanding Tatar artists, as well as meetings with Russian poets, prose writers and bloggers.

Despite the long distance separating the communities, several projects to unite Tatars around the world have been launched. Special attention has been paid to the  preservation of the Tatar language, the promotion of national and cultural, socio-economic and spiritual developments of the Tatar people, as well as the implementation of programmes in the fields of culture and heritage. Several national and regional organisations carry out educational  projects,  develop entrepreneurship, establish economic relations, and harmonise interethnic and interfaith relations among different ethnic communities.

These activities may be seen as a platform for the Tatar diaspora from different countries to communicate with each other, as well as a means of information for the international community about their needs. The organisations also provide a way of communicating with the non-Tatar world that may influence political decisions on internal matters of both their respective state and Russia, and to function as a bridge in bilateral relations between them, as well as to initiate and lobby on issues of global politics.

Tatars and the Russian world

Tatars from West European countries who are representatives of the new wave of emigration, declare cultural, political and financial attachment to Russia. They retain their Tatar identity, although they weaken their family and cultural connections with Tatarstan. Being influenced by Russia, the Tatar diaspora may lose its distinctiveness and be assimilated by Russian culture.

The authorities in Tatarstan and Russia significantly influence the diaspora. The government of Tatarstan, which has been allowed a considerable deal of autonomy in conducting its affairs, has contributed to the development of the diaspora through technical assistance such as supporting the establishment of representative offices, and through political support and economic co-operation between Tatarstan and the country where the diaspora resides. Moreover, there are several sponsorship agreements between the government of Tatarstan and the countries where Tatars reside to support exchange programmes. At the same time, there are more political actors who seek to take responsibility for the Tatar diaspora. While Tatarstan helps Belarusian Tatars in the field of education, a mosque in Minsk (which was destroyed in the Soviet era) was rebuilt in 2016 in line with its original Tatar architectural design was opened largely with Turkey’s help.

The European Alliance of Tatars ​​(Rusisan: Альянс татар Европы; Tatar: Auropa Tatarlari Alyansi) was founded in 2013 as the Tatar network and structural links of the “Russian world”. Among those who participate there are Russian-speaking Tatars from the Baltics and Tatars with Russian citizenship living in the European Union. Many of them are migrants or their descendants came to the Baltics as Soviet citizens. While many Tatar minority groups from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia joined the Alliance at first, they left largely due to political reasons.

The alliance was founded in Belgium to strengthen its international prestige and to be able to obtain European funds. However, it is an open secret that the organisation maintains close ties with the authorities in Russia. It has received funds from the Russian Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Rossotrudnichestvo), like millions of  other Russian compatriots living abroad. It has been responsible for organising the annual European Sabantuy Festival (each year in a different European city) with the Tatarstan delegation of the President of Tatarstan, Russian ambassadors and representatives of local government.

The Russian authorities actively support Tatar NGOs that embody the idea of the “Russian world”. As a result, a few of them are said to be defenders of Russia’s interest in the region. This co-operation is not welcomed by the host countries and the activities of these organisations are viewed with suspicion through the prism of disloyalty of Tatar residents in European states. The so-called foreign-domestic non-governmental organisations (FDNGO) are accused of infiltrating the culture with the purpose of weakening its democratic institutions and dividing societies. The phenomenon of the politicisation of Russian-speaking Tatar NGOs and the securitisation of the communities in general result from Russia’s foreign policy towards the West, particularly after the annexation of Crimea.

Element of hybrid war

Tatar communities in Europe are heterogeneous and weakly consolidated, stemming from their diverse interests, historical roots and socio-economic status. They seek to preserve their cultural, linguistic and political ties with their kin state through a variety of local societies and international organisations. These organisations are fragmented and compete with each other. Thus, these organisations have influenced the consolidation of the Tatars population in Europe only to a small extent. Nevertheless, some organisations co-operate with others or are connected in a larger, united network of institutions or state agendas representing certain political forces. Currently the Tatar diaspora in Europe faces new challenges, including a lack of religious leaders and Tatar language education resources. The intersections resulting from different origins, traditions and political preferences seem to be the key obstacles to achieve cultural unity in Europe.

As a result of the new-generation (hybrid) warfare to state security and social stability in the region, a serious problem emerges when one state claims to speak on behalf of its “people” and can potentially intervene in the diaspora’s host state in order to “protect” the interests of the diaspora. While Russia intensifies its power in its near abroad in order to integrate Russian-speaking diaspora communities under the aegis of the “Russian world”, financing organisations and supporting its leaders, the Tatar diaspora in Russia’s far abroad is not an obvious instrument for such policies. Russia’s attempt to influence the Tatar diaspora, however, does not require much effort since the Tatars suffer from a lack of social cohesion, greater awareness and financial support. Furthermore, the geopolitical situation determines the Tatar diaspora’s security threats and vulnerabilities to Russia’s influence. As a result, the Russian-speaking Tatar diaspora in Europe could be a useful tool in Russia’s compatriot policy of the “Russian world”.

For several years now the Kremlin has more frequently used its soft power and public diplomacy to pursue its interests, especially via international organisations like “World without Nazism” (a Russian-led international organisation which claims to seek the “de-Nazification of Europe”). The European Alliance of Tatars, similarly, has an agenda of articulating the Tatar diaspora’s need and is politicised and ideologically dependent on the Kremlin. Additionally, the alliance calls for the Tatar diaspora’s protection and claims Tatarstan and Russia as the true defenders of the Tatar diaspora. In fact, it creates an opportunity for Russia to interfere with the internal affairs of states where Tatars reside. Therefore, the Tatar diaspora, as well as other Russian-speaking residents in Europe, play an important role in the confrontation between Russia and the West, as their geopolitical situation determines their security threats and vulnerabilities to Russia’s influence.

Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik is the head of the department of the Baltics at the Institute of Central Europe in Lublin.

Europe, Russian world, Russkiy mir, Tatars