Illegitimate election observation and conflict resolution

Photo: (Andrew Butko (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Parallel systems

The role of election observation has been growing steadily since the 1990s. Over time election observation missions became more professional and methodologically sound. Since 2005 both international governmental and non-governmental organisations that engage in electoral observation follow the Declaration of Principles for International Observation (DoP). This document defines election observation as “the systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis”. Currently, according to the Project on International Election Monitoring, nearly 80-85 per cent of elections in non-established democracies are monitored.

In the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the key international organisation conducting electoral observation. Over the years these activities have been recognised as a tool which can impact political change, especially in cases of the so-called colour revolutions. Elections in Georgia in 2004, Ukraine in 2004 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, led to the formation of pro-western governments.

However the Kremlin saw these processes as contrary to its foreign policy interests and started to become very critical towards the OSCE’s observation missions. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, claimed that these missions are “arbitrarily dividing states into ‘mentors’ and ‘pupils’, with the former taken as ideal in every respect while the latter, mistaken in everything they do”. In response, the Russian Federation began creating a parallel system of its own election observations to question the neutrality of the OSCE’s observation.

In 2002 the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an intergovernmental platform of post-Soviet states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, adopted the Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections. The Convention served as the basis for establishing the first CIS parallel election monitoring organisation called the Commonwealth of the Independent States – Europe Monitoring Organisation” (CIS-EMO), which started observing elections in the post-Soviet space, both in CIS member states and the separatist republics in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

These observations in CIS countries and separatist regions merit a distinction. Their actions are politically motivated and hence practically void of any credible scientific methodology. Instead, they focus primarily, if not solely, on election days, and in the majority of cases it boils down to an endorsement of the electoral process, no matter how fair or unfair they are. These observations also serve the Kremlin’s agenda and damages the idea of election observation as a tool of democratisation, as it dilutes the message of organisations working in accordance with the DoP. Yet since these observers are invited and accredited by state authorities, it does not violate state sovereignty – a key principle of international law.

What is more, the election observation carried out by CIS-EMO in separatist territories bears all the above features but, most importantly, it violates the sovereignty of states since it takes place in areas governed by self-proclaimed authorities which lack international recognition. This contradicts key principles of the UN Charter and the DoP which states that “elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government … Election observers must respect the sovereignty of the host country.”

The case of eastern Ukraine

One of the main intricacies of the conflict settlement in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine is the dispute about the parties involved in the conflict. The international community recognises the involvement of Russia, while the Ukrainian government questions the political independence of the self-proclaimed authorities of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), and seeks a conflict resolution within the framework of the Minsk Agreement.

On the other hand, the Russian Federation systematically denies being directly involved in the conflict and insists that it be solved by negotiations between Ukrainian government and the separatists. Russia’s policy on the pivotal role of the so-called authorities of DNR and LNR in the negotiation process is supported by its systematic attempts to strengthen the political standing of the separatist leaders. Their alleged legitimacy to both govern the areas not controlled by Ukraine and to negotiate with the Ukrainian government is underpinned by illegitimate electoral processes organised contrary to the Minsk Agreement and is in violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.

The first elections for the heads and national councils of the DNR and LNR were organised on November 2nd 2014. Ukraine, the UN and OSCE declared they would not recognise their results. However, Russia expressed its respect for “the declaration of the will of the people in south-eastern Ukraine” and stated that “[i]n view of the election results, it is extremely important to take active measures to promote a sustained dialogue between the central authorities and the representatives of Donbas in accordance with the agreements reached in Minsk” .

In order to further strengthen the legitimacy of the electoral processes and the elected leaders, the elections were monitored by international electoral observers, reportedly invited by the so-called authorities of the separatist entities. Information on the number of international observers present at the 2014 elections ranges from 400 (according to the CIS-EMO) to 40 (according to some academic research).

The observers endorsed the elections as democratic, with a few isolated comments on the security situation and lack of voters’ list. Some of the observers went further, however, and spoke about the legitimate right of the self-proclaimed republics to hold elections and their right to self-determination. Magdalena Tasheva, a Bulgarian MP from the nationalist Ataka party, stated that “[t]he fact that the West will not recognise these elections does not mean that the state does not have the right to exist.” A couple of observers opined about the irreversibility of the separatist process and urged the Ukrainian government to embark on the peace talks with the so-called authorities of the non-government controlled areas.

