The role of a journalist in the age of disinformation

Surprisingly, an alarming number of people in the West still refuse to believe in the scale and impact of Russia’s intervention in their states. What is more, in parallel to some partial improvements in analytical and preventive mechanisms, a series of other, negative trends have also started to emerge. Among the most dangerous are: populism, polarisation and the radicalisation of public discourse. This context has given the field of journalism new problems and challenges. Yet there seems to be no agreement, or indeed an understanding, how to overcome the situation. This is true at both domestic and international levels.

Journalist vs media worker

Limited funds and human resources are clearly some of the biggest problems that media organisations face today. Falling fees for individual writers, which are the result of other market trends, lead to lower quality journalism. Further, lower pay, to be sure, discourages smart, young people from entering the field of journalism. It is also a reflection of society’s attitude towards information. In essence, we get what we pay for.

The demand for immediate information also hinders the process of verification, which explains why some journalists and media outlets publish information that is false or misleading. In short, the nature of the media in recent years, as a result of, among others, the growing influences and trends in social media, has changed. Journalists have little time for content-related work or investigative journalism while news production has been replaced by the passive repetition of press releases. Not surprisingly, the term “media worker” is becoming more and more popular and sometimes it even replaces the word “journalist”.

The need to attract advertisers explains the decisions made by media owners. The search for profit can also be noticed in the selection of themes or content of many outlets. The situation of local and regional media can be considered even more worrying as, in addition to the challenges they share with national media, they are often victims of local political and business pressures. Unfortunately, insufficient attention is paid to investigative journalism, and not only the kind that focuses on financial and political matters, but also the kind that highlights disinformation, its sources, mechanisms and actors. Instead, the overall attitude to media content shared by many journalists can be paraphrased with the following statement: “articles should be short and simple”. We can see that this false assumption is now backfiring and has evidently contributed to lower quality journalism.

Complex issues cannot be properly understood with short and simple accounts. The new threats require a greater understanding of psychological, informational and digital matters. Unfortunately the media world seems to be unprepared for such challenges.

Parallel phenomena

Overall the following parallel trends are now taking place in the West: information-related threats have become more popular; there are not enough experts on disinformation; state structures are unwilling to share evidence on disinformation, nor do they inform the public about their activities in this area; there is a lack of co-ordination of policies aimed at improving citizens’ safety in information and cyber spheres, which leads to the situation where societies are insufficiently aware of the threats they face; there is too much interest in some phenomena (e.g. fake news, bots and trolls), which are in fact part of larger problems; and the emergence of profit-driven agencies that would like to take advantage of an increased interest in information threats, but which often lack knowledge and experience.

The parallel existence of the above phenomena leads to even greater chaos as well as influences the perception of the real problems and the solutions that are necessary to reduce them. Thus, journalists play an even more important role in popularising new facts, research findings, analyses or reports on information security.

Noticeably, however, there is little consensus in the media world. There is no agreed definition of the information threats nor on the methods that should be used to fight them, and most importantly, on the role that media plays in the overall process. One of the consequences of this state of affairs is that some journalists have taken on the role as analyst or expert. Yet almost simultaneously a different problem has emerged, namely, there is a very limited exchange of knowledge and experience between different professional groups. As a result, while journalists tend to stay within their own areas of expertise, so do experts and academics.

A lack of interaction and the sharing of data and knowledge between different disciplines generates some grave consequences. It limits the development of effective solutions as well as diluting the perception of the nature of information threats. Consequently, there is little overlap between the parallel information worlds, which only generates more confusion for the “average” consumer of information.

Nonetheless, some groups, including public officials, interact with each other and influence one another in regards to information threats. Depending on the level of co-operation, they become an element in societal resilience on both the domestic and transnational level (e.g. the EU, NATO). But it is the media that have the greatest influence on society, especially when it comes to shaping people’s attitudes. That is why media outlets should consider it a duty to be part of the resilience against disinformation and misinformation.

Lastly, many only limit information threats to the spreading of false information. In fact, what we should understand as information threats is part of a wider spectrum of diverse social, psychological, economic, ideological, political, cultural, linguistic, sociological, military, national security and cyber-security issues.

Fragile status quo

In the West, apart from the Nordic and Baltic countries, there is limited co-operation between the state and civil society. There are very few analytical and research endeavours that are of an interdisciplinary nature or combine different groups and disciplines. In the West information security is treated separately from cyber-security, while in Russia it is included with state military and security policy, in which they are treated as complementary. The West also suffers from the problem of separate activities being undertaken by civilian state agencies and separate ones by the military. On top of that, there are separate activities in the third sector.

Noticeably, western countries also lack social dialogue on disinformation and strategic communication aimed at informing the public about state activities, as well as explaining the nature of information threats. Similarly, in the NGO sector there is a visible lack of co-operation between academia and civil society. The latter, although underfunded, have an impressive know-how and thus, in certain areas, are able to work faster and more effectively than highly bureaucratic state structures. There is no doubt that maintaining the status quo lowers the mechanisms of defence against disinformation in the West and only makes life easier for its enemies.

In a large part, the work that is carried out in academia and by the NGO sector is not always respected by the media as it is not “newsy” enough. This leads to a kind of a vicious circle which impedes halting the dangerous and destructive tendencies which include downgrading the topic of information threats solely to fake news and increasing people’s awareness about new threats. In other words, western societies are not completely aware of the scale of the danger that exists with disinformation, nor do they understand its nature. This is because technological changes happen faster than the implementation of new security mechanisms which at the same time are not popularised actively enough.

There is no impulse to change the status quo. The circle of the self-propelling mechanism closes up. Yet, with too much attention paid to just some aspects of information threats (such as fake news or bots), western states respond to narrowly defined problems. In other words, focusing on bots or fake news does not say enough about disinformation overall. We need to be better equipped to identify the broad spectrum of disinformation activities – who is responsible for it, what is the background and what is the aim?

Moreover,the ways in which media is consumed by young people is still an under-researched field. However it is clear from what is out there that young people operate more outside mainstream media, getting information from different sources than previous generations – including blogs, vlogs, social media, internet memes, niche portals and quasi-media. The messages they absorb are usually presented in video or images, and not text. In other words, millions of youngsters in the West, who will soon have more and more impact on the socio-economic situation in their states, are now under the broad influence of various information threats. Even if mainstream media outlets change their approach, it will not be enough to stop the many negative trends already in play. It maybe even be too late – as is well-known, habits are easy to create, but much harder to change or eliminate.

Similar observations can be made in regards to other generations who started using the internet at an older age. In many instances, they have not developed the adequate mechanisms to filter or consume information. Nor do they have sufficient knowledge about cyber-security and online risks. The latter is actually something both groups have in common.

Bubbles

Knowing the role that Russia plays in this process, we should nonetheless remember that the Kremlin is not the sole actor which has the means, resources and political will to use it against the West. Other state and non-state actors have similar intentions to harm the West. Private players, who are harvesting big data and have information about millions of online users, may also seek (or be used indirectly) to capitalise on societies’ susceptibility to disinformation, even if it means hurting fellow citizens. For this reason, there is an even greater need for interdisciplinary analytical research and preventive measures.

The way in which we filter information can be seen as a transfer of our convictions, and emotions onto the virtual world. This effect is known as “the filter bubble” and works the same for all online users. This process creates cognitively closed areas which define the way in which we consume information – so-called “information bubbles”. They also influence our perception about the world and events. One person can, of course, be part of many different information bubbles; there are thousands, if not millions of them, including those where you can find conspiracy theories, those with liberal or conservative bias, and those that provide various interpretations of historical events, and social issues. Additionally, cognitive biases are amplified online, no matter the years of professional training, practice or seniority. Among them is the blind spot bias, which explains why we recognise the impact of biases on the judgment of others, while failing to see the impact of biases on our own judgment. It makes us feel secure and sure of our arguments or even rightfulness, even without a basis in reason or fact.

Overall, the intention of information aggressors is to disturb, destabilise or destroy the whole information system of a state. This should not be understood just as an infrastructural or technical issue, but it should also be seen through its social, cultural and political prism. Put differently, groups and individuals can all equally be the objects of an attack. The recipients of information attacks also include the elite, journalists, academics, and public officials who operate in different social groups. Hence, we each find ourselves within our own individual information bubble, and we are all susceptible to our own cognitive limitations.

The above challenges highlight the ever greater role that journalists can play in the fight against disinformation. However, one group by itself is not enough to build real societal resilience and enhance the level of information security. Today’s challenges are highly complex and the responses that are needed require a multi-disciplinary approach with a strong support from the state and society. Thus, priority should be given to education (particularly critical thinking) and communication (especially strategic communication). Countering disinformation should also be undertaken in co-operation with the private sector which could offer new solutions. States such as Sweden and Finland are taking innovative approaches and should be looked at as model-like systemic solutions built on a very solid and stable social foundation.

Small steps

In this era of disinformation, journalists should first and foremost diligently work with information. Being diligent, however, is not tantamount to being objective – these are two completely different things. Moreover, there is no doubt that information security depends on us – the users. It also depends on our will, competence and determination. Thus it is impossible to ensure permanent security, just like it would be impossible to eliminate unemployment.

Declarations and assurances that we are safe in terms of information or cyber security are also a road to nowhere, or pure populism. Threats are constantly evolving, and the more advanced analytical and preventive measures undertaken in the West inspire its opponents to modify their activities. To counteract this, there needs to be more co-operation between diverse groups and disciplines, but something also needs to be done with the increasing social polarisation which is negatively affecting western societies.

Information aggressors, especially the Russian Federation, are not “reinventing the wheel”. They are using existing mechanisms. The journalists and the media, regardless of the provenance, are the first on the “information front” in the war over people’s hearts and minds. They have a choice: ignore or refute this fact or accept their role as a key component in state security and the information space.

While several factors will determine whether they will effectively fulfil this role, it is also true that sometimes not much is needed. For example, as a start some western journalists could finally stop pretending that Sputnik and RT (former Russia Today) are serious media outlets in the western understanding of the term. It would be just enough to stop reinforcing their messaging (designed to create informational chaos in our societies) or legitimising them for the western audiences by quoting them like an objective source. Instead they should consider them as elements of an aggressive foreign policy machine which is being implemented by a state that has been waging information and psychological war against the West. Therefore, only continued and interdisciplinary efforts that involve state, social and media actors will lead to much more than revolutionary, but at the same time chaotic and imprudent, activities that make the front pages of major dailies.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Adam Lelonek, PhD, is an independent Polish expert on information threats.

cybersecurity, disinformation, information, journalism, media