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Security takes centre stage in the Black Sea

The annexation and militarisation of the Crimean Peninsula has given Russia greater access to use enhanced military capabilities to project its forces in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and apply pressure on the other countries in the region, particularly Ukraine and Georgia. In response, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community have started developing a new approach to Black Sea security.

The Black Sea region over the centuries has been the subject of interest of empires and powerful states. The region, as a security space, has a complicated history. It combines a central maritime space with limited access and coastal areas that link it to the regional security complexes of Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East – and that often intersect and overlap.

August 26, 2019 - Zurab Agladze - Hot TopicsIssue 5 2019Magazine

Photo: Kober (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

The Black Sea region is of crucial significance for Europe, being a major crossroad and critical intersection of east-west and south-north corridors.

Despite its geopolitical importance, this region has always been a divider rather than a unifier of different geographical spaces and spheres of influence. The Georgian-Russian War in 2008 and the annexation of Crimean Peninsula in 2014 showed that this characteristic remains. And security is still a major challenge for countries of the region. Security challenges are determined by many aspects, but the main factors include the absence of a regional identity; the weak level of economic integration; and the differing levels of democracy and foreign policy among the regional states. In addition, the divergent views of the big players, like Russia, the United States, NATO and the European Union, play a role in the future development of the Black Sea.

Russian strategy

“Everything that happens today is the result of an attempt to introduce the concept of the unipolar world.” These words belong to the Russian President Vladimir Putin when he spoke at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Before and after the Munich event, representatives of the Russian political elite often emphasised that the former republics of the Soviet Union make up the sphere of Russia’s exclusive zone of influence and they will not accept western intervention or a decline of Russia in the region. While these statements did not directly threaten the use of military force, the situation that unfolded in Crimea highlighted that the use of military force is a privileged and permanent option for Russia in order to maintain influence in the Black Sea region.

In order to comprehend Russia’s actions, we should better understand how it sees itself and the other countries in the region. Russia’s revisionist policy in the Black Sea is determined by the identity of itself as a strong and dominant state. The Kremlin’s main goal is to create a multi-polar international order where Russia will be one of the power centres. Consequently, Russia seeks to end NATO’s domination over the European continent in the security sphere and to prevent the enlargement of NATO and the European Union further East. Therefore, it is not surprising that Russia is using military force in order to maintain its influence in the Black Sea region – even if it is at the expense of the neighbouring countries’ sovereignty (like Georgia and Ukraine).

Nevertheless, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community do not agree with the Kremlin’s policy in the region. The most fundamental point of contention between the West and Russia is the status of the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russia views these states as part of its exclusive sphere while the West views them as free sovereign states that have the right to join western institutions like NATO or the EU if they wish to do so. In addition to that, US policy in the region towards the promotion of democracy, foreign aid and the free flow of information directly conflicts with Russia’s view.

After Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine in February 2014, Russia seized the possibility of a vacuum of power in Kyiv, launching a process that eventually resulted in the illegal annexation of Crimea. The military phase of the operation began on February 27th with the occupation of official buildings and soon after by unidentified armed soldiers, later known as the “little green men”. Moscow gained full political control over the peninsula after a referendum was held on March 16th which was declared illegal by the Ukrainian authorities and recognised by only a small handful of states. Because Russia achieved its goal with low military cost, it decided to continue the military phase of operations and invaded eastern Ukraine with the help of proxy forces.

Rapid militarisation

Why is the Crimean Peninsula, which is located in the Black Sea, so important to the Kremlin? The annexation and militarisation of the Crimean Peninsula gives Russia a strong platform to project forces and political influence in Ukraine, the Black Sea region, and far beyond. With great access via Crimea, Russia can now use its enhanced military capabilities to project forces in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Russian has an enhanced military presence in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, Libya and Egypt. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula is directly related to Russia’s ambition to become an influential power in Eurasia.

