Slovakia’s new wave and its limits

Slovakia's president, Zuzana Čaputová. Photo courtesy of the European Commission.

On June 20th the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland together with Estonia eventually blocked the approval of the target by the European Council. But Slovakia was not among them and stood alongside France and other Western European countries arguing for a more ambitious climate policy.

It is not clear why the Slovak prime minister changed his opinion. Zuzana Čaputová, the new president, had barely the power to force him to do so. But it is safe to say that Čaputová significantly contributed to Slovakia’s shift. As a matter of fact, Pellegrini announced his decision standing next to her. Just a couple of days before, the new president, a former activist, in her inaugural speech warned against the threat of the climate crisis and climate refugees.

Fragmented political map

This story says a lot about Slovakia’s new political arrangement after Čaputová’s election victory. Environmental issues, together with the rule of law, are her stated policy priorities. They distinguish her not only from the current government and – to a large extent – from the former President Andrej Kiska, but also from her peers in the other Visegrad countries. New alliances with Western European countries, be it to the detriment of regional ties, are a real possibility for her. Indeed, Čaputová resembles Emmanuel Macron more than Miloš Zeman.

But her power is limited. First of all, the Slovak constitution reduces the authority of the president to a largely ceremonial role. Most of the executive power is in the hands of the government. And Slovakia is far from having a powerful pro-European government in line with Čaputová’s political values. Although the upcoming 2020 parliamentary elections in February are an opportunity to defeat the current nationalist populist coalition (including a Hungarian party in decline), there are four possible outcomes: a liberal democratic government, a nationalist populist alternative of the Orbán or Kaczyński variety, a combination of parties from both camps, or a political deadlock. Given the fragmentation of the Slovak party system, whatever the coalition’s composition, it can be threatened with instability. The worst-case scenario from Čaputová’s point of view would be a strong nationalist populist government which would marginalise her. And even if the elections result in a government that is friendly to her, the fine compromise – just like her own public support – can be shattered by certain social issues like gay rights or migration.

A strong story

Čaputová has a strong story which gives her the clout of authenticity, a key asset in today’s electoral campaigns across Europe. As a lawyer she offered her services to several non-profit causes. But it was the landfill case in Pezinok, a vineyard town 20 kilometres from Bratislava, which gained her the reputation of an internationally-recognised activist for the environment and rule of law. In the case lasting 14 years, Čaputová defended the rights of the residents of Pezinok against the local oligarchs building the landfill. The waste dump was at odds with the law, regulation and jurisprudence, and it correlated with an increased rate of cancer in the surrounding area.

As an attorney, she stood against certain ministries, state authorities and courts. Opposing them, she fought for the inclusiveness and transparency of the process of the construction of the landfill. In 2013 Čaputová won the case before the Court of Justice of the European Union which acknowledged the inhabitants’ right to information. Echoing this decision, the Slovak Supreme Court later ruled that the waste dump was illegal. Čaputová’s contribution was recognised internationally when she won the Goldman Environmental Prize awarded by a US non-profit.

The legal battle – bearing the ingredients of Čaputová’s future political stance – was a story about protecting the rights of Slovak citizens. Indeed, the landfill developers had too many connections in the local law enforcement agencies. For a certain time, one of their representatives was none other than Marian Kočner, a controversial businessman now charged with the murder of the Slovak investigative journalist, Ján Kuciak, and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová.

Čaputová was engaged in politics before the murder: as a member of the local city council, and, several years later, the vice chairwoman of the centrist party Progressive Slovakia. But she decided to run for president as a result of the murders. The rest is history: the more that Čaputová became known, the more public support she received. Campaigning on an anti-corruption and pro-environment platform, she finally won the March 2019 presidential election over the candidate of the ruling Smer-SD party and Vice President of the European Commission Maroš Šefčovič. She defeated him with 58 per cent of the vote.

The conservative vote

Čaputová’s victory, however, has already some bitterness to it. Although she showed empathy for voters of extreme and nationalist candidates during the second round of the election, most of them probably did not vote for her, according to an analysis by the daily Denník N. Their preferred candidates were Marian Kotleba, leader of the Popular Party Our Slovakia, who is nostalgic of fascism, and Štefan Harabin, a controversial judge and former minister of justice who is close to Vladimír Mečiar, the former authoritarian prime minister. In the first round, together they accumulated 25 per cent of the vote. As for these voters, Čaputová expressed sympathy for their “frustration from the arrogance of the powerful and from the injustice”. Yet, they did not rally to her.

It is also noteworthy that both Kotleba and Harabin branded themselves as conservative. Their defence of traditional values contrasted with that of Čaputová’s refusal to condemn LBGT rights, abortion and immigration. In the second round, she had to face also the conservative and anti-immigrant tones in Šefčovič’s rhetoric. Despite her liberal views, Čaputová attempted to reach out by saying “I want to speak also to conservative voters”. But she did not win over many Christian voters, which was then reflected by the decision of the main conservative opposition party, the Christian Democratic Movement, not to support any of the two candidates in the second round. It was unsurprising that she lost to Šefčovič in one of Slovakia’s most conservative districts.

Čaputová did not fully unite liberals and conservatives against the current government, and divisions remain present in the current opposition. This may mark not only the president’s tenure, but also the stability of a future government. History has a lesson to tell in this regard: socio-cultural issues were one of the major reasons for the fall of the two most recent centre-right governments in 2006 and 2012.

