Lord of the flies. Power struggles on Central Asia’s island of democracy

Photo: UNIDO (CC) www.flickr.com

In other words, the mere number of presidents in the region’s authoritarian regimes cannot be compared to Kyrgyzstan’s five (or six, if we include Ishenbai Kadyrbekov who was in power as a one-day caretaker leader in 2005). Yet, almost every presidential handover in this mountainous republic that has taken place was accompanied by riots and clashes which resulted in bloodshed.

Discontent

The first cataclysm transpired in 2005, branded the Tulip Revolution, in line with other colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space (e.g. the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004). The historic event brought down Kyrgyzstan`s first post-Soviet president, Askar Akayev. Having served uninterruptedly from 1990, and exceeding the two terms initially permitted by the Kyrgyz constitution, Akayev was ready to nominate himself for a fourth term. But his plans were disrupted by demonstrations that took place immediately after the 2005 parliamentary elections in February and March. Akayev’s candidates became victorious amid allegations of fraud, while his children won seats fuelling speculation on dynastical succession. Criticised both at home and abroad, the parliamentary elections sparked popular discontent, which turned into civil unrest.

Opposition supporters soon took over key cities and towns in the south. Although Akayev initially dismissed any negotiations, he was forced to flee the country once the protestors stormed the presidential complex in Bishkek after clashing with police. On March 24th 2005, Akayev, together with his family, escaped to Kazakhstan and later to Russia where he issued his resignation on April 3rd 2005. The Kyrgyz parliament later stripped him of the title “First President of Kyrgyzstan”, as well as all relevant privileges.

The main factors that contributed to the crisis included the difficult economic situation, deep-rooted corruption, nepotism, the contradictions in government and administration. Although the victorious revolution was diverse and had no one leader, it was Kurmanbek Bakiyev that won by a landslide victory in the presidential election in the same year. Despite initial hopes, Bakiyev’s tenure and reputation was damaged by the economic situation, allegations of corruption and assassinations of prominent politicians.

In foreign policy, Bakiyev walked a delicate geopolitical tightrope by manoeuvring among Russia, the United States and China. One of the most infamous episodes of the Bakiyev era, the events around the US military base at Manas Airport, clearly illustrates inconsistency within Kyrgyzstan’s external course. Despite the Kyrgyz leader’s initial promise to the Kremlin on the closure of the military base in exchange of nearly two billion US dollars in Russian aid in early 2009, the Americans outbid the Russians and maintained control over the base. It caused serious cooling in Russia-Kyrgyzstan relations. A negative campaign was launched against Bakiyev within Russian-language media, while duties were imposed by Russia on its energy exports to Kyrgyzstan, which affected fuel and transport prices in the Central Asian republic.

Domestically, Bakiyev’s policies did not improve the lives of the populace, who became further enraged with rising heating costs during the winter of 2010. It resulted in a series of demonstrations against political corruption and increased costs of living, the first was held in the city of Talas on April 6th 2010. The clashes between the opposition and the government the next day turned into a violent revolution and soon spread nationwide, where the protestors seized control of administrative buildings and a state television company in the capital. Having imposed a state of emergency, Bakiyev fled to the Jalal-Abad region. Acknowledging that he lost control of the situation, Bakiyev blamed foreign forces for the instability in Kyrgyzstan, invited UN peacekeepers into the country, and even considered relocating the capital to the south, where he hoped to receive more support.

Turmoil and bloodshed

After the April 15th negotiations between opposition leaders and Bakiyev, the latter left for Kazakhstan where he issued his letter of resignation. He was later given refuge in Belarus. Although the interim government soon announced the end of the domestic conflict, which claimed more than 80 lives and left over 400 wounded, it did not end at that point, extending in the form of interethnic clashes. The summer skirmishes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks led to the expulsion of thousands of residents, while, according to Roza Otunbayeva, then head of the provisional government, the death toll as a result of mass killings, gang rapes and torture was as high as 2,000 people. Although some claimed a Russian hand in the ousting of Bakiyev, Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky insisted that the United States was involved in order to gain control of Manas Air Base.

