Towards a new European Ostpolitik

Photo: Photo: European Commission (CC)

The latest deep and comprehensive changes in Eastern Europe require matching political adjustments because the strategic background behind Ostpolitik has shifted as a result of domestic policy towards European relations and of the varied policies enacted by other EU member states.

A new Ostpolitik as part of Germany’s development since 1969

Starting in 1969, Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr tried to overcome the division between an Eastern Europe dominated by the Kremlin and a Western Europe that was oriented towards the Atlantic. On the German side, coming to terms with historic legacies was closely linked with the elite of the Social Democratic party of Germany – developing a rapprochement with Moscow, Warsaw, Prague and East Berlin. This included symbolic acts such as Willy Brandt falling to his knees in Warsaw in 1970, which became a symbol for Polish reconciliation with Germany. It also included signing treaties with West Germany’s eastern neighbours and the Four-Power Treaty with the Allies, which were completed between 1970 and 1973. This can be considered the first step of a new Eastern policy, opening reconciliation with the East and solving problems of the post-Second World War settlement.

The realities of Europe have changed since then, and the dividing lines were replaced by German reunification in 1989 and the eastern enlargements of the EU in May 2004 and of NATO in successive rounds in 1999 and 2004. At the same time, Russia underwent its own transformations, as the Soviet Union disintegrated and its main successor state, the Russian Federation, sought a role in the new international system. The national and international developments of conflicts indicated that eastern policy should no longer equalize the perception in strategic terms. Members of the Warsaw Pact joined western institutions, and in this period of time it looked as though Moscow would come closer to the western values of democracy and a market economy. Developments included the framework agreement between the EU and Russia, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement signed in 1997 and the Eastern Partnership programme dedicated to the six neighbouring countries, from Belarus to Azerbaijan. The Eastern Partnership set different priorities related to the countries involved. Since 2007, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement has required either negotiating a new agreement or extending it on an annual basis if the two partners decided not to end the agreement.

Towards a European agenda

Considering the changes in Eastern Europe, the conflicts in Georgia and eastern Ukraine convinced Heiko Maas, the German foreign minister since March 2018, to bring the idea of a new European Eastern policy to the agenda in late 2018. The strategic target was security and stability in Eastern Europe. In the current situation, forty-plus years after Brandt, it is more about creating and implementing a European consensus for Eastern policy. In this regard Russia presents a particular challenge. Since the countries of Central Europe joined the EU, they are directly bordering the target countries of a new Ostpolitik. They have extensive – and often negative – historic experiences with the Soviet Union and are interested in developing the European and democratic spirt of their neighbours. With this intention, Lithuania, under the leadership of Andrius Kubilius and Gediminas Kirkilas, has been developing a “new Marshall Plan” for bringing Ukraine as well as Georgia and Moldova closer to the European Union. Based on this, a new declaration   for Eastern partnership, a Berlin process II, should be developed during the German EU presidency in 2020.

Currently, the former Eastern bloc is much less homogenous, not characterised by Kremlin dominance and central committees, but by democratic countries with their own independent culture, language and history. Enlargement of the EU did, however, sharpen a new dividing line by introducing the Schengen regime between the former Soviet countries and the new member states of the EU. The Estonian city of Narva and the Russian city of Ivangorod, for instance, are united by history and culture represented by a joint castle on both sides of the river Narva, but they became divided by the EU border.

The overall goal for Europe’s relations with Russia is to manage risks with a neighbour that is both a security threat and a potential partner. What is particularly challenging for a new European Ostpolitik are the limits of partnership with Russia when there are conflicts of co-operation in the countries of the Eastern Partnership such as Georgia or Ukraine. The Kremlin perceives the countries of its “near abroad” as belonging to a sphere of Russian influence, and Moscow has gone so far as to use armed conflict and new hybrid warfare techniques to assert that claim.

Considering the latest developments in the region, it is important to perceive the countries of the former Soviet bloc from their perspective of independence in cultural and historic terms. Furthermore, they should no longer be considered an appendix of Moscow but seen as fully independent states. Depending on their national development, they have the opportunity to become members of western institutions such as NATO and the EU. In more realistic terms, of course, western institutions are well advised to act beyond the terms of only offering membership while having in mind all kinds of co-operation on social and economic levels that pave the way to potential accession.

The most important thing for a new European Eastern Policy is an issue of national as well as European importance. The member states that have more recently joined the EU are of particular importance, considering their historic experience with the Soviet past and their ability to develop resilience and overcome those obstacles, as well as their efforts to build European and democratic values. That means creating a framework of conditions such as solving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, having committed actors and establishing a European dialogue on the issues – one that combines government discourse with the input of the European Commission and regional think tanks embedded in democratic civil society.