Limits

The other limit to Čaputová’s power is the Slovak constitution. The Slovak president’s role is largely ceremonial. He or she can veto laws voted by the parliament, but the latter can overturn the president’s veto with an absolute majority. He or she appoints the prime minister, who still has to win the confidence of parliament. The president de jureappoints and recalls ministers, but de factohas to follow the requests of the prime minister.

The president has a slightly larger field of manoeuvre concerning foreign policy. According to Article 102 of the Slovak constitution, “the president shall represent the Slovak Republic externally, negotiate and ratify international treaties”. But traditionally Slovak presidents use the provision of the same article allowing them to “delegate the negotiating of international treaties to the government of the Slovak Republic or, upon the consent of the government, to its individual members”. There is one simple reason for this: the president does not have the administrative capacities to conduct foreign policy.

Although Čaputová voiced clearly some of her views in domestic and international debates, the constitutional and administrative limits have already curbed her power to enforce them. The president may have won the prime minister’s blessing for EU’s climate neutrality in 2050, but she lost the battle with the parliament over a new law on nuclear energy. Čaputová vetoed it in July in order to protect the right of citizens to information, the inclusiveness of the permitting process, and the possibility to question the decisions of Slovakia’s Nuclear Safety Authority. Given both Čaputová’s personal experience and the tensions with Austria over the construction of two new Slovak reactors, her concerns were understandable. Yet she did not convince parliament which, in September, overturned her veto.

Čaputová has been more successful with the rule of law. In what became one of her strongest political declarations since she took office, she called for the resignation of Monika Jankovská, a state secretary at the ministry of justice, last August. In the past, Jankovská exchanged a thousand text messages with Marian Kočner who, according to the disclosed communication, used her political influence to advance his own interests. Constitutionally, the president cannot recall a state secretary; it is the government’s prerogative. Again, the real reason why Pellegrini did not support Jankovská is hard to know, but it is reasonable to speculate that the president contributed to the public pressure against Kočner’s ally.

Promoting the rule of law internationally, the new president has defended liberal democracy on her visits to other Visegrad states. In Prague, she expressed an “understanding for the Wenceslas Square full of peaceful people, because I had an understanding for the squares in Bratislava”, drawing an implicit parallel between the protests against the abuse of power by Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic and former Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia. In Budapest, she reminded Viktor Orbán, that “liberal democracy … is the best way to protect the rights of all minorities”, echoing the paradox of Hungarian’s regime being illiberal at home and at the same time promoting the rights of Hungarian minorities abroad. And in Warsaw, Čaputová recalled the 30th anniversary of the fall of communism when Poland was “a big inspiration for the whole region” and paid homage to Lech Wałęsa, a political enemy of the current government.

As for the Visegrad Group, Čaputová said in Budapest that “it must be about promoting the values of democracy, freedom and rule of law, also the values of European integration, in line with the initial agreement which gave rise to the V4, so that we are not perceived as those who divide or weaken the European Union”. When she later visited Paris, she warned the V4 that Slovakia is “ready to build partnerships which will go beyond our geographic region”.

But can Čaputová translate her rhetoric into official foreign policy? Currently, France and other countries attempt to advance the rule of law procedure against Hungary, according to Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union triggered earlier by the European Parliament. Slovak diplomacy is steered by Miroslav Lajčák, the foreign minister and a nominee of the Smer-SD party, who prefers “dialogue to sanctions”, although Article 7 foresees a continued dialogue before any decision on the suspension of a member state’s rights in the EU Council. In any case, Slovakia did not give any sign of wanting to make progress in the procedure against Hungary according to Article 7 at the latest General Affairs Council.

Overcoming divisions

Čaputová nevertheless remains a beacon of hope for Central Europe. She is living proof that a proponent of liberal democracy can win a popular election in a Visegrad country, and she has shown that she can still work on important issues with Visegrad partner countries. With Polish President, Andrzej Duda, she shares the view of NATO as a guarantee of security. With Hungarian President, János Áder, she agrees on the importance of the fight against climate change. At the same time, she represents an alternative to the nationalist-populist governments in Hungary, Poland and even in her home Slovakia.

Moreover, she has not broken with the traditions of her predecessor, Andrej Kiska, and remains in favour of the EU and NATO, defends human rights and criticises corruption. But liberal democracy is so important to her that she exports her views abroad and is ready to seek new partnerships beyond the Visegrad.

In the current political setup, Slovakia’s new president is in conflict with the ruling class in the region, and thus undermines the Visegrad’s image of a united front against the West. Čaputová is a unique politician in the region, just as she is the only Slovak president who did not seek to become a member of the communist party. She resembles Václav Havel more than any other Slovak politician since 1989, which was determined by her own dissidence in the Slovak oligarchic democracy – paradoxically enough – after the fall of communism.

As said before, her power is limited. She has experienced her first number of setbacks: the mixed results in uniting liberals and conservatives, and her failure to translate her views into government policies. Given the polarisation of Slovak politics, social and cultural identity issues will be her (and her allies’) biggest challenge.

For her to make real change in Slovakia, these divisions have to be overcome and government stability guaranteed. And that is a very difficult task. It remains to be seen if Čaputová is heralding in a new political wave in Slovakia and the Visegrad, or if she turns out to be the exception to the rule.

Pavol Szalai is a Slovak journalist and senior editor at EURACTIV Slovakia.

Slovakia, Visegrad group, Zuzana Čaputová