The dimensions of Georgia’s frozen conflicts

Crossing the line of contact between Georgia and Abkhazia. Photo by Clay Gilliland (CC) www.flickr.com

Which particular dimension one chooses to discuss the conflicts is a matter of political preference and a demonstration of loyalty towards a certain political narrative. Yet in order to get a clearer picture of the situation, all dimensions must be included. Hence, in order to adopt the right conflict transformation strategy, first the underlying causes and conditions, as well as all the parties involved within the conflict, must be identified.

Divide and rule

Georgians along with the international community – especially after the five day war between Russia and Georgia which took place in August 2008 – view the fight as a Russia-Georgia conflict over the breakaway Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has always been involved in the conflict in different roles. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse until 2008 its role was interpreted as being a mediator and peacekeeper. However after Russia’s direct military intervention in Georgia, Russia came out as a party to the conflicts.

One popular narrative says that if Russia had not been the main actor in the evolution of these conflicts, either they would not have taken place at all, or at least a conflict resolution would not be as stagnant as it is today. This does not necessarily mean there were no issues in Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian relations, as some of these issues were a result of the Russian “divide and rule” policies which go back over 200 years.

Nevertheless, in order to fully understand the conflict dynamics, the framework containing all three dimensions outlined above should be reviewed. The nature of the inter-power (Russia-West) as well as the inter-state (Russia-Georgia) conflict is interest-based, although it could also be framed as value based. Georgia is striving towards liberal democracy and Europeanisation, while Russia opposes liberalism in general and the West in particular. The recent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin where he implied that liberalism has become obsolete is a direct indication of the tension that Russia and the West are facing. The president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, criticised Putin’s remarks by saying that “whoever claims that liberal democracy is obsolete also claims that freedoms are obsolete, the rule of law is obsolete and that human rights are obsolete … however, what really is obsolete is: authoritarianism, personality cults, and the rule of oligarchs.”

Of course the Russia-West confrontation can also be discussed in the context of a geo-strategic dispute between Russia and the United States and the EU, whose interests and intentions have crossed and conflicted in the South Caucasus. Considering Russia’s geopolitical and imperialistic interest in the post-Soviet space – especially towards the countries in its immediate neighbourhood – Georgia, with its pro-West political orientation, poses a problem for Russia; it represents one of the battlefields of this confrontation.

Pressure and punishment

The origins of the Russia-Georgia interstate conflict can be traced to Georgia’s centuries-old struggle for independence and Russia’s forceful attempts to gain control over Georgia (which has led to the occupation of Georgia on several occasions throughout the last two centuries). The tension between the two countries has undergone varying degrees of intensity. However the events on April 9th 1989 – when Soviet troops used lethal force against anti-Soviet Georgian demonstrators, killing 21 (most of whom were young women) and injuring hundreds – became a cornerstone in the history of Georgia and has directed Georgian-Russian relations in a certain direction. This tragedy significantly impacted the view of the majority of the Georgian public. After April 9th, support for the nationalist president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, vastly increased, ranging from dissidents to lecturers of Marxism-Leninism, and even members of the Communist Party. The horrific April events had awoken the national spirit, uniting an otherwise polarised society against Russian aggression. Throughout this tension, one of the most useful tools for Russia was to utilise separatist movements in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, as means to punish Georgia.

When conflicts broke out in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, factors related to Russia’s support for separatist movements contributed to the victory of those separatists in both wars, resulting in thousands dead and up to 250,000 displaced. Russia also brokered ceasefires and assumed a peacekeeping role, but as time passed its political economic and military investment in Abkhazia and South Ossetia undermined its claim of impartiality.

Relations between the two countries deteriorated after the 2003 Rose Revolution, which brought a new government in Georgia, which openly voiced its strictly pro-West course and its intention for a speedy integration into NATO and the EU. Moscow reacted by increasing pressure on Georgia, imposing a trade embargo and closing land, air and postal links. It also deployed additional Russian troops (allegedly peacekeepers and military equipment) to Abkhazia in April and May 2008, which led to the August 2008 war. As a result of this, hundreds of civilians were killed and around 30,000 people were displaced, Georgia lost control of additional territories in and around the conflict zones, inter-ethnic relations were damaged, and prospects for effective conflict resolution were postponed indefinitely.

Ethnic simplifications

The roots of the intrastate conflict dimension – that Georgia has separate conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia – can be traced back to an earlier period in history. They turned into violent conflicts only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In general the protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus, including those of Georgia, can be traced back to the presence of nationalism over the past two centuries that sowed divisions in the Caucasus region (where multi-ethnic coexistence had been the norm). Another contributing factor was the nation-building processes in the Soviet Union, which created a hierarchy of ethnicities. As a consequence of the peculiar organisation of the Soviet Union into ethno-territorial units, the post-Soviet conflicts have all been ethnically framed. During the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, mobilisation based on ethnicity took place alongside the conflict development, rather than preceding it. Therefore the use of the term “ethnic conflict” would simplify and blur the full picture. However, the openly nationalist agenda of Gamsakhurdia coupled with separatist movements led to violent conflicts in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia resulting in thousands killed and up to 250,000 displaced. Following ceasefire agreements in 1992 and 1994 respectively, the conflicts remained “frozen” until a new wave of escalation took place in 2008.

The views of Russia, the EU and the US are fundamentally different on these conflicts. Russia claims that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are independent republics, while the EU and the US support Georgia’s territorial integrity. Nevertheless, only a handful of countries recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, all of which are dependent on Russia’s foreign policy, including Syria, Nauru, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

When Georgia signed the Association Agreement with the EU, Russia quickly responded by signing a treaty with Abkhazia on an “Alliance and Strategic Partnership” in late 2014 and a similar “Treaty for Alliance and Integration” with South Ossetia. Ossetians largely perceive this move as another step towards further integration into the Russian Federation. In fact, most Ossetians would like to see a unification of the “two Ossetias” and therefore an integration into Russia. This is not the case with Abkhazia, however. Yet, regardless of Ossetians readiness to unify, the formal annexation of South Ossetia is highly unlikely since Russia has not resolved its dispute with the West and Georgia. Russia has been quite successful in using these conflicts to impose pressure on its neighbours – and Georgia’s NATO aspirations are one of the areas where Russia reacts with the most pressure.

NATO aspirations

The 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, which preceded the August 2008 war, can be considered one of the cornerstones in shaping the Georgia-Russia conflict. There is some debate that without the support of Russia’s friends in NATO – namely, Germany and France – Georgia was unable to receive a Membership Action Plan that it was hoping to receive for advancing its NATO integration. It is also noteworthy that energy security issues were also discussed during the Bucharest summit and there was a debate whether the Alliance must first come up with a way to respond to energy cut-offs before moving closer to states like Georgia and Ukraine who are vulnerable to Moscow’s energy politics. This debate may have affected the decision to not grant the MAP to Georgia at the summit. According to another view, during the summit Georgia received a “promise” that NATO will certainly open the possibility of membership for Georgia and Ukraine in the future – these assumptions imply that this statement deeply angered Russia, and that this anger was soon translated into full-scale war carried out against Georgia in the summer of 2008.

In 2011, the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said, on two separate occasions, that the August 2008 war thwarted NATO’s plans to expand further into the post-Soviet space. Again in 2018, Medvedev, as prime minister, issued a stern warning that Georgia’s membership in NATO could lead to a “horrible” new conflict.

NATO has made it clear that every sovereign nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements which is a fundamental principle of European security, and one that Russia has also subscribed to and should respect. As implied by the Alliance, enlargement is not directed against Russia and every country that joins NATO agrees to uphold its principles and policies, including the commitment that “the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia”.

According to the Russian narrative, having NATO at its immediate border poses a risk to its national security. However, this account is considered to be an attempt to create the image of a threat in order to legitimise its aggression. The idea that Georgia reversing its Euro-Atlantic course would lead to a resolution of its internal conflicts and ensuring regional security is naïve. Russia has violated its own agreements on multiple occasions.

Highway control

It is important to highlight that the territories Russia is occupying reach into the middle of Georgia, next to a strategic highway which connects the east to the west – the shortest way for Russia to reach Turkey. The highway connects eastern Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia with Georgian Black Sea ports and Turkey. Russia’s military base in South Ossetia, housing 4,000 soldiers and heavy equipment, is also nearby, while Russian border guards, subordinated to the FSB, are stationed only 450–500 metres from the highway. Another threat the Russians are posing is their artillery’s proximity to strategic pipelines and railways that carry oil, natural gas and other goods from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea to Europe. Cutting this line would leave the region defenceless, as happened in 2008 when Russian troops occupied Gori, a city in central Georgia next to the east-west highway. The country was paralysed, as was the entire region. Considering the so-called creeping occupation, which describes the process of moving the occupation line further into Georgian territory, there is a risk this highway could fall under Russian occupation. In this case, the Europe-Central Asia route will be cut off.

Ultimately, today’s conflicts are directly related, as indicated above, to NATO’s integration. This has aroused debate regarding whether a country with unresolved territorial conflicts can be accepted as a member state. Russia is using this discussion to its benefit, keeping the conflicts frozen and unresolved. Yet in some discussions, particularly those voiced by the Georgian Labour party, the deployment of US military bases in Georgia has been suggested as an alternative to Germany and France’s obstruction of Georgia’s NATO membership; basically establishing a similar type of treaty with the United States that Russia has established with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some experts point to the regular military training carried out by the US and other NATO members in Georgia and believe these events are the only thing that prevents Moscow from escalating its confrontation with Tbilisi.

The 2008 war gave Russia the opportunity to turn the South Ossetian territory into a military springboard in the South Caucasus. However the annexation of Crimea enabled Russia to turn Crimea into a military springboard in the Black Sea, along with Abkhazia. Through the Black Sea, Russia has direct reach to Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria (all NATO members). The Black Sea, for Russia, is a point of contact as well as a buffer zone. Given the circumstances, it is likely that the cold conflicts will remain frozen as they give Russia the ability to pressure Georgia and advance its interests in the region.

Nino Kukhianidze is teaching university courses in Peace and Conflict Studies, Political Science and Civics Education; she has worked with the University of Georgia, the International Black Sea University, and San Diego State University. She has been involved in EU/UNDP supported Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz peacebuilding processes.

frozen conflicts, Georgia