From revolution to politics

Before becoming prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan was one of the leaders of the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Photo: Yerevantsi (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Even a glimpse at the agenda of Pashinyan’s government shows some similarities with the rule of Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power in neighbouring Georgia after the Rose Revolution in 2003. Pashinyan’s priorities on are clearly on domestic politics and include the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms, combating corruption and organised crime, as well as decentralisation. That being said, it is of course impossible to equate Armenia’s problems today with the destruction of Georgian statehood that took place in the early 1990s. In addition, Saakashvili not only had a record of successes but also failures. Hence what lies ahead for the Armenian government remains an open question.

New rules of the game

According to the available research of public opinion (at the time of writing, the newest data come from the May polls), the anti-corruption campaign is perceived as the greatest success of the new Armenian government. Starting from last year, almost every week brings new arrests or accusations. At the same time, systemic reforms have been initiated, including the anti-corruption strategy which is envisioned to last up until 2022. These policies still provide Pashinyan with a relatively large social support despite a certain fluctuation in its level. The new rules of the game have also brought multi-million budget inputs. Thus, despite some criticism that has been expressed regarding the apparent “leniency” to the abuses that take place in strategic areas – such as mining – the overall social assessment of the anti-corruption efforts remains positive.

The economy is the second sphere in which activity of the new government is visible. The neoliberal strategy undertaken in Armenia, regardless of our assessment, is now being implemented. For instance, the flagship tax reform has already been passed in the parliament and will introduce a flat tax. The current government actively pursues foreign investors and sees foreign capital as needed to fuel Armenia’s development. In addition, the authorities want to show their support to small and medium-sized enterprises which they promised tax breaks and a commitment to fight monopolies that flourished under the previous government.

Pashinyan’s government was quick to showcase the data which confirmed the effectiveness of the first reforms. It particularly prides upon the increased levels of foreign investments and state revenue. Rationally thinking, however, it is way too early to conduct a serious assessment of the new policies as many of the problems which clearly burden Armenia cannot be cured overnight. The country will most likely continue to struggle for quite some time, facing challenges like social stratification, poor demographics (including a debilitating brain drain) and weak institutions. These problems will remain on the surface of Armenia’s political life even if its GDP or any other indicators increase. As a matter of fact, these were going up even under the previous government and evidently, this process did not bring an automatic improvement in people’s living conditions.

Pashinyan vs Kocharyan

The earlier mentioned support that Pashinyan’s government is now enjoying does not mean that the new authorities do not have any opponents. Quite the contrary. The parliamentary opposition holds 44 of 132 seats in the National Assembly. Its members are active critics of the government and form the Prosperous Armenia party which is led by Gagik Tsarukyan – an Armenian oligarch who has managed to escape the anti-corruption fever. Another opposing force in the parliament are Pashinyan’s former allies from Bright Armenia group. Yet the prime minister’s most bitter enemy is to be found not in the parliament but behind bars (at the time of writing). Robert Kocharyan served as Armenia’s president from 1998 to 2008 but has been recently accused of accepting multi-million dollar bribes and a bloody dispersal of election protests at the end of his term.

Kocharyan is rarely perceived in a positive light, however his case remains one of the most widely commented ones in Armenia today. There are a few reasons which explain this. First, no president has been previously brought to justice and put in jail in any post-Soviet state. Second, and this is what adds zest to the whole situation, Kocharyan argues that his case is politically motivated and should be regarded as an act of revenge on the part of the prime minister. Pashinyan was indeed involved in the organisation of the 2008 protests, subsequently charged and sent to prison. Even more, the legal basis for his charge was exactly the same one that is being used against Kocharyan today – namely, the attempt to destroy constitutional order.

Hence Kocharyan’s case has taken a very stormy course. Controversies were arising both around some of the former president’s activities and included such facts as hiring a PR firm and paying for street demonstrators, as well as around some decisions that were made in regard to the case overall. Records also indicate Pashinyan has been putting personal pressure on the investigation. The selection of judges to try the case was repeated five times as judges started to resign. Finally, when following the court decision Kocharyan was released from custody, Pashinyan called for blocking the court buildings and starting a new stage of his revolution – this time against the judiciary.