History repeated itself as the second Kyrgyz leader faced a revolution that ultimately toppled him. Although it became bloody and tensed interethnic relations, its outcome formally turned Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentary republic by reducing presidential authority. The subsequent president, Almazbek Atambayev, could have entered the country’s history as a leader who managed to relinquish power in a pacific manner. Yet his post-presidency activities still led to further turmoil and bloodshed.

Having considered the fate of his overthrown predecessors, Atambayev did not extend his single term envisaged by the constitution. Although he left office in a timely manner in November 2017, he did not plan to leave Kyrgyz politics. The transfer of power initiated by Atambayev was, in fact, designed to extend his rule (later as prime minister) by using the Putin-Medvedev scheme: the constitutional changes in 2016, toward the end of his tenure, strengthened the power of prime minister at the expense of presidential authority. Moreover, Atambayev strategically placed his own allies in key governmental positions, including that of the prime minister.

Sooronbay Jeenbekov, an old friend and colleague, became the handpicked successor after a thorough casting. Although Jeenbekov seemed a good choice and controllable president for Atambayev, the alliance between the two soon turned into enmity, as the former, not wanting to serve as a mere puppet, refused to share power and reinforced his own authority. After assuming office, he began removing Atambayev cronies from top government posts, even arresting some of them. Atambayev, through his media holding, launched an information war against Jeenbekov and insulted him in March 2019 by saying “I apologise to everyone for bringing this person to power.” In response, the members of Kyrgyz parliament stripped Atambayev of his immunity and called for a criminal case to be opened against him.

The saga intensified this past summer when Atambayev, trenched in his compound, publicly expressed his desire to fight back. He was backed by the largest party in the country, popular media and his large number of supporters. Moreover, Atambayev flew to Moscow in July in a desperate and unsuccessful attempt to secure the Kremlin’s endorsement. The standoff peaked when the Kyrgyz authorities ordered a special operation to detain Atambayev on August 7th. Within two days elite forces stormed the residence, but Atambayev’s supporters resisted and returned fire. Ultimately, the ex-president was detained amid violent clashes which left a police officer dead and nearly 80 people injured, some seriously. Atambayev’s actions were viewed as an attempted coup.

The in-fighting between two political forces ended in favour of the incumbent president and heralded a new cycle in Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics. Two notable aspects – both positive and negative – should be noted here: the avoidance of a third revolution, and the failure of a peaceful transfer of power (although it had a huge opportunity to set a relevant precedent for the neighbouring countries). Yet the experiment itself was flawed as the outgoing Atambayev used all the administrative resources available to promote his protégé, Jeenbekov, and push back against other competitors.

Thorny path of democracy

With its unique political model, Kyrgyzstan, in a region full of autocratic regimes, is sometimes called an “island of democracy”. This reference, however, does not imply full ascension of democracy. The country has experienced transition of power several times, more than any other Central Asian state. The revolutions in 2005 and 2010 swept away the leaders and were intertwined with interethnic clashes; the second revolution, in particular, witnessed a lot of bloodshed. The third transfer of power, peaceful at the beginning, also brewed antagonism and ventured into a duel.

Moreover, the fate of the ousted leaders could not be called respectable post-presidency retirement. Since the Tulip Revolution, Akayev has been living in Russia, where he currently works at Moscow State University. Bakiyev is based in Belarus, where he has allegedly been granted citizenship. Together with his sons, Maxim and Zhanysh, also in Belarus, they were sentenced by a Kyrgyz court to long prison sentences for corruption and abuse of office. Atambayev, who had masterminded the arrangement to prolong his political career, now finds himself behind bars, demonstrating that the transfer of power in a post-Soviet state, especially one in Central Asia, can be accompanied by risk and unpredictability.

Lacking important natural resources like their rich neighbours, Kyrgyz leaders are usually unable to secure public support through petro- and gas-dollars. Thus, both society and political system does not allow the person at the helm to feel overconfident to establish a full autocracy. Despite its sacrifices in the form of a near-civil war, the Kyrgyz form of democracy is simultaneously uneasy and thorny due to the slow pace of necessary reforms, as well as the regional divide, the established clan system, nepotism, cronyism, and corruption.

Rusif Huseynov is the co-founder of the Topchubashov Center, Azerbaijan. His main interests are in peace and conflict studies, while his focus areas mainly cover Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan