A hot summer in Georgia

Photo by Adam Reichardt

The first act in a series of events that stirred Georgian society this past summer was the announcement of plans to organise the country’s first LGBT pride week – Tbilisi Pride. During the events, an international conference and theatre performance were planned. However, the biggest controversy was that the parade was supposed to march through the centre of Tbilisi. The ministry of internal affairs claimed it would not be able to provide adequate security for the participants and tried to convince the organisers to cancel the parade, recommending another venue, arguing it would be safer for the crowd.

The LGBT activists declined the offer. They emphasised that the authorities had been doing what they could to prevent them from exercising their constitutional right to demonstrate from the very beginning. “Our goal was to raise the visibility of our community in Georgian society. Demands such as civil partnerships are demands for the future,” says Giorgi Tabagari, one of the organisers of the Tbilisi Pride.

Unexpected guest

This self-restraint of the activists is easy to understand when one takes into account how strong homophobic sentiments can be in Georgia. The parade announcement has mobilised its opponents – including far-right groups and conservatives – headed by the businessman, Levan Vasadze. Vasadze advocated for the creation of a “civic guard” that would prevent immodest behaviour from occurring on the streets of the Georgian capital. A similar message came from the highly-respected Georgian Orthodox Church. The Georgian Patriarch Elias II said that homosexuality is a sin and that its public exposure was against Georgian values and traditions.

The organisers faced a dilemma: to go through with the parade, risking riots and attacks; or to cancel everything, thus letting months of preparation go to waste. This dilemma was abruptly suspended with the unexpected arrival of a Russian delegation to Tbilisi. The delegation came for a session of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy. After anti-Russian and anti-government demonstrations broke out, LGBT activists decided to postpone the date of the parade to not add further fuel to the fire. Finally, a small meeting of LGBT activists took place at the beginning of July in front of the ministry of interior building on the outskirts of Tbilisi.

Prior to this, there was real outrage in Tbilisi. The head of the Russian delegation, a deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, Sergei Gavrilov, was overseeing the assembly while sitting in the chair of the speaker of the Georgian parliament. This infuriated the opposition MPs, as well as a large segment of the Georgian society. The appearance of a representative from a country that occupies 20 per cent of its territory (i.e. Abkhazia and South Ossetia) was a shocking display. Until this day, it is hard to fathom who could not have foreseen the consequences of such an action. Was it the administration of the parliament, the authorities more broadly, or was it a conscious choice by the governing party to use it as a red herring in order to distract the population from the emotions connected to Tbilisi Pride?

The same evening some 20,000-30,000 people appeared in front of the parliament to protest against the incident. Earlier the assembly had been cut short and the Russian delegation was rushed out of the country. The demonstration soon turned into street clashes between some of the protesters and riot police. Law enforcement units used tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons. 240 people were injured, including 80 officers, during the clashes that continued throughout the night. Three people partially lost their eyesight. The opposition accused the government of acting under Russian command, while the ruling party accused their political adversaries of attempting a coup.

Demonstrations continued for the next several days with large attendances, but with a more peaceful atmosphere. The protesters put forward a number of demands, some of which were accepted, including: the resignation of the Speaker of Parliament, Irakli Kobakhidze; parliamentary elections with a full proportional system (not like the previous mixed proportional-majoritarian representation system, where half of the MPs were elected through a single-member/winner-takes-all district) in 2020 instead of 2024; and the release of those detained during the protests. The Georgian Dream forces put all their efforts into defending Giorgi Gakharia, the minister of interior, as his resignation was demanded by the protesters who claimed he used disproportionate force. The protests lost momentum in the subsequent weeks. By August, only a small number of people stood outside the parliament.

Nevertheless, the changes to the electoral law will have a significant impact. On the one hand, it will make a more pluralist parliament possible      – for example, a legislative chamber without any absolute dominance from the ruling party, and the increased likelihood of coalition governments. In all, this could be a positive development for Georgian democracy. On the other hand, the new parliament could be more fractured, as the Georgian Dream has suspended the five per cent threshold for the 2020 elections. This increases the chances of small and extreme groups to enter the legislature. Critics believe that the governing party opted for this as an insurance. In case they do not win a parliamentary majority, they would be able to attract smaller groups to its side.

Hassle on the Kura River

The June events in Tbilisi have had an impact on the relations with Russia. Many strong words were uttered against the Kremlin by both the Georgian opposition and the government itself. The Georgian President, Salome Zourabichvili, described Russia as an enemy and occupier. Russian authorities viewed the Tbilisi protests as another example of anti-Russian, Georgian hysteria. Vladimir Putin’s sanctions, introduced on July 8th, came in the form of halting flights between Russia and Georgia. This step was meant to punish the rebellious Georgians by hitting their tourist industry, one of the pillars of its domestic economy. After June 20th, a large number of Russians cancelled their summer holidays in the Black Sea resorts of Kobuleti and Batumi. The limitations put on the arrival of Russian tourists also caused a drop in hotel prices by 15-20 per cent. Unfortunately, the internet campaign “Spend Your Summer in Georgia”, which encouraged foreigners to visit the country, did not make up for those losses.

July was filled with equally important developments. There was a final decision on the ownership of one of the most popular TV channels in Georgia, Rustavi 2 (a channel connected to the opposition). The court battle over this case has lasted a few years. Finally, the European Court of Human Rights decided that the channel should return to the previous owner, Kibar Khalvashi. Up until then, the owners had been the Karamanishvili brothers, who were close to the former President, Mikheil Saakashvili. Nika Gvaramia, the director of the channel, was a former minister for Saakashvili’s United National Movement. However, the issue of Rustavi 2 ownership is far more complicated. In 2005, Khalvashi apparently took over the channel at the behest of the post-revolutionary government through the means of extortion. The funds were received from then influential minister of defence, Irakli Okruashvili, the right-hand man to Saakashvili.

This decision will shake up the balance on the Georgian media market, and it will certainly have an impact ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Controlling TV, where 85 per cent of Georgians get their news from, could have a massive impact on the results. Until now, Rustavi 2 has been closer to the opposition and remained one of the most popular channels next to Imedi which is associated with the ruling party. State television is of marginal importance and has low viewership. In the beginning of August, the prosecutor office charged Gvaramia with abuse of power and endangering the finances of Rustavi 2. The new-old owner decided to remove the director of the channel. He was followed by a large number of journalists and production crews, who went on to create a new television channel, the Main Channel, in early September.

Further shake-up

The government was indirectly involved in another conflict this summer. This one pertains to a strategic investment – the construction of a new deep sea port in Anaklia, on the so-called border with the separatist Abkhazia. The consortium responsible was an American-Georgian group headed by one of Georgia’s largest banks, TBC. In July, its founder and director, Mamuka Khazaradze, was charged by Georgian prosecutors with money laundering together with his deputy (they all resigned for the sake of the good name of the bank). Allegedly, a money transfer of roughly 17 million US dollars was made in 2008. Khazaradze claimed these accusations were unfounded. In his view, the prosecutors acted on behalf of the ruling party that was attempting to halt the construction of the port in Anaklia by the current consortium and handed the investment over to businessmen connected with Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder and head of the Georgian Dream party, and considered the most influential person in Georgian politics. The investment is important when it comes to strengthening Georgia’s role in the transit between Europe and Asia.

Officially, the government is supportive of the project. It emphasises that Khazaradze is attempting to cover up his failure in attaining funds, accusing the government of creating obstacles for him. At the beginning of August, Khazaradze and his deputy resigned from their positions in the consortium so that the investigation would not hurt the investment. However just a few days later, an American partner, Conti International, withdrew from the project. They did not state the reasoning behind the decision, but it means that the completion of the investment is now in serious jeopardy. It is important to note that in the beginning of September in Anaklia, Mamuka Khazaradze announced the emergence of a new political movement that would participate in the 2020 parliamentary elections. A shadow government is supposed to be presented early next year.