This deep and comprehensive discourse, on a wider European level, about setting political priorities among joint interests and common values would be a crucial step towards the goal of developing democracy and stability both inside the EU and amongst the neighbouring Eastern countries. In the framework of reconciliation, the United States could also have a particular and positive effect. Previously, Washington and EU institutions as well as the member states played important roles; today the two actors are pulling in different directions, even if their strategic goals are still similar. Overall, the actors in Eastern policy have been changing significantly. Previously, dialogue took place between actors that were in favour of agreement, even if they held opposing values. Based on this, it was possible to develop institutions and address a joint agenda with different perceptions on both sides. Today, the approach of overcoming clashing values via dialogue of partnership does not exist, but the two sides are trying to increase their political and economic influence. Even though the sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014, followed by the counter-sanctions, did not have political success in terms of solving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, they also have a negative impact on partnership and co-operation. This is a particular challenge for a new European Ostpolitik: to change from confrontation between a Russia-driven Europe to a Europe dominated by the values of the EU.

Implementation of a new European Eastern policy  

Instead of encouraging co-operation through the opening of potential windows for partnership, which was the guideline of the previous renewal of Ostpolitik in 2006–07, a new European Ostpolitik should take the concerns and historic experiences of the more recently added EU member states seriously by developing and implementing a new strategy of partnership. A European partnership council should be established in addition to the already existing institutional framework, such as co-operation at a governmental level in the OSCE and the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and on the level of NGOs and think tanks, such as the Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC) in Vilnius ,the Estonian Centre of Eastern Partnership, and the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). An institution of partnerships would bring a revitalized spirit to Eastern European policy. Partnership on all levels of co-operation is very much needed. This is true even if the East and the West spend a lot of effort on establishing partnerships but do not develop a deep, comprehensive character that goes beyond individual signs of reconciliation.

The former approaches have not been so successful because they bypassed historic problems and their impacts today. They also failed to establish a discourse on resilience between Russia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were also involved with the Eastern Partnership states. The best-case development would be a European process of understanding and forgiveness, which ideally could be the foundation of a new European Ostpolitik. In any event, bypassing the set limits on the former Ostpolitik to indicate the dimensions of the subject, it is possible to refer to the estimates of the former chairman of the organisation Memorial, Arseniy Roginskiy. According to his estimates, 7.1 million people were arrested under state-directed terror campaigns during the entire Soviet period. According to other calculations the number of victims was close to 12 million people. Similar questions about suffering arise as a result of German National Socialism in 1933-45. To this day the countries of the former Soviet Union are particularly affected by the painful experiences of the past. As for the states of Central Europe, their particular input is guided by the memory of Soviet repression, which culminates in the feelings of defensiveness and of being threatened. But in the current European Eastern policy, these issues are not addressed from a national perspective, leading to discrimination and the devaluation of certain peoples. Instead, they are viewed in a European context that emphasises partnership and bonds among countries and peoples.

Taking these countries’ experience seriously is important for partnership and future co-operation. These efforts should also be connected with the German experience of dialogue and co-operation as the beginnings of an Eastern policy. In a difficult time for European democracies, it will help strengthen them against internal and external attacks. To follow this approach, the policy should be based on a general paradigm of optimism that supports resilience. An important goal is to show how strength from the past could be gained for a future based on European and democratic values. The successes of co-operation must be worked out and presented as a result of resilience. Thus dealing with crises becomes an instrument for shaping co-operation and the future. Based on the experiences of the painful past, the affected societies have also developed the strength to shape an economic, social and political future that is part of Europe.

New institutional framework

These two overarching positions – having a dialogue among equals with existing institutions and developing new institutions – indicate very different priorities and risks of partnership which should be considered in an institutional framework of co-operation, such as the OSCE or the Council of the Baltic Sea States, combining operational work with summit diplomacy. Russia has already learnt to use institutions to implement its own priorities in opposition to European aims. The institutions could become useful settings for dialogue and co-operation even if partnership is not guaranteed.

In addition to the international organisations, single EU member states such as France and Germany or groupings such as the Weimar triangle and the Visegrad 4 Group are connecting historic experience with new opportunities for dialogue and should be used as such. The existing institutions should be linked with founding new institutions. A decade of Eastern Partnership should be celebrated on the regional level as well as on the level of the founding actors. For instance, a mandate of an Ambassador for Eastern Partnership ought to be developed and rotated among the most important countries of the Eastern partnership, in particular those with signed Association Agreements.

Furthermore, one should consider the Lithuanian approach towards developing a new Marshall Plan which could be a process led by the EU and G7 capitals (Ottawa, Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, Stockholm, Vilnius, Washington, etc.) and institutions (the European Commission, the Council of Europe, international financial institutions and major EU development banks). In this respect, the European Commission’s proposal on the Reform Contract for Investment in Ukraine is a good starting point to boost reforms and for better investment implementation. The annual Ukraine Reform Conference (to be held in Toronto this year) could be another platform for this purpose. This process-led initiative could boost a digital, a transport, and an energy infrastructure connectivity agenda for the EU Association countries of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Furthermore, it could develop an EU investment guarantee instrument to boost public and private investment capacities of the EU Association countries.

In the spirit of differentiation the group of EU Association countries, countries from the Western Balkans could expand further with the remaining Eastern partners, depending on their European ambitions and successful implementation of the euro-integration reform agenda. As for Russia, the EU shall adopt a strategy for an open European Russia that would create opportunities for long-term transformation that would contribute to the stability and prosperity of the EU, as well as strengthen transatlantic unity.

Economic growth

In very general terms, economic co-operation and trade is also in Russia’s interest. The Russian elite is interested in western investment and technology, which is currently blocked by sanctions, indicating a linkage between interest in modernisation and international conflict prevention. Facilitation of visa-free travel should be introduced in cases that make partnership between Russia and Europe possible. That should be the case for those under the age of 25 from Russia and the EU. From the European side it requires an agreement on the level of Schengen regulations and it should be negotiated among the member states involved. In the case of partnership dialogue and for the purpose of cross-border co-operation, visas should be issued free of charge.

Shaping the future through economic, social and political co-operation would increase institutional ties. Therefore it makes sense to set up institutions that are not blocked by a Russian veto power and that are capable of overcoming emerging democratic crises. They should support modernisation and international security through co-operation and dialogue.

In contrast to the Eastern policy of the 1960s and 1970s, which was mostly run by Germany, the new policy should be a European strategy that takes other EU member states into consideration, including countries sharing borders and historic experiences with the former Soviet bloc. Overall the goal should not be about developing new dividing lines but establishing new platforms of communication. From the European side, institutions to consider are the Weimar triangle of Poland, Germany and France; co-operation in terms of the Visegrad 4 countries and initiatives of growing importance such as the Three Seas Initiative (also known as the Baltic, Adriatic, Black Sea [BABS] Initiative), should also be examined.

Russia should not be totally excluded from the Partnership Council dialogue. While it is difficult to imagine a successful dialogue that includes Russian government officials, Russian organisations or actors that share European values should be allowed to share their opinions. The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum as well as the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum are of particular importance and should be considered accordingly. Furthermore, developing a European Civil Society Council for Central Asia makes sense. Examples for this might be NGOs and think tanks such as Memorial, Carnegie and others. Co-operation and extended support between the EU and NGOs in Eastern European countries is especially significant now as more and more of those countries introduce “foreign agents laws” that inhibit the functioning (or even survival) of NGOs that could domestically deliver any sort of Western impact. In addition, as the Russian government has established GONGOs (government-organised non-government organisations); the EU and its member states should increase the amount of NGOs driven by democratic values, and in particular committed to a dialogue of European Eastern policy.

Even if the West and Russia share interests in co-operation, both sides have different value sets and are instrumentalising their values to have a global impact. That might be the case in direct terms: having different values that influence the other side not as a basis to facilitate partnership and co-operation but to dominate the other side. In the worst case, this could cause international conflict and would require particular institutional coverage depending on the countries involved.

In addition to continuing dialogue with Russia, a revised European Ostpolitik differs from previous strategies. Today’s European Ostpolitik must take the experiences and concerns of the newer EU member states seriously. Their techniques of resistance and attitudes of resilience should be seen as an instrument for overcoming historic problems. In other words, it is important to differentiate the approach towards Russia from the countries of the Eastern Partnership that are interested in European co-operation and in favour of democratic values with their own history, language and culture.

Dialogue is possible, but the value set should be considered according to priorities and the windows of opportunity for partnership. On the other hand, the existence of different values and priorities means that participants, beyond listening to each other, should not expect co-operation to happen overnight.

Iris Kempe is a non-resident fellow of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Previously she was senior advisor at the Council of the Baltic Sea States and regional director at the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation South Caucasus.

Eastern Partnership, Germany, Ostpolitik