A similar sequence of events took place on November 11th 2018 during the elections for the DNR and LNR national councils. Voters were called to the polls – as stated by the Russian Federation – in order to fill the political vacuum that appeared after the assassination of Alexander Zakharchenko, the leader of the DNR, on August 31st 2018. Ukraine, together with the EU and the OSCE, declared they would not recognise the “elections” while Russia expressed an understanding for organising the elections in “regions rejected and abandoned by Ukraine”.

The November elections were monitored by some 100 international observers, invited by the DNR and LNR so-called authorities, coming from Russia, a number of European countries, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Brazil, Chile, Canada, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Turkey and the United States. There were also observers from Palestine, Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia, which were portrayed by the local media as “states”.

Creating a sense of legitimacy

The observers of the illegitimate November 2018 elections – unsurprisingly – unanimously endorsed the electoral process as democratic and in line with international standards, which was noted by local and Russian media. What is more important, however, is that they emphasised the legitimacy of the elections and the legitimate right of the self-proclaimed republics to hold their own elections. Many spoke about the independence of the territories and the formation of a state through the electoral process. Bogdan Bezpalko, a member of the Russian Council on Interethnic Relations, stated that “the elections should demonstrate to Kyiv that the republics are established states, aiming at securing their status”. Jan Penris, an MP from the populist Vlaams Belang party in Belgium, congratulated “the Donetsk Republic on its independence”. The observers were also talking about the inevitability of the Ukrainian government’s negotiations with the so-called authorities. A French observer, Thierry Mariani, currently a member of the European Parliament, stated: “I hope these elections will be a step forward in the direction of an agreement. But to have an agreement it is necessary to have two parts, and unfortunately I don’t see in this moment on the Kyiv side a strong will to have an agreement”.

Notwithstanding the international observers’ remarks on the alleged legitimacy of the elected leaders and the need for conflict resolution negotiations between Kyiv and the so-called authorities of the DNR and LNR, there is a prevailing divergence of stances about the character of the conflict in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and eligible parties of the conflict settlement process. Ukraine’s foreign policy, in this regard, has not changed with the new government, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed in July 2019 that Ukraine is not ready for direct talks with the Donbas “separatists”; but that it would act within the Minsk framework and is ready for a ceasefire. On the other hand, in the context of July 2019 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin, once again, reiterated: “a comprehensive settlement … in Donbas, is possible only in case of direct contact of the Kyiv government with representatives of the republics”. Meanwhile, negotiations did take place in December last year, for the first time since 2016, within the framework of the Normandy Format; however, they yielded limited results.

Objectives of illegitimate observers

In analysing the so-called international monitors who came to eastern Ukraine to observe the illegitimate elections, it is worth looking at their political backgrounds. The initial CIS-EMO monitoring teams were composed solely of observers from the former Soviet Union and predominantly from the Russian Federation. Yet with time the CIS-EMO started co-operating with two far-right organisations: the Eurasian Observatory of Democracy and Elections (EODE) and the European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis (ECAG), the latter run by Mateusz Piskorski who, in 2016, was arrested in Poland on suspicion of spying for Russia. Both the EODE and ECAG’s engagement in the parallel system of election monitoring is underpinned by ideologies such as Novorossiya and Russia as the counter-balance of the western world.

Russia clearly reaches out to a particular profile of political parties, politicians and activists throughout Europe as evidenced by those who participated in these pseudo-observations. Stanislav Byshok, the Executive Director of CIS-EMO, in his book, The New Europe of Vladimir Putin: Lessons from the West for Russia (in Russian: Новая Европа Владимира Путина. Уроки Запада для России), offers a full overview of right-wing, Eurosceptic and nationalist parties in Europe showing their pro-Russian affinities and “how the Russian experience of building a sovereign domestic and foreign policy is perceived and positively evaluated by the nationally-oriented political forces of the West”. Nationalism is juxtaposed with liberal democracy, with the conclusion that “supporters of the national ideology, paradoxically, became the real protectors of cultural diversity, whereas the champions of tolerance and multiculturalism appeared to be committed to unification and blurring the established ethno-cultural borders”.