After a few weeks of a relatively calm summer, Georgian politics was abuzz again with speculations that a change of prime minister was looming. The possible resignation of Mamuka Bakhtadze would not be anything extraordinary. Prime ministers and ministers are generally considered fronts for the Georgian Dream, with Ivanishvili as the one who is really in control. It was the name of the next head of government that shocked many people. The media reported that the new prime minister would be Giorgi Gakharia, who the protesters demanded to be sacked just two months earlier. Media speculations, in the end, turned out to be true and there was a shake-up in many of the top ministerial positions. Vakhtang Gomelauri, who was previously the head of the state security services, became the new minister of interior. Irakli Garibashvili, the former prime minister and secretary general of Georgian Dream, became the minister of defence. Levan Izoria, the previous defence minister, became head of security services.

The opposition could not believe the decision of nominating Gakharia as prime minister, describing it as “spitting in the face of Georgian society” and “starting a war with it”. Furthermore, they refrained from participating in a vote of confidence for the new government. Georgian citizens attempted to understand the motives behind placing a controversial figure like Gakharia as the head of government a year ahead of the parliamentary elections. It appeared to be a provocation, an absurdity, or even madness.

Yet, the decision of the ruling party can be interpreted in another way. The Georgian Dream is fully aware that it will be difficult to win the next election. They have not fulfilled many of their campaign promises, especially socio-economical ones. There is also the natural wear-and-tear process that all ruling parties experience. That is why it has opted for a strong head of government with political experience. Someone like Gakharia would not hesitate to employ all means necessary to make sure his party is victorious. As a former minister of the interior, he will know exactly how to use the state apparatus and services to reach his goals. It seems that we can expect further infringements on Georgian democracy through different forms of extortion, limiting the right of assembly for citizens and the opposition, the arrests of people “uncomfortable” to the regime, and the expansion of media control. It could even increase so-called administrative measures, changing or falsifying the election results.

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There is no doubt that the June demonstrations were not only anti-Russian, but anti-government. The incident with the Russian delegation became the last straw after several years of frustration within Georgian society caused by poor life quality and unfulfilled social reforms. The domestic economy is modestly growing, but there still remains the problem of high unemployment (73 per cent of Georgians believe this is the main problem) and low wages. The Georgian Lari has been depreciating for years which, in turn, has resulted in less purchasing power and excessive debt. Add to this the year-long political battles between the two groups connected to the informal leaders, Bidzina Ivanishvili and Mikheil Saakashvili. Many Georgians are fed up with both groups – recent polls indicate that 30 per cent of the public is unable to decide which party they would vote for. The emergence of a third option, which would carry the hope for a better tomorrow with it, is in the air. The present situation, according to the polls, is viewed negatively by two out every three people.

During the protests this summer, it seemed that this new political movement could be shaped by its leaders – students, NGO activists, artists. The initial enthusiasm and hope, however, disappeared together with the end of the demonstrations. A lack of financing and structure became very clear in the end. It is hard to envisage Mamuka Khazaradze’s movement being a success either. His entry is just another case of a wealthy person involving himself in Georgian politics.

It appears the political situation will intensify over the coming months. Even if Georgians are tired of it, the election campaign will still be decided between the camps of Ivanishvili and Saakashvili. It is possible that the elections will take place earlier than next fall, which would benefit the Georgian Dream. In the end, Georgia is entering a very important year, with a finale that could decide the country’s democratic future.

Translated by Daniel Gleichgewicht

Wojciech Wojtasiewicz is a journalist, a regular contributor to the Polish Nowa Europa Wschodnia and a member of the Association “Bridge to Georgia”. He has been published in Polityka, Krytyka Polityczna, Newsweek, Open Democracy, Holistic.news, and Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny, among others.

Georgia, Georgia-Russia relations, protests