The prime minister’s intervention (including his announcement to lustrate all judges) generated mixed reactions in the public while the Council of Europe expressed its concern. Even though the final stage of activities on Armenian transitional justice is taking place in co-operation with international organisations (changes in judiciary are nonetheless very much needed), the whole situation has generated a discussion on the similarities between Pashinyan and Saakashvili who are both hot-tempered and – according to some – may have inclinations towards authoritarian rule. The latter tendency is especially relevant to today’s Armenia where the prime minister holds quite a wide range of power.

From Russia with distrust

Kocharyan’s confidence during the court case was probably caused by his strong connection to Vladimir Putin, with whom he has had a long history of co-operation. Its results include, among others, a dominant position that Russian firms have in the Armenian gas industry, transportation or telecommunications. It has also been reported that there are close personal ties between Putin and Kocharyan. Most importantly, Putin may continue supporting Kocharyan (at least to some extent) because of the current lack of trust in Russian-Armenian relations. Clearly, Russians do not know what to expect from the new authorities in Yerevan and are suspiciously looking at the reform programme. Considering Armenia’s dependency on Russia, especially in regard to defence and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its closed border with Turkey, this is a serious limitation for Pashinyan’s government.

Nevertheless, Moscow sees Armenia’s current internal policies quite problematic. The fight undertaken by the new authorities against the previous political and oligarchic establishment deprives Russia of some of its influence. Russian officials have lost some personal connections as well as are seeing the weakening of some Armenian monopolies which were often in close co-operation with their own monopolies. Russia’s position in Armenia has also been weakened by the new reforms – as seen in the energy sector where the Armenian government is pushing for diversification of gas supplies and lowering dependence on Moscow. For the Kremlin, these activities could signal Armenia’s gradual “emancipation” from its influence.

Seemingly, a less problematic area of the Russian-Armenian relations is the overall direction of Armenia’s foreign policy. Pashinyan recognises the importance of Russia’s security guarantees and knows where are the red lines. He has not questioned Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union nor proposed a more radical turn towards the West. At the same time, he is not afraid of criticising Russia’s gas supplies to Azerbaijan. That said, it is clear that Armenia’s current foreign policy is more of a continuation of the manoeuvres that the former president, Serzh Sargsyan, had initiated. It may not be an ideal scenario for the Kremlin, but it is acceptable as long as it does not breach the regional status quo.

Without a view for peace

Just as naïve as it would be to think that Pashinyan could break the alliance between Armenia and Russia, it would also be so to expect that his government will quickly solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is unlikely that this situation would change even though the new authorities in Yerevan have intensified talks with Azerbaijan. For months now the frontline has been seeing peace (although fatal casualties have again been reported since the summer of this year) and the crisis communication between the decision-makers has been brought back. An agreement was also reached to continue humanitarian aid. All these may not be much, but for sure there is a qualitative difference between today and previous years. So why it is still believed that there is no chance for peace?

Despite the activities of the new Armenian authorities, the country’s society remains unwilling to make even the smallest concessions towards the Azeri side, which is equally resilient to any concessions as well. Clearly, Nagorno-Karabakh is a key point of reference for people living in both states which have mutually exclusive demands. For example, even though the talks are carried out at the level of ministries and even heads of the states, Azerbaijan society will never agree to Pashinyan’s proposal to include in them the authorities of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. For the record, it is unclear which authorities the prime minister even has in mind. The internal politics of the unrecognised republic is quite messy and in 2020 its residents will decide in elections as to who will succeed Bako Sahakyan – who has ruled there for the last 22 years.

What conclusions can one draw from the above analysis? Certainly, changes in Armenia will continue to take place at their own pace which can be considered rather evolutionary than revolutionary. This is true for a few reasons and many of them have been explained earlier: the systemic nature of some internal problems and the impossibility to reformulate foreign policy, including towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, one more thing is of key importance here. Namely, Pashinyan’s political rankings.

The importance of the political factors in present-day Armenia can be illustrated by the case of Lydian International, a British-American company that the previous government has allowed to extract gold from the Amulsar mine and which was supposed to invest 400 million US dollars, thereby becoming the largest individual investor in Armenia’s history. The decision for this investment, however, is contested by both environmentalists and a significant number of Armenians. As a result, the prime minister has had no choice but to start manoeuvring between his voters (and political supporters) and foreign investors. Seemingly, this is the most telling evidence that Armenia has already undergone a transition from “revolution” to “politics”.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Mateusz Kubiak is an energy analyst with Esperis Consulting and author of the blog Kaukaz Kaukaz .

Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan