A sea of insecurity

Photo: AlexP (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Powers around the Black Sea have evolved and have even substantially changed over the course of centuries, but one fact has remained the same – the sea remains a relatively unstable space in today’s geopolitics. 

Historical context

A brief history will suffice to bring context to the presence of perpetual competition within the Black Sea region. The gradual expansion of the Ottoman Empire from the south and the Duchy of Muscovy (later transformed into the Russian Empire during the 18th century) in the 15th and 16th centuries from the north eventually brought both powers into direct contact in the Black Sea. Thus began three centuries of economic and diplomatic competition, not to mention direct military conflict between the two rival powers.

Consider the following examples. Tsar Peter I, the Great (emperor 1682-1725), elevated Russia to the status of a land and maritime power on equal footing to the Western European empires of the time. A critical element for achieving this was to gain access to the seas around the Russian heartland – in this case the Black Sea. There were unsuccessful attempts to get control over the Azov Sea and the Tsar did not have enough time to attain his aims in the Baltic Sea area – as most of his reign was spent on containing and eventually defeating the Swedes in the north and establishing a footing on the Baltic Sea.

Peter’s attempts in the Black Sea were repeatedly emulated by subsequent Russian monarchs, with Catherine the Great (1762-1796) finally succeeding in gaining control over the northern parts of the region. One of the most famous Russo-Turkish wars was the one of 1768-1774 when Russia, under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, was given free access to the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait and into the Black Sea. Moreover, the Crimean Khanate gained independence from the Ottoman Empire, making it easier for Russia to complete its conquest of Crimea in 1783. Thus the Ottoman naval supremacy in the Black Sea was gradually eroding. The Russians built naval bases in Crimea and gained control over Georgia’s Black Sea shore.

Russian naval dominance in the Black Sea, and geopolitical superiority in the surrounding territories, lasted through the end of the First World War. The Turks, unless helped by the French and the British (as happened during the Crimean War of 1853-1856), were unable to resist the Russians. The Russo-Turkish competition of the 17th century through to the early 20th century illustrated that general peace in the Black Sea could only be reached if one power controlled the entire body – similar to what the Romans attained when they controlled the entire Mediterranean Sea.

This meant that the West should have always helped the Turks limit Russia’s ambitions, lest the Black Sea was lost to western navies. During the Cold War, the Black Sea region did not feature much in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union; but by the end of the Cold War it provided a geopolitical vacuum. Turkey (independently or as a member of the NATO alliance), Ukraine and other Black Sea countries hoped for a larger influence in this erstwhile “Russian lake”.

Turning point

This is where Ukraine becomes important. Ever since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, Russia has worried that Kyiv might shift its allegiance to the West. This would have caused an intolerable security breach for Moscow and an end to the Kremlin’s ambition to restore an empire similar to the Soviet Union. Thus when events in Ukraine took place in 2014, it was truly a turning point for the Black Sea region.

Russian activity in Ukraine demonstrated that, despite some concrete steps in furthering bilateral relations, Turkey and Russia still remain geopolitical rivals with overlapping interests in several strategically vital regions. One such theatre is the Black Sea. Turkey’s geographic position gives it the longest shore along the Black Sea and natural control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits – making it capable of projecting its military and economic power across the entire Black Sea. Turkey, like Russia, has a natural interest in extending its influence in the Black Sea, leaving little room for the two powers to find a foundational compromise in the long run. The Turks fear that, by annexing the Crimean Peninsula, Russia got the upper hand in terms of military infrastructure and the ability to cover all the shores of the Black Sea. Thus there is a potential for deep disagreement between Ankara and Moscow, particularly as Turkey is worried that it is not only in the north that Russia is collecting geopolitical assets, but also in the south, in Syria.

The Black Sea region in 2018 witnessed some interesting developments. On November 25th Russian gunboats attacked Ukraine’s naval convoy, rammed a tugboat and seized it along with two other Ukrainian ships. The vessels were traveling from the Ukrainian port of Odesa (on the Black Sea) to the Ukrainian port of Mariupol (on the Sea of Azov). The only route to access Mariupol was the Kerch Strait that separates Russian-controlled Crimea from Russia proper. Previously, Ukrainian and Russian sailors were causing problems for each other which often ended in temporary arrests. However, the November events near Crimea marked a new level of escalation between the two states. While the situation in Donbas is relatively calm – with occasional fighting along the contact line – the overall state of affairs points to the fact that large-scale military action is unlikely to happen in east Ukraine. Perhaps another theatre where Moscow could pressure Kyiv is at sea, and its activity might be a negotiating tactic, or first a step, towards further securing the Sea of Azov.

The sealing off of the Kerch Strait would be significant for Ukraine, especially for its economy as it is the only route for its boats to reach the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol. A large part of Ukraine’s maritime economy depends on trade through these two ports as Ukraine’s Black Sea ports are not that competitive and it would  be difficult for Kyiv to re-route trade from the Azov ports to the Black Sea ones. If a veritable blockade of the Azov Sea continues, then we are likely to see a further drop in economic activity. For instance, exports entering through Mariupol have already dropped 58 per cent in recent years. Because of the difficult security situation, foreign investment has been close to zero. At the same time, Russia’s actions might be regarded as a logical continuation of earlier ones. The annexation of Crimea, temporary closures of the Kerch Strait, as well as the construction of the bridge from the Russian mainland to the peninsula, would still not mean a total domination of the Azov Sea or straits if Ukraine’s boats are allowed to sail into the Azov basin.

Wider perspective

Russia’s drive to dominate the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea might also reflect Moscow’s strategic thinking. The Kerch Strait is an approximately 40-kilometre-long channel that is no wider than 15 km. The strait links the Black Sea to the Azov and is important as it allows the control of water routes and energy resources coming in and out of the Azov Sea. Thus, it was inevitable that Russia and Ukraine would fight for the territory. Indeed, there were cases well before Russia-Ukraine relations plunged. In 2003, for instance, Russia and Ukraine nearly went to war over the strait when Russia started the construction of a bridge to one of the islands in the Azov Sea.

However, following the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014, the dispute took a much more serious turn, seeing the two countries now battling for control of the Black and Azov seas’ military and economic transportation lines. The Kerch Strait is a continuation of the Northern Caucasus into Crimea, home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, located at Sevastopol. That is why Moscow is concerned that the pro-western government in Kyiv could potentially allow the strait to be used by western military fleets and even by NATO. The Russians want to retain direct access to the Don River safe, closed to the military alliance. Moscow also believes, theoretically, that the strategically important Don River could be used by foreign troops to access the Russian mainland. As such, we need to put Russia’s actions last November into a wider geopolitical perspective. Yet, even if the closure only turns out to be a temporary move, Moscow is sending a clear message to Kyiv regarding the tools it has to limit potential western military encroachment in the Black and Azov seas.

In many ways, most of the Black Sea countries’ sovereignty and integration into the western political and economic system (i.e., NATO and EU) is contingent upon direct US support and power in the region which can be inserted via the sea. The starting point, of course, is the understanding that the United States’ power in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea has always been limited compared to other regions. This is largely due to the fact that the US is a sea power surrounded by large swathes of water and its reach into the depths of the Eurasian continent through the deployment of troops is constrained.

Elegant decline

Let us start with s basic numbers. The earth is a relatively modest-sized planet – 40,000 kilometres in circumference at the equator, while its total surface area is 510 million square km. Nearly three-quarters of the planet is covered by water. The power controlling the planet’s oceans thus commands numerous economic and military developments across the globe. Americans understand this well, seen in their efforts since the late 19th century to expand their naval capabilities. The 20th century was the American century, but this is now changing. China and India are now building navies, along with Iran’s growing assertiveness in the Persian Gulf, and Russia’s growing assertiveness in the Black Sea.

It is also important to see what China is doing. Their strategy is more to dilute American power than to engage outright. This is a clever approach (more like a hit and run) and it creates uncomfortable conditions for rival powers. Ancient Chinese strategists give some interesting insight into how the Chinese could be seeing their present-day competition. Pure numbers and power overstretch is also to blame. Consider the following fact. During the Cold War, to maintain dominance the US deployed fleets (up to 1,000 ships) mostly in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well as in the Mediterranean. In a striking contrast, today, it has fewer than 500 ships while the number of competing sea powers is on the rise.

Another possible reason for the decline in US naval capacity is globalisation. The faster the pace of globalisation, the bigger the need to control every corner of the planet – as a minor military confrontation in Asia, Europe or the Middle East, for example, could transform into a global problem. Sea power throughout history has proved to be far more long-lasting than other forms land power, and it can be an indicator of a nation’s power. The US might hope to retain its global dominance by enlisting allies with similar geopolitical aspirations to its own. But even here it would mean that the US would be revealing that its naval power is in a relatively weaker position. Many would call it an elegant decline.

This, in many ways, is what the British experienced before the First World War. The country had been the main naval force in the world for almost two centuries, but the rise of the US and German naval fleets were becoming more evident and potentially threatening to the British order at sea. One of the reactions from Britain was to deny the trend and claim that their power would be unmatched. It is difficult to admit your declining power and influence.

What does all this mean for the countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova? It means that, while today the US has an interest in the Black Sea, in the long run its focus will shift more towards containing China at sea, and this is far away from the Black Sea region. Washington will thus be less able to properly address the Russian navy in the Black and Azov Seas. As argued above, there are simply not enough naval resources at America’s disposal. The scenario is unfortunate for Tbilisi and Kyiv, particularly as both are keen to expand and keep their nascent (e.g. Georgia’s Anaklia Deep Sea Port) or already existing ports (e.g. Ukraine’s Berdyansk, Mariupol) secure. The Black Sea region has therefore entered a period of deep insecurity. And what is more worrisome, there is less chance, due to the global maritime trend, that this area will be the primary focus of the world’s sea powers.

Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles on military and political developments across the post-Soviet space.

Black Sea, Georgia, Russia, security