The annexation of Crimea has had a direct impact on the security of the region due to the fact that the Kremlin has begun a process of the militarisation of the peninsula. The Kremlin set up an A2/AD system (anti-access, area denial) which allows Russia to deny other countries access and free movement in the region. By creating this system, the Kremlin ensures that NATO will not be able to establish any sort of stronghold, particularly in former Soviet republics. This system includes the deployment of the “Bastion” coastal defence system which includes anti-ship and air defence systems; S-400 missile systems; “Pantsir” S-1 air defence missile systems; Tu-22M3 strategic bombers; and naval assets such as heavy frigates and submarines equipped with Kaliber cruise missiles. In addition to the military resources, the Kremlin has drastically increased the number of personnel deployed to Crimea, including a reconnaissance brigade, two naval infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, one nuclear, chemical, and biological defence regiment, a coastal defence missile brigade, three fighter regiments, one helicopter regiment, and two air defence regiments. The militarisation of the region is not limited to the Crimean Peninsula; Russia is also increasing its military presence in the two Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

NATO support in the region

Unfortunately the Black Sea has never been high on NATO’s priority list. However after the developments in Ukraine, the West acknowledged that the Black Sea and its subsequent militarisation is a core of Russia’s political agenda and it is not willing to abandon its effort in the near future. In response, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community have started developing a new approach to security in the Black Sea. Even though NATO and the wider transatlantic community have an interest in deterring or quickly resolving sovereignty challenges in the region, Russia has enough ability and will to deter this process. One recent expression of NATO’s interest was the 2016 Warsaw Summit communique highlighting NATO’s commitment to non-ally partners such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The statement, and subsequent actions, illustrate that the Black Sea region has become a greater priority for NATO, and the West declared it is ready for a prolonged standoff against Russia. The first element in this process is the diplomatic and financial pressure of economic sanctions placed on Russia by the West. The second element is a process which will enable NATO to rapidly deploy military forces in the region should conflict arise.

The third element focuses on maintaining the freedom of movement and protecting allies in the region. NATO has undertaken specific measures towards this aim, including greater military patrol and reconnaissance aircrafts, an increase of naval forces present in the Black Sea through the Bosporus Strait, enhanced training and education programmes for Georgia and Ukraine, increased military assistance funding for non-NATO countries, and increased military exercises in the region.

The fourth element is direct military aid to non-NATO countries. Ukraine was recently granted a comprehensive assistance package which includes aid to increase its intelligence capabilities, assistance to reorganise and develop naval forces (including the relocation of the naval academy from Sevastopol to Odesa), and resources to reorganise and strengthen the military industry. Similarly, Georgia was granted the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) as part of the NATO Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCB). The SNGP is aimed at improving Georgia’s defence capabilities, increasing its resilience, enhancing interoperability with NATO and supporting its NATO membership preparation process.

Currently, the SNGP consists of 14 initiatives:

  • NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre
  • Defence Institutional Building School
  • Logistic Capability Development
  •  Intelligence Sharing and Secure Communications
  • Aviation
  • Air Defence
  • Special Operations Forces
  • Military Police
  • Acquisition
  • Maritime Security
  • Cyber Security
  • Strategic Communications
  • Crisis Management
  • Counter Mobility.

Beyond NATO, the United States is working directly with its partners and developing bilateral co-operation programmes. The US Congress has approved the sale and delivery of defensive weapons to Ukraine and Georgia (including anti-tank “Javelin” missiles delivered to Georgia and Ukraine in 2018). In May 2018 the Congress also approved 250 million US dollars to go towards military assistance in Ukraine. The Congress has voted for military support previously, but at the time it was blocked by the Obama administration. It appears that officials in the Trump administration are more willing to provide this aid. 

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Black Sea region is becoming one of the most important security points in the current East-West standoff. None of the parties has shown any indication of backing down, and with the greater militarisation of the region, particularly on the side of Russia, the Black Sea will remain a possible host to a military standoff. Of course any outcome is possible, but certainly a more peaceful one would require all sides to take a step back, and put real effort into trying to reach an agreement that would take security-related issues out of the Black Sea.

Zurab Agladze is a founding member of the Georgian Strategic Analysis Center. He has 18 years of experience in international relations, defence, education and management. His military service includes, among others, being the senior military representative of Georgian forces in Iraq, commander of the 5th Infantry Brigade and Commander of land forces. Between 2013 and 2015 he was rector of the National Defense Academy of Georgia.

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