The European observers came from political parties on the extremes of the European political spectrum. Their endorsement of elections in unrecognised republics stem from the Euroscepticism and nationalist ideologies they promote in their own domestic contexts. Anton Shekhovstov, in Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir, notes that the politicians observing the 2014 elections in eastern Ukraine included members of right-wing and nationalist parties, like Jobbik (in Hungary), Ataka (in Bulgaria), Forza Italia, Movement for Serbia (Pokret za Srbiju) and the French Marine Blue Gathering (Rassemblement bleu Marine). The observers often come from political parties promoting autonomy or secession of the regions they come from – for instance, Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interests) – hence they perceive elections as a step towards independence and sovereignty. Legality and the quality of the process is of lesser importance.

What’s next?

Nationalist and separatist political movements are on the rise in Europe and Russia capitalises on their existence, using them for its own ends. The pro-Russian, nationalist and, in some cases, separatist ideologies, make them prone to endorse elections held in the unrecognised, self-proclaimed republics of the post-Soviet space. The messages coming from of the international observers of these illegitimate elections are mostly aimed at Russian and local audiences, but their visit to the separatist regions are often part of a broader co-operation with Russia, which aims to legitimise the Kremlin’s policy in Europe. The initiative of the Italian Northern League in 2014 to form the group “Friends of Putin” in the Italian parliament, in response to EU sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea, is one example of such co-operation.

On the eve of the 2018 elections in the DNR and LNR, Andreas Maurer, from the German left-wing populist party Die Linke,offered his interpretation on the legality of election observation there: “We have come, we have observed … we cannot be punished for that pursuant to European or German legislation … Maybe if I had been here alone, there would have been some doubts. But the fact that my colleagues from Holland, Finland [and] other states, have received accreditations today – 22 states – shows, that there is more and more of us. And I believe the process will not stop.” The question remains how to stop (or reduce) the politically-motivated observation from having an impact on international politics in general and on conflict settlement in particular.

The parliamentary assemblies of international organisations hardly make their members, who engage in politically-motivated and/or illegitimate election observation, accountable. The Spanish parliamentarian and president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Pedro Agramunt, was stripped of his position only in 2017 after he joined Russian officials on a trip to Syria to meet with President Bashar Al-Assad. The following year he was openly involved as an “international observer” invited by Russia to monitor their presidential elections.

It often happens that the European officials involved in legitimising self-proclaimed republics return back to the official political milieu without any consequences. Paolo Grimoldi, an Italian parliamentarian with the Northern League, and who openly supports the annexation of Crimea, visited Russia-annexed Crimea together with Matteo Salvini in 2014; he was seconded as an OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observer and accredited as a member of the OSCE PA election observation mission during the early parliamentary elections in Ukraine in July 2019. There is no clear mechanism for holding such officials liable when they become involved in activities that undermine the sovereignty of states.

The international and non-government organisations which conduct election observation missions often stress their neutrality and the soundness of their methodologies. Yet a greater emphasis needs to be put on the fact that those undertaking election observation missions, first and foremost, abide by the principle of state sovereignty. Not every exercise where the ballot box is involved can be legitimately called an election. Not every election in a disputed area is a step towards conflict settlement. As long as electoral exercises are held in opposition to national legislation, international law and peace agreements, they do not deserve recognition. Their results are neither legitimate nor binding for the conflict resolution process.

The full version of this article was presented at the 2019 Pre-APSA workshop, “Securing Elections: Foreign Meddling, Fake News, and Political Violence.”, where the author represented the European Centre for Electoral Support (www.eces.eu).

Daria Paprocka, PhD, is an electoral expert with almost 20 years of international experience. She worked, among others, in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. She works as deputy head of mission or political & campaign finance analyst in election observation missions of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, as well as provides advisory support to election management bodies. She specialises in electoral political economy analysis.

Donbas, eastern Ukraine, Election observation, separatist